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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, using 
recently-released American, British, and Israeli documents, 
private papers, and oral evidence in addition to published 
work, it re-evaluates the causes and development of the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. Secondly, it examines the operation of the 
Anglo-American 'alliance' in the Middle East, if one 
existed, in the 1950s by considering not only the 
policymaking structures and personalities involved in 
'alliance' but also external factors, notably the actions of 
other countries, affecting relations between the American 
and British Governments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to the staffs of the British Public 
Record Office, the U.S. National Archives, the Truman and 
Eisenhower Presidential Libraries, and the University of 
Birmingham Library for their help in the research of this 
thesis. I am indebted to the London School of Economics 
and the University of London for financial assistance.
I am indebted to the tolerance and guidance of my 
supervisor, Professor D.C. Watt of the London School of 
Economics. I have been fortunate to benefit from 
collaboration with many colleagues, especially C.J. Morris 
and Anthony Gorst. I am grateful to Orna Almog for her 
assistance with Israeli documents and to the Institute of 
Contemporary British History for its support and the use 
of its facilities.
I have relied upon the strength of many friends 
during the course of my research. Above all, I am grateful 
to my family, especially my mother and father, who have 
accepted my 'permanent vacation' with forebearance above 
and beyond the call of parental duty.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION i
MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1954 V
MAP OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL vi
CHAPTER 1 1945-1952: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO- 1
AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
CHAPTER 2 1953-1954: DIVISION AND RECONCILIATION 24
CHAPTER 3 FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER 1955: SEEDS OF CONFLICT 51
CHAPTER 4 SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1955: THE SEARCH FOR A 74
COMMON POLICY
CHAPTER 5 JANUARY-MARCH 1956: PREPARING FOR A 109
SHOWDOWN
CHAPTER 6 MARCH 1956: THE TURNING POINT 122
CHAPTER 7 APRIL-JULY 1956: THE OMEGA DISCUSSIONS 156
CHAPTER 8 19 JULY-26 JULY 1956: WESTERN ATTACK, 187
EGYPTIAN COUNTERATTACK
CHAPTER 9 26 JULY-14 AUGUST 1956: BRITAIN'S QUEST 196
TO 'HIT, HIT NOW, AND HIT HARD'
CHAPTER 10 15 AUGUST-3 SEPTEMBER 1956: WASHINGTON'S 234
LEASH UPON LONDON
CHAPTER 11 4 SEPTEMBER-18 SEPTEMBER 1956: NEW PLANS, 256
NEW FAILURES
CHAPTER 12 19 SEPTEMBER-4 OCTOBER 1956: THE ILLUSION 283
OF SCUA
CHAPTER 13 5 OCTOBER-14 OCTOBER 1956: FORCE DISMISSED 303
CHAPTER 14 14 OCTOBER-29 OCTOBER 1956: FORCE 313
RESURRECTED
CHAPTER 15 29 OCTOBER-6 NOVEMBER 1956: WAR 354
CHAPTER 16 7 NOVEMBER 1956-10 JANUARY 1957: AFTERMATH 404
CONCLUSIONS I: SUEZ AND BRITISH POLICY 439
CONCLUSIONS II: SUEZ AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 447
BIBLIOGRAPHY 454
INTRODUCTION
In October 1956, Britain, France, and Israel, all of 
whom desired the overthrow of the Egyptian President, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, agreed to attack Egypt. The Israelis 
invaded the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October, and the British 
and French, intervening as 'peacekeepers,' began bombing 
on 31 October, dropping paratroopers on the Suez Canal 
Zone on 5 November, and landing the main assault force 24 
hours later. Almost immediately, Britain, under pressure 
from the U.S., was forced to cease fire. The Anglo-French 
force occupied only one-third of the Canal Zone and failed 
to topple Nasser. British and French troops left Egypt in 
December, and the Israelis departed in March 1957. British 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden was replaced by Harold 
Macmillan in January, as the Americans, under the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, replaced Britain as the dominant 
Western power in the Levant*
This chronology of the Suez War is well-known, but it 
fails to answer questions surrounding the conflict. Why 
did Britain, traditionally allied with Arab States, risk 
her Middle Eastern position by conspiring with Israel? Why 
did Ministers ignore the warnings of their officials 
against war and then circumvent them to carry out the 
invasion? Why did the United States, who privately shared 
Britain's aim of curbing Nasser's prestige and discussed 
covert plans against Egypt with Britain, cooperate with 
the Soviet Union in the United Nations, as the Soviets 
were crushing the Hungarian Revolution, and force two of 
her NATO allies to cease fire? Why did an operation which
ii
was a military success end in political failure?
Past accounts of Suez have often tried to answer 
these questions by placing the responsibility for 
'failure' upon individuals or portraying the crisis in 
terms of a 'moral,' rather than political or legal,
conflict. Some authors ascribe the failure of Anglo- 
American 'alliance' to the hypocrisy and deceit of U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; some blame the 
'irrational' behaviour of Prime Minister Eden. Some
portray Suez as a Cold War episode with Britain and France 
confronting the Communist menace in the Middle East; 
others describe it as Egyptian resistance to imperialist 
oppression.
Recently-released documents and private papers from 
Britain, the U.S., and Israel do not contain portentous 
revelations about the chronology of Suez. No 'smoking gun' 
identifies the culprit who destroyed Anglo-American 
cooperation or orchestrated collusion between Britain, 
France, and Israel. Yet this approach to the crisis, which 
assumes that a few pieces of 'evidence' will solve all 
mysteries, is flawed in itself. By focussing merely on a 
talisman like the intrigue of collusion or American 
betrayal of her allies, we fail to recognise that those
talismen are products of a number of variables within and
outside the control of policymakers on either side of the 
Atlantic.
The first task of this thesis is to reconstruct those 
policies, actions, and circumstances which led to the Suez 
crisis and determined its course. British and American 
policies were not only influenced by France, Israel, and
iii
Egypt. The cast of actors must be extended to include the 
Soviets, the Iraqis, the Jordanians, the Saudis, the 
Syrians, and the Turks, among others. The loci of action 
not only included 10 Downing Street and the White House, 
the State Department and the Foreign Office but also the 
Treasuries of both the U.S. and Britain, the CIA, MI6, and 
military staffs in both countries. 'Chance' occurrences 
such as Foster Dulles' departure for hospital during the 
Suez War must also be considered.
Through reconstruction, 'irrationality' becomes, if 
not 'rational,' at least comprehensible. The immediate 
'causes' of the Suez War can be perceived as products of 
wider issues. Collusion becomes a strand of a web 
including Britain's Middle Eastern foundation of an 
Israeli-Jordanian axis, the Israeli-Jordanian border 
conflict, and the developing Franco-Israeli 'alliance.' 
Eden's apparent obsession with Nasser is appreciated in 
the context of a Chancellor of the Exchequer, Macmillan, 
who believed Britain could not survive as a global power 
without a victory over Egypt, a press which criticised the 
Prime Minister for being weak and indecisive, and an 
intelligence service, MI6, which insisted that Nasser was 
Britain's enemy and a Soviet puppet.
Re-evaluation of Suez leads to re-evaluation of the 
Anglo-American 'alliance.' The 'alliance' is not a fixed 
entity, subjectively defined by language, culture, and 
tradition or objectively defined by institutions and 
operating procedures. By autumn 1956, relations between 
Washington and London were so complex that, while the U.S. 
was refusing to join Anglo-French military planning
iv
against Nasser, it was cooperating with Britain in a 
comprehensive program of political, economic, and 
psychological action to overthrow the Egyptian Government. 
Some American agencies and officials continued to work 
with the British, even during the Suez War, while others 
advocated sanctions against London.
Some aspects of Suez are still shrouded in secrecy. 
For example, a detailed account of the Franco-Israeli 
planning which pushed Britain towards collusion may never 
be available. However, as the legends of Suez are verified 
or refuted, so the myths surrounding the Anglo-American 
'alliance' can be replaced with an understanding of the 
complexities of relations between Washington and London. 
The 'specialness' of the 'special relationship,' if it 
exists, can only be defined through such an examination.
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1CHAPTER 1
1945-1952: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
By 1939, Britain's dominant position in the Middle 
East was firmly established. The completion of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 provided an important trade route to India. 
By 1876, Her Majesty's Government had acquired 44 percent 
of the shares in the Paris-based Suez Canal Company, and 
six years later, British troops occupied Egypt. The 
discovery of large oil deposits in the Middle East in the 
early 20th century expanded British interests in the 
region, as Britain created the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
to supply oil to the British navy and sought concessions 
in countries formed from the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire.
Under the auspices of the League of Nations, Britain 
and France divided the Middle East into spheres of 
influence after World War I. Britain, having converted 
Egypt into a protectorate in 1914, assumed the mandates 
for Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq, installing Hashemite 
kings on the thrones of the latter two countries. France 
assumed responsibility for Syria and the Lebanon. Only 
Saudi Arabia, where King Ibn Saud ousted the patriarch of 
the Hashemite dynasty, Sharif Hussein of Mecca, in 1926, 
escaped the 'spheres of influence' settlement.
In the 1930s, Britain confirmed its position in the 
region with a series of bilateral political and economic 
agreements. Iraq was granted independence in 1930, with 
the 1932 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty guaranteeing British rights to
military bases until 1957. Under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty, Egypt, nominally independent since 1922, obtained 
the withdrawal of British troops from most of the country. 
In return, the British were granted free use of the Suez 
Canal Base until 1956. Besides its controlling stake in 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Britain had a 37.5 percent 
share of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, and British banks 
and businesses dominated foreign investment in Egypt. King 
Abdullah of Transjordan was carefully advised by Sir Alec 
Kirkbride. Closest of all to the British was Nuri es- 
Sa'id, more influential in Iraqi politics than the titular 
sovereign.
Control of the Middle East was vital to Britain in 
World War II. The Suez Canal Base, at the pivot of Europe, 
Asia, and Africa, was the largest base in the world, 
through which supplies and troops were shipped to all 
theatres of the war. The Anglo-American Middle East Supply 
Centre in Cairo provided $33 million in aid throughout the 
area. Axis control of the Mediterranean rendered the Suez 
Canal ineffective, but Middle Eastern oil supplies were 
shipped to Britain around the Cape of Good Hope.
In Iraq, the assumption of power by the pro-German 
Rashid Ali in 1941 not only led to a British-sponsored 
coup but also provoked the British to remove Reza Shah 
Pahlavi from the throne of neighbouring Iran, partitioning 
the country into British and Soviet spheres of influence. 
Fearful that Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Maher would 
welcome the Germans, who were advancing from Libya, the 
British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, surrounded the 
Abdin Palace of King Farouk with tanks in 1942 and forced
3the monarch to remove Ali Maher in favour of Nahas Pasha.
World War II also led to the involvement of the U.S. 
Government in the region. Private American interests, 
notably religious, philanthropic, and educational 
institutions, had entered the Middle East in the 19th 
century. In the 1930s, U.S. oil companies acquired 
concessions for exploration in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
while U.S. companies established offices in Egypt. All 
these private efforts were independent of the U.S. 
Government.
The tradition of non-involvement was gradually 
overcome by American entry into the war and the growing 
strain on British resources, as U.S. finance was necessary 
for the Middle East Supply Centre and the Persian Gulf 
Supply Centre in Iran. When Britain requested that the 
U.S. continue to the annual subsidy to King Ibn Saud of 
Saudi Arabia, the State Department's Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs (NEA) recommended U.S. assumption of 
responsibility in Egypt as well as Saudi Arabia. The State 
Department planned to discontinue the Middle East Supply 
Centre after the war and introduce a 'free trade' area 
providing for equality of opportunity in commerce, 
transit, and trade, as well as measures for the 'general 
protection of American citizens [and the] protection and 
furtherance of legitimate American economic rights, 
existing or potential.' An interdepartmental committee 
recommended $100 million in aid 'for the purpose of 
furthering the political and strategic interests of the 
U.S. in the Middle East.'1
1 Thomas Bryson, Seeds of Middle East Crisis (Jefferson,
4Despite these plans, post-war demobilization reduced 
the American presence in the Middle East, and the $100 
million in aid was not authorised. Only in Saudi Arabia, 
where U.S. oil companies triumphed in their bid for 
influence with King Ibn Saud, and the special political 
case of Palestine did the U.S. Government retain an 
interest. In contrast, Britain maintained her position in 
Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. She also helped Syria and 
the Lebanon achieve independence by evicting Vichy French 
governments and preventing the Free French from assuming 
control after the war.
While the Americans remained aloof from the Middle 
East, their interest in the Greco-Turkish-Iranian 'tier' 
increased. In 1946, the U.S. and Britain supported Iran, 
first against continued Soviet occupation of the north and 
then against Soviet-backed separatist movements. The U.S. 
and Britain also resisted Soviet pressure on Turkey to 
allow Soviet fortifications in the Bosporus Straits.
In February 1947, Britain's decision to withdraw aid 
from Greece and Turkey led to the Truman Doctrine. In 
principle, the U.S. promised to support any country 
threatened by Soviet expansion. In practice, the Doctrine 
allocated $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey and 
extended any U.S. commitment to Western Europe to Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran, a possible 'outer ring' defence of the 
Middle East.
In October 1947, 'outer ring' defence was taken up in 
high-level Anglo-American talks in Washington. For the 
first time, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized
North Carolina: MacFarland, 1981), pp. 175ff.
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern security as
'vital' to American defence. The diplomatic and economic
representatives agreed:
Both Governments should endeavor to prevent 
either foreign countries, or commercial 
interests, or any other influence from making 
capital for themselves by playing Great Britain 
and the United States off against each 
other....It should be contrary to their 
respective policies for either country to make 
efforts to strengthen itself or to increase its 
influence at the expense of the other.
In mid-November, the U.S. National Security Council
(NSC) agreed that the U.S., to protect the Middle East,
should defend Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The NSC
added, 'It would be unrealistic for the U.S. to undertake
to carry out such a policy unless the British maintain
their strong strategic, political, and economic position
in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and unless
they and ourselves follow parallel policies in that
area.'3
The British hoped for American assistance to finance 
economic development and build 'outer ring' defence while 
retaining a free hand to maintain their political and 
economic interests in the Middle East. Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin recognized that Britain could not afford, 
politically or financially, to return to its pre-war 
policy. Resentment among nationalists in Egypt and Iraq at 
British 'domination' was growing as was disillusionment 
with the 'pashas' and monarchs.4
From 1946 to 1949, the Foreign Office pursued
2 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter 
referred to as FRUS) 1950, Volume V, p. 124.
3 Ibid.
4 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 155.
renegotiation of bilateral treaties. The results were 
disappointing. Plans to shift the centre of Middle Eastern 
defence from Egypt to Palestine foundered upon the dispute 
over a Jewish state. In 1946, Britain and Egypt 
tentatively revised the 1936 Treaty, with British 
withdrawal from the Suez Canal Base to bases in Libya and 
East Africa, but the agreement collapsed over a dispute 
about control of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Portsmouth 
Treaty, signed by the British and Iraqi Governments in 
January 1948, was abandoned after violent demonstrations 
in Baghdad. Only in Transjordan was a treaty successfully 
revised.
Britain's political difficulties were compounded by 
economic weakness, as a sterling crisis in 1947 exposed 
the precarious state of Britain's reserves of foreign 
exchange. The cost of overseas commitments hastened 
Britain's departure from the Indian sub-continent, Greece, 
and Palestine, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee even 
considered withdrawal from the Middle East. In July 1949, 
Bevin's program to maintain Middle Eastern influence 
through economic investment was undermined by a crisis 
that forced the devaluation of sterling.
With the failure of bilateral cooperation and no 
money for unilateral initiatives, Britain asked the U.S. 
for economic and military support to the Middle East. In 
November 1949, Assistant Undersecretary Michael Wright, 
supervising Middle Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office, 
visited Washington for several meetings with George 
McGhee, the Director of NEA. McGhee committed the U.S., in 
principle, to support of Britain's Middle Eastern position
7while noting the obstacles to a coordinated Anglo-American 
policy:
The objectives of the two countries in the area 
were identical, although there might be a 
difference of method in seeking to attain 
them....The difference in methods might arise 
from the fact that the influence and material 
interests of the U.K. and U.S. were not the same 
in each country.... The U.S. Government had no 
desire to compete with or to hinder the U.K. in 
carrying out its policy in the Middle East. The 
U.S. policy was, however, governed by the 
limitations imposed by the nature of the U.S. 
Government, its policy of non-interference, and 
the difficulty of securing ad hoc treatment.
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, preoccupied with
Europe and the Far East, delegated authority on Middle
Eastern affairs to McGhee, who told Congressmen in
February 1950:
The political loss of the [Middle East] to the 
Soviet Union would be a major disaster 
comparable to its loss during the war....The 
whole area between Greece and India, although 
constitutionally a relatively stable element, is 
already threatened by militant communism to the 
north and would be hard-pressed indeed in its 
efforts to hold fast to its newly-won 
independence.6
The Arab-Israeli dispute also led the U.S. into a 
more active role in the Middle East. After the Arab- 
Israeli war of 1948-49, the U.S. refused to supply weapons 
to countries in the region, but Israeli diplomats and pro- 
Israeli Congressmen pressed for renewed supplies to 
Israel. The State Department was also concerned with the 
effect of the Arab-Israeli dispute upon U.S. aid programs, 
almost all of which was being spent to keep Arab refugees 
alive. Little remained for resettlement or development
5 Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey, United Kingdom 
(hereafter referred to as PRO), F0371/81907/E1023/3, 
Records of Anglo-American discussions, October 1949.
6 PRO, F0371/81907/E1023/12, Burrows to Wright, 6 April 
1950? FRUS 1950 V, p. 1.
projects, and irrigation programs were blocked by 
disputes between Israel, Transjordan, and Syria over 
division of the Jordan River.7
When Britain, recognising the American anxiety, 
suggested an Anglo-American policy on arms supplies, 
Acheson responded with the suggestion that the U.S., 
France, and Britain obtain 'non-aggressive declarations 
from the Middle Eastern countries' who received Western 
arms. Issued on 25 May, the Tripartite Declaration not 
only included Acheson's provision but also recognised the 
de facto Middle Eastern frontiers, pending a final Arab- 
Israeli settlement. Any violation of those frontiers by 
aggressive action would be opposed by the three powers 
'both within or without the United Nations.'8
The practical effect of the Tripartite Declaration 
was limited. The Western powers did not formally guarantee 
the Middle Eastern frontiers, and any of them could, 
unilaterally, refuse to act against an aggressor. The 
provision on arms supplies was not enforced until the 
creation of the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee in 
1952.
The importance of the Tripartite Declaration was 
symbolic. The U.S. Government had expressed its 
willingness to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs, and 
the Americans were committed to consultations with Britain 
on Middle Eastern matters. In September 1950, McGhee and 
Wright, reviewing the Declaration and Arab-Israeli 
relations, also discussed Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for
7 FRUS 1950 V, pp. 125ff.
8 PRO, F0371/E1023/10, Furlonge minute, 27 March 1950?
FRUS 1950 V, p. 135; PRO, F0371/81907-81910/E1023/File.
a new treaty, oil operations in Iran, and economic aid for 
the Middle East and South Asia. In October, 'Ambassador- 
at-Large' Philip Jessup and General Omar Bradley, Chairman 
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, held talks with the 
British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, and 
British military representatives, for specific discussions 
based upon informal talks in July and September. The 
British, who had favoured an 'inner ring' defence based on 
the Lebanon and Jordan, agreed to study protection of Iran 
against Soviet attack or subversion and defence of the 
'outer ring' of Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. 
In April 1951, McGhee, following a Middle Eastern tour, 
discussed his impressions with the Foreign Office. After 
the Truman Administration approved a comprehensive 
economic and military aid package for the region, McGhee 
and Franks considered the coordination of American aid 
with British assistance.9
The U.S. balked, however, at an unconditional 
commitment to support Britain in Middle Eastern defence. 
Bradley stated in the October 1950 talks that, 'owing to 
demands elsewhere,' notably Korea, the U.S. could not 
commit air or ground forces to the Middle East. In 
wartime, Britain would have to hold the area, without 
American assistance, for two years.10 In February 1951,
9 PRO, F0371/81912/E1023/152G, Price to Furlonge, 20 
September 1950? PRO, F0371/80382/JE1055/55G, Allen 
minute, 20 September 1950; PRO, F0371/81922/E10213/File? 
PRO, F0371/81967/E1195/4G, Ministry of Defence minute,
26 October 1950? FRUS 1951 V, p. 134? PRO, F0371/91185/ 
E1024/24G, Franks to Morrison, 19 May 1951, and 
subsequent minutes.
10 David Devereux, Between Friend and Foe; The Formulation 
of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East. 1948- 
1956 (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1988), pp.
33ff.? PRO, F0371/ 81967/E1195/4G, Ministry of Defence
10
the Istanbul Conference of U.S. diplomatic representatives 
in the Middle East, while recommending a new security 
commitment to Greece and Turkey and an American statement 
of 'its willingness...to assist the Near Eastern states to 
strengthen their capabilities to defend themselves against 
aggression,' rejected a Middle Eastern defence pact. 
Anglo-American military talks in Malta in early 1951 
foundered over the definition of Turkey's role in Middle 
Eastern defence.11
It was only with the development of Western European 
defence that the U.S. considered joining Britain in the 
Middle East. In May 1951, the British agreed to accept 
Turkish membership in NATO, provided the U.S. and Turkey 
participated in Middle Eastern defence. In response, the 
State Department's Policy Planning Staff recommended a 
Middle East Common Defence Board, led by the U.S., 
Britain, France, and Turkey, to plan and coordinate 
defence with Middle Eastern countries, Iran, and Pakistan. 
In early September, the Foreign Office and State 
Department agreed the details of a Middle Eastern Command 
(MEC). France and Turkey joined as sponsors, and on 13 
October, Egypt was asked to become a founding member.12
The approach had no chance of success. Talks about 
revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty had resumed in 
January 1950 but broke down in mid-1951. On 8 October, the 
Egyptian Government abrogated the 1936 Treaty.13 For the
minute, 26 October 1950.
11 FRUS 1951 V, p. 50? PRO, F0371/91219-91221/E1192/File.
12 FRUS 1951 V, p. 50 and p. 144? PRO, CAB128/26,
C.M.36(51), 22 May 1951? PRO, F0371/91184/E1024/30G, 
Dudgeon minute, 31 May 1951.
13 PRO, F0371/90129-90151/JE1051/File.
11
next 20 months, the MEC and a subsequent proposal, the
Middle Eastern Defence Organisation (MEDO), were submitted
to Arab countries without reward. The plan depended on the
use of the Suez Canal Base, which could only be guaranteed
with an Anglo-Egyptian settlement.
The U.S. never regarded the MEC or MEDO as military
organisations but as political pacts to link Middle
Eastern countries with British defence planning, and many
American and British officials subsequently questioned the
plans' value?14 however, just as the Tripartite
Declaration brought Anglo-American consultation over the
Middle East, discussion of MEC ensured U.S. involvement in
the region. The Americans even considered formal machinery
for co-operation with Britain. In October 1951, the State
Department suggested joint appreciations by American and
British missions in the Middle East followed by meetings
at the level of Assistant Secretary. The Foreign Office
noted the U.S. was...
... clearly ready to play an important part [ in 
the Middle East]....This can only be beneficial 
to British interests, provided that the somewhat 
exaggerated respect which they have hitherto 
tended to display towards Middle Eastern 
nationalistic movements can be modified by 
experience.15
The initiative failed for several reasons. McGhee 
left his post in late 1951 to become Ambassador to Turkey. 
Iran and Egypt became 'crises' that required ad hoc
14 Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, U.S.A. 
(hereafter referred to as HST), Acheson Papers,
Princeton Seminars, Box 80, 15-16 May 1954 Discussions.
15 PRO, F0371/91182/E1022/12, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1108 Saving, 27 October 1951, and 
E1022/14, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1146 
Saving, 7 November 1951, and subsequent minutes? PRO, 
F0371/91200/E1057/8, Eastern Department memorandum, 29 
October 1951.
12
attention. The greatest deterrent was the Foreign Office's 
resources. Extra personnel needed for formal liaison could 
not be provided, and overworked officials in the British 
Embassy in Washington, notably Bernard Burrows and Denis 
Greenhill, continued informal consultations with the State 
Department.16
Cooperation continued at a high level throughout 
1952, however, and an ad hoc body discussed a joint Anglo- 
American policy on Middle Eastern oil. From October 1950, 
a British Embassy official liaised with the State 
Department on 'information policy,' an euphemism for 
covert and overt propaganda operations. Relations between 
the Pentagon and the British Joint Services Mission 
remained close.17
While British and American officials tried to 
coordinate general Middle Eastern policy, they differed in 
their approaches to the 'crises' of Iran and Egypt. In 
April 1951, the Iranian Government, led by Mohammed 
Mossadegh, nationalised the British-owned Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (AIOC). British officials and Ministers feared 
that McGhee, who made his fortune in the Texas oil 
business, and other State Department personnel privately 
welcomed the challenge to Britain's oil interests. Several 
Ministers, including Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, 
favoured military force to regain control of the Iranian 
oilfields and installations, and war was only averted by 
Prime Minister Attlee's warning that the Americans would
16 Ibid.
17 FRUS 1950 V, p. 289? FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 585ff.; 
United States National Archives (hereafter referred to 
as USNA), Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files, 611.41 
Series.
13
not support military intervention. The election of Winston
Churchill as Prime Minister in October 1951 did not ease
tensions. Acheson cabled McGhee that British
intransigence...
...starts from Churchill with the roar of a 
wounded lion, becomes more articulate with 
[Foreign Secretary Anthony] Eden, as he 
remembers twitting the Laborites for weakness 
during the campaign, and is fully rationalized 
by the civil servants....The new ministers are 
depressingly out of touch with the world of. 
1951, and they are being advised by the same 
officials who have allowed the government to 
follow the AIOC meekly into disaster.18
When Churchill visited Washington in January 1952, an
argument between Acheson and Eden over Iran wounded Eden's
feelings. Conciliatory letters healed any rift and the two
sides compromised to make a joint approach to Mossadegh in
August 1952, but Acheson's dislike of British policy was
1 Qunabated. * Secretary of Defence Robert Lovett, supported
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote:
The risks of continuing our present policy have 
become unacceptable, and...it must be discarded 
in favor of a policy of action to prevent Iran 
from falling to communism. Such a policy would 
involve a willingness, if necessary, to displace 
British influence and responsibility in Iran as 
has occurred in Greece, Turkey, and Saudi 
Arabia....Every effort should be made to obtain 
British cooperation in this policy, but with or 
without British cooperation, I believe we must 
move ggomptly along these lines before it is too
The State Department responded by presenting London with a
18 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1983), pp. 329ff.? PRO, F0371/91184/ 
E1024/15G, Boswall to Bowker, 29 March 1951; PRO, 
CAB128/19, C.M.51(51), 12 July 1951? HST, President's 
Standard File, Subject, Box 180, Iran, Paris to State 
Department, Cable 5189, 10 November 1951.
19 HST, Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars, Box 80, 15-16 
May 1954 Discussions.
20 USNA, RG 330 (Secretary of Defence), Office of the 
Administrative Secretary, Box 316, Lovett to Bruce, 16 
August 1952, and Lovett to Acheson, 18 November 1952.
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package for the production and distribution of Iranian 
oil, warning the British that the U.S. would proceed 
unilaterally if the proposals were rejected. The Foreign 
Office agreed to the package.21
The threat of high-level Anglo-American conflict was 
not as apparent in the case of Egypt. Until 1952, the 
Americans gave unqualified support to Britain in its 
negotiations with Egypt, and Eden praised the State 
Department and the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson 
Caffery. When mobs rioted in Cairo in January 1952, 
burning British-owned buildings and killing eight 
Europeans and Canadians, Caffery's representations 
prevented Egypt from breaking diplomatic relations with 
Britain.22
The riots forced the State Department to re-evaluate 
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Acheson observed, 'The 
"splutter of musketry" apparently does not stop things as 
we had been told from time to time that it would.' If the 
British position could not be held by force, a negotiated 
settlement was imperative. On Caffery's advice, the State 
Department asked the British to recognise King Farouk of 
Egypt as King of the Sudan. Britain refused to compromise. 
Churchill, supported by backbench Conservative opinion, 
insisted Britain's Middle Eastern role depended on the 
maintenance of her position in Egypt, and the Foreign
21 PRO, CAB129/55, C(52)354, 'Persia: U.S. Ideas for a 
Settlement of the Oil Dispute,' 23 October 1952.
22 PRO, F0371/90150/JE1051/518, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 6098, 14 December 1951? PRO, F0371/ 
96920/JE1052/69, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 166, 26 
January 1952; PRO, F0371/96921/ JE1052/85, Foreign 
Office to Queen Marv. Cable 27, 27 January 1952? USNA,
RG 59, CDF, 641.74/1-2752, Cairo to State Department, 
Cable 1158, 27 January 1952.
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Office claimed recognition of Farouk betrayed the 
Sudanese, who had been promised self-determination and
o o
self-government. J
In July 1952, Britain and the U.S. nearly quarrelled 
publicly when King Farouk threatened to replace Prime 
Minister Hilali Pasha, whom the British considered fair 
and honest in negotiation. Eden wished to tell Farouk that 
the change would 'lead to disaster for him and Egypt.' 
Acheson, acting on Caffery's advice that 'any carrying out 
of British proposals...would be the beginning of the final 
evacuation of the British from the Middle East and of the 
eventual evacuation of our own interests,' withheld his 
support.24
State Department officials noted on 21 July, 'It is 
becoming more and more difficult to give support to the 
British in the measure they desire since we are less and 
less convinced of the correctness of this position.' If 
Egypt proceeded with negotiations over the Suez Canal Base 
and Middle Eastern defence, the U.S. would recognize 
Farouk as 'King of the Sudan' and aid Egypt's armed 
forces. Days later, plans were upset when a group of Army 
and Air Force officers toppled the Egyptian Government and 
forced Farouk's abdication on 26 July. General Mohammed 
Neguib was installed as the leader of the ruling junta, 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).25
23 Author's interviews with Lord Franks, and George 
McGhee; HST, Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, 
Box 67, Acheson and Franks, 27 January 1952; FRUS 1952- 
1954 IX, p. 1758.
24 PRO, F0371/96876/JE1018/189, Strang minute, 2 July 
1952; FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 1826-1833; USNA, RG 59, 
Central Decimal File, 641.74/7-1152, Cairo to State 
Department, Cable 64, 11 July 1952.
25 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 1838.
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The coup averted high-level Anglo-American 
differences in the short term, but it allowed State 
Department and CIA representatives in Cairo to shape 
American policy and establish American independence of 
Britain in the Middle East.26
CIA operations in Syria in the late 1940s failed to 
establish a stable regime, but the Agency, supported by 
the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, soon identified Egypt as the 
optimal target for intervention. Economic aid could 
develop the agricultural and industrial potential of the 
country, provided it was accompanied by social and 
political reform, and a stable Egypt could be prosperous 
enough to lead the Arab world. Before this occurred, the 
U.S. had to bring a new regime to power, as King Farouk 
was 'no more than a reactionary landowner' and leaders of 
the ruling party, the Wafd, were more concerned with 
'making personal fortunes rather than introducing social 
reform./27
The CIA acquired an important ally in 1949 when 
Caffery, U.S. Ambassador in France since 1946, was 
transferred to Egypt. McGhee allowed him freedom of 
action, and the Ambassador became formally involved in the 
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. When Washington expanded the 
Embassy's staff between 1950 and 1952, Caffery obtained 
several young, ambitious associates for his 'diplomacy' 
with the Egyptians and British.28
26 See Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
27 M.A.W. Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy. 
1952-1956 (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1987), p. 
59 and p. 69? FRUS V 1949, p. 187.
28 Author's interviews with George McGhee, Sir John 
Wilton, and Miles Copeland; Copeland, pp. 52ff.
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Egypt's new military training program in 1950, which 
planned to send 300 officers to the U.S., gave the CIA its 
opportunity. Promising candidates were identified, and 
personal contacts were established which could be
developed in Cairo. Of the more than 50 officers who
studied in the U.S., at least six, including RCC members 
Hassan Ibrahim and Abdel Latif Baghdadi, were in the Free 
Officers' movement, the core of the July 1952 coup.
Another RCC member, Gamal Salem, spent several months in
the U.S. undergoing medical treatment. Shortly before the 
Revolution, Ali Sabri, the Chief of Air Force Intelligence 
and a secret supporter of the Free Officers, attended a 
six-month intelligence course, normally reserved for NATO 
officers, in Colorado. Sabri hinted later, 'The attendance 
of many Egyptian officers at U.S. service schools during 
the past two years had a very definite influence upon the 
coup d'etat in Egypt.'29
In late 1951, after a CIA report identified anti- 
Western nationalism, rather than Communism, as the chief 
threat to American interests in the Middle East, Acheson 
convened an interdepartmental committee to study problems 
in the region. The report of the committee, chaired by 
Kermit Roosevelt, one of the CIA's Middle Eastern 
specialists, acknowledged, 'Whatever the U.S. can do to 
bolster both generally and locally the power and prestige 
of the U.K. will assist the U.K. in maintaining stability 
in the area and will reduce the need for direct action by 
the U.S. or other Allied powers.' However, the committee 
endorsed the CIA's Middle Eastern strategy for the Middle
29 Sayed-Ahmed, pp. 84ff.
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East:
Our principle should be to encourage the 
emergence of competent leaders, relatively well- 
disposed toward the West, through programs 
designed for this purpose, including, where 
possible, a conscious, though perhaps covert, 
effort to cultivate and aid such potential 
leaders, even they are not in power. 0
The committee's identification of Egypt as the
primary target for operations coincided with Acheson's
concern after the Cairo riots, and Roosevelt launched an
operation in February 1952. The primary objective was a
'peaceful revolution,' hopefully led by Farouk, to defuse
extremist opinion and encourage economic and social
development. If Farouk was uncooperative, Roosevelt would
look for 'other possibilities.'31
'Other possibilities' were the Free Officers. In
October 1951, Ahmed Hussein, later Egyptian Ambassador to
Washington, put Roosevelt in contact with the group. By
March 1952, Roosevelt was meeting Free Officers' spokesmen
in Cyprus. The contacts were carefully chosen. Sabri was
trusted by Farouk, Abdel Moneim el-Naggar was related to
Queen Narriman, and Colonel Abdel Moneim Amin was a
wealthy member of the Court. The meetings with Roosevelt
fostered exchanges between the Officers and the U.S.
Embassy, notably the Assistant Air Attache, Lieutenant-
Colonel David Evans, and the Political Secretary, William
Lakeland.32
In May, Roosevelt, after consulting Caffery, cabled
30 Geoffrey Aronson, From Sideshow to Centre Stage: U.S. 
Policy Towards Egypt. 1946-1956 (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienne, 1986), p. 51? USNA, RG 59, Records of the 
Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 14, National 
Security Council staff study, 18 January 1952.
31 Copeland, pp. 47ff.; Sayed-Ahmed, pp. 61ff.
32 Sayed-Ahmed, p. 74 and p. 80.
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Acheson that the 'popular revolution' favoured by the 
State Department was not feasible, and only the Army could 
cope with Egypt's problems.33 In June 1952, the State 
Department told Britain, when it requested American 
support to prevent Hilali Pasha's replacement, that the 
Department did 'not believe that the U.S. should involve 
itself in Egyptian domestic political crisis.' The ploy 
worked: for the Free Officers, the choice of the
discredited Hussein Sirry to replace Hilali symbolised the 
corruption of King Farouk and his advisors. On 13 July, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Evans was told that the rebels would 
act within the next few days. A week later, Caffery issued 
a statement discreetly condoning the forthcoming 
revolution: 'The policy of the U.S. is not to interfere in 
the domestic politics of another country and this policy 
has been strictly adhered to in this embassy.'34
The coup swept away the 'old guard,' on whom the 
British relied for information and influence, in favour of 
the Free Officers, with whom Britain had few links.35 
Significantly, the first assurances by the Free Officers 
during the coup were not given to the British but to Evans 
by Sabri. Evans had to arrange a meeting between a 
spokesman of the new ruling group, the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC), and a British Embassy official. The 
State Department warned the British Embassy in Washington 
that 'foreign intervention,' including a British military
33 Copeland, pp. 52ff.
34 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 1826ff.; HST, HST Series, Naval 
Aide Files, State Department Briefs, Box 24, July-August 
1952, 16 July 1952 Summary.
35 PRO, F0371/96877/JE1018/204, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1060, 23 July 1952? PRO, FO371/96932/JE1052/398G, 
Eden minute, 5 August 1952.
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operation, 'would be disastrous.'36
Between July and October, the RCC dealt exclusively
with the Americans. Evans was consulted almost daily by
Sabri or el-Naggar, and Lakeland established a channel to
Nasser through Mohammed Heikal, a journalist for the
newspaper Akhbar el-Yom, owned by Mustafa Amin, another
CIA contact. Evans was promoted to Air Attache, and a new
Army Attache, Colonel H.R. Greenlee was appointed to work
with the RCC. Through Evans, the Egyptians offered 'an
unofficial committee to fight communist activities and
propaganda,' with Egyptian military representatives and
the American, British, and French Military Attaches. The
RCC also proposed that a U.S. expert 'maintain contacts
with civilian authorities' on matters such as land reform.
The State Department accepted both proposals.37
By September, the Egyptian situation provoked
differences between Britain and the U.S. The Americans
encouraged the RCC's program for land reform, despite the
doubts of the civilian Prime Minister, Ali Maher, about
the plan, and Acheson publicly praised 'encouraging
developments in Egypt...including the reform program.'
When the RCC forced Maher to resign on 7 September, the
State Department, on Caffery's advice and without
consulting the British, issued a supportive statement:
The Department sees no basic alteration of 
policies in this development, since the program 
of the Egyptian Government remains based on 
principles rather than personalities.
36 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.00/7-2552, Cairo to State 
Department, Cable 182, 25 July 1952; Sayed-Ahmed, p. 95.
37 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.00/8-952, Cairo to State 
Department, Cable 315, 9 August 1952, and subsequent 
minutes.
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The Foreign office was enraged. Eden asked the State
Department to reconsider its 'encouragement [of the] more
extreme elements in Egypt' and minuted privately, 'Caffery
could not be worse. Ought we not to tell the Americans
what we think of him?' The immediate crisis passed with
the mediation of the British Ambassador to Egypt, Ralph
Stevenson, and Caffery finally persuaded the RCC to
establish contact with the Foreign Office through the
British Embassy.38
The U.S. Embassy was now the dominant Western
influence. Its independence of the British was illustrated
by an incident in January 1953. Since October, U.S.
Minister Robert McClintock conferred with RCC members
about Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, Middle Eastern defence,
and the supply of American arms to Egypt. At one meeting,
probably on 12 January 1953, McClintock, under British
surveillance, gave the Egyptians details of top-secret
discussions between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Henry Byroade and the Foreign Office. London demanded
McClintock's immediate recall from Egypt. Despite Egyptian
protests, the Minister returned to Washington in March. A
British officer in Cairo wrote:
I am struck by the damage the Americans have 
done here, in their attempts to woo the 
Egyptians, by communicating to them details of
38 PRO, F0371/96880/JE1018/33G, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1279, 27 August 1952? HST, HST Series, Naval Aide 
Files, State Department Briefs, Box 24, September 1952,
9 September 1952 Summary? USNA, 774.00/9-752, Cairo to 
State Department, Cable 593, 7 September 1952, and 
774.00/9-852, Washington to State Department, Cable 
1334, 8 September 1952? PRO, F0371/96896/ JE10345/14, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1715, 8 September 
1952, and JE10345/18, Cairo to Foreign Office, 9 
September 1952, and subsequent minutes? FRUS 1952-1954 
IX, p. 1857.
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what we had hoped to achieve in our 
negotiations.... If we fail to get an efficient 
base, it is at least arguable that it would be 
largely the Americans' fault. 9
To the extent that American policy was directed from 
Washington, the Truman Administration moved towards Anglo- 
American 'alliance' in the Middle East. Acheson did not 
want to confront Britain, even over Iran and Egypt, at the 
height of the Korean War and the Cold War against the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, the British lead in the Middle 
East relieved the U.S. of the financial and military 
burden of defending the region.
American policy was not produced by one source, 
however. CIA and State Department representatives in the 
Middle East saw no reason to use the same methods as their 
British counterparts. The British supported existing 
leaders in the region while encouraging economic and 
social reforms, but the Americans preferred to encourage 
nationalist movements and cultivate leaders who would work 
with the U.S., since they doubted that pashas and 
monarchs would ever adopt the policies needed for economic 
development and political stability. A revised National 
Security Council policy in April 1952 yielded to these 
views. The U.S., through aid and propaganda, would 
'support or develop those leadership groups in the area 
which offered the greatest prospect of establishing
39 PRO, FO371/96896/JE10345/27, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1493, 9 October 1952? Wilbur Eveland, Ropes of 
Sand (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 262? USNA, RG 84, 
Cairo Embassy Records, 1949-1954, 320.1 Anglo-Egyptian 
Negotiations, Cairo to State Department, Cable 1990, 5 
March 1953? The Times. 14 January 1953? USNA, RG 59,
CDF, 641.74/1-1453, State Department to Cairo, Cable 
1401, 14 January 1953? PRO, F0371/102731/JE10345/1, 
Strang minute, 29 January 1953, and JE10345/14, Hankey 
to Bowker, 23 June 1953.
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political stability oriented toward the free world.'40
40 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 222.
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CHAPTER 2
1953-1954: DIVISION AND RECONCILIATION
With the accession to power of the Eisenhower 
Administration on 20 January 1953, coordination of Middle 
Eastern policy between Washington and London was no longer 
standard practice. President Dwight Eisenhower represented 
the Republican Party's 'internationalist' wing, and his 
Administration, like Truman's, was fervently anti-Soviet 
and committed to the NATO 'partnership' in Europe. It did 
not, however, equate the Atlantic alliance with 
unconditional cooperation with Britain in areas such as 
the Middle East. In the future, 'alliance' with Britain 
would be a on a case-by-case basis, undertaken only when 
it fulfilled specific American objectives.
Eisenhower had a great respect and admiration for the 
legend of Winston Churchill, writing, '[Churchill] comes 
nearest to fulfilling the requirements of greatness in any 
individual I have met in my lifetime,' but the Churchill 
of legend was not the Prime Minister who returned to 
power in 1951. When Churchill visited Washington in 
January 1953, emphasizing 'that he would like to 
reestablish with General Eisenhower the sort of 
relationship which existed between President Roosevelt and 
Mr. Churchill,' Eisenhower replied, 'Of course he wished 
to have the closest possible relationship with Mr. 
Churchill but...the making of decisions must go through 
regular channels.' The President wrote in his diary, 'The 
two strongest Western powers must not appear before the 
world as a combination of forces to compel adherence to
25
the status quo.'1
The President endorsed the 'anti-colonialist'
rhetoric, increasingly pointed at Britain, of his
officials. Writing in mid-1954, after France's defeat in
Vietnam, Eisenhower's resentment surfaced:
The British always think their colonialism is 
different and better. Actually, what they want 
us to do is go along to help keep their empire.
The President wrote to Churchill in July:
Colonialism is on the way out as a relationship 
among peoples. The sole question is one of time 
and method.
Eisenhower suggested a speech by Churchill that would
'deal with the need for education and announce the
cooperative purpose of great nations in the Western World
to bring educational opportunities to all peoples we are
able to reach,' so they 'achieved political, cultural, and
economic standards to attain their goals' within the next
25 years. Churchill's reply was dismissive:
The sentiments and ideas which your letter 
expresses are in full accord with the policy now 
being pursued in all the Colonies of the British 
Empire. In this I must admit I am a laggard. I 
am a bit skeptical about universal suffrage for 
the Hottentots even if refined by proportional 
representation.2
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, U.S.A. 
(hereafter referred to as DDE), Ann Whitman Series, DDE 
Diaries, Box 8, DDE Diary, December 1954 (2), Eisenhower 
to Hazlett, 8 December 1954; DDE, Pre-Presidential 
Series, Princeton File, Box 72, Robert A. Lovett (1), 
Lovett to Eisenhower, 24 January 1952? PRO, PREM11/89, 
New York to Foreign Office, Cable 7, 6 January 1953? 
Robert Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries (London: W.W. 
Norton, 1982), p. 222.
2 William Ewald, Eisenhower the President (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1981), p. 95? DDE,
Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 3, DDE Personal 
Diary, January-November 1954 (2), Eisenhower to 
Churchill, 22 July 1954? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE 
Diaries, Box 8, DDE Diary, August 1954 (1), Churchill to 
Eisenhower, 8 August 1954.
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As early as May 1953, Eisenhower's advisers tried to
convert rhetoric into policy. Preparing for the Bermuda
summit between Eisenhower, Churchill, and French Premier
Joseph Laniel, Eisenhower's 'special assistant,' C.D.
Jackson, advised:
[Britain] must be persuaded, through a solemn 
conference called for that purpose alone, that 
if they are to have any hope of preserving their 
commercial advantage through their crumbling 
world, they must allow us occasionally to take a 
front position....Out of Bermuda must emerge 
tripartite unity, but at the apex of the 
triangle there must be the U.S., in the
person of President Eisenhower. This role should 
not be sacrificed because of a very human 
feeling of decency and generosity towards an 
opinionated old gentleman who is still 
sufficiently sharp and selfish to grab every 
advantage with bland assurances of unwavering 
esteem.
The CIA suggested:
Bermuda might show concern about a general issue 
like colonialism and invite someone ([Indian 
leader Jawaharlal] Nehru, Neguib) to come to 
Bermuda or submit his views by wire. The 
appearance of other statesman in Bermuda, or 
Bermuda exchanges of view with them, would turn 
Bermuda into a world forum, instead of a Big 
Three Western Atlantic club.
In the State Department, the NEA asked that the conference
communique avoid reference to the Near East, Africa, or
South Asia:
The U.S. is trying to use its influence to 
further a solution of the various disputes of 
the area. To be successful, the U.S. must secure 
an independent position, in order to give 
confidence in its efforts.
3 DDE, C.D. Jackson Series, Papers, Box 37, General 
Robert Cutler, Jackson to Cutler, 11 May 1953.
4 DDE, C.D. Jackson Series, Records 1953-1954, Box 2, 
Bermuda Conference Briefing Book (5), CIA, 'Political 
and Psychological Warfare Exploitation of Bermuda,' 
undated.
5 DDE, C.D. Jackson Series, Records 1953-1954, Box 2, 
Division of Near East and Africa Affairs, 'Communique of 
the Bermuda Conference,' undated.
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The U.S. would support Britain's traditional position if 
and only if that support prevented the expansion of Soviet 
influence. As early as 1946, Eisenhower's Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, argued that the Soviet Union 
sought social revolution throughout the world and compared 
Stalin's Problems of Leninism with Hitler's Mein Kampf. In 
the 1950s, he unveiled the strategy of a 'counter­
offensive' against Communism, based upon the material, 
moral, and spiritual advantage of the U.S. over the Soviet 
Union. For Foster Dulles, American leadership, rather than 
the Anglo-American 'alliance' or international 
organisations, would secure peace and protect the Free 
World.6
As soon as Eisenhower took office, the policy of 
cooperation with Britain in the Middle East and Iran was 
reviewed. Ironically, re-consideration of Iran brought 
U.S. agreement with Britain on the need for stronger 
action against the Mossadegh Government. In November 1952, 
the British asked the Truman Administration to join covert 
operations to overthrow Mossadegh, but no action was 
authorised. In contrast, the NSC in January 1953 accepted 
the estimate of the U.S. Ambassador in Iran, Loy 
Henderson, that an Anglo-Iranian settlement was no longer 
possible and that Mossadegh would eventually be replaced 
by the Tudeh, the Communist Party of Iran. Officials from 
Britain's foreign intelligence service, MI6, twice visited 
Washington in February to discuss details of a coup. 
Patrick Dean, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence
6 Louis Gerson. John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper 
Square, 1967), p. 28 and p. 72.
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Committee and the head of the Foreign Office's Permanent 
Undersecretary's Department, attended the second set of 
talks. After Foreign Secretary Eden's visit to Washington 
in March, the NSC approved Operation AJAX, a coup to be 
planned, funded, and supported by the CIA and MI6. In 
August 1953, Mossadegh was overthrown and the Shah of Iran 
was restored to power.7
The review reached far different conclusions on 
Egypt. In early January 1953, Assistant Secretary of State 
Henry Byroade and the Foreign Office had agreed upon the 
joint presentation to Egyptian President Neguib of 
proposals on the Suez Canal Base, Middle Eastern defence, 
and American economic and military aid for Egypt. In 
essence, the Americans were actively supporting the 
British.8
Eisenhower and Dulles retreated from the agreement. 
They feared that the RCC, dissatisfied with the slow 
progress of the Anglo-Egyptian discussions, would turn 
against Britain. The President told Eden, when he visited 
Washington, that American involvement now depended upon 
Egyptian willingness to receive an Anglo-American 
presentation. When the RCC rejected the initial approach 
by the British and American Ambassadors, Caffery and 
Stevenson, Eisenhower, to Churchill's horror, refused
7 Christopher Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London: 
Granada, 1982), p. 123? Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 120? Nigel West, The 
Friends: Britain's Post-War Secret Intelligence 
Operations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), p. 
90? PRO, F0800/739, Foster Dulles-Eden and Foster 
Dulles-Eden-Eisenhower meetings, 6 March 1953? DDE, Ann 
Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 4, 132nd 
NSC meeting, 18 February 1953, and 136th NSC meeting, 11 
March 1953.
8 PRO, F0371/102795-102796/JE1192/File.
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further American participation:
If the U.S. walks into a conference with 
[Britain], against the wishes of the Egyptian 
Government, then the only obvious interpretation 
would be that our two governments, together, are 
there to announce an ultimatum. An uninvited 
guest cannot possibly come into your house, be 
asked to leave, and then expect cordial and 
courteous treatment if he insists upon staying.
The U.S. Embassy in Cairo, supported by the State
Department, now argued that the five points of the package
agreed in January were not interdependent. The U.S. might
push Britain into a settlement on the Suez Canal Base
without ensuring Egypt's commitment to the Middle Eastern
Defence Organization.10
Foster Dulles' Middle Eastern tour in May 1953, in
which he visited six Arab countries, Israel, Turkey, and
Pakistan, was the catalyst for the change in general
American policy. Foster Dulles was especially shaken by
his stop in Cairo, where he met Neguib, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, and other RCC members over two days. Nasser told
Foster Dulles that MEDO was the 'perpetuation of
occupation' and added:
I can't see myself waking up one morning to find 
that the Soviet Union is our enemy....I would 
become the laughing-stock of my people if I told 
them they now had an entirely new enemy, 
thousands of miles away and that they must 
forget about the British enemy occupying their 
territory.11
Foster Dulles cabled the State Department:
From talks with the Egyptians, I believe that,
9 PRO, PREM11/486, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
479, 6 March 1953, and Eisenhower to Churchill, 19 March
1953.
10 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 2032.
11 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 27ff? H.W. Brands, 'The Cairo- 
Tehran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the 
Middle East,' International History Review. August 1989, 
p. 451.
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while they realize chaos and destruction of 
their regime would inevitably be an aftermath of 
open hostilities, they will choose that rather 
than make concessions to the British, which they 
consider would publicly be looked upon as 
infringing Egyptian sovereignty. Their emotions 
are so great they would rather go down as 
martyrs than concede.
The RCC was sponsoring guerrilla operations against
British troops in the Canal Zone; the British were
planning the reoccupation of Cairo and Alexandria. Thus,
the U.S. 'must abandon [its] preconceived ideas of making
Egypt the key country in building the foundations for a
military defence of the Middle East.'12
Foster Dulles was also depressed by other regional
problems. After discussions with Arab leaders and Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel, he was convinced that
a formal Arab-Israeli settlement was not possible. The
U.S. would 'have to move step by step upon segments of
[the] problem that [would] reduce tension,' including the
question of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem,
assurances against Israeli aggression, and distribution of
American aid. Syria offered 'some promise' as an emerging
Arab country under the firm control of General Adib
Shishakli, but it was 'very unpopular with its neighbours'
and 'no adequate substitute for a stable Egypt.' Even the
U.S. relationship with with Saudi Arabia was insecure:
'Given the temperament and age of King Ibn Saud, it was
quite possible that he would decide to throw away his
alliance with U.S., conclude the oil concession and the
[U.S. rights to the Dhahran] air base, and throw in his
lot with some other nation which he might feel was a more
12 FRUS 1952-1954, IX, pp. 25ff. and p. 379.
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faithful ally.'
In the short term, Foster Dulles recommended that the 
U.S. reaffirm the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, 
reassuring Arabs that Israeli aggression would not be 
tolerated, and improve relations with Syria and Saudi 
Arabia. Britain would be urged to enter discussions to end 
the Anglo-Saudi dispute over boundaries on the Arabian 
Peninsula, especially the Buraimi oasis.
Foster Dulles' most significant proposals were long­
term measures asserting American independence of British 
policy. First, the U.S. would end unqualified support of 
Britain in the Anglo-Egyptian discussions and ask the 
British to compromise over the status of the Suez Canal 
Base. Second, Foster Dulles abandoned MEDO, as Egypt's 
instability made the pact 'a future rather than an 
immediate possibility.' Instead he proposed the 'Northern 
Tier' defence system of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran. 
Turkey was securely in NATO? Iraq, with a 'forward- 
looking' government, was the Arab country 'most plainly 
concerned with the Soviet threat'; Pakistan, with its 
'martial and religious characteristics, ...could be made a 
loyal point' for the U.S.; even Iran could be an asset if 
the U.S. could 'concentrate on changing the situation 
there.'13
Foster Dulles had indicated that the U.S. would no 
longer guarantee support of British policy. If British 
actions jeopardised American interests, then the 
Administration would form its own policy. The Secretary 
announced on television that the peoples of the Near East
13 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 379ff.
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and South Asia were...
...suspicious of the colonial powers. The U.S., 
too, is suspect because, it is reasoned, our 
NATO alliance with France and Britain requires 
us to try to preserve or restore the old 
colonial interests of our allies....The day is 
. past when [nationalist] aspirations can be 
ignored.14
The tripartite Bermuda summit in June was postponed when 
Churchill suffered a stroke. With Eden out of office 
because of gall bladder problems, the Acting Foreign 
Minister, Lord Salisbury, met Foster Dulles in Washington 
in July. The talks were sometimes acrimonious, especially 
over the Anglo-Egyptian discussions. The Americans thought 
British rigidity over provisions for the Suez Canal Base 
ensured failure of the discussions, while the British were 
angered that the U.S. Embassy in Cairo conferred with the 
Egyptians without consulting the British. After several 
days of bargaining, Salisbury and the British military 
representative, General Brian Robertson, were more 
optimistic. Although the U.S. refused to underwrite new 
British proposals for operation of the Base, they agreed 
to their 'underlying principle.' Eisenhower even wrote to 
Neguib, urging him to consider the new British offer 
carefully.15
Salisbury and the British Cabinet did not know that 
the Americans were already mediating the Anglo-Egyptian 
dispute. The 'Egyptian' proposals presented to British in 
early July were based upon a State Department draft passed 
to Cairo. American 'support' for Salisbury's proposals was
14 PRO, F0371/104257/E10345/23, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1174, 2 June 1953. C.f. USNA, RG 59, 
Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 14.
15 PRO, F0371/102731-102732/JE10345/File.
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given after British assurances that the only outstanding
issues were the availability of the Base in wartime, the
agreement's duration, and a reference to free transit of
the Suez Canal. Without revealing the source of the
'Egyptian' proposals, Foster Dulles told Salisbury that
they were favourable on the first two of these points.
When Caffery reported Robertson's belief that the
Washington talks had revived U.S. support for the British
position, Foster Dulles replied:
Robertson's statement reflects wishful thinking.
We are not "backing" either Britain or Egypt. In 
certain respects we share the British position, 
in other respects we share the Egyptian
position, and in many respects we strongly
backed the Egyptian viewpoint in our talks here 
with the British.'16
The Americans refused to accept British policy on two 
other Middle Eastern issues. Salisbury, seeking U.S. 
support in the Anglo-Saudi dispute over the Buraimi oasis, 
proposed that the area be placed under international
supervision pending arbitration. The U.S., recognising
that the idea would involve a loss of face for King Ibn
Saud, declined. On Foreign Office advice that it was
'inexpedient to join issue with the Americans on this 
question at a time when we were seeking to reach agreement 
with them on matters of much greater moment,' the Cabinet 
agreed not to press the point.17 Second, the U.S. 
announced that it would forge a Northern Tier defence
grouping, with or without Britain's help. Foster Dulles
informed U.S. missions on 30 July and announced that $50
16 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 2108 and p. 2124? USNA, RG 59, 
Central Decimal Files (CDF), 641.74/7-2253, State 
Department to Cairo, Cable 96, 22 July 1953.
17 CAB128/26, C.C.42(53), 13 July 1953.
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million for military aid was available as a lever for the 
cooperation of the Northern Tier states.18
Anglo-American relations deteriorated further over 
Egypt. An agreement was imminent in late September, with 
the Egyptians compromising on Suez Canal transit and the 
agreement's duration, when talks stalled over military 
uniforms for British technicians remaining at the Base. 
The State Department suspected that the British introduced 
the uniform issue to sabotage the talks. Foster Dulles 
warned Eden, who had just returned to the Foreign Office, 
that the U.S. might break publicly with Britain.19
Eden was in a near-impossible position. A negotiated 
settlement with Egypt was opposed by many backbench 
Conservative MPs, and the Suez Group was formed by Colonel 
Charles Waterhouse and Julian Amery in 1953 to unite the 
opposition. No Ministers joined the Group, but some senior 
figures, including Churchill, were privately 
sympathetic.20 The Prime Minister and Eden quarrelled 
about the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations periodically from 
April 1952, and they had bitter exchanges in early 1953 
when Eden and the Egyptians agreed on the status of the 
Sudan, Churchill complaining that he never realised 'that 
Munich was situated on the Nile.'21
The Cabinet refused to concede the demand that 
British technicians wear military dress, and a frustrated
18 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 379 and p. 466.
19 PRO, F0371/102818/JE1192/568G, Eden-Foster Dulles 
meeting, 17 October 1953.
20 PRO, DEFE4/56, COS(52)121st meeting, 26 August 1952? 
Author's interview with Julian Amery.
21 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Volume VIII:
Never Despair. 1945-1965 (London: Heinemann, 1988), pp. 
719ff. and pp. 795ff.
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Foreign Office found a scapegoat in Ambassador Caffery.
They accused him of saying, privately but widely, 'that
the British have bungled negotiations from the start' and
refusing to affirm that British proposals on availability
of the Base had U.S. support. The Permanent
Undersecretary, Sir William Strang, formally protest to
the U.S. Embassy in London, and Eden, speaking to General
Alfred Gruenther, the commander of NATO forces, 'made
several rather uncompromising remarks about Caffery's
attitude.' Foster Dulles put the onus on Britain over the
issue: if they formally requested the recall of Caffery,
he would consider it. *
In fact, Foster Dulles had no intention of
transferring Caffery, the 'mediator,' while the Anglo-
Egyptian discussions were in progress,23 the dispute over
the Ambassador was superseded by the question of U.S. aid
to Egypt. In January and May 1953, the Americans approved
the delivery of $11 million of military equipment, but
vehement British protests postponed the shipments. On 14
November, Foster Dulles warned Eden:
This settlement has dragged out to a point where 
we cannot continue much longer without very 
grave effect upon all our Arab relationships. If 
you felt that it was likely there would soon be 
new moves in the Suez matter which might produce 
agreement, we could still hold up briefly but 
our time is fast running out.
At the Bermuda summit, rescheduled for December, Foster
Dulles virtually gave Eden an ultimatum, insisting that
22 PRO, CAB128/26, C.C.60(53), 22 October 1953; PRO,
F0371/102818/ JE1192/560G, Cairo to Foreign Office,
Cable 1449, 23 October 1953, and subsequent minutes.
23 PRO, F0800/774, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2373, 3 November? DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, 
Chronological, Box 5, November 1953 (5), Foster Dulles 
memorandum, 3 November 1953.
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the British put the points agreed with the Egyptians into 
writing to ensure that new arguments would not be 
introduced into the talks, as had occurred with the 
uniform question. If Britain did not comply, the U.S. 
would proceed with economic aid to Egypt.24 A 
'transatlantic essay contest,' with four messages between 
Churchill and Eisenhower and one from Eden to Dulles, 
followed, as the Prime Minister threatened to 'go it 
alone' in Egypt and withdraw support for the U.S. policy 
on Communist China.25 Finally, the British retreated and 
consented to a draft Heads of Agreement setting forth 
points of agreement and difference in the Anglo-Egyptian 
talks.26
Eden barely survived the crisis. Twelve members of 
the Suez Group wrote Churchill that Britain had to retain 
full control of Base facilities and 'British combatant 
units strong enough to make effective our right to 
reinforce the base in case of necessity.' On 17 December, 
the Commons debated a Suez Group motion condemning the 
Government's negotiations with Egypt. Churchill, privately 
critical of the Foreign Office, supported Eden before the 
1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers and the 
Commons; however, the Prime Minister told the Cabinet at 
the end of December that the negotiations should be 
abandoned if agreement was not reached in the near-
24 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 1958ff.? PRO, PREMll/395/File; 
PRO, PREMll/699/File; PRO, F0371/102843/JE11345/9G,
Dixon minute, 16 December 1953? PRO, PREM11/484, Boothby 
minute, 18 December 1953.
25 PRO, PREM11/699, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
5334, 19 December 1953.
26 PRO, PREM11/701, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
86, 13 January 1954.
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future.27
Meanwhile, the U.S., without consulting the British,
proceeded with the Northern Tier's formation. In September
1953, the State and Defence Departments agreed in
principle to $30 million in military grants for Iraq,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, and the Lebanon, with
$50 million to be set aside for Egypt and Pakistan. In
November, after visits to Washington by Pakistani leaders,
President Eisenhower approved the provision of military
aid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff went further:
The time might be propitious for encouraging 
Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Iraq or a 
combination thereof to form a defense 
association of indigenous forces under an 
indigenous command advantageously located with 
relation to the current threat.28
Preoccupied with Egypt and unable to provide
sufficient aid to meet Pakistani demands, the Foreign
Office agreed that if the 'Americans [decided] to make the
offer, we would not wish to stand in the way.' Only on 4
December did Eden have second thoughts, writing:
We are not at all clear what it is the Americans 
are proposing, and I think our main objective 
should be to find out what they have in mind. If 
it is a question of American bases in Pakistan, 
then I think we should warn them that this might 
seem provocative to the Russians.... There would 
also be no harm in telling them about the 
message we have had from [Indian Prime Minister]
Nehru [objecting to the plan].29
27 PRO, F0371/102766/JE1052/148, Amery to Churchill, 7 
October 1953? PRO, CAB128/26, C.C.79(53), 14 December 
1953, and subsequent meetings.
28 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 416ff. and p. 433? DDE, Ann 
Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 1, November 1953, 
Foster Dulles memorandum, 10 November 1953. C.f. Ayesha 
Jalal, 'Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle 
Eastern Defence in the Cold War, 1947-1955,' 
International History Review, August 1989.
29 PRO, FO371/106935-106936/FY1192/File? PRO, 
F0371/106937/FY1192/ 66, Eden minute, 4 December 1953, 
and subsequent minutes.
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Eden voiced his fears to Foster Dulles at Bermuda, 
but the Foreign Office did not press the objections and 
the State Department acted with unexpected speed. On 28 
December, the Turks agreed to the American suggestion of a 
Turkish-Pakistani Pact, and the U.S. Ambassador in Karachi 
consulted the Pakistanis the next day. Only then did 
Washington inform the British Embassy of its efforts. Eden 
wrote, 'This is rather startling, and I have considerable 
doubts,' but was unable to halt the Americans.30
On 5 January, Eisenhower agreed to grant aid for 
Pakistan. At the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers, 
Foster Dulles told Eden that he and Eisenhower had decided 
'they must go ahead' despite Indian objections. Eden gave 
way. His hope was a British role in the Northern Tier 
through Iraqi participation.31
Eden's view reflected a significant change of policy 
by the Foreign Office and the military: Britain would no 
longer base her Middle Eastern position upon Cairo but 
upon Baghdad and Amman. Caught between American pressure 
for concessions in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and 
right-wing pressure to stand firm, the Foreign Office and 
Chiefs of Staff concluded that the only alternatives to an 
agreement with the Egyptians were complete withdrawal or 
indefinite occupation of the Canal Zone against Egyptian 
opposition. Eden considered a coup against the Neguib
30 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, pp. 439ff.? PRO, F0371/106937/ 
FY1192/94, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2793, 29 
December 1953, and subsequent minutes.
31 DDE, John Foster Dulles, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 1, Meeting with the President 1954 
(4), Foster Dulles memorandum, 5 January 1954? PRO, 
F0371/112315/DY1192/47, Eden to Foreign Office, Cable 7, 
24 January 1954.
39
Government, but Ambassador Stevenson replied, 'There is no 
[political] alternative for Egypt: assassination of Neguib 
would lead to one of Neguib's lieutenants, presumably 
Nasser./32
The Foreign Office also wanted a strategy to block 
further U.S. intrusion upon Britain's Middle Eastern 
position. In autumn 1953, the Iraqi Government requested 
the reequipment of two Army divisions and the creation of 
a third, approaching the U.S. as well as Britain, the 
traditional supplier of their military. The State 
Department drafted a 'memorandum of understanding' with 
the British Embassy in Washington to permit a 'readily 
identifiable' U.S. contribution to Iraq while maintaining 
the British position. The British Embassy in Baghdad did 
not trust their American counterparts, however, and some 
Foreign Office officials agreed. J
The idea of an Iraqi-Jordanian axis was not a new 
one. In March 1953, Eden approved British military plans, 
stemming from the 1952 Global Strategy Paper and the 
subsequent Radical Review, to base Middle Eastern defence 
upon Iraq and Jordan. The Foreign Secretary was content 
for plans to evolve slowly until the American initiative 
in Iraq and the collapse of the Anglo-Egyptian talks. 
Simultaneously, Jordan requested the build-up of British 
forces with the stationing of an armoured squadron in
32 W.R. Louis, 'The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Settlement of 1954,' in W.R. Louis and Roger Owen
(eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 46ff. and p. 64.
33 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 787.5-MSP/11-2553, State Department 
to Baghdad, Cable 302, 25 November 1953; Jalal, p. 430; 
PRO, F0371/ 104676/EQ10345/3, Troutbeck to Eden, 1 
December 1953.
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Ma'an in southern Jordan.34
On 12 January 1954, Eden drew these elements together
into a new policy:
[We] should make it plain that our positions in 
Iraq and Jordan are clearly related....If we are 
to have any position in Middle East, our 
authority must be based on close relations with 
Jordan and Iraq....The chances of Egyptians 
becoming our friends are slight. Israel cannot 
fulfill our purpose. Iraq and Jordan are 
friendly and could be made more so.35
The Chiefs of Staff modified the 'inner ring' concept to
redeploy forces at British bases in Libya, which signed a
20-year treaty with Britain in 1953, Jordan, Iraq, Cyprus,
and Aden. British troops, supported by air cover, would
push out from the 'inner ring' around Jordan and the
Lebanon to defend Iraq. The Cabinet agreed. The RAF base
at Amman was reopened, with a fighter squadron permanently
stationed there, and an armoured squadron was sent to the
O  f.
port of Aqaba. °
With the new defence policy established, the Foreign 
Office agreed to operate the Suez Canal Base with civilian 
technicians. Nasser, pressed by the Americans, accepted 
British re-entry into the base in event of war or threat 
of war against an Arab state or Turkey, and the U.S. 
promised aid to Egypt after a settlement was reached. 
Churchill was still doubtful, but the persistence of the 
Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff and the advent of the 
hydrogen bomb forced him to reconsider the value of 
'digging in.' Heads of Agreement for an Anglo-Egyptian
34 PRO, F0371/104236/El197/14, Eden minute on BMEO to 
Cairo, Cable F233, 27 March 1953? PRO, CAB128/27,
C.C.62(53), 29 October 1953.
35 PRO, F0371/110819/V1193/8, Eden minute, 12 January
1954.
36 PRO, F0371/110819-110821/V1193/File.
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Treaty were initialled on 27 July 1954 and the Treaty was 
signed on 19 October.37
Meanwhile, the Turks and Pakistanis, prompted by the 
U.S., announced their intention to form a pact on 19 
February and signed the document on 2 April. The U.S. and 
Iraq reached a military aid agreement on 21 April, and the 
U.S. and Pakistan on 19 May. British representatives in 
the Middle East still believed that U.S. resources would 
overwhelm any British plans. The Foreign Office had 
decided, however, that American military and economic aid 
to the Northern Tier was established and Britain's task 
was to regain political leadership of the area through
. . . TQrevision of the 1932 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. °
Pursuing its 'independence' in the Middle East, the 
Eisenhower Administration attempted to resolve the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, using the 'step-by-step' approach 
suggested by Foster Dulles in June 1953. When Israel 
attempted in September 1953 to divert water, claimed by 
Syria, from the Jordan River, the Eisenhower 
Administration, believing that the Truman Administration's 
favouritism of Israel had prevented successful American 
mediation, implemented a policy of 'impartiality.' 
Economic aid to Tel Aviv was suspended until the Israelis 
ceased diversion on 27 October. Eisenhower then appointed 
a special emissary, Eric Johnston, to negotiate an 
amicable division of the Jordan River. When this was 
achieved, issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the
37 PRO, F0371/108413-108445/JE1192/File.
38 PRO, F0371/112316/DY1192/62, Ankara to Foreign Office, 
Cable 57, 2 February 1954; PRO, F0371/112314- 
112322/DY1192/File.
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settlement of Arab refugees, and the elimination of trade 
boycotts could be addressed. On 17 November, Johnston 
reported that the Arabs and recommended a second visit in 
early 1954 to pursue the initiative.39
The second Johnston mission was overshadowed by 
disturbances on the Arab-Israeli borders and an attempt by 
Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade and NEA, 
resisted by Foster Dulles, to check Israeli 
'expansionism.*40 In contrast, the third Johnston mission 
in June 1954 renewed hope for a settlement. Johnston was 
'much encouraged at the prospect of obtaining Arab 
cooperation,' especially from Egypt, and the chairman of 
the Arab committee claimed, 'Apart from a few technical 
points, agreement is complete between Johnston and us.'41
In July 1954, the NSC reviewed the progress of its 
Middle Eastern policy. With the Anglo-Egyptian problem 
resolved, the NSC linked the progress of a Northern Tier 
pact to an Arab-Israeli solution. Initially, the pact 
would be indigenous, with Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq 
as members. Before the U.S. joined, Arab-Israeli tension 
had to decrease significantly. Failing this, the State 
Department was in an impossible position. The U.S. 
Congress, with its large pro-Israeli lobby, would demand
39 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 5, Phone 
Calls, July-December 1953 (1), Eisenhower minute, 8 
October 1953? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Administration, 
Box 22, Eric Johnston (1), 'Report to the President on 
Middle Eastern Mission,' 19 November 1953.
40 See FRUS, 1952-1954 IX, p. 1406 and p. 1502? DDE, John 
Foster Dulles Series, Chronological, Box 7, April 1954 
(2), Foster Dulles to Byroade, 10 April 1954? DDE, John 
Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 2, July- 
August 1954 (1), Foster Dulles to Nixon, 13 August 1954.
41 USNA, RG 84, Cairo Embassy Records, 1953-1955, Box 1, 
322.2 TVA-Jordan Valley Project, Johnston minute, 26 
June 1954.
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an American guarantee of Israeli borders before approving 
accession to a pact with Arab membership, but a guarantee 
of Israel in advance of an Arab-Israeli settlement, would 
indicate American favouritism of Israel.
To reduce border tensions and improve chances for a 
wide-ranging settlement, the NSC took steps to deter an 
attack by Israel or the Arab States. U.S. economic aid 
would be cut off, and trade sanctions would be imposed to 
force an 'attacking state to relinquish any territory 
seized.' The establishment of a naval blockade upon the 
aggressor and additional military steps would be 
considered. Other countries would be urged to take similar 
measures, and U.N. support would be sought.42
The Arab-Israeli issue forced the NSC to recognise
the need for Anglo-American cooperation. While 
'independent' action had brought results, especially in 
the Northern Tier, the U.S. could not advance towards an 
Arab-Israeli settlement without the help of Britain, who 
still retained the diplomatic lead in Iraq and political 
and military dominance in Jordan. Moreover, the Anglo- 
Egyptian agreement might renew British prestige in Cairo. 
The NSC acknowledged that, as British support for the
Northern Tier was an 'important factor' in determining its 
success, 'efforts should be made to overcome the doubts 
now held by the U.K., particularly regarding the inclusion
of Iran,' and the initiative for an Arab-Israeli
settlement should be defined 'in collaboration with the 
U.K./43
42 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
7, 207th NSC meeting, 22 July 1954.
43 Ibid.: FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 506.
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Military cooperation over Middle Eastern policy had 
continued since 1953 through Anglo-American staff 
conferences in Washington. Meetings in December 1953 
considered the stationing of Allied air forces in Cyprus, 
Libya, the Persian Gulf, and Jordan and, with the Turks, 
the use of railways and prestocking of equipment in 
southern Turkey to supply the Middle Eastern theatre in 
wartime.44 In June 1954, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
unexpectedly requested detailed planning studies on the
Middle East. Discussions between Britain, the U.S., and 
Turkey would be followed by Anglo-American discussions to 
establish the concept of operations for Middle Eastern
defence and to draft plans to secure lines of 
communication between Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and one 
major oil-production complex.
At the tripartite talks in January 1955, general 
agreement was reached on the concept of operations. 
Differences about the forces required from each country, 
the amount of petroleum and oil available in wartime, and 
requirements for the prestocking of materials were left 
for Anglo-American talks. Meanwhile, the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff agreed to consider provision of American-
controlled nuclear weapons for Middle Eastern defence.45
With the NSC offering renewed Anglo-American
diplomatic cooperation, the Foreign Office hastened to
44 PRO, F0371/104238/El197/71G, War Office to Bruce, 13 
October 1953, and E1197/83G, Scott-Fox to Hood, 16 
December 1953? PRO, F0371/110826-110827/V1195/File.
45 PRO, F0371/110822/V1193/79G, COS(54)212, 'Coordination 
in Middle Eastern Defence Planning,' 25 June 1954, and 
subsequent minutes; USNA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, 
Geographical Files, 1954-1956, 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), S. 
22, Joint Strategic Plans Committee report, 11 August 
1955.
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unite London and Washington on the Arab-Israeli question. 
On 2 October, Eden broached the idea to Foster Dulles of a 
joint demarche to the Arab States and Israel, followed by 
negotiations in which one side and then the other would be 
consulted by Anglo-American mediators. On 17 November, the 
State Department accepted the British suggestion, and 
Foster Dulles and Eden agreed that Assistant 
Undersecretary Evelyn Shuckburgh, supervising Middle 
Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office, would visit 
Washington in January 1955 to meet Foster Dulles' special 
representative, Francis Russell. Project ALPHA had been 
launched.46
The reconciliation between the two Governments on 
Middle Eastern policy limited differences between American 
and British representatives in the field. Foster Dulles 
and his brother Allen, the director of the CIA, 
coordinated the implementation of NSC policy and both, 
unlike their predecessors, were closely involved in 
American action in the Middle East. Thus, the NSC's 
renewed emphasis on cooperation with Britain was 
translated, through directives from Washington, into 
consultation between American and British Embassies.
Even the operational independence of the Americans, 
most significant in areas where British influence was 
limited or declining, did not precipitate prolonged Anglo- 
American conflict. The CIA station was in close contact 
with the Syrian dictator, General Adib Shishakli, but his 
fall in February 1954 and the return of instability 
renewed Anglo-American interest in preventing the loss of
46 FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 1662, p. 1683, and p. 1693.
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Western influence in Damascus. On the Arabian Peninsula,
the Trucial Sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi and of Muscat and
Oman, supported by British advisors, subsidies, and
troops, continued to vie with Saudi Arabia and the
Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) for control of the
Buraimi oasis. After repeated requests from the Eisenhower
Administration, however, Britain submitted the question of
Buraimi's status to a five-member tribunal, establishing a
temporary accord between Washington and London.47
Egypt was still the most significant theatre for
American intervention. With the British departure from the
Suez Canal Base, American aid could be used to usurp
Britain's traditional position in Cairo. On 28 July 1954,
the day after Britain and Egypt initialled the Heads of
Agreement, Foster Dulles authorised Ambassador Caffery to
discuss economic and military assistance with the RCC, and
$40 million in economic aid was earmarked for Egypt.
Covertly, the CIA continued to develop Egypt's military 
• • • • 4ftintelligence and internal security forces. °
The possibility of American dominance in Egypt 
through aid never arose, however. Under the Military 
Defence Assistance Act (MDAA), any country receiving 
military aid had to accept a U.S. military mission, but 
Nasser told the U.S. Embassy that he could not accept 
foreign troops on Egyptian soil so soon after an agreement
47 PRO,F0371/104258/E10345/40, Pelham to Bowker, 5 July 
1953? PRO, F0371/114874/ES1051/File? Leonard Mosley, 
Dulles (New York: The Dial Press, 1978), p. 348.
48 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.5-MSP Series, State Department to 
Cairo, Cable 144, 28 July 1954, Eisenhower minute, 12 
August 1954, and State Department to Cairo, Cable 382, 4 
September 1954; Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America's 
Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), pp. 249ff.
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to end the British 'occupation.' Foster and Allen Dulles 
tried to circumvent the MDAA. Of the $40 million in 
economic aid, $5 million would be diverted to arms 
purchases, and an additional $3 million from Eisenhower's 
'executive' budget would be offered for 'certain morale- 
building items of military equipment such as uniforms and 
staff transportation.' CIA and Defence Department 
officials, including Kermit Roosevelt, presented the 
package to Nasser, but he refused to divert any money from 
the package of economic aid, despite the $3 million 
'sweetener,' which he and his advisors considered a 
personal bribe. Nasser used the $3 million to build a 
monument to the CIA: an ostentatious tower in Cairo, known 
locally as 'Roosevelt's Erection.'49
The real threat to renewed Anglo-American cooperation 
came, outside the 'alliance,' from action by Middle 
Eastern leaders, notably efforts by Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri es-Sa'id to establish leadership of the Arab world 
through Iraq's position in Northern Tier and Middle 
Eastern defence pacts. In September 1954, after a failed 
attempt at rapprochement with Egypt, Nuri suggested 
replacement of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, due to 
expire in 1957, with a multilateral system, with Britain 
continuing to have the use of bases in Iraq. The Foreign 
Office was hesitant, since Nuri had tabled vague schemes
49 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.5-MSP/9-2754, Cairo to State 
Department, Despatch 545, 27 September 1954, and 
subsequent minutes; DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, 
Telephone Calls, Box 3, September-October 1954 (2), 
Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 27 October 1954?
Copeland, p. 123? Eveland, p. 91? Mohammed Heikal, 
Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English 
Library, 1972), p. 52.
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in the past without results, and Eden and Shuckburgh 
suspected that Nuri's real motive was Iraq's long-standing 
wish for union with Syria. If Nuri was serious, however, 
and his plan led to revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 
the proposal could be 'an ingenious one.' Eden and the 
Foreign Office agreed to take a 'wait-and-see' attitude.50
London's caution appeared to be justified after Iraqi 
talks with Turkey in mid-October. Nuri's ideas were still 
imprecise, and it was merely agreed that Turkish Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes would visit Baghdad in January
1955. The most that the Turks expected from the January 
talks was clarification of Nuri's intentions and progress 
towards a future agreement.51
At first, the Turkish-Iraqi talks did not threaten 
Anglo-American cooperation. A new Ambassador, Waldemar 
Gallman, was sent to Baghdad in September to encourage the 
Iraqis, and Washington urged Turkey to bring Iraq into the 
Turkish-Pakistani Pact.52 However, Britain and the U.S. 
supported the Northern Tier for different reasons. The 
U.S. sought a combination of countries oriented against 
the Soviet Union, the British an 'umbrella' for their 
Middle Eastern treaty commitments. With events developing 
quickly and haphazardly, the two sides never coordinated 
their views. The Foreign Office never perceived the 
American emphasis on an 'indigenous' grouping free of 
overt Western participation, while the State Department
50 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 780.5/9-2754, London to State 
Department, Despatch 876, 27 September 1954; PRO, 
F0371/110788/V1073/57, Falla minute, 2 October 1954, and 
subsequent minutes; Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez 
(London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 237.
51 PRO, F0371/110787-110788/V1073/File.
52 Ibid.
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never appreciated the British priority of revision of the
Anglo-Iraqi treaty.
The uncertain position of Egypt also hindered Anglo-
American relations. The 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty ended
open hostility between London and Cairo, but it did not
bring the 'new era of cooperation and mutual
understanding' sought by the Foreign Office. When Anthony
Nutting, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, asked
Nasser about Egypt's participation in Middle Eastern
defence, the Egyptian Prime Minister was evasive. Nutting
reported optimistically, '[Egypt are] reluctant to take
any overt steps in this direction at present, although
they expressed hope of being able to do so in [the] not
too distant future,' but Caffery warned:
The greatest mistake the British (or we) could 
make at this moment would be to attempt to force 
the Egyptian pace towards participation in area 
security arrangements including the Western 
powers. I am convinced that this will come to 
pass, but the Egyptians, and only the Egyptians, 
must decide when the time is ripe. 3
Both Britain and Egypt were soon diverted from the 
matter, Britain by Nuri's proposals for regional defence, 
Nasser by an assassination attempt upon him by the Moslem 
Brotherhood and his subsequent removal of General Neguib 
from the Presidency. Most importantly, Nasser told British 
representatives that Egypt could not consider military 
cooperation until an Arab-Israeli settlement was arranged. 
Shuckburgh minuted in early December, 'I am not at present 
convinced that we want to press the Egyptians over defence 
arrangements. It would be more useful if they would help
53 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 641.74 Series, London to State 
Department, Cable 2506, 25 October 1954, and Cairo to 
State Department, Despatch 761, 21 October 1954.
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us over Israel.' Eden endorsed the statement.^
54 PRO, FO371/108485/JE11932/5, BMEO to Foreign Office, 
Cable 614, 9 December 1954.
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CHAPTER 3
FEBRUARY - SEPTEMBER 1955: SEEDS OF CONFLICT
On 20 February 1955, Foreign Secretary Eden visited
President Nasser in Cairo, ostensibly to exchange
congratulations over the new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. In
fact, Eden's primary objective Egyptian cooperation with
Britain in a Middle Eastern defence system.
Within nine days, that vision was shattered. Egypt
refused military ties with the West, and the Anglo-
Egyptian rapprochement was replaced by distrust. The Arab
world was polarised between Egypt and Iraq, and secret
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations for peace were replaced by
preparations for long-term conflict. By the end of
February, the chain of events leading to the Suez Crisis
had been established.
Contrary to later legends, the deterioration was not
due to animosity between Eden and Nasser. Eden reported to
Prime Minister Churchill:
I was impressed by Nasser, who seemed forthright 
and friendly although not open to conviction on 
the Turkish-Iraqi [Pact]. No doubt jealousy 
plays a part in this, and a frustrated desire to 
lead the Arab world.
Clarissa Eden wrote that her husband 'had a good talk with
Nasser except regarding the Turkish-Iraqi Pact, upon which
[Nasser] was very bitter.' Nasser was baffled by Eden's
aristocratic manner did not dislike the Foreign Secretary.
It was Eden's wife Clarissa who found Nasser's informal
dress and casual manner rude and insulting.1
1 PRO, F0371/115492/V1073/289, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 269, 21 February 1955? Robert Rhodes James,
Anthony Eden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), p. 
398.
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The centrepiece of the visit was a dinner at the 
British Embassy.2 The conversation centred upon Egyptian- 
Iraqi relations and the Turkish-Iraqi defence pact, which 
had been initialled on 12 January. Eden argued that a 
united defence as far north as possible was in Egypt's 
interest, reinforcing the point with a 15-minute 
presentation by General Sir John Harding, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff. Nasser agreed that Middle Eastern 
defence against the Soviet Union should link Iraq with 
Arab states to the west and south, but he argued that this 
should be under a unified Arab command free of foreign 
'influence.' He reminded Eden that Israel, not the Soviet 
Union, was the main concern of the Arab States. Eden, 
however, refused to oppose the final signature of the 
Turkish-Iraqi Pact.3
Despite their inability to compromise over Middle 
Eastern defence, the two men parted amicably, but their 
'friendship' was now the hostage of events outside Britain 
and Egypt. The announcement by Turkey and Iraq that they 
intended to conclude a defence pact had surprised the 
Foreign Office. The previous day, before the announcement, 
the British Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad, Robin Hooper, 
reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id was not 
seeking a formal agreement. At most, Turkey and Iraq would
2 For accounts of the meeting, see Mohammed Heikal, 
Cutting the Lion's Tail (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), 
pp. 60ff.; Carlton, Anthony Eden (London: Allen Lane, 
1981), p. 365? Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: 
Constable, 1967), p. 89? Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice- 
Fought War (London: Longman, 1970), p. 199.
3 PRO, F0371/115583/V1193/31G, Bangkok to Foreign Office, 
Cable 146, 23 February 1955? PRO, F0371/115866/VR1076/ 
28G, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 278, 22 February 
1955? PRO, F0371/115492/V1073/289, Cairo to Foreign 
Office, Cable 269, 21 February 1955? Love, p. 199.
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arrange for staff conversations and free transit for 
military material through their countries. Assistant 
Undersecretary Shuckburgh summarised, '1 am doubtful 
whether this is really a problem which cannot very well 
wait.'4
The Foreign Office worried about the effect of a 
Turkish-Iraqi agreement upon Egypt, but it was forced into 
a decision. Egyptian support of the Northern Tier was the 
optimal solution, but failing that, Britain had to choose 
between a defence strategy centred upon Cairo and one 
centred upon Baghdad. The redeployment of British forces 
in the Middle East, begun in 1953, and Nasser's refusal to 
allow foreign troops in Egypt in peacetime precluded the 
former option. Without a satisfactory revision of the 1932 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, due to expire in 1957, the latter 
would be lost as well.5
On 14 January, Eden wrote Nuri that he was 'much 
encouraged' by the Turkish-Iraqi announcement and implied 
that an Anglo-Iraqi arrangement should follow. Advised by 
Michael Wright, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, that an 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty under cover of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact 
was 'as solid a basis [of agreement] as it is possible to 
secure,' the Foreign Office authorized military talks with 
the Iraqis. On 10 February, without waiting for Cabinet
4 PRO, F0371/115484/V1073/11, Baghdad to Foreign Office, 
Cable 25, 11 January 1955? PRO, F0371/115485/V1073/56, 
Hooper to Shuckburgh, 12 January 1955? PRO, F0371/ 
115484/V1073/2, Shuckburgh minute, 6 January 1955. See 
also H.F. Eilts, 'Reflections on the Suez Crisis: 
Security in the Middle East,' in Louis and Owen, p. 350.
5 PRO, F0371/115484/V1073/26, Shuckburgh minute, 11 
January 1955. See also Avon Papers, University of 
Birmingham (hereafter cited as AP), AP20/23, Bowker to 
Eden, 1 March 1956.
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authority, the Foreign Office advised Iraq and Turkey that 
Britain was prepared to accede to the Pact. Anglo-Iraqi 
military talks on British requirements successfully 
concluded on 22 February, two days before the final 
signature of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact.6
Meanwhile, a period of calm on the Egyptian-Israeli 
border was suddenly dashed by changes in the Israeli 
government and its security policy. Between 1952 and 
February 1955, Egyptian and Israeli leaders, including 
Nasser and Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister and then Prime 
Minister of Israel, secretly sought a peace settlement. 
In August 1952, Israeli and Egyptian diplomats met in 
Paris, and discussions about a possible settlement began 
in early 1953. According to Gideon Raphael of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, Israeli officials met Nasser in July 
1954 to 'reassure him of Israel's understanding of his 
aspirations and its keen interest in negotiating a 
peaceful settlement with him.' The talks were 'intimate 
and intense,' although they 'did not yield significant 
political results.' After the Knesset, the Israeli 
Parliament, endorsed negotiations with Egypt in September, 
Israeli officials discussed the resolution of specific 
issues, including Israeli transit through the Suez Canal, 
with special envoys from Cairo.7
6 PRO, F0371/115484/V1073/33, Foreign Office to Baghdad, 
Cable 45, 14 January 1955? PRO, FO371/115488/V1073/175, 
Foreign Office to Baghdad, Cable 153, 5 February 1955; 
PRO, FO371/115490/V1073/229, Foreign Office to Ankara, 
Cable 199, 10 February 1955.
7 Shimon Shamir, 'The Collapse of Project ALPHA,' in 
Louis and Owen, pp. 73ff.; Sayed-Ahmed, pp. 195ff. and 
pp. 206ff.; Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's 
Secret Relations with a Militant Israel. 1948-1967 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1984), pp. lOlff.? Nutting, 
Nasser, p. 93; USNA, RG 84, Cairo Embassy Records, 1949-
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Sharett faced continuous opposition within the 
Israeli Government to the peace initiatives. Although 
Sharett's predecessor, David Ben-Gurion, 'retired' in 
1953, he maintained close contact with key members of the 
Government, including Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon, and 
the Chief of Staff, General Moshe Dayan. Ben-Gurion had 
always advocated a policy of 'reprisals' against the Arab 
States - from November 1951 to November 1952, while 39 
Israelis were killed in border incidents, 394 Arabs were 
slain in Israeli raids - and the policy continued during 
his 'retirement.' Just before Ben-Gurion left office, 
Dayan became Chief of Staff, and Force 101, a special 
commando unit, was established for reprisals, carried out 
its first operation. In October 1953, over the objections 
of Foreign Minister Sharett, Force 101 attacked Qibya in 
Jordan, killing 53 people. Nine major raids were carried 
out during 1954, often without the approval of the Prime 
Minister's Defence Committee.8
Israeli policy was complicated in June 1954 when 
Israeli military intelligence, without Sharett's 
knowledge, activated a spy ring in Cairo. Attempting to 
poison relations between Egypt and the West and ruin
1954, Box 5, To Department, July 1952-June 1953, Cairo 
to State Department, Cable 1819, 10 February 1953.
8 The following section on Israeli policy is based upon 
Avi Shlaim, 'Conflicting Approaches to Israel's 
Relations with the Arabs: Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 1953- 
1956,' Middle East Journal. Spring 1983, pp. 180ff.; 
Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1978), pp. 217ff.? USNA, RG 59, CDF,
684A.86/5-2055, Tel Aviv to State Department, Despatch 
728, 20 May 1955; W.S. Lucas, 'Israeli Foreign Policy 
and Civil-Military Relations, 1953-56,' paper presented 
at Political Studies Association conference, Durham, 
United Kingdom, April 1990; Ariel Sharon with David 
Chanoff, Warrior: An Autobiography (London: MacDonald, 
1989), pp. 83ff.
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Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, the ring set off explosions 
in British- and American-owned buildings. The saboteurs 
were arrested in summer 1954 by the Egyptians, provoking a 
government crisis which led to the resignations of the 
head of military intelligence and Defence Minister Lavon 
in February 1955.9
Sharett won a victory with the removal of the 'hard­
liner' Lavon, but he lost the battle when Ben-Gurion, who 
succeeded as Defence Minister, wrecked the Egyptian- 
Israeli contacts. Although the situation was 
'comparatively quiet in the Gaza Strip area,' Ben-Gurion 
and Dayan demanded a strike against Egypt. Reluctantly, 
Sharett approved a modest raid, but Ben-Gurion and Dayan 
turned it into a large-scale attack on a military camp in 
Gaza on 28 February. Thirty-eight Egyptians were killed.10
Sharett, misled by Dayan, who estimated that 10 
Egyptians would be killed, confronted Ben-Gurion at a 
Cabinet meeting about reprisals. In reply, Ben-Gurion 
defined a new Israeli policy. Irregardless of Arab 
attitudes, the raids were necessary to display Israel's 
military superiority over the Arabs and to bolster the 
confidence of the Israeli public and army. He dismissed 
the opposition of the United Nations and Western countries 
to the reprisals, since Arab resources would always 
prevent others from supporting Israel's case*11
Gaza was a turning point in Arab-Israeli relations, 
as Sharett was eclipsed by the hard-liners. In March, he
9 See Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Imperfect Spies: The 
History of Israeli Intelligence (London; Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1989), pp. 64ff.
10 Shlaim, p. 188; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. p. 217.
11 Shlaim, p. 188; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. p. 218.
57
narrowly prevented adoption of Ben-Gurion's proposals for 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and abrogation of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, but after a loss of 
seats for Maoai. the dominant party in the Government 
coalition, in elections in July, Ben-Gurion was asked to 
form a government. Sharett remained as Foreign Minister, 
but only for the sake of Western opinion toward Israel and 
the unity of Manai. After Gaza, Nasser abandoned a policy 
of restraint on the border and agreed to organisation of 
fedayeen, commando units to carry out raids into Israel. 
He renewed efforts to acquire arms from the U.S. and 
Britain, and discontented Egyptian Army officers in the 
Egyptian Army demanded approaches to other sources,
, 1 o
notably the Soviet bloc. *
Gaza also spurred the development of a Franco-Israeli 
'alliance.' Evicted from Syria and the Lebanon during 
World War II and excluded from Anglo-American discussions 
of the Middle East between 1950 and 1955, the French 
sought an outlet for a Middle Eastern role. Israel,
anxious for arms and refused large deliveries by London 
and Washington, provided the opportunity.
The appointments of French Ambassador Pierre-Eugene 
Gilbert to Israel and Israeli Ambassador Jacob Tsur to
Paris in 1953 improved cultural and diplomatic contacts,
and military talks led to a visit by Dayan and Shimon 
Peres, the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence, to France in June 1954 and talks in August 
between the French Secretary of Air, Jacques Catroux, and
12 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. p. 219, Nutting, Nasser, p. 93? 
Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1981), p. 33.
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Peres. The French agreed to sell 155-millimeter guns, AMX- 
13 tanks, and 30 fighters, including six Mystere II jets, 
to Israel, and in January 1955, Catroux informed Tel Aviv 
of France's willingness to supply the Mystere IV, one of 
the most advanced jet fighters in the world. Delivering 
the weapons to Israel, France circumvented the Near East 
Arms Coordinating Committee, established by Britain, the 
U.S., and France in 1952 to supervise the Middle Eastern 
'balance of arms israeli secret services provided 
intelligence on nationalist movements in North Africa to 
the French, and France supplied information on nuclear 
research and development to Israel.13
Finally, Gaza sounded the death knell for Egyptian 
accommodation with the Turkish-Iraqi Pact, which was 
directed against the Soviet Union rather than Israel. If 
other Arab countries, such as Syria, Jordan, and the 
Lebanon, joined the Pact, the Egyptians might be isolated 
against the Israelis. To prevent this, Nasser sought an 
Arab defence pact linking Egypt and Syria, with support 
from Saudi Arabia and later accessions by Jordan and the 
Lebanon. On 6 March, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia signed 
an agreement for military cooperation.14
From this point, no Anglo-Egyptian compromise was 
possible. Military cooperation, tentatively discussed by
13 See Sylvia Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974)? Michael Bar-Zohar, 
Suez Ultra-Secret (Paris: Fayard, 1964), pp. 58ff.? 
Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israeli Foreign Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 262ff.; 
Melman and Raviv, p. 99.
14 PRO, F0371/115495/V1073/399, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 350, 5 March 1955, and V1073/406, Damascus to 
Foreign Office, Cable 91, 7 March 1955? PRO, F0371/ 
115496/V1073/407, Jedda to Foreign Office, Cable 56, 7 
March 1955.
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Lord Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, and Nasser in 
December 1954, was abandoned in February when General Sir 
Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief of Britain's 
Middle Eastern forces, discovered that the Egyptian Chief 
of the General Staff, General Hakim Amer, was no longer 
interested. On 5 March, Nasser suggested to British 
Ambassador Stevenson that Britain serve as the 
'coordinating factor' with inter-Arab pacts led by Egypt, 
but the British Ambassador to Jordan, Charles Duke, argued 
that British acquiescence would be a 'letdown of Jordan' 
and suggested that Britain disrupt the Egyptian-Saudi- 
Syrian agreement, for example, by inviting the Jordanians 
to join the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. Nutting wrote, 'I think 
this is right. We cannot reverse or appear to reverse our 
fears now.' Eden minuted, 'Excellent.'15
On 15 March, the Cabinet approved, in principle, 
negotiation of a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and accession to 
the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. The only recorded objection came 
from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, R.A. Butler, who was 
concerned about the expense of British arms supplies to 
Iraq and states who subsequently joined the Pact. On 5 
April, Britain's formal accession turned the Turkish-Iraqi 
Pact into the Baghdad Pact.16
The speed of events temporarily separated London and 
Washington in their Middle Eastern policies. Before the 
Turkish-Iraqi statement of 12 January, the Americans 
worried about British hesitancy over the Northern Tier. A
15 PRO, F0371/115496/V1073/408, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 95, 7 March 1955, and subsequent minutes.
16 PRO, CAB128/28, C.C.24(55), 15 March 1955; PRO,
F0371/115751-115759/VQ1051/File.
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U.S. Embassy official told Shuckburgh that, even if Nuri's 
actions...
. .. should result in a breakup of the Arab 
League,...the Northern Tier would provide an 
alternate centre of attraction around which the 
Arab States might group themselves and this 
would not, in their opinion, be a bad thing.
Shuckburgh commented after the meeting:
If the American policy succeeds, it may be a 
great success, but I think it is risky and may 
well faij. We must avoid blame for its 
failure.17
On 27 January, Shuckburgh informed the State 
Department of the Foreign Office's change of heart: the 
Turkish-Iraqi Pact should be welcomed as a step 'toward an 
arrangement which we hoped would maintain for us our basic 
defence requirements.' The State Department responded, 
'Mr. Dulles' preliminary reaction was that he would favour 
eventual U.S. association with the Pact provided...the 
U.S. would only be involved in the event of aggression 
from outside the area.' On certain questions, notably 
Iranian accession, the U.S. was still more eager than 
Britain for rapid development of the Pact.18
Over next fortnight, the State Department reversed 
its attitude. The catalyst was Nuri's proposal of 27 
January, endorsed by the Turks, that the U.S. and Britain 
be invited to join the Pact. When the Foreign Office asked 
for its views, the State Department replied that, while 
quick conclusion of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact was essential, 
U.S. Embassies in Baghdad and Ankara were not to imply 
that the U.S. was willing to join. Accession was difficult
17 PRO, FO371/115484/V1073/2G, Shuckburgh minute, 11 
January 1955.
18 PRO, F0371/115469/V1023/3G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 631 Saving, 28 January 1955.
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because of the opposition of pro-Israeli groups in 
Washington. Eden informed the Cabinet on 15 March that the 
'U.S. are unlikely to accede [to the Pact] in the 
immediate future' but they 'might... consider acceding to 
it at an appropriate time.'A;7
In late March, the State Department put the question 
of American accession to rest. It informed the British 
Ambassador in Washington, Roger Makins, that problems with 
Congress were anticipated because of a draft provision in 
the Pact that disputes between signatories were to be 
settled within the framework of the United Nations 
Charter. According to pro-Israeli lobbyists, the provision 
implied that a dispute between a signatory of the Pact and 
a non-member, e.g., between Iraq and Israel, did not have 
to be resolved within the Charter's framework. The Foreign 
Office noted that this legal point was 'extremely poor' 
but missed the political point of the argument. Israeli 
opposition, inside and outside Congress, was an
• , Of)
insuperable obstacle to U.S. accession. u
While the U.S. and Britain disagreed on the Northern 
Tier's development, they coordinated their policies on the 
related issue of an Arab-Israeli settlement. Shuckburgh's 
first journey to Washington established the method of 
approach to Egypt and Israel, and visits by Francis
19 PRO, FO371/115487/V1073/115, Baghdad to Foreign Office, 
Cable 68, 27 January 1955, and V1073/133, Ankara to 
Foreign Office, Cable 69, 31 January 1955; PRO, F0371/ 
115488/VI073/161, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
332, 4 February 1955; PRO, F0371/115489/V1073/176, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 387, 9 February 
1955; PRO, CAB128/28, C.C.24(55), 15 March 1955.
20 PRO, FO371/115502/V1073/568, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 649, 24 March 1955, and subsequent 
minutes.
62
Russell, the chief American negotiator, to London in March 
and April, produced guidelines for the settlement. 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement would be sought on the 
American plan for division of the Jordan River. Israel 
would cede some territory in the Negev desert to Egypt to 
establish an Egyptian-Jordanian border and, with an 
international loan, compensate Palestinian refugees 
displaced from their homes by the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli 
War. The U.S., besides contributing $200 million toward 
the international loan, would provide $395 million in 
economic and military aid for the Arabs and, with Britain, 
guarantee Arab-Israeli borders. The first approach with 
the proposal would be made by the U.S. Ambassador in 
Cairo, Henry Byroade, to Nasser. Eisenhower approved the 
package on 6 May.21
If Nasser had cooperated on the Arab-Israeli 
question, Anglo-American organization of Middle Eastern 
defence might have proceeded smoothly, but the spectres of 
Gaza and the Baghdad Pact haunted the Egyptian President. 
After the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in 
April 1955, Nasser complained to Ambassador Stevenson 
about reports that the British Embassy was spreading 
propaganda against his government. Nasser also alleged 
that U.S. personnel in Egypt and Arab States were 
spreading rumours about the RCC's instability, that the 
American representative in the Sudan was conspiring
21 PRO, F0371/115964-115867/VR1076/File; DDE, John Foster 
Dulles Series, Special Assistants, Chronological, Box 7, 
February 1955 (3), Hanes to Russell, 15 February 1955; 
DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 3, Meetings with the President (4), 
MacArthur to Foster Dulles, 5 May 1955, and enclosed 
memoranda.
63
against Egypt, that the U.S. was sabotaging foreign 
support for the High Aswan Dam and undermining the 
Egyptian economy through its cotton policy, and that the 
Americans intended to pressure Egypt into making peace 
with Israel. The State Department had second thoughts 
about the approach to Nasser and considered alternative 
initiatives with Jordan and Lebanon, but under Foreign 
Office pressure, it authorised the State Department the 
Ambassador to speak to Nasser on 9 June.22
However, ALPHA had been eclipsed by the question of 
arms supplies to Cairo. The increase in military aid 
promised for Egyptian signature of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty never materialised. In January 1955, Britain agreed 
to release 30 fighters, on order since 1949, and 16 of 64 
Centurion Mark III tanks purchased in 1951, but it would 
not consent to further releases or offer current equipment 
such as the Centurion Mark VII.23
After his trip to Cairo and the Gaza raid, Eden, 
anxious 'about the effect of military and political 
defeats upon Nasser's regime,' suggested the release of 
the remaining Centurion Mark Ills and immediate supply of 
six of the 30 released fighters, but the Foreign Office 
Minister of State, Nutting, objected, since such releases 
might cause a 'dangerous explosion in Israel,' and
22 PRO, F0371/113591/JE1022/7, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 633, 17 May 1955, and JE1022/8, Cairo to Foreign 
Office, Cable 641, 19 May 1955; PRO, F0371/115868/ 
VR1076/85G, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 609, 10 May 
1955? PRO, F0371/115869/VR1076/105G, Washington to 
Foreign Office, Cable 1244, 31 May 1955? Aronson, p.
126? PRO, F0371/115870/VR1076/112G, Cairo to Foreign 
Office, Cable 727, 9 June 1955.
23 PRO, F0371/113680/JE1194/368, Trevelyan to Foreign 
Office, 24 October 1955? PRO, F0371/113669/JE1194/File.
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Shuckburgh's compromise of the release of 16 additional 
Centurions and immediate supply of six fighters was 
finally accepted.24
On 10 March, Nasser gave Byroade a list of $27 
million in necessary equipment. Eisenhower labelled the 
request 'peanuts' and authorised a first installment of 
$11 million, but the deal foundered over the method of 
payment. Short of foreign exchange, Nasser had to obtain 
the arms on credit or trade Egyptian cotton for them. 
Egypt's refusal to accept a U.S. military mission 
precluded the former, and the U.S., because of domestic 
cotton surpluses, had no wish to pursue the latter.25
While the Americans dithered, Nasser learned of 
France's arms agreement with Israel. Pressed by his Army 
to prevent further Israeli 'aggressions,' he approached 
Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Premier, at the Bandung 
Conference with a request for arms. Chou replied that 
China was dependent on Soviet supplies but promised to 
pass Nasser's inquiry to Moscow. On 19 May, the Soviet 
Ambassador to Egypt, Daniel Solod, told Nasser that the 
Soviet Union would supply Egypt with arms in exchange for 
later payment in cotton and rice. °
When Byroade met Nasser on 9 June, the Egyptian
24 PRO, F0371/113669/JE1194/35, Shuckburgh minute, 10 
March 1955, and subsequent minutes, and JE1194/36, 
Shuckburgh minute, 15 March 1955.
25 PRO, F0371/115497/V1073/445, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 378, 11 March 1955, and V1073/446, Cairo to 
Foreign Office, Cable 380, 11 March 1955; Love, p. 88? 
Heikal, Nasser, p. 56? Lyon, p. 682? Hoopes, p. 323? 
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1961 (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 24.
26 Heikal, Nasser, pp. 69ff.? Channel 4, The End of 
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President warned:
I beg you to understand that this is the last 
time I shall ask for arms from the U.S. If I do 
not get them from you, I know where I can and 
[I] will ask the Soviets for them.
Trying to intimidate Egypt, the Foreign Office instructed
Stevenson to tell Nasser that acceptance of arms from the
Soviets would 'be considered a very serious act.' Nasser
bluntly replied:
I have tried my utmost to obtain from you the 
arms required for the defence of my country, but 
I have not been successful. I cannot stand with 
folded arms in the face of Israel. I consider 
what you have just said as a threat which I am 
not prepared to accept. You are free to do 
whatever you like and I am free to do as I 
please.27
Some Foreign Office officials, anticipating Nasser's
position, had recommended increased aid to Egypt. T.E.
Bromley of the African Department wrote on 3 June:
If this kind of policy [reconciliation with the 
West] was in Nasser's mind, it received a severe 
jolt from the rather sudden conclusion of the 
Turkish-Iraqi pact and from our subsequent 
accession to it....The various border incidents 
around Gaza and Egyptian dissatisfaction with 
U.N. efforts to control them may have also 
contributed to this drift.
He concluded that 'no defence arrangements in the Middle
East [could] be really solid without at least the
• 0 Racquiescence of Egypt.' Shuckburgh concurred on 8 June. ° 
An Egyptian arms mission was lingering in London, but 
Eden, now Prime Minister, had turned against Nasser. 
Incensed by Egyptian propaganda, which supported the Saudi 
Arabian case in the dispute over the Buraimi oasis, Eden
27 PRO, F0371/113675/JE1194/190, BBC Monitoring Report, 8 
October 1955; Love, p. 90? Neff, p. 81? Heikal, Nasser, 
pp. 72ff.? Hoopes, p. 324.
28 PRO, F0371/113608/JE1057/5, Bromley minute, 3 June 
1955, and subsequent minutes.
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scribbled in bright red ink across telegrams from Cairo.
On one he wrote, 'If these representations [for the
cessation of Egyptian propaganda] have no effect, what do
we do next? Anything in our powers to hurt Egypt without
hurting ourselves?'; on another, 'This is gross
impertinence by [the Egyptians] who are likely to be
attacked and destroyed by Israel before long. I hope we
give them no help.'29
Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan wrote the Prime
Minister, 'We may well have to consider such measures [to
hurt Egypt]...but I do not want it to come to this if I
can possibly help it,' but Eden continued to treat minor
incidents as a challenge to the British position. When the
Egyptians passed a routine report on Buraimi to the
Secretary-General of the Arab League, Eden wrote:
This kind of thing is really intolerable. 
Egyptians get steadily worse....They should 
surely be told firmly no more arms deliveries 
while this goes on, or at least warned that we 
will take this position publicly unless they 
stop.
Shuckburgh stood firm:
The plain fact is that, however, disappointed we 
may be in the attitude of Colonel Nasser and his 
colleagues, we can see no alternative Egyptian 
Government in sight which would be any 
better....We have an interest therefore in 
giving him such support as is necessary to 
maintain him in power which includes providing a 
certain amount of toys for his armed forces.
Macmillan chose a new method to deal with Eden: 'I don't
think we need answer Prime Minister's minute at all.'
However, other Ministers, notably Minister of Defence
Selwyn Lloyd, urged Macmillan to defer any shipments to
29 PRO, F0371/113608/JE1057/7, DeZulueta minute, 22 June 
1955, and subsequent minutes, and JE1057/8, DeZulueta to 
Graham, 8 July 1955, and subsequent minutes.
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Cairo, and the Foreign Secretary had neither the time nor 
the motivation to press his point in Cabinet.30
Meanwhile, Nasser sent another list of equipment, 
valued at less than $10 million, to Washington. When the 
State Department did not reply, Nasser agreed to Soviet 
Ambassador Solod's suggestion that Soviet Foreign Dmitri 
Shepilov visit Cairo on 22 July to discuss arms supplies 
from the Eastern bloc to Cairo.31
The State Department had information, through the CIA 
station in Cairo and Israeli sources, that an Egyptian- 
Soviet deal was imminent, and Foster Dulles asked Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev about the reports at the Geneva 
Four-Power Summit in July. Khrushchev firmly denied any 
sale of arms, but Foster Dulles told Eisenhower on 5 
August that he 'planned to notify Nasser that we would 
sell certain military equipment to Egypt as desired by 
him' to preclude an Egyptian deal with the Soviets. 
However, the Secretary added the crippling proviso that 
the U.S. 'would have to be in a position to sell to Israel 
also' to maintain impartiality. When Eisenhower suggested 
telling the Israelis of American plans, Foster Dulles 
retreated from an immediate commitment, 'This might be 
useful but it had better be deferred until we discovered 
whether in fact the Egyptians would buy [American 
arms]./32
The ALPHA negotiations diverted Foster Dulles from
30 Ibid.: PRO. F0371/113608/JE1057/10G. Lloyd to 
Macmillan, 4 August 1955, and subsequent minutes.
31 PRO, FO371/113670/JE1194/File; Love, p. 90; Hoopes, p. 
324; The End of Empire; Egypt, interview with Ali Sabri.
32 Copeland, p. 148; Neff, p. 81; Mosley, p. 386; DDE,
John Foster Dulles Series, Chronological, Box 12, Foster 
Dulles memorandum, 5 August 1955.
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the immediate crisis with Egypt. In February, the Israeli 
Ambassador to Britain, Eliahu Elath, surmised that Britain 
and the U.S. were planning an Arab-Israeli settlement with 
territorial concessions by Israel, especially to Egypt.33 
By late May, the State Department, fearing that the 
Israelis would expose ALPHA, suggested a speech by Foster 
Dulles clarifying the Anglo-American position on the Arab- 
Israeli question.34
After initial opposition,35 the Foreign Office agreed 
that an American statement was necessary. However, the 
British explicitly linked ALPHA to the Baghdad Pact and 
Middle Eastern defence. In exchange for British support of 
Foster Dulles' statement, the Americans would promise to 
join the Baghdad Pact as soon as an Arab-Israeli 
settlement was completed. Meanwhile, the U.S. would 
finance the supply of British Centurion tanks to Iraq and 
give military support to Britain if fighting erupted in 
the Middle East because of Foster Dulles' statement.
By mid-August, the Americans agreed to the Cabinet's 
conditions. The U.S. would pay for 10 Centurions to Iraq 
if the British paid for two, and more tanks would be 
shipped in 1956. Foster Dulles would make a very general 
statement in early September, identifying the problems of 
Arab-Israeli borders, Palestinian refugees, and division
33 Israeli State Archives, 2382/9, Elath to Foreign 
Ministry, February and April 1955.
34 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/5-2855, State Department to 
Cairo, Cable 2069, 28 May 1955.
35 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/5-3055, London to State 
Department, Cable 5222, 30 May 1955.
36 PRO, F0371/115871/VR1076/131G, Shuckburgh to 
Kirkpatrick, 8 July 1955, and subsequent minutes, and 
VR1076/128G, Macmillan to Eden, 12 July 1955? PRO, 
CAB128/29, C.M.23(55), 14 July 1955.
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of the Jordan Waters, without mentioning ALPHA and Anglo-
American consultations. Twenty-four hours later, Macmillan
would issue a supporting statement.37
All was not settled, however. By 19 August, the State
Department and CIA had evidence of a Soviet arms offer to
Egypt. Fearing that exposure of Moscow's support for Cairo
would force the U.S. to abandon 'impartiality' and back
Israel, Foster Dulles moved his speech from 8 September to
26 August. Eden wrote:
The Americans are behaving disgracefully. This 
is their third change of plan over this 
operation....We should hold the Americans 
responsible for any flareup which may occur in 
the area.
As late as 25 August, the Prime Minister threatened to ask 
Eisenhower to cancel the speech. Macmillan minuted, 'It's 
no good trying to call it off now.'38
The statement was an anti-climax. Stripped of any 
reference to ALPHA, it issued general platitudes about the 
need for a comprehensive settlement that would solve 'the 
tragic plight of the 900,000 [Palestinian] refugees,' the 
'pall of fear' over Israeli expansion and Arab aggression, 
and 'the lack of permanent fixed boundaries.' The 
Israelis, while being 'restrained and sympathetic,' warned 
against any concessions of territory. Nasser complained
37 PRO, F0371/115871/VR1076/134G, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 3338, 19 July 1955; CAB128/29,
C.M.27(55), 28 July 1955? DDE, John Foster Dulles 
Series, White House Memoranda, Chronological, Box 3, 
Meetings with the President (2), Foster Dulles 
memorandum, 11 August 1955; PRO, F0371/115586/V1193/97G, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1902, 16 August 
1956.
38 PRO, FO371/115873/VR1076/177G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1938, 19 August 1955, and subsequent 
minutes? U.S. DDRS, US83 001051? PRO, F0371/115874/ 
VR1076/200G, Graham to Macmillan, 25 August 1955.
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about the lack of specific proposals. Iraq, the Lebanon, 
Syria, and Jordan withheld reaction until the Arab states 
could discuss the matter.39
Neither the British nor the Americans comprehended 
that Foster Dulles' statement had been superseded by other 
events. In Israel, Ben-Gurion agreed on 12 August to form 
a Cabinet, heralding a more aggressive Israeli policy. On 
22 August, Israeli patrols crossed the Egyptian border and 
occupied positions in the Gaza strip. Nasser responded 
with fedayeen raids into Israel, and only desperate 
intervention by the U.S. Embassy prevented RCC 
authorisation of a large-scale attack. In turn, Ben-Gurion 
requested an assault upon Egyptian positions at Khan Yunis 
on 31 August. Sharett opposed the raid but gave way when 
Ben-Gurion and Dayan threatened to resign. Thirty-six 
Egyptians were killed.40
Before the attack on Khan Yunis, Nasser told American 
contacts that he would accept a cease-fire if Israel 
withdrew from Gaza,41 but he now faced further Israeli 
attacks and France was reportedly offering Mystere IV 
fighters to Israel while suspending arms deliveries to 
Egypt. Most importantly, the State Department, preoccupied 
with Foster Dulles' speech, continued to ignore the
39 U.S. Declassified Document Reference System (hereafter 
cited as US DDRS), US86 000218; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, 
Dulles-Herter, Box 4, September 1955 (2), Foster Dulles 
to Eisenhower, 1 September 1955? CAB129/77, C.P.(55)127, 
'Palestine,' 20 September 1955; PRO, F0371/115875/ 
VR1076/208, Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, Cable 291, 28 
August 1955? PRO, F0371/115879/VR1076/306G, Cairo to 
Foreign Office, Cable 1286, 20 September 1955? PRO, 
F0371/ 115876/VR1076/218G, Arthur minute, 30 August 
1955.
40 Shlaim, pp. 191ff.
41 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, 
Foster Dulles to Lawson, 31 August 1955.
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Egyptian arms request of 30 June. Until late August,
Assistant Secretary George Allen, the Director of NEA,
mistakenly thought a reply had been made to Nasser.42
The State Department was also confused because it
could not verify the completion of the Egyptian-Soviet
arms deal. On 15 August, the Egyptian Ambassador in
Washington, Ahmed Hussein, visiting Cairo, told Byroade
and CIA station chief James Eichelberger that the Soviets
had offered Egypt 100 MIG fighters, 200 tanks, and jet
bombers, but he added that Nasser had not made a definite
reply. Two days later, Foster Dulles told Allen Dulles,
Director of the CIA, that 'he did not know how seriously
we should take the Russian proposals about Egypt,' and
only on 29 August did the CIA meet Foster Dulles' request
'to work up information on some of the things these people
might be doing about offering arms to the Arabs, etc.'43
Nasser's probably decided to complete the deal after
renewed Israeli attacks on the border, notably at Khan
Yunis. The CIA concluded:
Prime Minister Nasser is impressed with the 
weakness of his position and feels strongly that 
he must secure arms and economic help at the 
earliest possible date. Whether he would, if 
unable to secure this type of aid elsewhere, 
accept Soviet military and economic assistance 
is not at the moment entirely clear, but there 
is a serious risk that, for internal political 
reasons, he might feel himself driven to this.49
42 Love, p. 98 and p. 142; Abel Thomas, Comment Israel Fut 
Sauve (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), pp. 19ff; Bar-Zohar, 
Ben-Gurion. pp. 227ff.; Erskine Childers, The Road to 
Suez (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), p. 133? Hoopes, 
p. 136; Copeland, p. 132.
43 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.56/8-1556, Cairo to State
Department, Cable 234, 15 August 1955? DDE, John Foster
Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, Foster Dulles to
Allen Dulles, 17 August 1955, and Foster Dulles to
Cabell, 29 August 1955? U.S. DDRS, US76 224G.
49 U.S. DDRS, US76 182E.
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Despite the report, the State Department refused on 15 
September to meet Egypt's arms requests, citing the 
'severe practical difficulties' of financing the purchases 
and insisting, 'Positive steps by [Nasser] such as a start 
in exploring Secretary's statement [of 26 August] would 
bolster greatly case for accommodating Egypt on 
financing.' Byroade protested, but the State Department 
repeated its position on the 20th.50 On 21 September, 
Nasser confirmed to Byroade that Egypt would receive 
approximately $80 million in arms from the Soviet bloc, 
with submarines, 100 tanks, and 200 planes, including MIG- 
15 fighters and IL-28 bombers. Soviet technicians would be 
in Cairo for three months to set up the equipment and 
train Egyptian forces to use it.51
Developments in Egypt coincided with difficulties in 
Anglo-American discussions over the Middle East. Politico- 
military talks between Undersecretary of State Herbert 
Hoover, Jr., and British Ambassador Makins brought 
professions that 'the U.S. Government continues to regard 
the Baghdad pact as the best foundation on which to build 
the defence of the area' but no further evidence of 
American support. Eden resented Foster Dulles' lead on 
ALPHA and minuted on 29 August, 'Our long-standing credit 
in the area is not receiving the credit it deserves.' Two 
days later, he added, 'Mr. Dulles started all this, and if
50 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86 Series, State Department to 
Cairo, Cable 515, 15 September 1955, Cairo to State 
Department, Cable 485, 16 September 1955, and State 
Department to Cairo, Cable 537, 20 September 1955.
51 Neff, p. 89? PRO, F0800/669, Macmillan to Eden, 22 
September 1955? PRO, F0371/113674/JE1194/149, Cairo to 
Foreign Office, Cable 1315, 25 September 1955, and 
JE1194/151, Shuckburgh minute, 22 September 1955.
he has got himself into trouble [with Arab or Israeli 
reaction], it is not for us to help him out.' With the 
precarious balance in the Middle East about to be upset, 
the omens were not good for Anglo-American cooperation.52
52 PRO, F0371/115518/V1073/998, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1945, 19 August 1955? PRO, F0371/115521/ 
V1073/1066G, Morris to Hadow, 29 September 1955? PRO, 
F0371/115585/V1193/94G, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 456 Saving, 13 August 1955? PRO, F0371/115586/ 
V1193/97G, Eden to Macmillan, 19 August 1955? PRO, 
F0371/115877/VR1076/272G, Graham minute, 29 August 1955? 
PRO, F0371/115876/VR1076/218G, Eden minute 31 August 
1955. See also AP, AP20/1, Eden diary entry, 30 August 
1955.
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CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1955: THE SEARCH FOR AM EGYPTIAN
POLICY
The Americans' immediate objective, upon confirmation
of the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal, was to block its
announcement. However, the CIA, for unknown reasons, had
little confidence in Ambassador Byroade, and the State
Department suspected that Byroade was too close to Nasser
to be objective. On 20 September, he cabled Washington
with bitterness:
I find it impossible to understand why I have 
not been informed of Department's reasoning in 
turning down repeated and increasingly urgent 
recommendations....By our unwillingness to 
manipulate a few million dollars, we are 
permitting the situation to deteriorate to a 
point where a chain reaction of nature that will 
constitute a major defeat for U.S. policy in the 
Middle East, as contrasted to that of the Soviet 
bloc, is highly probable.
Undersecretary of State Hoover told Foster Dulles the same
day:
Apparently there are misunderstandings and 
difficulties with respect to our man [Ambassador 
Byroade] who is there, and [I] would not feel 
satisfied we had done everything in our power 
unless [the CIA's] Kim [Roosevelt] could go 
himself and talk with [Nasser]. That would 
probably raise an explosion on the part of our 
man [Byroade] there...but enough is involved, if 
it is true, that we should not let it stand in 
our way.1
Foster Dulles agreed, and Roosevelt, accompanied by Miles 
Copeland, a CIA official who served in Cairo from 1953 to 
1955, met Nasser on 23 September. Roosevelt, realizing 
that the arms deal was a fait accompli, surprised Nasser 
by suggesting that its announcement contain a gesture of
1 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, 
Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles and Foster Dulles to 
Hoover, 20 September 1955.
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peace towards the Israelis. Nasser assented, and an 
American-Egyptian working part began drafting the speech.2
Foster Dulles reported to Eisenhower, who was at the 
'Western White House' in Denver, Colorado, 'It seems to be 
authentic that [the Soviets] are giving a massive lot of 
arms to the Egyptians, theoretically to be paid for by
cotton --  it is $100 million worth.' Foster Dulles
considered a propaganda offensive against the deal but 
dismissed the idea: 'The Army will overthrow him [Nasser] 
if he refuses to take it. [I don't] think he is happy 
about it but he is held in power by the Army.' He did not 
mention the Roosevelt mission to the President.3
The following day, Eisenhower suffered a major heart 
attack. He was cut off from all business for two weeks and 
only received a general account of events until his return 
to Washington in early November. Foster Dulles was left in 
command of American policy.4
The British, who were not told about the Roosevelt 
mission and knew nothing of the impending Egyptian-Soviet 
deal until Byroade informed them of his conversation of 21 
September with Nasser, were in disarray. Assistant 
Secretary Shuckburgh recommended a 'vigorous effort' to 
persuade Egypt to abandon the deal but could only suggest 
an approach by Byroade and British Ambassador Trevelyan to 
Nasser. Francis Russell, in London to discuss ALPHA with 
Shuckburgh, suggested American accession to the Baghdad
2 Copeland, pp. 132ff.
3 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 23 September 
1955.
4 Sherman Adams, First-Hand Report (London: Hutchinson, 
1962), pp. 182ff; Author's interview with General Andrew 
Goodpaster.
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Pact and guarantee of Israel's frontiers, but Shuckburgh 
rejected the guarantee as 'fatal to the Western position' 
with the Arabs. He continued, 'We must somehow keep Egypt 
on our side even to the extent of paying a very heavy 
price which may well include having to abandon Israel.'5
Deputy Undersecretary Harold Caccia, reviewing the 
Shuckburgh-Russell talks, had another idea: 'We may have
to get rid of Nasser, especially if he becomes publicly 
committed to the contract.' Macmillan's only immediate 
response was to berate the new Egyptian Ambassador, but 
the Foreign Secretary privately seethed, 'We really cannot 
allow this man, who has neither the authority of a throne 
nor of a Parliament, to destroy our base and threaten our
/ c.
rear. °
The British did not realise that the matter was in 
the hands of the CIA, who had no desire to be rid of 
Nasser. On 26 September, Roosevelt, Copeland and Nasser 
discussed the draft announcement of the arms deal, 
including the passage offering an Egyptian-Israeli 
detente. According to Copeland, 'Nasser liked it and said 
he could easily work it into his speech.'7 A duty
officer interrupted to say that Trevelyan had requested a 
meeting with Nasser. Roosevelt advised Nasser to tell 
Trevelyan that the arms were being supplied not by the 
Soviet Union but by Czechoslovakia, then he and Copeland
5 AP, AP20/22, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2582, 
25 October 1956? PRO, F0371/113674/JE1194/151G, 
Shuckburgh minute, 22 September 1955, and subsequent 
minutes.
6 PRO, F0371/113674/JE1194/152G, Caccia minute, 23 
September 1955, and JE1194/156G, Macmillan minute, 23 
September 1955; Alistair Horne, Macmillan: Volume I. 
1894-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 368.
7 Copeland, pp. 134ff.
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went upstairs.8
Trevelyan issued Macmillan's warning that the deal 
could 'not be allowed to go on.' Nasser replied that the 
deal was done. It had been completed '10 or 12 days ago' 
after he had 'waited for months and got nothing' from the 
West. His only consolation was that, as 'the British had 
dominated Egypt for 70 years,...he had no intention of 
substituting Russian for British domination.' Meanwhile, 
'it was all very cheerful [upstairs],' according to 
Copeland, with 'jokes about what would have been the look 
on the British Ambassador's face had Kim or I interrupted 
his meeting with Nasser to ask, "Excuse me, Gamal, but 
we're out of soda.”'9
After Trevelyan left, Nasser and the Americans drove 
to the residence of a relative of Ahmed Hussein, the 
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. There they met Byroade, 
Eric Johnston, Eisenhower's 'special emissary' for the 
Jordan Waters negotiations, and Eichelberger, the CIA 
station chief in Cairo. The meeting was congenial until a 
'tired and emotional' Byroade complained about the beating 
of the U.S. Embassy's Labour Attache by Egyptian workers 
in the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser replied that the Attache 
'was spying and provoked some of the workers.' Byroade, 
losing all sense of diplomacy, criticised the 'Egyptian
8 Ibid.
Roosevelt's suggestion may have been superfluous. The 
Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, Daniel Solod, had told 
Nasser that 'the transaction could be disguised as a 
deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia.' (PRO, F0371/ 
113673/JE1194/134, Trevelyan to Shuckburgh, 23 August 
1955)
9 Copeland, pp. 134ff.; PRO, F0371/113674/JE1194/163, 
Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1330, 26 September 1955, 
and JE1194/182, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1340, 28 
September 1955.
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police state' and described the RCC as 'a lot of juvenile
delinquents.' When he added, 'One of my men is badly
beaten and you try to make excuses for those who did it. I
don't understand it,' Nasser replied, 'All right. If you
don't understand it, we had better leave until you do.'10
Byroade and Nasser were used to speaking 'frankly'
with each other, and the Egyptian President soon dismissed
the incident. The argument, however, worsened the tenuous
relations between the CIA and Byroade, and Roosevelt and
Johnston asked Washington to recall the Ambassador because
of his 'extraordinary behaviour.' Learning of the cable
the morning after his outburst, Byroade telephoned the CIA
man at a 'safe house' and demanded to see the message.
When Roosevelt hesitated, the Ambassador warned, 'If you
don't bring that Goddamn cable here, I'm coming over with
my Marine guard and taking it.' Roosevelt gave in. An
embittered Byroade cabled the State Department:
Neither I nor any member of the embassy staff 
under my control have taken any part in 
encouraging Nasser to make a
statement....Neither were messages which 
apparently have been available to you from Cairo 
on this subject shown to me or my staff. 1
The situation was further complicated when Foster
Dulles and Macmillan, in New York for the opening of the
U.N. General Assembly, 'got more and more worked up' as
they discussed Egypt.12 The next day, Foster Dulles told
Hoover:
10 Neff, p. 91; Copeland, pp. 136ff.? Heikal, Nasser, p. 
76? PRO, F0371/113675/JE1194/190, Cairo to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1350, 27 September 1955? Author's 
interview with Miles Copeland.
11 Neff, p. 92? Copeland, p. 138? Eveland, p. 148? USNA,
RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/9-2855, Cairo to State Department, 
Cable 590, 28 September 1955.
12 Shuckburgh, p. 281.
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We have a lot of cards to play with Nasser 
although they are mostly negative. The waters of
the Upper N i l e  we can strangle him if we
want to. We can develop the Baghdad group and 
ruin the cotton market. We can switch this 
year's economic aid from Egypt to Iraq.1**
In a personal letter, Foster Dulles threatened Nasser with
the consequences of his actions, 'It is possible that you
may not have realized fully the seriousness with which
such a transaction will be viewed in the U.S. and the
consequent difficulty of preventing it from marring the
existing good relations between our two peoples.' Noting
that the U.S. had assisted Egypt in the Anglo-Egyptian
negotiations, provided economic and military aid, and
revised its cotton policy to prevent damage to the
Egyptian economy, Foster Dulles implied that American
policy could be reversed at any time.14
Tensions increased when the Foreign Office leaked
information of the arms deal to British newspapers, who
published the story on 27 September. Outraged, Nasser
removed Copeland's paragraph on detente with Israel,
replaced it with an anti-American passage, and reserved
radio time for his speech. An emergency meeting with
Roosevelt softened Nasser's rhetoric, but it did not
restore Copeland's paragraph.15
The Americans had failed to ease the blow of the arms
deal, and the Roosevelt mission had disrupted the work of
13 PRO, F0371/113674/JE1194/180, New York to Foreign 
Office, Cable 844, 27 September 1955, and JE1194/178, 
New York to Foreign Office, Cable 847, 27 September 
1955; DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, 
Box 4, Foster Dulles to Hoover, 27 September 1955.
14 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Chronological, Box 12, 
Foster Dulles letter to Nasser, 27 September 1955.
15 Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution 
(London; Macmillan, 1970), p. 90? Copeland, pp. 140ff.
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the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. On 28 September, Foster Dulles 
told Hoover that Byroade should be recalled for 
consultations. Hoover agreed but noted that Byroade was 
supposed to deliver Foster Dulles' warning letter to 
Nasser. He pondered, 'Johnston and Kim [Roosevelt] cannot 
do it. On the other hand, we might send [Assistant 
Secretary] Allen there.' Foster Dulles agreed. Allen would 
also 'find out re the relationship between Byroade and 
Nasser....It [was] impossible to have a crisis and no 
recourse to the head of government.'■LO
The plan backfired, however. Nasser perceived that 
Foster Dulles the Secretary was circumventing Roosevelt, 
just as the CIA had circumvented Byroade, because the 
policy of confrontation had triumphed in Washington. He 
warned Roosevelt, 'I will throw [Allen] out' if he 
delivered an ultimatum. Roosevelt appealed to Washington
• . . • 1 7for 'no leaks to press of message Allen is bringing in.'J-/ 
When Allen arrived at Cairo Airport on 30 September, 
Byroade boarded the plane and warned him, 'If you say 
anything about an ultimatum, your ass is out of here right 
now.' General Hassan Touhami, an associate of Nasser and a 
CIA contact, followed Byroade with a similar message from 
Roosevelt and Johnston. Allen told waiting reporters that
his trip was a routine visit to a Middle Eastern country.
. . . i nFew believed him, but the veneer of goodwill was intact. °
When Nasser finally received him the next day, Allen
16 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, 
Hoover to Foster Dulles and Foster Dulles to Allen, 28 
September 1955.
17 Neff, p. 94? Heikal, Nasser, p. 79? DDE, John Foster 
Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, Foster Dulles to 
Allen Dulles, 29 September 1955.
18 Neff, p. 95? Author's interview with Miles Copeland.
did not present Foster Dulles' 'ultimatum' but read
extracts, changing 'I' to 'we' throughout and covering
Foster Dulles' signature. In reply, Nasser stressed 'the
change in the Israeli situation last February' and
reminded Allen that the U.S. had not replied to numerous
Egyptian arms requests. Allen was given no chance to
expand on the contents of Foster Dulles' message. A second
meeting on 3 October was equally futile.19
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office and State Department
reviewed long-term policies concerning Egypt. British
officials considered Caccia's idea of removing Nasser from
power. Even Shuckburgh, who advocated conciliation because
of ALPHA, wrote, 'We must first try to frighten Nasser,
then to bribe him, and if neither works, get rid of him.'
Bromley of the African Department suggested that the
Foreign Office first suspend arms shipments to Egypt and
increase aid to Jordan, but it 'might in the last resort
have... to try to overthrow Nasser... to stop the rot,
since once Russian technicians are in Egypt, there is no
knowing how far the damage may extend.' However, A.J.
Wilton, the desk officer for Egypt, pointed out the flaw
in the policy:
No outstanding military figure or group...[can] 
consolidate the loyalty of the armed forces....A 
Syrian-pattern situation would most probably 
develop with rival military figures rising and 
falling rapidly.
The Wafd, the party that dominated Egyptian politics
before the 1952 revolution, might try to reorganise itself
19 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.56/10-155, Cairo to State
Department, Cable 632, 1 October 1955, and 774.56/10- 
355, Cairo to State Department, Cable 654, 3 October 
1955.
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or ally with a military group, but this would be difficult 
because the Wafd did 'not command any particular emotional 
loyalty.'20
Shuckburgh travelled to Washington to continue the 
search for an alternative. CIA Director Allen Dulles asked 
'whether [the British] thought [former Egyptian President 
General] Neguib would be a possible alternative.' The idea 
was dismissed because Neguib, under house arrest since an 
attempt on Nasser's life in October 1954, had faded from 
public view and commanded little support within the 
Egyptian armed forces. The State Department 'had various 
suggestions for "squeezing” Egypt by cutting off economic 
aid, etc., and...mentioned again the alternative policy of 
joining the Northern Tier and trying to get other Arab 
States in.' Other possible measures included a refusal to 
help Egypt in the international cotton market and pressure 
on the World Bank to withhold funding for the Aswan High 
Dam.21
Following the State Department's lead, the Foreign 
Office concluded that a far-reaching regional policy, 
rather than direct action against Nasser, was the best 
option. Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Undersecretary, 
might have persisted with plans to overthrow Nasser, as he 
was convinced that the Egyptian leader was controlled by 
the Soviets,' but he was on vacation. Caccia cabled 
Macmillan on 30 September, '[The] main object should not 
be to oust Nasser or, far less, to damage Egypt.' Instead,
20 Shuckburgh, p. 281? PRO, F0371/113676/JE1194/248, 
Bromley minute, 27 September 1955, and subsequent 
minutes.
21 PRO, F0371/113678/JE1194/289G, Shuckburgh record, 29 
September 1955.
83
Britain should stop or limit the arms deal and demonstrate
to other Arab countries that Egypt's policy would not
benefit her in the long run. The U.S. should be brought
into the Baghdad Pact, military aid should be increased to
Iraq, and the Sudan should be pressed to announce her
independence, precluding any possibility of Egyptian
control of her affairs.
Caccia linked a comprehensive program against Egypt
to the eventual downfall of Nasser. It 'might even
discredit Nasser to the point where he was removed by
Egyptian processes alone....If this came about, it would
have happened without our direct interference in Egyptian
politics.' He concluded:
We should prefer to see the effects of the 
positive acts...before a decision is taken that 
we, i.e, the Americans and ourselves, must try 
to oust Nasser. It may come to that later. Even 
then we should be careful not to damage our best 
candidate hv too obvious or too early sales- 
promotion.22^
The 'best candidate' was the septuagenarian Ali Maher, 
former Prime Minister in the 1940s and 1950s. Although he 
was in contact with the American and British Embassies, he 
was a questionable choice. Dismissed by the military as 
Prime Minister in September 1952, he was unlikely to 
command the support of a new junta and, as an 
'independent' politician, he could not count on the
• • . O')political machinery of the Wafd. J
Even this long-term program against Nasser was soon
22 PRO, F0371/113678/JE1194/286G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cables 2339 and 2340, 30 September 1955, and 
subsequent minutes.
23 Interview with Sir John Wilton; USNA, RG 84, Cairo 
Embassy General Records, 050 Prominent Persons, Cairo to 
State Department, Despatch 1957, 13 April 1955.
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reconsidered. The CIA station in Cairo, recovering its 
role in American policymaking, convinced Foster Dulles 
'that Nasser did not want to go over to the Communist 
side' but hoped to play a neutralist role in the Middle 
East. Conferring with Macmillan on 3 October, Foster 
Dulles recommended caution until the size of the arms deal 
was confirmed. It was 'not a very attractive policy but 
...[there was a] lack of a better alternative.' Macmillan 
agreed:
We must accept this diplomatic defeat and try to 
narrow and limit it....We should now talk to 
Nasser more in sorrow than in anger and tell him 
that he must endeavoin: to reduce his commitment 
with the Soviet bloc.24
Reverting to his initial reaction to the arms deal, 
Foster Dulles told Allen Dulles that it was 'difficult to 
be critical of countries which, feeling themselves 
endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely need for 
defense.' On 22 September, the Israelis occupied the 
demilitarised zone of El Auja, only withdrawing after U.N. 
protests. In a speech on 2 October, Nasser displayed 
French documents indicating that 120 aircraft, 115 tanks, 
and 100 armoured cars had been supplied to Israel and a 
British intelligence report of May 1955 stating 'there was 
every reason to believe that Egypt had no aggressive 
intentions of any kind.' Both documents were later 
verified as authentic by British officials.25
24 PRO, F0371/113676/JE1194/260G, Record of Anglo-American 
meeting, 3 October 1955; USNA, RG 59, 774.56/10-355, 
Wilkins memorandum, 3 October 1955. Also see Horne, p. 
369.
25 Neff, p. 103? Love, p. 109? PRO, F0371/113675/JE1194/ 
206, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1368, 2 October 
1955, and JE1194/207, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 
1369, 3 October 1955? PRO, F0371/113676/JE1194/251,
Paris to Foreign Office, Cable 391 Saving, 5 October
)■K ‘ . , 85 ‘
Moreover, Eden offered no opposition to Soviet arms
shipments to Cairo, as he was occupied with the Geneva
Conference of Foreign Ministers and East-West cooperation.
Apart from asking Macmillan for 'an estimate from our
Ambassador in Cairo as to Nasser's present position, the
extent of his support, and the chances of any rival, e.g.
AM [Ali Maher],'26 he left the question of dealing with
Nasser to the Foreign Office and concentrated on reaching
an accommodation with the Soviet Union. To achieve this
goal, he was willing to accept the arms deal.
Trevelyan concluded on 26 September:
I see no reason that [Nasser] would not have 
preferred to get arms from the West and [he] 
only decided to accept the Soviet offer when he 
felt he could wait no longer in the face of 
increased tension on the Gaza frontier and 
internal pressure....A thorough reversal of our 
policy of friendship to Egypt could hurt her to 
a certain extent but would extensively damage 
our own interests here and endanger our 
interests elsewhere.
Eden commented, 'I am much impressed by [Trevelyan's]
force and cogency. We must not cut off our noses.' As for
the Soviets, Britain had 'nothing to hide and it [was]
surely better that the Four Powers should discuss the
situation than we should embark on arms competition.' By
29 September, Eden was anxious to send a personal message 
. . . .  . 0 7to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin. '
The State Department were concerned that Eden's
1955.
26 AP, AP20/20, Eden to Macmillan, 12 October 1955.
27 PRO, F0371/113608/JE1057/11, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1326, 26 September 1955? PRO, F0371/113674/JE1194/ 
161, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1325, 26 September 
1955, and JE1194/162, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 
1326, 26 September 1955; PRO, F0800/669, Foreign Office 
to New York, Cable 1283, 27 September 1955? Shuckburgh, 
p. 284.
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initiative would set the precedent of consulting the 
Soviets on Middle Eastern matters, and Shuckburgh's 
discussions in Washington indicated that a four-power 
conference on the Middle East 'would meet with a very 
strong reaction from the United States.' Macmillan agreed 
with the Americans, and in several days of debate with 
Eden via cable, requested a delay in the dispatch of the
t 0 ftmessage to Bulganin. °
Eden wanted to ignore Macmillan, but he finally 
decided to obtain Cabinet approval on 4 October. To pursue 
his initiative, he was willing to sacrifice Anglo-American 
cooperation:
Our interests in the Middle East were greater 
than those of the U.S. because of our dependence 
on Middle Eastern oil and our experience in the 
area was greater than theirs. We should not, 
therefore, allow ourselves to be restricted 
overmuch by reluctance to act without full 
American concurrence and support. We should form 
our own policy in the light of our interests in 
the area and get the Americans to support it to 
the extent we could induce them to do so.
While the message to Bulganin did not propose a four-power
conference, it asked the Soviet Union to consider the
'special responsibilities' of the Great Powers.
Eden's personal venture did not override long-term
Foreign Office policy, however. The Cabinet of 4 October
noted that it was...
inadvisable to subject the Nasser regime to 
overwhelming pressure. It was doubtful whether 
such pressure could be made effective and a 
rebuff would be bad for our prestige in the 
Middle East.
Instead, Egypt should be isolated in the Arab world
28 AP, AP20/22, Foreign Office to New York, Cable 1304, 28 
September 1955, and subsequent minutes.
29 PRO, CAB128/29, C.M.34(55), 4 October 1955.
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through increased arms supplies by Britain to her Arab
allies. Macmillan also received Cabinet agreement to offer
arms to Iran to bring her into the Baghdad Pact and to
offer the Sudan immediate independence.30
Two days later, the NSC, chaired by Vice-President
Richard Nixon but led by Foster Dulles, evaluated American
policy. Foster Dulles recommended increased military aid
to Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia but rejected an Iraqi-
Syrian merger because of Saudi fears of 'Greater Iraq^'
The NSC agreed.31
The immediate task was to reestablish coordination of
British and American policies. Foster Dulles and Macmillan
had established a close working relationship, but the
crisis atmosphere surrounding ALPHA and the Egyptian-
Soviet deal played into the hands of Eden and American
representatives in the Middle East who questioned the need
to consult Britain. Furthermore, some British officials
wanted strong and decisive action, including expansion of
the Baghdad Pact and 'protection' of British-supported
rulers, even if this conflicted with American objectives.
Ambassador Makins summarised:
We have advanced ahead of the Americans on three
fronts, the Russian, the Persian, and the
Iraqi....While I fancy that [Foster] Dulles has 
taken this in good part, there is a risk
(perhaps not too great) that they may not come
up to us, or go off at a tangent, and that we 
may fijP£l ourselves out on one of these various 
limbs.32
The first point of contention was Iranian accession
30 Ibid.
31 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
7, 260th NSC meeting, 6 October 1955.
32 PRO, F0800/678, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2433, 9 October 1955.
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to the Baghdad Pact. British qualms about the cost of 
strengthening Iranian forces, strongly expressed by Eden 
and shared by Macmillan,33 were removed by the Egyptian- 
Soviet arms deal. On 3 October, Macmillan cabled Eden, 
'One of the cards we may want to play in offsetting the 
Egyptians' arms deal with Czechoslovakia may be general 
strengthening of the Baghdad Pact.' At a Ministerial 
meeting two days later, the Chiefs of Staff cited the 
strategic advantages of Iranian accession. Eden, noting 
Iraqi support of the measure, agreed.34 Foster Dulles was 
now hesitant, however, telling Allen Dulles, 'Russia might 
regard it as a reprisal against Egypt and any hopes of 
quietening the situation would disappear and it would lead 
to a step against us and things would be worse.' Although 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff favoured Iranian accession as a 
riposte to the Soviets, Foster Dulles complained to 
Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson about the cost of 
rearming the Iranians.35 Foster Dulles finally decided 
that he would not risk breaking U.S. ties with Iran. When 
the Iranians announced on 11 October their intention to 
join the Baghdad Pact, the State Department followed the 
Foreign Office's lead in publicly welcoming the news.36
33 See AP, AP20/23, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
4074, 3 September 1955, and AP20/22, Eden minute on 
Tehran to Foreign Office, Cable 589, 23 August 1955, and 
Eden minute on New York to Foreign Office, Cable 865, 28 
September 1955.
34 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.56/9-2755, New York to State 
Department, Cable DULTE 2, 27 September 1955? AP,
AP20/23, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2365, 3 
October 1955, and GEN507/lst meeting, 5 October 1955.
35 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, 
Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles and Wilson to Foster 
Dulles, 6 October 1955.
36 PRO, F0371/115522/V1073/1089, Hadow minute, 24 
September 1955, and subsequent minutes? PRO, F0371/ 
115523/V1073/1108, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable
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Meanwhile, the NSC reviewed the guidelines set for 
American policy in July 1954. The commitments to act 
against any aggressor, Arab or Israeli, were restated, as 
was the intention to collaborate and develop plans 'with
the U.K., and to the extent desirable and feasible, with
France and Turkey.' Specific economic and military 
actions, including suspension of aid, a trade embargo, and 
naval blockade, would be considered with the British. 
Foster Dulles would inform the Arabs and Israelis 
privately that the U.S. would 'seek to prevent resort to 
armed aggression by either Israel or the Arab States and, 
if it should occur, seek to stop it quickly.'37
The British carried out their own review. A report by
the Foreign Office's Robert Belgrave noted that Britain
spent, apart from its obligations under the Anglo- 
Jordanian Treaty and to the United Nations Relief and 
Works Administration, less than £2.25 million per year in 
the Middle East, although most of the 300 percent increase 
in British consumption and production of oil over the next 
20 years would come from the region. Most of the 
additional oil would come from the Middle East. The 
Cabinet approved the principle 'that our position in the 
Middle East is vital to the economy of the U.K. and that 
Her Majesty's Government should be prepared to spend in 
the area on a scale more closely related to our essential 
interests there.' A working party was established to draft 
recommendations for expenditure.
2473, 13 October 1955.
37 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
1, Record of Actions by NSC 1954, Action 1421, 27 
October 1955.
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Macmillan also presented the Foreign Office's formula
to counter the Soviet Union's 'deliberate policy of
opening up another front in the Cold War':
We should adapt a policy of moderation in our 
dealing with Egypt and we should endeavour to 
persuade the Americans to do the same. We should 
concentrate on helping other Arab States who 
behaved loyally, while at the same time 
demonstrating that there were limits to the 
extent to which we could be provoked.
Eden agreed but, like Foster Dulles, considered the
possibility of wooing Cairo back to the West. In
particular, funding for the Aswan High Dam 'could be a
trump card.' The Cabinet agreed.38
The construction of the Dam had been a dream of the
Egyptian junta since October 1952. In spring 1953, the
Egyptians appointed consulting engineers from Britain,
Sweden, Italy, and the U.S., and Eugene Black, the
President of the World Bank, endorsed the Dam's
construction. Byroade, then Assistant Secretary of State,
and Eisenhower also recommended the initiative, but
financial constraints forced Foster Dulles to reject
American assistance for the project.39
The Egyptians continued to negotiate with a private
Anglo-German consortium, but plans were in the preliminary
stages when the Soviets offered in October 1955 to finance
the Dam. This prompted Eden to set aside his wish for
'independence' of the Americans in the Middle East, and on
21 October he asked the U.S. Ambassador, Winthrop Aldrich,
38 CAB129/78, C.P.(55)152, 'Middle East Oil,' 14 October 
1955? CAB128/29, C.M.35(55), 18 October 1955, and 
C.M.36(55), 20 October 1955.
39 Nutting, Nasser, p. 130? FRUS 1952-1954 IX, p. 1908? 
USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.5-MSP/4-2853, Byroade to Smith, 28 
April 1953, and subsequent minutes.
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to raise the issue of the Dam with the State Department 
immediately.4 0
On 26 October, Macmillan and Foster Dulles met to 
reconcile the developing policies. Macmillan was 
optimistic about the discussion. Foster Dulles apparently 
wanted 'to try to get the Aswan Dam for a Western group,' 
and the Americans agreed to send political and military 
observers to the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council
in November. Foster Dulles also hinted at accommodation
with the British policy on Jordan and Syria. According to 
Macmillan:
Mr. Dulles asked me whether we could not bring 
pressure upon Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact.
He thought it would be a fine thing if they did.
Foster Dulles was 'ready for counteraction in Syria,'
believing that it 'was the nearest thing in the Middle
East to a Soviet satellite.' Although the U.S. was wary of
Iraqi-Syrian union, Macmillan maintained that Foster
Dulles 'was moving in the direction of being less averse
to, if not wholly favouring, a coup d'etat by the
Iraqis.'41
However, as Macmillan met Foster Dulles, unilateral 
British action again threatened the formation of an Anglo- 
American policy. The dispute over the Buraimi oasis, 
claimed by Saudi Arabia and by the British-supported 
Trucial Sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi and Muscat and Oman, had 
plagued Eden since August 1952, when a Saudi envoy with 40
40 Carlton, Anthony Eden, p. 391.
41 PRO, F0371/115469/V1023/14G, Paris to Foreign Office, 
Cable 419 Saving, 26 October 1955, and V1023/15G, Paris 
to Foreign Office, Cable 421 Saving, 26 October 1955; 
PRO, F0371/115387/V1193/149, Paris to Foreign Office, 
Cable 420 Saving, 26 October 1955? Macmillan, Tides of 
Fortune. 1945-1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 642.
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horsemen established a base in one of the oasis's eight
villages. Buraimi's oil resources were negligible, but the
Saudis needed it for easy access to the Persian Gulf,
while the British wanted it 'to consolidate the
southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula into a single
political entity.'42
Britain and Saudi Arabia finally agreed in early 1955
to arbitration by an international tribunal, but the
proceedings degenerated, each side accusing the other of
bribing local tribes and maintaining military forces in
the oasis. In September, Shuckburgh ordered the British
representative on the tribunal, Sir Reader Bullard, to
leave the proceedings after Bullard reported that Britain
would lose its case.43 On 18 October, the Cabinet approved
the abandonment of arbitration and seizure of Buraimi.
British-sponsored troops occupied the oasis on 26 October,
allegedly discovered documents indicating that Saudi
Arabia and the American oil company, ARAMCO, were plotting
to occupy the disputed territory.44
Foster Dulles expressed disdain for the British
occupation to Macmillan on 26 October but was not 'unduly
concerned' or 'unpleasant.' Within days, however, State
Department officials revealed anger and irritation. Hoover
told Makins that...
.. .he had been taken aback by [the British] 
action....He hoped that, in the future, we would 
not think it necessary to ”do that kind of
42 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 780.001 Series.
43 C.f. USNA, RG 59, CDF, 780.001 Series, Geneva to State 
Department, Cable 737, 17 September 1955, and Newsom 
memorandum, 10 October 1955.
44 Shuckburgh, p. 289? PRO, CAB128/29, C.M.35(55), 18 
October 1955? PRO, F0800/678, Kirkpatrick to Eden, 25 
October 1955.
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business with one another" and that we would be 
able to "to play it together from now on."'4*
Renewed Egyptian-Israeli conflict further hindered
Foster Dulles and Macmillan. The State Department
reconciled itself to the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian Defence
Pact, formally concluded on 27 October, but an
intelligence report of 31 October warned that the
atmosphere on the Egyptian-Israeli border was...
...extremely tense, with an outbreak of fighting 
likely at any time. [U.S.] Embassy Tel Aviv sees 
the possibility of wider hostilities.
Israel was expected to purchase $50 million of arms 'with
heavy concentration on French jet planes and tanks.' On 2
November, Ben-Gurion, formally taking office as Prime
Minister, told the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, that
he would meet Arab leaders to discuss a settlement, but
that evening an Israeli military force attacked the
Egyptian village of El-Sabha, killing at least 50 people
and taking 40 prisoners.46
On 2 November, Nasser told Byroade that he was 'ready
to discuss Palestine on a strictly confidential basis' and
promised that 'he would not interfere with the Northern
Tier if nothing new happened, meaning if neither the U.S.
nor any other Arab States should join it.'47 El-Sabha
overtook this statement. The State Department warned the
Israeli and Egyptian Ambassadors that it would support
45 AP, AP20/1, Geneva to Foreign Office, Cable 3, 26 
October 1955? PRO, F0371/115954/VY10393/10G, Hoover- 
Makins meeting, 27 October 1955. Also see FRUS 1955-1957 
XIII, p. 285.
46 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 4, October 
1955, Goodpaster to Adams, 31 October 1955? Shlaim, p. 
193.
47 PRO, FO371/115468/V1023/20, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1609, 2 November 1955.
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U.N. action against any aggressor in the area, and Byroade
and the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Edward Lawson, were
instructed to deliver demarches, preferably with their
British and French colleagues, supporting the U.N. plan
for a truce. Israeli Chief of Staff Dayan was undeterred.
He called for 'an early confrontation with the Egyptian
regime, which is striving toward a war for the destruction
of Israel, in order to bring about a change of regime or a
change in its policy' and presented Ben-Gurion with a plan
to capture the Straits of Tiran at the southern edge of
the Egyptian-Israeli border. Ben-Gurion requested
postponement of the plan, but only because Foreign
Minister Sharett was in the U.S. seeking economic and
military aid. 0
The renewed fighting pushed Eden, whose note to
Bulganin produced no results, into another unilateral
initiative. Shuckburgh concluded, 'Every day the weight of
Israel round our necks draws us further down into the
mud,' but Eden decided that his intervention would save
the situation. Shuckburgh commented:
It has occurred to [Eden] that with Eisenhower 
sick, [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer 
sick, Macmillan and Dulles engaged with Molotov 
in Geneva, there is only one great man left in 
the world capable of giving a lead and that is 
himself. 9
Coincidentally, G.G. Arthur of the Foreign Office had 
just examined new approaches to the Arab-Israeli problem 
and concluded:
48 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, November 
1955 (2), Goodpaster to Whitman, 4 November 1955, and 
Minnich to Goodpaster, 7 November 1955? Shlaim, p. 194; 
Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. p. 223.
49 Shuckburgh, p. 296.
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I can only see one possibility: that we should 
move towards some acknowledgement of the 
validity of the [1947] U.N. resolution on 
Palestine....[This] would be a blow to the 
Israelis, but we must face the fact that, if we 
are ever to bring about a Palestine settlement, 
we shall have to be nasty to the Israelis at 
some stage.
Eden seized upon the idea as the cornerstone of his annual 
speech at the Guildhall dinner on 9 November, suggesting a 
settlement on the basis of 'the 1947 and other United 
Nations resolutions.'50
Although Eden mentioned 'other United Nations 
resolutions,' his reference to the 1947 resolution 
commanded attention. In the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War, 
Israel gained territory beyond the 1947 boundaries, 
including the Negev desert. Therefore, Eden's speech was 
welcomed by Egypt, which sought part of the Negev, but 
criticised by Israel. Nasser called the speech the 'first 
constructive declaration since the Palestine War,' but 
Ben-Gurion insisted that it had 'no legal, moral, or 
logical basis' and that it was likely to increase Arab 
aggression and lead to the Israel's dismemberment.51
More importantly, Eden's venture undermined ALPHA. 
Foster Dulles was not notified of the Prime Minister's 
initiative until 24 hours before the speech,52 and the 
Americans were preoccupied with Israeli Foreign Minister
50 PRO, F0371/115880/VR1076/331G, Arthur minute, 4 
November 1955.
51 PRO, F0371/115881/VR1976/350G, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1706, 12 November 1955, and VR1076/383, Tel Aviv 
to Foreign Office, Cable 475, 16 November 1955. For 
Israeli reaction, see Israeli State Archives, 325/6, 
Eytan to Elath, 12 November 1955; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 
684A.86 Series, Tel Aviv to State Department, Cable 501, 
14 November 1955, and Cable 508, 16 November 1955.
52 AP, AP20/22, Geneva to Foreign Office, Cable 124, 9 
November 1955.
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Sharett's visit to the U.S. Fearing that Sharett would
appeal to the American public, forcing the Administration
to bow to public pressure and assist the Israelis, the
White House issued a statement on 9 November:
While we continue willing to consider requests 
for arms needed for legitimate self-defence, we 
do not intend to contribute to an arms 
competition in the Near East because we do not 
think such a race would be in the true interest 
of any of the participants....True security must 
be based upon a just and reasonable settlement 
[i.e., Foster Dulles' speech of 26 August].53
Antagonising the Israelis, the Guildhall speech made 
the Americans' task more difficult. By 11 November, Eden, 
worried about press reaction to his speech, abandoned his 
independent stance and sought American support. He wrote 
Foster Dulles, 'I am sure that we must persevere and that 
we have the essentials of an agreement here.' The long­
term damage was done, however. The Israelis, who knew of 
secret Anglo-American discussions since the spring, always 
linked Guildhall with ALPHA. To them, Eden's speech meant 
that British desire to return the Negev to the Arabs had 
triumphed over the general call for negotiations in Foster 
Dulles' statement. Eden's protests that the speech was not 
a commitment to the 1947 borders were dismissed by the 
Israelis, and the Prime Minister and Shuckburgh added to 
the furor, telling Israeli Ambassador Eliahu Elath that 
'if Israel would not accept Eden's proposals, she would 
damage herself.'54
53 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, November 
1955 (2), State Department to Adams, Cable TODEN 18, 8 
November 1955, and November 1955 (1), Eisenhower 
statement, 9 November 1955.
54 PRO, F0371/115881/VR1076/357, Foreign Office to Geneva, 
Cable 392, 11 November 1955? Shuckburgh, p. 299? Israeli 
State Archives, Shuckburgh-Elath meeting, November 1955.
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However, the most damaging blow to Anglo-American 
planning in late 1955 was Britain's attempt in December 
1955 to obtain Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact, 
made in defiance of American warnings that the project was 
ill-timed. Moreover, the project could not be dismissed as 
Eden's whim, as it was a mission sanctioned by the Foreign 
Office, the British military, and the Cabinet.
The genesis of the mission was a visit to Amman by 
the Turkish President, Celal Bayar, to request Jordanian 
accession to the Pact. Eden minuted to Macmillan on 14 
October that the idea was 'worth considering' as Britain 
'must tie to [its] Treaty all Arab States we now can.' 
Initially, the British were hesitant about proceeding, 
Makins telling Hoover that Britain did not believe that 
Jordan could be persuaded to join the Pact 'but they did 
not want to discourage the Turkish Government.' Meanwhile, 
Foster Dulles' suggestion of 26 October to Macmillan that 
Britain encourage Jordanian accession remained American 
policy.55
As Foster Dulles' anger over the Egyptian-Soviet arms 
deal cooled, the Secretary listened to officials who 
opposed an approach to Jordan. The result was a harmful 
ambivalence in American policy. On 1 November, a U.S. 
Embassy official told the Foreign Office that the U.S. 
Ambassadors in the Lebanon and Jordan would tell those 
Governments that accession to the Pact was undesirable at
55 AP, AP20/23, Eden minute on Ankara to Foreign Office, 
Cable 734, 14 October 1955? PRO,
F0371/115954/VY10393/10G, Makins-Hoover meeting, 28 
October 1955; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter,
Box 5, October 1955, Goodpaster to Adams, 31 October 
1955.
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the moment, and two days later, Makins warned London that 
Foster Dulles' apparent support of Jordanian accession 
depended upon an Arab-Israeli settlement. As late as 8 
November, however, Russell informed Shuckburgh that the 
U.S. had no objection to Jordan's accession 'if the Turks 
could persuade her to do so.'56
Amidst the uncertainty, the Foreign Office told the 
British Embassy in Amman that Turkey's efforts should be 
endorsed, despite the danger of Nasser's opposition, but 
advised against further pressure upon Jordan until it 
reacted to the Turkish initiative. On 9 November, King 
Hussein told British Ambassador Duke that Jordan was ready 
to join the Pact 'given the necessary backing.'57
The same day Foster Dulles finally decided against 
Jordanian accession after Nasser confirmed to Byroade 
that, for Egypt to accept secret talks with Israel, the 
West must promise that no more Arab states would join the 
Baghdad Pact. Foster Dulles tod Macmillan, 'The 
introduction into the Pact of Israel's neighbours 
presented a new problem and would make it more difficult 
for the U.S. to support the Pact. Unless Lebanon, Syria, 
and Jordan were ready to make peace with Israel (which he 
doubted), he rather wondered whether it was wise to bring 
them in./58
56 PRO, F0371/115527/V1073/1220, Hadow minute, 1 November 
1955, and subsequent minutes? PRO,
F0371/115527/V1073/1222, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2675, 3 November 1955.
57 PRO, F0371/115527/V1073/1224, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 460, 6 November 1955, and subsequent minutes? PRO, 
F0371/115528/ V1073/1246, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 
480, 9 November 1955.
58 PRO, F0371/115649/V1023/20, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1609, 2 November 1955, and V1023/24, Macmillan- 
Dulles meeting, 9 November 1955? PRO,
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The decision to proceed rested with Macmillan. Eden,
concerned with the Guildhall speech...
...was beginning to wonder whether it was wise 
to press Jordan hard to join the Pact. This 
might rile the Egyptians, who were showing signs 
of being reasonable.
He also worried that, as 'Israel might be contemplating a
preventive war in Jordan,' Jordanian accession might pull
Britain into a conflict with Tel Aviv. However, Macmillan,
supported by Ambassador Duke and General Sir John Glubb,
the commander of Jordan's army, the Arab Legion, concluded
that the need to strengthen the Baghdad Pact and support
King Hussein outweighed the risk of upsetting Nasser,
especially after the completion of the Egyptian-Saudi-
Syrian Defence Pact. The next day, Macmillan instructed
Duke to tell Hussein that Britain welcomed 'early'
Jordanian adherence to the Pact. The British would provide
10 Vampire fighters as a 'gift' and would consider further
supplies of equipment when 'Jordan had...taken her place
in a Middle Eastern defence organisation.'59
Macmillan's opinion was reinforced at the Baghdad
Pact Council by the Turks, who argued that Jordanian and
Lebanese accession would be 'giving a positive example to
all the countries of the Middle East.' Ambassador Duke
suggested that Britain double her annual subsidy of £10
million, providing an extra army division, if Amman joined
the Pact. Shuckburgh, after conferring with Macmillan and
F0371/115533/V1073/1370, Morris to Hadow, 2 December 
1955.
59 PRO, F0371/ 115529/V1073/1222, Stark minute, 11 
November 1955? AP, AP20/23, DC(55)14th meeting, 8 
November 1955, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 507, 18 
November 1955, and Foreign Office to Amman, Cable 778,
19 November 1955.
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Templer, recommended an offer of tanks and guns, 
reaffirmation of the British guarantee under the Anglo- 
Jordanian Treaty, and more RAF fighters at Amman and 
Mafraq.60
Upon his return from the Baghdad Pact Council,
Macmillan wrote Eden:
I very much fear that, if we do not get Jordan 
into the Baghdad Pact now, she will drift out of 
our control....We should...present this to [the 
Jordanians] and more or less compel them to come 
in. In the final result, we may have to say that 
we cannot continue our financial and military 
support for a country which will not stay on our 
side in grave issues and then the Israelis will 
get them.
Shuckburgh noted on 25 November, 'Prime Minister is 
understood to have agreed with the policy considered.' 
Five days later, Macmillan approved Shuckburgh's idea that 
General Sir Gerald Templer, the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, visit Jordan to arrange the accession.61
The Templer mission, which lasted from 7 to 14 
December, was a diplomatic disaster. Although the King 
supported accession, the British overestimated the 
commitment of the Jordanian Government to the Pact. The 
resignation of four Palestinian ministers from the West 
Bank toppled the Government. The formation of a new 
Cabinet under the pro-Pact Hazza al-Majali lifted Foreign 
Office hopes, at least for a Jordanian statement of intent 
to accede, but public demonstrations against the Pact 
persuaded Hussein to abandon the negotiations. 
Reluctantly, he dissolved the Jordanian Parliament to try
60 PRO, F0800/678, Macmillan-Menderes meeting, 22 November 
1955? PRO, F037/115532/V1073/1342, Hooper to Rose, 24 
November 1955.
61 PRO, FO371/115532/V1073/1336G, Shuckburgh draft, 24 
November 1955, and subsequent minutes.
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go
to restore order. *
Foster Dulles warned Macmillan on 6 December that, 
because of ALPHA, the U.S. would not support the Templer 
mission :
We need to keep in mind our present plans to 
make another try through Egypt towards an Arab- 
Israeli settlement. An immediate move to expand 
the Baghdad Pact would probably deny us Nasser's 
cooperation.
Templer's failure particularly upset Eisenhower, who 
wrote, 'The British never had any sense in the Middle
East....[I am] a little "afraid" of the results of the 
Baghdad Pact.6 3
If the crises over Buraimi, the Guildhall speech, and 
the Templer mission had occurred during 1953-54, as the 
U.S. was pursuing an 'independent' policy in the Middle 
East, they might have produced open conflict between 
Washington and London. However, Britain's acceptance of 
American 'independence' and the recognition by most 
American officials of British influence in the region
preserved, in large part, the 'alliance' at the end of
1955. Foster Dulles and Macmillan respected and admired 
each other, while Shuckburgh and Russell, who had become 
close friends, expanded the ALPHA discussions to other 
issues.
On the day of the Guildhall speech, Shuckburgh and 
Russell drafted a paper defining Anglo-American
cooperation. The two countries would 'not write off Egypt' 
for the moment but 'if...Egypt [was] clearly lost to
62 PRO, F0371/115656-115658/ VJ1051/File.
63 PRO, F0371/115469/V1023/28G, Aldrich to Macmillan, 6 
December 1955? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Ann Whitman 
Diary, Box 7, December 1955 (3), Eisenhower minute, 16 
December 1955.
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Western influence, [they] should have to consider policies 
which would minimise the harm which she could do to 
Western interests.' The U.S. would 'maintain liaison with 
the Baghdad Pact Council and...give material support to 
its members.'64 American diplomatic and military observers 
subsequently participated in the Council's first meeting 
in November.65
If the Americans had abandoned ALPHA after the 
Guildhall speech, British hopes for an Anglo-American
foundation to the Baghdad Pact would have been dashed, but 
the Shuckburgh-Russell discussions continued, and the 
Egyptian reaction to the Guildhall speech was more
positive than Washington expected. Egyptian Foreign
Minister Mahmoud Fawzi indicated that Egypt would start 
negotiations with Israel on border changes to provide an 
Egyptian-Jordanian frontier, some repatriation of 
Palestinian refugees to their homes in Israel with full 
compensation for the rest, and free transit through the 
Suez Canal. Nasser confirmed this on 27 November.66
Foster Dulles, still upset with Sharett's visit to 
the U.S., told him that a settlement was essential for 
Israel's survival. The settlement might involve 
territorial adjustments by Israel, including part of the 
Negev, but its value to Israel was 'incomparably greater' 
than the cost of the concessions. Foster Dulles warned
64 PRO, F0371/115469/V1023/23G, Shuckburgh minute, 10 
November 1955, and subsequent minutes.
65 PRO, F0371/115531/V1073/1317, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 669 Saving, 23 November 1955.
66 PRO, F0371/115882/VR1076/391G, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 174 Saving, 17 November 1955? PRO, F0371/115884/ 
VR1076/456G, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1813, 28 
November 1955.
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Sharett that Israeli refusal to compromise would 'put us 
all in great peril' and 'would be forcing us to make a
67very grave choice.'
The State Department was anxious to begin Egyptian- 
Israeli talks before the first Soviet arms shipment 
reached Cairo, forcing the U.S. to consider increased aid 
to Israel. A special peace mission was first suggested in 
late October, and Hoover, on 28 November, proposed to 
Eisenhower that a mediator visit Cairo. A further exchange 
with Sharett on 6 December convinced Foster Dulles that, 
despite the Foreign Minister's outward intransigence, 
Israel would accept a mediator and consider some
£Q
territorial changes. °
On 8 December, Eisenhower endorsed a mission to Cairo 
and Tel Aviv. Informed by the State Department, the 
Foreign Office were hesitant about the use of a special 
envoy but deferred to the American lead, and Shuckburgh 
and Russell continued to confer over the settlement's 
details. The State Department and the CIA approved Robert 
Anderson, a Texas oil man, close confidant of Eisenhower, 
and former Secretary of the Navy, as the envoy.69
67 PRO, F0371/115883/VR1073/421G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2839, 21 November 1955, and subsequent 
minutes, and VR1076/422G, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2840, 21 November 1955.
68 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86 Series, State Department to 
Paris, Cable TEDUL 12, 25 October 1955, and Paris to 
State Department, Cable DULTE 11, 26 October 1955? DDE, 
John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White House, 
Box 10, Hoover memorandum, 28 November 1955; PRO, 
F0371/115885/VR1076/485G, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2983, 6 December 1955; DDE, John Foster Dulles 
Series, Telephone Calls, Box 4, Allen Dulles to Foster 
Dulles and Foster Dulles to Allen, 6 December 1955.
69 PRO, F0371/115887/VR1076/504G, Arthur minute, 8 
December 1955, and VR1076/524G, Shuckburgh minute, 16 
December 1955? DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone 
Calls, Box 4, Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 23 December
104
The continuation of ALPHA encouraged Britain and the
U.S. to woo Nasser through funding of the Aswan High Dam.
On 26 November, Eden wrote Eisenhower:
If the Russians were to succeed in this [aid to 
Egypt], they would, of course, be ruthless with 
the Sudan and abuse their control of the Nile 
waters. The outlook for Africa would be grim 
indeed.70
Eisenhower asked Foster Dulles if there was 'any reason
not to go out for the Dam in Egypt.' Foster Dulles
wondered if 'Nasser [was] trying to get a bid and then let
the Russians better the terms' but concluded, 'It is a
risk we are taking but [I] think we have to.'71
The NSC debated the issue on 1 December. Foster
Dulles argued:
If the Egyptians accepted [aid for the Dam], it 
would certainly be impractical for Egypt to 
switch to a Soviet satellite status, at least 
while the project was in the course of 
construction. Moreover, the presence of so many 
engineers, technicians, and other people from 
the Free World in Egypt would constitute a 
strong influence in keeping Egypt on the side of 
the Free World.
Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey vigorously opposed the
extension of foreign aid, but Eisenhower's intervention
was decisive. He supported Foster Dulles and dismissed
Humphrey's fears of creeping socialism through
nationalised projects and of increased Egyptian cotton
production competing with U.S. output. The NSC agreed that
the U.S. would provide 80 percent and Britain 20 percent
of the West's $200 million contribution to the project,
1955.
70 PRO, F0371/113739/JE1423/269G, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 5631, 26 November 1955.
71 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 29 November 
1955? PRO, F0371/113739/JE1423/275G, Washington to 
Foreign Office, Cable 2907, 30 November 1955.
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matching the $200 million loaned by the World Bank. Egypt
formally accepted the offer of the World Bank and the
Western countries on 17 December. The World Bank, Britain,
and the U.S. would send aide-memoires to Egypt explaining
the detailed conditions for provision of the assistance.72
Eisenhower was also amenable to Eden's request, in
his message of 26 November, for a summit in Washington on
Middle Eastern questions. Foster Dulles worried that the
summit would 'give a crisis atmosphere? [the British] will
talk about the Baghdad Pact and making it into a second
NATO,' but Eisenhower declared:
It might show after all we are people others 
like to come see. It is possible that by letting 
them come now, it will show a position of 
influence [for the U.S.].
The next day, Eisenhower and Foster Dulles scheduled the
meeting for late January, the President concluding:
We should have a frank talk with Eden on this
whole situation --  the Baghdad Pact, etc....[I]
would like to know why they give Egypt a dam and 
then jnake him [Nasser] furious on the other 
hand*73
Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East was
still under threat, however. The Americans accepted
British fait accomplis on Buraimi and the Templer mission, 
but they would not tolerate threats to their interests, 
notably their oil concession and rights to air bases in 
Saudi Arabia. Eden's obsession with the 'threat' that
Saudi Arabia posed to the British-backed Trucial
72 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
7, 268th NSC meeting, 1 December 1955? PRO, 
F0371/113740/JE1423/File.
73 PRO, F0371/113739/JE1423/269G, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 5631, 26 November 1955? DDE, John 
Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White House, Box 
10, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 28 and 29 November 
1955.
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Sheikhdoms was fed by officers of MI6, Britain's foreign 
intelligence service, who wanted to topple the Saudi 
monarchy, by Foreign Office officials, who feared Saudi 
expansion throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and by Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id, who was anxious to remove Saudi 
opposition to Iraqi-Syrian union. Nuri suggested to 
Macmillan on 20 November that the U.S. withhold Saudi 
royalties from oil revenues for six months to prevent 
Saudi funding of 'anti-Western' and 'anti-Iraqi' forces in 
Syria and Egypt.74
On 25 October, Foster Dulles had privately passed CIA 
information, of which even his advisers were unaware, to 
Macmillan that the Egyptians were supplying arms to Saudi 
Arabia, who paid with ARAMCO revenues. Using this 
information and Nuri's allegations, Macmillan suggested a 
joint study of possible measures by American and British 
governments and oil companies. Foster Dulles' cautiously 
replied, 'I believe it would be useful for us to exchange 
information regarding Saudi activities but it will be 
difficult for us to reduce or control Saudi Arabia's 
income.'75 On 15 December, at the NATO Council in Paris, 
Russell told Shuckburgh that 'some [State Department 
officials] were doubtful about the policy of giving way to 
the Saudis, but...all had the feeling that [Britain] 
tended to act without due consideration for American
74 PRO, F0800/678, Macmillan-Nuri Sa'id meeting, 20 
November 1955? PRO, F0371/115532/V1073/1342, Hooper to 
Rose, 24 November 1955.
75 AP, AP20/22, Geneva to Foreign Office, Cable 3, 26 
October 1956? PRO, F0371/115469/V1023/26G, Macmillan to 
Foster Dulles, 25 November 1955, and V1023/28G, Aldrich 
to Macmillan, 6 December, and subsequent minutes? 
Shuckburgh, p. 308.
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interests.' He and Shuckburgh agreed that Shuckburgh would 
visit Washington in January 1956 to discuss the issue.76
Macmillan also tried to convince Foster Dulles that 
British retreat from Buraimi would provoke the Trucial 
Sheikhdoms to turn to the Soviets for protection. 
Unconvinced, Foster Dulles stalled Macmillan, proposing a 
joint study during Shuckburgh's visit to Washington. The 
outlook was not favourable. The Foreign Office's Permanent 
Undersecretary, Ivone Kirkpatrick, cabled Shuckburgh, 'I 
made a fairly savage attack on the American Minister this 
morning [about Buraimi and the Arabian Peninsula], 
emphasizing that the Americans were playing the Russian
• . . .  77game and violating justice!'''
Finally, the Foster Dulles-Macmillan relationship was 
suspended in December when Eden moved Macmillan to the 
Treasury, replacing him with Selwyn Lloyd. Eden wrote in 
his dairy in autumn 1955 that he 'thought Harold too 
woolly generally,' as he thought 'of too many things at 
once.' He complained, '[Harold] follows Dulles around like 
an admiring poodle and that is bad for Foster and worse 
for British interests in the Middle East.'78 Although 
Lloyd was Minister of State in the Foreign Office from 
1952 to 1954, he spoke no foreign languages and travelled 
little outside Britain. While he was a competent 
barrister, he was awkward in conversation and placid in 
temperament. Many inside and outside the Foreign Office 
suspected that Eden had replaced the assertive Macmillan
76 Shuckburgh, pp. 311ff.
77 Ibid.? PRO, F0800/678, Macmillan-Foster Dulles meeting, 
15 December 1955.
78 AP, AP20/1, Eden diary entries, 17 September and 3 
October 1955.
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with a Minister who could be controlled from Number 10.
The rising influence in British policymaking was MI6. 
Since November, an MI6 operative in Cairo, codenamed LUCKY 
BREAK, had sent reports to London from a source who was 
allegedly within Nasser's inner circle of advisers. The 
reports portrayed Nasser as an irrational dictator bent on 
leading the Arabs, Africa, and the Islamic World and 
devoted to the destruction of Israeli and British
influence in the Middle East. To achieve this, Nasser,
supported by the subservient Syrians and the anti-British 
King Saud of Saudi Arabia, would eagerly accept economic 
and military assistance from the Soviet Union, turning
. , 7QEgypt into a member of the Soviet bloc. ^
LUCKY BREAK'S reports were used to justify MI6's 
objectives. Britain would no longer 'appease' Nasser but 
undermine his regime and those of his Arab allies until 
they were overthrown, while supporting Iraq as the leader 
of the Arab world. ALPHA would be shelved. Instead,
Britain would cooperate with Israel to establish new 
governments in Egypt and Syria. With the Foreign Office 
assuming a lower profile under Lloyd, MI6, if it could 
convince Eden of the necessity of its policy, would direct 
British activities in the Middle East.
79 CIA London Station to Director CIA, Cable LOND 7064, 1 
April 1956 Xcopy in author's possession and available for 
consultation) .
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CHAPTER 5
JANUARY-MARCH 1956: PREPARING FOR A SHOWDOWN
Since 1953, Britain's long-term Middle Eastern policy 
was built upon the creation of the Iraqi-Jordanian axis. 
However, in its haste to bring Jordan into the Baghdad 
Pact, Britain ignored the U.S., alienated Egypt, and 
misread Jordanian public opinion. The miscalculation 
threatened to topple King Hussein and evict British forces 
from the country.
Hussein's dissolution of the Jordanian Parliament in 
late 1955 failed to quell 'nationalist' disturbances 
supported by money and propaganda from Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. On 7 January, General Sir John Glubb, the British 
commander of Jordan's army, the Arab Legion, anxiously 
asked the Foreign Office for British and Iraqi 
reinforcements. Four days late, the Cabinet approved the 
despatch of two paratroop battalions to Cyprus, with 
another battalion on 48-hour notice in Britain. One wing 
of RAF aircraft was redeployed from Habbaniya in Iraq to 
Amman, and the British armoured regiment stationed near 
Aqaba, at the southern tip of Jordan, prepared to travel 
north to defend Hussein. British forces were authorised to 
take retaliatory air action against Saudi troops if they 
entered Jordan.1
The immediate threat to Hussein was short-lived. By 
12 January, the British Embassy reported that the
1 PRO, F0371/121762/VJ105/19G, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 57, 9 January 1956; PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.3(56), 11 
January 1956? PRO, F0371/121463/VJ1015/44G, Amman to 
Foreign Office, Cable 72, 10 January 1956, and 
subsequent cables and minutes.
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situation had stabilised. Nasser assured British 
Ambassador Trevelyan that Egypt would stop inciting 
Jordanian demonstrations if there was no further quest for 
Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact. Saudi troops did 
not cross the border, and the British battalions stayed in 
Cyprus.2
The crisis had long-term effects, however, as the 
British, tried to strengthen their position in Jordan 
without expanding the Baghdad Pact. Proposals, first made 
in early 1954, for the defence of Jordan against Israel 
were revived by the British Defence Coordinating Committee 
for the Middle East (BDCC) in December 1955. The BDCC 
argued that Jordanian forces would soon be overwhelmed by 
Israel in an Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan could only be 
saved if Britain airlifted two brigades into the country 
and, using fighter squadrons in Jordan and fighters and 
bombers from Cyprus, neutralised the Israeli Air Force 
within 72 hours. The plan required more fighter squadrons 
in Jordan and the support of fighters and bombers from 
Cyprus. In January-February 1956, the Chiefs of Staff 
refined and approved the plan, codenamed CORDAGE.3
Paradoxically, the crisis over Jordan's accession to 
the Baghdad Pact increased Iraq's role in Anglo-Jordanian 
relations. Britain had linked the Templer mission with 
direct Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation, encouraging Baghdad's
2 PRO, F0371/121462/VJ1015/36G, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 199, 12 January 1956, and VJ1015/57G, 
Jedda to Foreign Office, Cable 6, 11 January 1956? PRO, 
F0371/121241/V1071/19, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 
53, 11 January 1956.
3 PRO, DEFE4/82, JP(55)100(F), 22 December 1955; PRO, 
DEFE4/83, COS(56)11th meeting, 24 January 1956,
COS(56)12th meeting, 26 January 1956, and COS(56)22nd 
meeting, 21 February 1956.
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proposals for economic agreements with Amman and 
persuading Iraq to promote its diplomatic mission in Amman 
to Embassy status.4 While the Templer missions failed, 
Hussein's need for support expanded Iraq's economic 
interest in Jordan into diplomatic and military 
initiatives. Replying to a letter from Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri Sa'id encouraging him to stand firm, Hussein 
requested a meeting in Baghdad in the near-future. At the 
height of the riots on 9 January, Hussein asked that an 
Iraqi division stand by to enter Jordan. Although the 
subsidence of the emergency made this unnecessary, 
Hussein's talks with Nuri in mid-January led to military 
staff discussions on the long-term deployment of Iraqi 
troops in Jordan.5
Iraqi and British interests coincided: a strong Iraq 
controlling Syria and sharing the economic, political, and 
military supervision of Jordan with Britain. This would 
indirectly link Syria and Jordan with the Baghdad Pact and 
isolate Egypt and Saudi Arabia if they did not cooperate 
with London. To increase its influence in Syria, Iraq 
considered an increase in 'subsidies' for pro-Iraqi 
newspapers and politicians, visits by Syrian dignitaries 
and students to Iraq, and a new radio station transmitting 
from Baghdad throughout the region. The British Ambassador 
to Syria, John Gardener, met Iraqi officials in Baghdad to
4 PRO, F0371/115532/V1073/1353, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 558, 4 December 1955, and subsequent minutes.
5 PRO, F0371/115659/VJ1051/149G, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1083, 30 December 1955; PRO, F0371/121462/ 
VJ1015/27G, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 59, 9 January 
1956, and subsequent minutes; PRO, F0371/121484/VJ10393/ 
1G, Baghdad to Foreign Office, Cable 81, 18 January 
1956.
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suggest similar activities in Jordan and Lebanon.6
Preparing for the Eden-Eisenhower summit, Britain
tried to include the Americans in plans for an Iraqi-
Jordanian axis. A brief for Assistant Undersecretary
Shuckburgh's talks in Washington argued that, while
Britain obtained no direct advantage from her presence in
Jordan, her departure would prompt Israel to annex the
West Bank of the Jordan River, leaving the Saudis,
Syrians, and Iraqis to fight for eastern Jordan. Any
reduction in the British presence 'would have a serious,
and perhaps decisive, effect on our position in Iraq.'
Eden went further, suggesting that Britain openly endorse
Iraqi union with Syria and/or Jordan.7
The Prime Minister, appealing to Eisenhower on 16
January, linked the Iraqi-Jordanian question to Britain's
campaign against Egyptian and Saudi intrigue. Eden
asserted that Saudi money was bribing officials, buying
newspapers in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, and threatening
to replace the British subsidy to Amman. Eden concluded:
It was increasingly clear that the Saudis, the 
Russians, the Egyptians, and the Syrians are 
working altogether, and...if we don't want to 
see the whole Middle East fall into Communist 
hands, we must back our friends in Jordan and in 
Iraq. If the Saudis have their way, there will 
be nothing left for anybody but the Bear [the 
Soviet Union].
Shuckburgh discovered in Washington that not all 
State Department officials were as accommodating as 
Russell, his co-negotiator on ALPHA, and Foster Dulles.
6 PRO, FO371/121648/VQ1022/File; PRO, F0371/121870/
VY10393/File.
7 PRO, F0371/121491/VJ1051/41, Arthur minute, 14 January 
1956; Shuckburgh, p. 327.
8 PRO, F0371/121280/V1077/1G, Bishop to Resident Clerk,
15 January 1956.
113
Assistant Secretary Allen displayed a bad sense of timing 
and little knowledge of Anglo-American planning, 
recommending that Britain give up on Jordan and indicating 
that the State Department favoured Arab unity under 
Egyptian leadership in the long term. Shuckburgh pointedly 
asked Allen whether the West could reach an accord with 
Nasser without paying too high a price in Jordan, Libya,
Q
and the Sudan.*
Shuckburgh and Russell agreed to coordinate military 
action against any aggressor on the Arab-Israeli borders, 
but the British position on Buraimi and Saudi Arabia 
blocked any advance on regional policy and antagonised
*i n  ,
Hoover, Foster Dulles' deputy. u The Americans advocated a 
resumption of arbitration over Buraimi despite British 
protests that this would undermine their support of the 
Trucial Sheikhdoms, but Lloyd had reiterated, in a Cabinet 
Paper of 9 January, that Britain 'must firmly resist any 
pressure to induce us to return to arbitration' or to 
negotiate directly with the Saudis. The State Department 
also asserted that Saudi opposition to the Iraqi-Jordanian 
axis was defensive, prompted by their fear of strong 
Hashemite regimes in Iraq and Jordan.11 Concerned about
9 PRO, F0115/4548, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 33 
Saving, 14 January 1956; Shuckburgh, p. 320.
10 Shuckburgh, pp. 321ff.
A trained geologist, Hoover had surveyed oil reserves 
in Saudi Arabia for American companies who eventually 
took the Saudi concessions from British firms. In 1954, 
he was the chief American negotiator on the Iranian oil 
settlement, which replaced the monopoly of the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company with an international consortium in 
which British and American companies each held 40 
percent of the shares. Hoover was convinced that 
Britain, clinging to imperial dreams, would never 
cooperate with the Arabs and the U.S. in the Middle 
East.
11 PRO, F0371/121270/V1075/5G, Shuckburgh minute, 19
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U.S. ambivalence towards Iraqi-Syrian union and closer
Iraqi-Jordanian ties, Shuckburgh allegedly snapped,
'America might wake up and realize that Iraq represents
the solution of the West in the Middle East.'12
Only Russell's intervention prevented a breakdown of
the talks. He reminded Shuckburgh that Foster Dulles was
more receptive than Hoover to British views and suggested
a message from Lloyd to the Secretary of State. Discussion
of Buraimi was adjourned while the State Department
acknowledged the vital importance of Middle Eastern oil
and transport routes, the Soviet threat to the region, and
the necessity of Anglo-American defence of the area.13
Specifically, the Americans agreed to act under the
Tripartite Declaration against Arab or Israeli aggression
and to give all support to the Baghdad Pact short of
accession. They would promote closer Iraqi-Syrian-
Jordanian links, as long as they did not alienate Egypt.
In return, Shuckburgh retreated from an aggressive policy
for Iraqi-Syrian union and endorsed the State Department's
reassertion of the need for reconciliation with Egypt:
For the time being, this will mean that we must 
show her that we are not trying to isolating her 
or to thwart her legitimate ambitions. We must 
do our best to help with the High Aswan Dam.
Egypt was expected to stop anti-Western propaganda,
especially in Iraq and Jordan, and eventually seek a
rapprochement with Iraq.14
The successful conclusion of the Shuckburgh talks was
January 1956? PRO, CAB129/79, CP(56)9, 'Buraimi,' 9 
January 1956; FRUS 1955-1957 XIII, p. 310.
12 Eveland, p. 160.
13 Shuckburgh, p. 323.
14 PRO, F0371/121270/V1075/5G, Shuckburgh minute, 19 
January 1956.
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soon overshadowed by Eden's petulance and pessimism. 
Besieged by press attacks in Britain claiming he was 
indecisive and lacked authority, beset with fears of a 
worsening economy, and pestered by his Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Macmillan, Eden was not only embarrassed by the 
near-disaster in Jordan but also by a public row with the 
Labour Party over the shipment to Belgium of 
'demilitarised' tanks which were armed and re-exported to 
Egypt. Shuckburgh wrote that Eden was 'very suspicious of 
American intentions and absolutely distrusts Nasser. He 
seemed thin, nervy, and, in a curious way, frivolous.' 
Eden complained at the limited time allocated for meetings 
with Eisenhower, a condition imposed by the President's 
doctors because of Eisenhower's recent heart attack. He 
told Lloyd:
I am not going to be treated like this. I will 
take the next boat home....It is no use talking 
to Dulles and the State Department, though you 
will do it very well, Selwyn dear; they cannot 
treat the British Prime Minister like this. 5
Speaking to Ambassador Aldrich about Buraimi, Eden 'lost
his temper and flared up bitterly about the U.S. wanting
always to have Britain abandon its interests and give away
its rights.'16
Fortunately for the Foreign Office, Eden despite his
anger, could not change policy on Egypt and the Middle
East. He had committed himself to the Aswan High Dam. The
Iraqi-Jordanian axis was not yet established, and Nasser
could not be abandoned while ALPHA still had hopes of
success. A conference of British heads of Middle Eastern
15 Shuckburgh, p. 325, p. 327, and p. 330.
16 FRUS 1955-1957 XIII, p. 324.
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missions, under Lloyd's auspices, concluded:
Although Nasser's regime has shown signs of 
being prepared to cooperate with U.K. since the 
conclusion of the Canal Zone Agreement, we see 
no reason why we should not come to some kind of 
working arrangement which would take the edge 
off Egyptian opposition to U.K. policies. '
Shuckburgh's deputy, G.G. Arthur, summarised:
Nasser is more likely to be able to help us get 
a settlement than any alternative government in 
Egypt. We should not therefore undermine Nasser 
until we are convinced that he will not help 
when it is reasonable for him to do so.1®
At the first summit meeting on 30 January, Foster
Dulles reviewed the policy on Egypt. He complained to Eden
that Anderson's talks with Nasser were 'no good...the
Egyptians were dragging their feet.' Eden replied that he
'did not know how long we can go along with Nasser. [He is
an] awful fellow.' When Eisenhower joined the talks,
Foster Dulles commented that 'little could be done until
we knew more about what might be expected of Nasser in
Egypt.' Eden noted:
It was difficult to know whether Nasser could be 
dealt with. If so, our course of action in the 
Middle East could go one way; if not, it should 
go another.
To Eisenhower's inquiry 'if they [the British] had lost
confidence in him [Nasser],' Eden carefully answered, 'It
was difficult to evaluate Nasser, who was a man of
limitless ambition.' Foster Dulles retorted:
[He] did not mind ambition, which was a healthy 
thing that could be played upon. However, Nasser 
might have become a tool of the Russians.19
17 PRO, F0115/4548, Commonwealth Relations Office to U.K. 
High Commissioners, Circular Cable W15, 23 January 1956.
18 PRO, FO371/121271/V1075/39, Arthur memoranda, 7 January 
1956.
19 The account of the summit meetings is based upon the 
records in DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 
20, Eden Visit; AP, AP20/29/2, Records of Washington
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As before, Foster Dulles' anger gave way to the assessment
that, unless ALPHA was abandoned, accommodation with
Nasser must continue. Eden and Lloyd agreed.
Once it was clear that Eden would accept the policy
forged by Shuckburgh's talks in Washington, Anglo-American
coordination was furthered on a range of issues. On the
Arab-Israeli question, Eden came to Washington hoping 'to
put teeth in the Tripartite Declaration.' Although Foster
Dulles was hesitant about a public statement of intent to
enforce the Tripartite Declaration, as U.S. military
action required a Congressional resolution, he accepted
Eden's suggestion of Anglo-American military studies.
Eisenhower agreed to Foster Dulles' proposal that Britain
and the U.S....:
...make clearly evident our resolution to react 
to an outbreak of hostilities in order to 
forestall such an outbreak....We should consider 
a possible U.N. resolution and other steps in 
the U.N. to establish a basis for action if it 
should be required.
The next day, Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed, after talks with 
General William Whiteley, the head of the British Joint 
Staff Mission, Radford confirmed, 'Our naval forces alone 
could establish an effective maritime blockade of Israel, 
and with a few reinforcements in the Persian Gulf and Red 
Sea, we could blockade Egypt also.' Eisenhower endorsed 
immediate steps that did not require Congressional 
consent, notably stationing of warships in the Eastern 
Mediterranean with visits by cruisers and destroyers to 
Middle Eastern ports.
Summit? F0115/4548, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
241, 30 January 1956.
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Eden again sought a formal commitment by the
Americans to the Baghdad Pact. In his memoirs, he
castigated the U.S. reaction:
Having played a leading part to inspire the 
project, the U.S. held back while Britain joined 
it....The repeated hesitation perplexed and 
harassed our friends in Turkey and Iraq, Iran, 
and Pakistan. They strengthened Russian and 
Egyptian will to destroy the Pact and overthrow 
the Governments which supported it.20
Eden's recollection is misleading. Shuckburgh had accepted
that American accession was not forthcoming, and Lloyd
informed Foster Dulles of the British position, stressing
'the great importance attached by the British to American
support for the Baghdad Pact even though it could not now
join' and requesting increased American aid for countries
in the organization. Eden supported Lloyd:
He understood U.S. difficulties which prevented 
its adherence. He hoped, however, [that] the 
communique following the current talks would 
give some support for the Pact.21
The Americans fulfilled the request. The final communique
noted that the Baghdad Pact had 'an important part to play
in the economic and political development of member
countries' and served 'the interests of the area as a
whole.' The State Department agreed to seek an increase in
the number of Centurion tanks delivered to Iraq in 1956
and in economic aid for Iran.22
The two sides even moved toward compromise on
Buraimi. Foster Dulles and Eisenhower, deferring to
20 Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 
336.
21 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International Subseries, Box 
20, Eden Visit, Foster Dulles-Eden meeting (ETW MC-1),
30 January 1956.
22 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, February 
1956 (2), Washington Declaration, 1 February 1956.
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British insistence that they could not return to 
arbitration, suggested that a high-ranking British 
representative meet King Saud and agreed to urge the 
Saudis not to take Buraimi to the Security Council. 
Although Britain refused any concessions on the status of 
the oasis, Foster Dulles and Eisenhower left the issue for 
direct Anglo-Saudi talks.23
Lloyd and Eden again asked the Americans to cut off 
the Saudi royalties from oil sales. The Americans balked, 
as the royalties were a private transaction between Saudi 
Arabia and ARAMCO, and a cutoff risked Saudi retaliation 
against American oil concessions and use of the Dhahran 
Air Force Base. Instead, they suggested that King Saud be 
persuaded to devote revenues to social projects instead of 
'expensive toys' like arms and 'air-conditioned Cadillacs 
by the gross.' Shuckburgh concluded, 'We thought all this 
not at all bad.'24
The Iraqi-Jordanian axis and action against Syria 
were also reviewed. Foster Dulles noted that 'various 
plans had been put forward by the Turks and Iraqis to 
effect a change in Syria' but added that none of those 
plans 'seemed sufficient to warrant our support.' No 
immediate steps were agreed, but the U.S. linked the 
Iraqi-Jordanian axis and a coup in Syria to a future 
campaign against Nasser if the Egyptian leader did not 
cooperate over ALPHA. Eden agreed, 'We must decide later, 
not during this trip, where we should go in relation to
23 Shuckburgh, p. 324; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, 
International, Box 20, Eden Visit, Foster Dulles- 
Eisenhower-Eden meeting (ETW MC-5), 31 January 1956.
24 Ibid.
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Egypt, and what our attitude toward Nasser should be.'25
The Eden-Eisenhower summit laid the foundations for 
an unprecedented Anglo-American concord on Middle Eastern 
policy. While British and American military staffs 
continued discussions, the U.S. and Britain conducted 
patrols of two destroyers off the Israeli coast, two off 
the Mediterranean coast of Egypt, and two in the Red Sea. 
On 22 February, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to 
Anglo-American military plans to enforce the Tripartite 
Declaration. The State Department and Foreign Office 
examined economic sanctions to be levied against the 
aggressor in a Middle Eastern conflict and discussed 
measures to safeguard the supply of Middle Eastern oil. ° 
Meanwhile, the British proceeded with the development 
of Iraqi-Jordanian links. On 15 February, Jordan requested 
a British assurance of support in case of an Israeli 
attack upon an Arab state, and British intelligence 
reports indicated that the Israelis would take 
'provocative action on or about 1st March.' The Chiefs of 
Staff refused to inform Amman of CORDAGE, the plan for the 
defence of Jordan, but they agreed to talks between the 
British Defence Coordinating Committee for the Middle East 
and British officers of the Arab Legion. On 28 February, 
the Cabinet approved a formal reply to Jordan: while
Britain was not obliged under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty
25 Ibid.
26 USNA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Geographical File 
1954-1956, Box 12, 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), S.26, JCS 
memorandum, 8 February 1956? PRO, F0371/121761/VR1076/ 
54G, Rose minute, 18 February 1956, and VR1076/51G, Rose 
minute, 1 March 1956? PRO, F0371/ 121759/VR1076/9G, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 351, 11 February 
1956, and subsequent minutes? PRO, CAB134/1298, Middle 
East (Official) Committee Papers.
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to aid Jordan if Israel attacked another Arab state, the 
Tripartite Declaration would bring Britain 'side-by-side 
with Jordan' to resist aggression, provided Jordan did not 
take precipitate action against Israel.27
The persistent question was whether Eden would permit 
the Foreign Office to develop Middle Eastern policy. The 
Prime Minister plagued Lloyd with phone calls, tore up the 
Foreign Secretary's draft messages to Foster Dulles on 
Buraimi, launched verbal tirades against Nasser, and 
vetoed the despatch of messages to Jordan or Saudi Arabia 
without his personal approval. Kirkpatrick, the Permanent 
Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, noted, 'Selwyn's 
only ambition is not to get into trouble.'28
Lloyd had to make a gesture to Eden or risk dismissal 
from his post. At the same time, the British received word 
that the Anderson mission for ALPHA was making little 
progress with Egypt or Israel. On 22 February, Lloyd, 
preparing for a Middle Eastern tour, proposed taking 'a 
firm line on Egyptian propaganda....[Our] objective would 
be to make it clear that Egypt could not expect further 
help from us unless she changed her policy towards us.' 
The Cabinet approved this line. Anglo-Egyptian relations
• • o qwere at breaking point. *
27 PRO, F0371/121484/VJ10393/2G, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 185, 6 February 1956? PRO, DEFE4/83, COS(56)21st 
meeting, 17 February 1956, and C0S(56)22nd meeting, 21 
February 1956.
28 Shuckburgh, p. 332, p. 334, and p. 337ff.
29 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.16(56), 22 February 1956.
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CHAPTER 6 
MARCH 1956: THE TURNING POINT
Until March 1956, confrontation with Nasser did not 
serve either American or British interests. Two events 
changed this. First, King Hussein's dismissal of General 
Glubb as commander-in-chief of Jordan's Arab Legion 
convinced the Eden Government that Nasser was determined 
to destroy Britain's Middle Eastern position. Second, the 
failure of the Anderson mission ended hopes for ALPHA. The 
Americans believed they could not proceed towards an Arab- 
Israeli settlement unless a new regime was installed in 
Cairo. An Anglo-American 'alliance' against Egypt was 
possible.
On 1 March, King Hussein summoned Glubb and asked him 
to leave the country within two hours. Eden's urgent 
appeal to Hussein was refused, although the deadline for 
Glubb's expulsion was extended to 24 hours.1 The dismissal 
was prompted by disagreement between Hussein and Glubb 
over control of Jordan's internal affairs and the Arab 
Legion. In May 1955, when General Templer, the Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, and Britain's commander of 
Middle Eastern forces, General Charles Keightley, visited 
Jordan, Hussein complained that Glubb tried to keep all 
matters in his hands, would not cooperate with the Jordan 
Defence Ministry, and supported 'his own favourites.' 
Matters worsened when Glubb insisted that Wing Commander
1 PRO, F0800/724, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 276, 1 
March 1956, and subsequent minutes; PRO, F0371/121540/ 
VJ1201/8G, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 280, 1 March 
1956, and subsequent minutes, and VJ1201/11G, Amman to 
Foreign Office, Cable 280, 1 March 1956, and subsequent 
minutes.
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Jock Dalgleish, the Head of the Royal Jordanian Air Force 
since June 1953 and a good friend of Hussein's, should be 
replaced in February 1956.2
On 28 February, Prime Minister Samir Rifai, fearing 
British opposition, refused Hussein's request to transfer 
control of the Jordanian police from Glubb to the Ministry 
of the Interior. The next day, Glubb recommended the 
dismissal of 11 Jordanian officers and the transfer of 34 
others to police or civilian departments. After an 
acrimonious meeting with Glubb, at which the King refused 
to endorse the General's proposals for the reinstatement 
of certain officers, the dismissal of the 'troublesome' 
ones, and the delay of 'Arabisation' of the Arab Legion 
until 1985, Hussein decided the commander would have to 
leave.3
On 9 March, the Foreign Office told the U.S. Embassy
that it had no evidence of Egyptian or Saudi intervention
in Jordanian affairs, and Lloyd later confirmed that the
'principal reason for Glubb['s] dismissal was King's
resentment at taking guidance and advice from a man so
many years his senior.' Moreover, Lloyd was optimistic
about his talks with Nasser:
Although the Glubb incident was a bodyline ball 
in the middle of the innings....My general 
feeling is the talks were useful....An 
accommodation with him is not impossible to 
start on a tentative basis.
2 Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government 
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987), pp. 186ff.
3 The End of Empire: Egypt, interview with King Hussein? 
Hoopes, p. 335; Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, p. 94? 
USNA, RG 59, CDF, 741.5274/3-1356, Amman to State 
Department, Despatch 311, 13 March 1956.
4 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 641.85/3-956, London to State 
Department, Cable 3834, 9 March 1956, and 780.00/4-1256, 
London to State Department, Cable 4604, 12 April 1956?
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On 1 March, however, Eden and his Ministers were 
convinced that Nasser had prompted or forced Hussein to 
remove Glubb. Since January, Eden and the Foreign Office 
had collected reports of an Egyptian propaganda campaign 
against Glubb. Allegations that Glubb halted the advance 
of Iraqi and Jordanian armies towards Tel Aviv in 1948
5were common.
By an unfortunate coincidence, Lloyd arrived in Cairo 
on the day of Glubb's dismissal. At dinner, during a 
three-hour discussion, Nasser proposed a 'truce.' in 
Anglo-Egyptian sparring. If Britain would 'freeze the 
membership of the Baghdad Pact, with no more recruitment 
of Arab states,' Nasser would halt anti-British and anti- 
Pact propaganda and revive, with Iraq, the Arab Collective 
Security Pact, which might eventually be linked to the 
Baghdad Pact. Lloyd did not reject the proposal but stated 
that he must consult other Baghdad Pact members and the 
British Cabinet.6
Near the end of the dinner, a British Embassy 
official passed a note about Glubb's dismissal to 
Ambassador Trevelyan, who told Lloyd of the news upon 
their return to the Embassy. When Lloyd visited Nasser the 
next day, he believed that the Egyptian President, at 
worst, had engineered Glubb's removal and, at best, had
AP, AP20/24, Bahrain to Foreign Office, Cable 155A, 2 
March 1956. See also PRO, F0371/ 127876/VJ1011/1, 
Johnston to Lloyd, 19 March 1957.
5 PRO, F0371/118861/JE1053/7G, Shuckburgh minute, 22 
February 1956, and subsequent minutes; PRO, 
F0371/121270/V1075/22, Arthur to Rose, 20 January 1956.
6 Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956 (New York: Mayflower, 1978), 
pp. 44ff.? Heikal, Nasser, pp. 84ff.; Love, pp. 210ff.? 
Trevelyan, pp. 64ff.? PRO, F0371/121243/V1071/85, Cairo 
to Foreign Office, Cable 413, 2 March 1956.
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withheld the information from him. Nasser, however, did 
not learn of the news from Jordan until late evening on 1 
March or early the next morning. Unaware of Hussein's 
motives, he believed the British asked Glubb to resign.
The result was farce. Lloyd asked Nasser, 'You are 
aware, Mr. President, of what has happened in Jordan?' 
Nasser replied 'Yes, it's good, isn't it?' to which Lloyd 
rebutted, 'What's good about it?' Nasser explained his
assumption that Britain approved the change because it 
'would improve the position in Jordan and strengthen 
[Hussein's] regime.' Lloyd, incensed at 'this pretence' of 
Nasser's, charged that Egypt had been responsible, through 
propaganda or direct action, for Glubb's removal and
warned of the bad effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations.
Proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian 'truce' fell by the
wayside.7
The situation worsened when Lloyd left Cairo and 
arrived in Bahrain on the Arabian Peninsula. En route from 
the airport to the British Residency, Lloyd's motorcade 
encountered demonstrators protesting the lack of social 
reform and control of the country's policies by Sir 
Charles Belgrave, the British adviser to the Bahraini 
Ruler. Sand and pebbles were thrown at the procession, 
some cars were jostled, and one of their windows was 
broken. Lloyd cabled, 'I did not have as exciting a time 
in Bahrain as is described here,' but the incident
. . ftheightened anger in London.
7 PRO, F0371/121243/V1071/85, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 413, 2 March 1956; Lloyd, p. 47; Heikal, Cutting 
the Lion's Tail, p. 97; PRO, F0371/121540/VJ1201/24G, 
Bahrain to Foreign Office, Cable 156, 2 March 1956.
8 Lloyd, pp. 49ff.; Nutting, No End of a Lesson (London:
126
The news of Glubb's removal convulsed Eden with fury. 
Anthony Nutting, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
was with the Prime Minister until 5 a.m. trying to calm 
him:
[Eden] put all the blame on Nasser and brushed 
aside every argument that mere personal 
considerations had in fact influenced Hussein's 
arbitrary decision....He decided that the world 
was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser.
Nutting wrote that he pressed the need for deliberation:
[Eden] called me nothing but a Foreign Office 
clerk and said I didn't understand anything 
about politics and the implications of this
dismissal for Britain and her Prime Minister. At 
one point he said, 'You won't accept any
arguments against Nasser, you are in love with 
Nasser.'
About midnight, Eden called Shuckburgh at his home in
Henley after the day's work at the Foreign Office, 
snapped, 'I thought you would be looking after your 
business,' and summoned him back to London.10
After Eden cabled that Glubb's removal could be
'disastrous for Anglo-Jordanian cooperation in the 
future,' Hussein publicly confirmed Jordan's friendship 
with Britain and respect for the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, 
but the Prime Minster was not pacified. Shuckburgh wrote 
that Eden, intervening constantly with phone calls and 
messages, was 'now violently anti-Nasser, whom he compares 
with Mussolini.' He ordered Shuckburgh to consider 
reoccupation of the Canal Zone Base by British troops.11
With Lloyd absent and Eden in an aggressive mood, the 
Foreign Office was initially paralysed, and an Anglo-
Constable, 1967), p. 28; PRO, F0800/734, Delhi to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, Cable 361, 4 March 1956.
9 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 17.
10 Shuckburgh, pp. 339ff.
11 Shuckburgh, p. 341.
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Egyptian showdown seemed inevitable. On 4 March, however,
some officials began to counteract the rush towards
conflict. Glubb met Eden, Nutting, Shuckburgh, and other
officials and warned:
It would not be right to come down on Jordan 
like a ton of bricks....Do not pull out, do not 
cut the subsidy. Stop sending telegrams and let 
the dust settle down.
Ambassador Duke, wondered if he and London might have
overreacted to Glubb's dismissal.12
That evening Eden convened a meeting at Chequers,
attended by the Lord President, Lord Salisbury; the
Minister of Defence, Walter Monckton? Templer? the Chief
of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Dermot Boyle? Kirkpatrick;
Nutting? and Shuckburgh. Eden insisted upon a tough line.
Kirkpatrick lent support, calling for withdrawal of the
British subsidy and denunciation of the Anglo-Jordanian
Treaty. Everyone agreed that British officers of the Arab
Legion should leave Jordan. The only sign of moderation
was an attempt, probably led by Shuckburgh, to soften the
tone of a statement to be made by Eden to the House of
Commons the next day.13
This was the high-water mark of Eden's policy of
reprisal, as Foreign Office officials mobilised support
for a conciliatory line. Duke rejected withdrawal of the
subsidy and denunciation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty,
since 'action against General Glubb might have been
directed only against him personally and...the manner of
12 Shuckburgh, p. 342? Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 30? 
PRO, FO371/121541/VJ1201/37G, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 335, 4 March 1956.
13 Shuckburgh, p. 342? PRO, F0371/121541/VJ1201/41G, 
Foreign Office to Amman, Cable 403, 5 March 1956.
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his dismissal might have been due to the awe in which he 
had come to be held in Jordan.' The Cabinet agreed that a 
wide-ranging statement should be considered further, and 
Eden's address to the Commons asked only for the relief of 
British officers from their commands in the Arab Legion.14
Shuckburgh and Nutting argued that Jordan would 
repair its relations with Britain 'if we could find a way 
of letting them back through the Iraqis.' Telegrams from 
Iraq indicated that Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id and the 
monarchy were 'waking up a little to the facts of life' 
and considering a meeting with Hussein. Shuckburgh and 
Nutting recommended that Britain suggest Iraqi assistance, 
through military forces and partial takeover of the 
British subsidy, to Amman.15
The Ministerial meeting to decide British policy 
occurred late on the evening of 5 March. Shuckburgh and 
Nutting found a sponsor in Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Macmillan. Over the dissent of Salisbury and the Lord 
Privy Seal, R.A. Butler, who wanted to jettison the Anglo- 
Jordanian Treaty, the Chancellor obtained agreement to the 
policy of an Iraqi-Jordanian axis. He told Shuckburgh 
after the meeting, 'I have gained you a day or two to 
rescue the work of 40 years.' Apparently Macmillan had 
convinced Eden that the Iraqi-Jordanian front would block 
Nasser's hopes in the Middle East.16
14 Shuckburgh, p. 343? Eden, p. 350? PRO, CAB128/30,
C.M.18(56), 5 March 1956.
15 Shuckburgh, p. 343? PRO, F0800/734, Nutting to Eden, 5 
March 1956.
16 Shuckburgh, p. 343? PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.19(56), 6 March 
1956.
Present were Eden? Salisbury? Macmillan? Butler? 
Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd? the Chief Whip, 
Edward Heath? Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook? Templer?
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The next day the Cabinet approved the decisions of
the Ministerial meeting, although Eden still spoke of
Egypt as 'the main threat to [British] interests' in Iraq
and the Persian Gulf'17 and cabled Lloyd that Nasser's
hopes of an Anglo-Egyptian 'truce' over the Baghdad Pact
were misplaced:
I am absolutely sure that we must do nothing to 
lead the members of the Baghdad Pact to think 
that we are considering limiting the membersh 
ip. It could be fatal even to explore this with 
them at the present time.18
Eden, however, painted himself into a corner with his 
tough posturing. On the one hand, he assured the public 
that Britain would react firmly to Glubb's dismissal. He 
showed his resolve over the crisis in the British colony 
of Cyprus, where the guerrilla movement EOKA, supported by 
many residents, was demanding union with Greece, by 
ordering the jamming of Greek broadcasts to the island and 
the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the 
Greek Orthodox community, to the Seychelles. On the other 
hand, the Cabinet had approved the Foreign Office's 
conciliatory approach towards Jordan, and Eden had been 
warned that public denunciation of Amman might inflame 
anti-British nationalists and topple King Hussein.19
With Eden unable to support his fighting talk with 
tough measures, the Opposition trapped the Prime Minister 
in a Commons debate on Jordan on 7 March. In his memoirs, 
Eden claimed that he had inadequate time to prepare his
Edward Boyle of the Treasury? Kirkpatrick? Nutting? and 
Shuckburgh.
17 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.19(56), 6 March 1956.
18 PRO, F0800/734, Foreign Office to Karachi, Cable 651, 7 
March 1956.
19 Shuckburgh, p. 344.
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winding-up speech, but Foreign Office staff, including
Shuckburgh, spent all of 7 March drafting the statement,
which was a concise summary of Britain's need to work
with, rather than against, Jordan as part of a long-term
strategy in the Middle East.20
Eden's downfall was a loss of temper when the
Opposition dared him to give an immediate sign of British
strength. The Prime Minister strayed from his script to
produce the image of Britain vigorously defending her
interests against foreign threats. When he could not
support the rhetoric with an aggressive policy, he tried
to shout down his hecklers. He failed miserably, leaving
the chamber 'pretty broken' and saying only, 'Noisy,
noisy.' Drew Middleton of the New York Times wrote that
Eden was 'subjected to a storm of vituperation and abuse
beyond anything heard in the Commons since the last days
of Neville Chamberlain's Prime Ministership.' A British
columnist added:
Sir Anthony suffered a blow to his prestige that 
was clearly reflected in the silent, devastated 
ranks on the Conservative benches behind 
him....If the year goes on as it has begun, it 
will not be Sir Anthony but Mr Harold Macmillan 
who reigns in Downing Street in 1957.21
Press Secretary Clark wondered 'to what extent [Macmillan
was] intriguing' to take advantage of Eden's position.22
Despite Eden's woesome performance, the Government had a
majority of 60, a typical figure, in the division, but,
humiliated by the Opposition, the Prime Minister now
20 Eden, p. 352? Hansard, 7 March 1956.
21 Carlton, Anthony Eden, pp. 398ff.; William Clark 
Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 7 March 1956? Rhodes James, 
p. 432.
22 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 7 March 
1956.
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sought total victory over Egypt.
The choice lay between Eden's wish for quick, 
decisive action and the Foreign Office's strategy of long­
term 'isolation' of Nasser. On 10 March, Shuckburgh, 
learning of ALPHA'S death, defined the situation:
The Tripartite Declaration [was] a mere stop­
gap; its sole justification was that it held the 
ring while [an Arab-Israeli] settlement was 
sought. This is a situation of grave national 
emergency. If the Jews attack, then perhaps we 
can find means of saving ourselves by falling 
upon them [but] unless the Israelis commit an 
aggression, we are daily becoming more committed 
to go to war against a Soviet-armed Arab world 
as soon as they fell strong enough or fanatical 
enough to attack Israel.23
Stressing the need for consensus within the Commons and
with the Americans, Shuckburgh posed six questions,
answering the first two himself. There was no alternative
to Egypt as the route to an Arab-Israeli settlement
because of the weakness of Jordan, Syria, and the Lebanon.
Nor could Britain impose a settlement upon the Arabs and
Israel because of Israeli refusal to cede territory and
American preoccupation with the 1956 Presidential
elections. Since an immediate settlement was impossible,
Shuckburgh pondered:
If we have despaired of Nasser, ought we to seek 
to overthrow him and if so, how? We must have 
full American cooperation in any such effort.
Britain had to decide how Nuri and the Baghdad Pact could
be sustained, how King Saud of Saudi Arabia could be
detached from Nasser, and whether the United Nations, and
thus the Soviet Union, should become more involved in the
23 PRO, FO371/121235/V1054/70G, Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 
10 March 1956, and subsequent minutes; Shuckburgh, p. 
346.
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Nutting answered Shuckburgh's questions on 12 March.
To isolate Nasser, Britain should bring the U.S. into a
strengthened Baghdad Pact, forge the Iraqi-Jordanian axis,
detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt, and install a pro-Western
government in Syria. Meanwhile, military and economic aid,
including funding for the Aswan High Dam, would be
withheld from Egypt.25
Eden was quick to reply. He called Nutting, who was
having dinner at the Savoy, and snapped:
It's me. What's all this poppycock you've sent 
me? I don't agree with a single word of it.
When Nutting explained that he was trying to establish
Britain's long-term position in the Middle East, Eden
responded:
But what's all this nonsense about isolating 
Nasser or 'neutralising' him, as you call it? I 
want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want 
him removed, and if you and the Foreign Office 
don't agree, then you'd better come to the 
Cabinet and explain why.
Nutting explained the need to find another leader for
Egypt, but Eden persisted, 'I don't want an alternative
and I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in
Egypt.'27
Fortunately for the Foreign Office, two issues 
distracted Eden. The first was progress towards
24 Ibid.
25 The Nutting minute is missing from PRO, F0371/121235/ 
V1054/70G and retained in PRO, F0800/734, but its 
contents can be deduced by tracing the Foreign Office 
minutes between Shuckburgh's inquiry of 10 March and 
Lloyd's presentation to Cabinet on 21 March.
26 Nutting later claimed that Eden's original words were, 
'I want him murdered, can't you understand?' (The End of 
Empire: Egypt, interview with Anthony Nutting)
27 Nutting, No End of A Lesson, pp. 34ff.
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reconciliation with Jordan. Sir Alec Kirkbride, advisor
for more than 30 years to King Hussein's grandfather, King
Abdullah, reported to the Cabinet after a visit to Amman:
The King's dismissal of General Glubb...was 
essentially an act directed against General 
Glubb personally? it was not designed to disrupt 
Jordan's relations with the U.K.? and both the 
King and the Prime Minister of Jordan were now 
most seriously disturbed at the possibility that 
a lasting breach might thereby created in the 
relations between the two countries.
He added, 'What was immediately required was an assurance
that the U.K. Government were not proposing to withdraw
their support from Jordan and an offer to discuss the
terms on which British officers might serve with the Arab
Legion in the future.' While Eden was 'clearly put out by
what Kirkbride had to say,' the Cabinet expressed 'general
agreement ...that it would be inexpedient' to assume that
Anglo-Jordanian relations could not be restored.28
On 10 March, Britain's need to maintain good
relations with Jordan increased when Egypt, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia renewed their offer, first made in January,
to replace the British subsidy to Jordan. The Foreign
Office confirmed three days later:
It is most important that we should bring the 
Iraqis and Jordanians much closer
together....It would be better to proceed
through closer bilateral arrangements between 
Jordan and Iraq in the first place, leading 
possibly to some trilateral arrangements to 
include us. 9
The opportunity to develop the Iraqi-Jordanian axis 
came on 14 March when Hussein met King Feisal II of Iraq,
28 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 34ff.? PRO, CAB128/30, 
C.M.21(56), 9 March 1956? Shuckburgh, p. 345.
29 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.21(56), 9 March 1956? PRO, 
F0371/121243/V1071/102, Foreign Office draft, 13 March 
1956.
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Crown Prince Abdul-Illah, and Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id at
H-3, a pumping station on an Iraqi oil pipeline. Hussein
told Ambassador Duke that the talks were 'most
satisfactory,' as Iraq and Jordan would establish a joint
defence council similar to the Anglo-Jordanian Defence
Board. The British Chiefs of Staff confirmed on 22 March:
[While] existing facilities and the stationing 
of forces in Jordan are not militarily essential 
to U.K. strategy, ...overriding political 
considerations demand the retention of U.K. 
influence and interests in Jordan.... Support 
for Jordan should include the continuation of a 
subsidy, the setting up of a Military Mission to 
advise the Arab Legion and the Royal Jordanian 
Air Force, and assurance of U.K. intention to 
stand by the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.30
Meanwhile, Eden's attention turned from Egypt to
Bahrain and the Persian Gulf States. As early as 3 March,
Eden was writing minutes to Minister of Defence Monckton,
ringing Foreign Office staff, and demanding emergency
meetings. When Eden drafted a telegram authorising British
military action in Bahrain, Nutting reminded the Prime
Minister that progress was being made towards an
accommodation between the Ruler and his reformist
opponents.31
Rebuffed by the Foreign Office, Eden pressed 
Monckton:
We cannot allow the oil to be endangered. 
Therefore, a plan must be worked out without 
delay as to what reinforcements are necessary 
and where they can be put....Both the political 
and military difficulties have got to be
30 Shuckburgh, p. 346? PRO, F0800/734, Amman to Foreign 
Office, Cable 422, 15 March 1956? PRO, F0371/121484/ 
VJ10393/15, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 427, 15 March 
1956? PRO, CAB131/17, DC(56)7, 'Review of U.K. Position 
in Jordan,' 22 March 1956.
31 AP, AP20/21, Eden to Monckton, 3 March 1956?
Shuckburgh, p. 345? Clark, p. 162? PRO, F0800/734, 
Nutting to Eden, 9 March 1956.
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overcome.3 2
Eden's interventions were so persistent that Cabinet
Secretary Brook asked Shuckburgh to reassure the Prime
Minister. Shuckburgh complained:
Nutting, Kirkpatrick, and I feel that we, 
alternately, are rejected by the PM as no good, 
not on the job, unhelpful.... [Eden] seems to 
want to march troops in and arrest the 
[reformist] "Higher Executive Committee" with 
whom Bernard [Burrows] is now negotiating....We 
have now got to a state where each telegram that 
comes in causes Ministers to meet, telephone one 
another, draft replies, and curse everybody.33
Bahrain was an official's nightmare, but Eden's
obsession gave the Foreign Office a clear field on wider
issues. On 21 March, Lloyd returned from his tour to
present the Cabinet with a modified version of Nutting's
minute of the 12th. The Foreign Secretary warned:
It was evident that [Nasser] was aiming at 
leadership of the Arab world; that, in
order to secure it, he was willing to accept the 
help of the Russians; and that he was not 
prepared to work for a settlement of the Arab 
dispute with Israel....It was now clear that we 
could not establish a basis for friendly 
relations with Egypt.
However, as Nutting suggested, a direct confrontation with
Egypt was rejected in favour of of a long-term policy of
'isolation':
We should seek increased support for the Baghdad 
Pact and its members. We should make a further 
effort to persuade the U.S. to join the Pact. We 
should seek to draw Iraq and Jordan more closer 
together. We should try to detach Saudi Arabia 
from Egypt by making plain to King Saud the 
nature of Nasser's ambitions. We should seek 
further support for Libya, in order to prevent 
the extension of Egyptian or Communist influence 
there. We should seek to establish in Syria a 
Government more friendly to the West. We should 
counter Egyptian subversion in the Sudan and the
32 AP, AP20/21, Eden to Monckton, 10 March 1956. See also 
AP, AP20/21, Eden to Lloyd, 17 March 1956.
33 Shuckburgh, pp. 346ff.
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Persian Gulf. There were also possibilities of
action aimed more directly at Egypt --- e.g.,
the withholding of military supplies, the 
withdrawal of financial support for the Aswan 
Dam, the reduction of U.S. economic aid, and the 
blocking of.sterling balances.
In all this we should need the support of the 
U.S. Government. The first task would be to seek 
Anglo-American agreement on a general 
realignment of policy towards Egypt.
Despite his earlier castigation of Nutting, Eden now
asserted 'he was in full agreement' with the Foreign
Office approach and authorized Lloyd to presented the
package to Foster Dulles.34
The Foreign Office had apparently won the
policymaking battle, but Eden's concession was incomplete.
Without Ministerial consent or the knowledge of Foreign
Office officials, Eden apparently authorised a separate
policy for dealing with Nasser. MI6 officers and
unofficial representatives contacted Egyptian military
personnel and politicians who were prepared to form a
government if Nasser was overthrown.35
In early 1956, a group of rebel officers formed 'The
Supporters of Justice.' Julian Amery, a backbench
Conservative MP, member of the Suez Group, and Macmillan's
son-in-law, had been a British intelligence officer in
Egypt in World War II and had maintained excellent
contacts in the country since then. Unlike the British
Government, he knew about the Free Officers movement in
Egypt and their plans for a coup months before it happened
in 1952. in 1956, Amery discussed the replacement of the
Egyptian leader with a 'shadow Government' of the rebels.
34 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.24(56), 21 March 1956.
35 Peter Wright, Spvcatcher (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 
160.
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The dissidents said they would assume power after Britain
had toppled Nasser by covert or overt means. Amery passed
selected portions of the talks to 'certain friends' in the
intelligence services. According to the CIA's Miles
Copeland, the Agency and MI6 subsequently exchanged lists
of dissident Egyptian officers.36
How could Eden have authorised planning against
Nasser which not only bypassed the Foreign Office but was
incompatible with the Cabinet policy? The answer lay in
the Prime Minister's temper, MI6's desire to topple 'anti-
British' governments, and direct liaison between Eden and
the intelligence services through the Permanent
Undersecretary's Department of the Foreign Office (PUSD).
Formed in 1948, the PUSD was supposed to be a
coordinating body for planning by the Foreign Office, the
military and service departments, and the intelligence
services. By 1956, however, the PUSD, while responsible
for the coordination of diplomatic and military plans,
functioned as an adjunct to MI 6 and ambitious Foreign
Office personnel in operational matters. William Hayter,
one of the 'founders' of PUSD, admitted that the
Department...
... tended to be used ad hoc by Undersecretaries 
who wanted someone to devil for them outside 
their own department.... Short-term problems were 
being constantly referred to it and we used to 
fend them off as best we could.
The head of the Department, Patrick Dean, chaired the 
Joint Intelligence Committee, and the PUSD 'cleared' all 
intelligence operations that might conflict with Foreign
36 PRO, F0371/125423/JE1019/File; Author's interviews with 
Julian Amery and Miles Copeland.
37 Author's interview with William Hayter.
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Office objectives.
Formally, the PUSD was supervised by Kirkpatrick and 
Lloyd. Lloyd, however, was occupied with the burdens of 
his post, and Kirkpatrick, familiar with covert operations 
and a strong proponent of action against Egypt and the 
Soviet bloc, did not interfere with MI6's plans. The 
result was that Eden, working through the PUSD, gave MI6 
carte blanche, despite the possible impact of the 
intelligence service's plans upon the Foreign Office-'s 
more cautious approach.
The Crabb incident in April 1956 illustrated the 
problems of this 'system.' When Soviet leaders Nikolai 
Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev visited Britain, MI6 wanted 
to discover why the cruiser on which they travelled, the 
Ordjonikidze, was faster than British warships. When the 
cruiser docked in Portsmouth Harbour, the service hired a 
frogman, Commander Lionel 'Buster' Crabb RNVR (retired), 
to inspect its hull. His first mission was successful, but 
he never surfaced from the second. His decapitated body 
washed ashore in the summer.38
Eden knew nothing of the mission until a Soviet note, 
two weeks after Crabb's disappearance, asked for an 
explanation of a frogman floating near the Ordjonikidze. 
He told Ministers that, asked by the Admiralty about the 
mission a few weeks before the Soviet visit, he had 
written 'a clear and precise minute, expressly forbidding 
anything of the kind.' An enquiry by Sir Edward Bridges, 
the former Cabinet Secretary, cleared Ministers and senior 
MI6 officials of responsibility for the event, claiming
38 See West, pp. 79ff., for a full account of the mission.
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that the operation had been planned and implemented by
junior personnel of MI6. In December 1956, Eden approved
Bridges' recommendation that Dean, 'in his personal
capacity, undertake an enquiry into the question of
balance between military intelligence on the one hand, and
civilian intelligence and political risks on the other.'39
The fiasco arose because Eden had given MI6 to gather
information on the Soviets without ensuring that he knew
of all operations. John Henry, a MI6 Technical Officer who
knew of the Crabb operation, commented:
You know what Eden is like. One minute he says 
you can do something, the next minute not. We 
thought it was an acceptable risk to take.
MI6 referred the Crabb mission to its Foreign Officer
Adviser, Michael Williams, for approval, but Williams had
just learned of the death of his father. Confronted with
the proposal at the end of the day, he approved it without
referring it to higher authority.40
The same system encouraged MI6, without consulting
Foreign Office officials outside the PUSD, to plot
Nasser's downfall. A new head of MI6, Sir Dick White, was
appointed to prevent a repetition of the Crabb fiasco, but
his career had been spent in MI5, the British domestic
intelligence service, and he needed time to adjust to MI6
procedures. Williams, after taking a leave of absence was
replaced as Foreign Office Adviser in July 1956 by
Geoffrey Macdermott, but the effective liaison with Eden
was Dean. As the U.S. Embassy noted, 'The reshuffle of the
chain-of-command of certain intelligence units after the
39 AP, AP20/21, Eden to Head, 22 December 1956.
40 Wright, pp. 73 and 160? West, pp. 83ff.
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embarrassing episode of Commander Crabbe [sic]...brought
increased authority to Dean.'41 The result were two
British foreign policies, one developed and implemented by
Foreign Office officials, the other by Eden and MI6.
In Washington, the Eisenhower Administration was also
reviewing the Middle Eastern situation. Since January,
American hopes had been pinned on the Anderson mission for
ALPHA. Briefing Anderson before his departure in January,
Foster Dulles outlined the 'bargaining positions' the U.S.
could use to extract concessions from Egypt and Israel,
but it was soon obvious that American pressure could only
be applied against Cairo. Foster Dulles noted, 'Nasser
would be willing to pay a considerable price to get the
support of the U.S. in limiting the Baghdad Pact to its
present Arab membership...with Egypt maintaining its
hegemony of the Arab countries.' Economically, 'in
relation to cotton...[the U.S.] could either destroy or
help Egypt's market' and withhold finance for the Aswan
High Dam. Finally, the U.S. could construct a canal,
financed by oil companies, outside Egypt.
Israel was immune from these threats. The pro-Israeli
lobby in Congress and the upcoming Presidential election
precluded any withdrawal of American aid. Foster Dulles'
only suggestion was to warn Tel Aviv:
There was...a growing realization that backing 
Israel might be very costly to vital U.S. 
national interests. Israel from now on would 
have to play the part of a good neighbor to the 
Arabs and not seek to maintain itself by its own 
force and foreign backing. Unless the Israelis
41 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 741.13/2-757, London to State 
Department, Despatch 1912, 7 February 1957. I am 
grateful to Tracy Steele for bringing this document to 
my attention.
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realized this, they were doomed.42
After his first meeting with Nasser, Anderson was
ready to report Nasser's acceptance of direct Egyptian-
Israeli negotiations on territorial adjustments and
resettlement of Palestinian refugees. After Anderson's
departure, however, Nasser stopped the CIA's Kermit
Roosevelt. Roosevelt recalled, 'In his amiable way, Nasser
was nodding at everything Anderson said and Anderson
thought he was making historic advances...[but his] Texas
drawl was so thick that Nasser couldn't understand a thing
he said.' When Roosevelt explained that Anderson wanted
direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, Nasser interjected:
I could never do that. I'd be assassinated. Go 
stop him. Don't let him send that cable!
Roosevelt hurriedly left for a CIA safe house to stop
Anderson's despatch. The next day, Nasser confirmed to
Anderson that his proposals were not acceptable.4**
Anderson flew to Israel for meetings with Ben-Gurion
and travelled between Cairo and Jerusalem twice more by
early March. He made no progress. Ben-Gurion, while
proposing direct talks, rejected territorial concessions
or repatriation of Palestinian refugees to their homes in
Israel. Nasser would not enter direct negotiations without
some compromise by Ben-Gurion on both issues. Anderson,
desperate to keep the negotiations alive, obtained
Eisenhower's approval of a last approach to Egypt to
pursue Nasser's offer of an agreement over the Johnston
42 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject, Alphabetical, 
Box 10, Israeli Relations, 1951-1957 (4), Foster Dulles 
memorandum, 11 January 1956.
43 Neff, pp. 135ff.? Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, p. 
91; Nutting, Nasser, p. 128.
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Plan for the division of the Jordan River 'on condition
that the U.S. and U.K. would not attempt to expand the
membership of the Baghdad Pact.'44
The Administration, however, was under pressure from
American politicians and Israeli diplomats to increase
arms shipments to Tel Aviv. On 23 February, Foster Dulles
informed Ambassador Makins that time for finding an Arab-
Israeli settlement was short and it was 'doubtful that the
U.S. Government could hold off on arms to Israel.'45 If
Foster Dulles maintained his faith in the Anderson
mission, he risked a showdown with the pro-Israeli lobby
in an election year. If he increased U.S. arms to Israel,
the Egyptians, Syrians, and possibly the Saudis,
Jordanians, and Lebanese might turn to the Soviets.
Foster Dulles responded with a dual approach.
Publicly, the U.S. would support the enforcement of the
Tripartite Declaration and the U.N.'s efforts to conclude
an Arab-Israeli settlement. Privately, the State
Department would endorse arms supplies to Israel through
third countries and, if Anderson's last efforts failed
with Egypt, review its position towards Nasser.46
The British tried to exploit Foster Dulles' dilemma.
Makins advised London:
The Americans are groping too for a policy, and 
need our help and advice. Moreover, they are
44 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 224ff.? Ewald, p. 196? 
Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, pp. 92ff.; U.S. DDRS, 
US84 002554.
45 PRO, F0371/121271/V1075, Bailey to Shuckburgh, 24 
February 1956. See also USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86 
Series, Foster Dulles statement to Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 24 February 1956.
46 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 14, March 
1956 Miscellaneous (6), U.S. Cabinet meeting, 2 March 
1956.
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evidently bracing up to the necessity of 
accepting additional responsibility in the 
Middle East.
Eden wrote Eisenhower on 5 March:
There is no doubt that the Russians are resolved 
to liquidate the Baghdad Pact. In this 
undertaking Nasser is supporting them and I 
suspect that his relations with the Soviets are 
much closer than he admits to us. Recent events 
in Jordan are part of this pattern.
Asking for American accession to the Pact and more
Centurion tanks to Iraq, the Prime Minister concluded:
Certainly we should accept, I think, that a 
policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in 
Egypt. Our best chgjice is to show that it pays 
to be our friends. 7
Lloyd, in Karachi for a Ministerial meeting of the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation, spoke to Foster 
Dulles, but the request for American accession to the 
Baghdad Pact was premature. Foster Dulles had not 
forgotten the failure of the Templer mission to Jordan, 
and Anderson's faint hopes in Egypt rested upon a 
moratorium on Pact membership: 'There was still a
sufficient chance to salvage something from our relations 
with Nasser.' Moreover, 'a political crisis over U.S. 
relations with Israel,' provoked by Congressional debate 
over accession, 'would be the one thing that might rob 
President Eisenhower of victory [in the 1956 Presidential 
election].' Nutting commented to Eden, 'It does not seem 
that the Americans have yet hoisted in that appeasement of 
Nasser simply does not pay and that whatever "bargain” you
• . Aftmake with him he will break.
47 PRO, F0371/121271/V1075/55, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 582, 3 March 1956? PRO, F0800/734, Foreign 
Office to Washington, Cable 1246, 5 March 1956.
48 PRO, F0800/734, Foreign Office to Karachi, Cable 531, 5 
March 1956, and Nutting to Eden, 6 March 1956? Lloyd, p.
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However, further meetings between Lloyd and Foster
Dulles brought some accord on other issues. Significantly,
Foster Dulles hinted at measures against Nasser if Egypt
did not cooperate with Anderson:
Unless Nasser did something definite soon, we 
would have to "ditch" him. By something 
definite, he meant an immediate cessation of 
propaganda against the Baghdad Pact and the 
West, acceptance of the Johnston plan, and 
definite steps toward a settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. 9
Shuckburgh, talking to American officials in London,
wrote, 'Today both we and the Americans really gave up
hope of Nasser and began to look around for means of
destroying him.'
On 8 March, Foster Dulles carried out a 'speculative
exercise' for Eisenhower. Possible measures included U.S.
adherence to the Baghdad Pact? a settlement of the dispute
between Britain and Saudi Arabia over Buraimi? a
Congressional resolution authorizing Eisenhower to act
with the U.N. to ensure Arab and Israeli compliance with
armistice lines; 'substantial military support' to Saudi
Arabia and Iraq and accelerated programs for Iran and
Pakistan? and defensive arms to Israel.50 The President
adopted Foster Dulles' position:
We have reached the point where it looks as if 
Egypt, under Nasser, is going to make no move 
whatsoever to meet the Israelis in an effort to 
settle outstanding differences. Moreover, the 
Arabs, absorbing major consignments of arms from 
the Soviets, are daily growing more arrogant and 
disregarding the interests of Western Europe and
53? PRO, F0371/121271/V1075/61G, Karachi to Foreign 
Office, Cable DORAN 29, 7 March 1956.
49 PRO, F0371/121271/V1075/64, Baghdad to Foreign Office, 
Cable 292, 9 March 1956? PRO, FO371/118842/JE1022/11G, 
Karachi to Foreign Office, Cable DORAN 33, 7 March 1956.
50 Shuckburgh, p. 345? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles- 
Herter, Box 5, Foster Dulles to Hoover, 8 March 1956.
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the U.S. in the Middle Eastern region. It would 
begin to appear that our efforts should be 
directed towards separating the Saudi Arabians 
from the Egyptians and concentrating, for the 
moment at least, in making the former see that 
their best interests lie with us, emd not with 
the Egyptians and with the Russians.51
Approval of an Anglo-American campaign against Nasser
awaited the return of Anderson and Foster Dulles to
Washington. On 9 March, Eisenhower replied to Eden's
letter of the 5th:
It may be that we shall be driven to conclude 
that it is impossible to do business with 
Nasser. However, I do not think that we should 
close the door yet on the possibility of working 
with him.
The President agreed to 40 Centurion tanks for Iraq and 
increased aid to Iran and Pakistan but 'questioned whether 
adherance [sic] by the U.S. to the Baghdad Pact now is the 
right answer.'52
On 12 March, Anderson briefed Eisenhower and 
Undersecretary of State Hoover. Unable to arrange direct 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, he could only suggest 
letters from Eisenhower to Ben-Gurion and Nasser 
expressing the President's disappointment. The meeting 
concluded that 'a suitable tripartite resolution [on the 
Arab-Israeli issue] should be introduced in the Security 
Council at an early opportunity' and 'we should make every 
attempt to try to effect a split between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt./53
51 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 
1956 Diary, Eisenhower diary entry, 8 March 1956. See 
also DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, 
Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 10 March 1956.
52 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eisenhower to Eden, 10 March 1956.
53 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 4, Hoover to Foster Dulles, 12 March 
1956.
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Eisenhower diary recorded the significance of 
Anderson's failure in his diary. While both Israel and 
Egypt had refused to make concessions, the President 
concluded:
Nasser proved to be a complete stumbling block.
He is apparently seeking to be acknowledged as 
the political leader of the Arab world.
Israel was 'a tiny nation, surrounded by enemies....[It
had] a very strong position in the heart and emotions of
the Western world because of the tragic suffering of the
Jews throughout 2500 years of history.' Eisenhower
concluded:
I think we can hold Libya to our side through a 
reasonable amount of help to that impoverished 
nation, and we have an excellent chance of 
winning Saudi Arabia to our side if we can get 
Britain to go along with us. Britain would, of 
course, have to make certain territorial 
concessions, and this she might object to 
violently. If Saudi Arabia and Libya were our 
staunch friends, Egypt could scarcely continue 
intimate associations with the Soviets, and a 
certain Egyptian would no ganger be regarded as 
a leader of the Arab world.
Eisenhower's decision to hold Nasser, rather than both
Israel and Egypt, responsible for ALPHA'S failure was more
pragmatic than ideological. While Eisenhower did not wish
to be seen as 'pro-Israeli,' he could ill-afford to be
perceived as 'anti-Israeli' in an election year.
Once ALPHA was laid to rest, British pressure upon
the U.S. began to pay dividends. Eden wrote Eisenhower on
15 March:
I send you here with a most secret note of 
Egyptian intentions of whose authenticity we are 
entirely confident....It adds nothing 
startlingly new to what we both suspected. It 
does, however, confirm the wide range of
54 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 
1956 Diary, Eisenhower diary entry, 13 March 1956.
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Egyptian ambitions against the Saudis, as well 
as Iraq and Jordan.
The enclosed intelligence report on Egyptian intentions is
not available, but it was probably based upon the reports
of LUCKY BREAK, the MI6 operative in Cairo who controlled
an agent allegedly close to Nasser. The Egyptian President
supposedly desired Israel's destruction of Israel,
planning to attack by June 1956, and the elimination of
Western influence in the Middle East. To dominate 'a sort
of League for Arab republics,' he sought the overthrow
Arab monarchs, not only in Jordan and Iraq but also in
Saudi Arabia and Libya. To achieve this, he would allow
the Soviets a dominant role in the area.55 Using LUCKY
BREAK'S information, Ministers instructed British military
planners in Washington, who were discussing with the
Americans the response to an Israeli attack upon an Arab
state, to consider an Egyptian attack because of the
'probability that Egypt is now more likely to be the
aggressor.'56
The accuracy of the intelligence was dubious, but it
reinforced Eisenhower's developing antagonism towards
Nasser. He replied to Eden:
Assuming that the information therein contained 
is completely authentic, it seems to me to give
a clue of how we --  your Government and ours —
- might operate with the greatest chance of 
frustrating Soviet designs in the region.57
Others in the Administration were advising the
55 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eden to Eisenhower, 15 March 1956. 
See also William Clark Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford 
University, MSS 7, Clark diary, 29 November 1955.
56 CIA London Station to Director CIA, Cable LOND 7064, 1 
April 1956 (in author's possession).
57 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, March 
1956, Eisenhower to Eden, 20 March 1956.
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President to take a firmer line. Admiral Radford, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Eisenhower 
that Egypt was distributing arms to insurgents in Libya. 
He warned, 'If the U.S. does not join the Baghdad Pact, 
there are signs the Pact may disintegrate....The time may 
be coming when we will have to serve some notice on
/ rp
certain of the Middle Eastern countries. 30 Admiral
Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, added:
By dumping cotton, great pressure could be 
exerted [on Egypt]. Similarly, by curtailing oil 
output in some areas, the flow of money [to 
anti-Western activists] might be curtailed.
The next day, Hoover told Eisenhower about an Israeli
request for 24 F-86 fighters and anti-tank weapons and
remarked, 'It might...seem desirable for us to give them
[the Israelis] a very few items, more in the nature of
radar equipment than airplanes and anti-tank weapons, and
at the same time fulfill some of the requests which we
have from Saudi Arabia.' He concluded:
Nasser appeared to be becoming a progressively 
increasing menace. We were therefore giving
added attention to methods of splitting the 
Saudis away from the Egyptians and to obtain
closer relations with Libyans.
On 23 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally
recommended U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact.59
On 21 March, an aide-memoire informed the Americans
of the British Cabinet's adoption of a long-term program
of measures against Nasser. The next day, Foster Dulles
received a request from Allen Dulles for a meeting 'on
58 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 
1956 Goodpaster, Goodpaster memorandum, 15 March 1956.
59 Ibid.: DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House 
Memoranda, Chronological, Box 4, Meetings with the 
President, January-July 1956 (4), Hoover to Foster 
Dulles, 16 March 1956.
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something urgent... about the Middle East.' On the 24th, at 
Foster Dulles' home, the Dulles brothers were joined by 
James Angleton, Director of the CIA's Counter-intelligence 
Staff and the chief CIA contact with the Mossad, Israel's 
foreign intelligence service? Roosevelt; Hoover? Assistant 
Secretary Allen; William Rountree, Allen's deputy in NEA? 
Francis Russell; and Herman Phleger, the State 
Department's chief legal officer. The meeting considered 
the following questions:
i
1) Can Nasser rally Arab world behind him and 
precipitate war with Israel?
2) Can we at the same time win the Saudis away 
from alliance with Nasser and bolster Iraq?
3) What is oil situation and what losses can 
Western Europe and NATO tolerate?
4) What are vulnerabilities re loss of [oil] 
production and loss of transport?
5) Can Iraq be built up as a rival to Egypt 
having regard to a) our Israeli policy and b) 
our Saudi Arabian policy?
6) [DELETED]
7) Can Communist atheism be explored?60
Foster Dulles converted the meeting's conclusions
into a memorandum for Eisenhower The document, completed
on 28 March, outlined OMEGA, the cornerstone of Anglo-
American cooperation against Nasser:
In view of the negative outcome of our efforts 
to bring Colonel Nasser to adopt a policy of 
conciliation toward Israel, we should, I believe 
now adjust certain of our Near Eastern policies, 
as indicated below.
[The] primary purpose [is] to let Colonel 
Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is 
doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time 
enjoy most-favored nation treatment from the 
United States. We would want for the time being 
to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser 
irrevocably into a Soviet satellite status and
60 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Memoranda of Telephone Conversations, General, 3 
January-30 April 1956 (4), Foster Dulles to Allen 
Dulles, 23 March 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, 
Subject, Alphabetical, Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951- 
1957 (4), State Department memorandum, 24 March 1956.
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we would want to leave Nasser a bridge back to 
good relations with the West if he so desires.
The policies indicated below would in the 
main be coordinated with the U.K.
I. As regards Egypt:
1) Export licenses covering arms shipments 
to Egypt, whether from governmental or 
commercial sources, will continue to be 
denied by the U.S. and the U.K.
2) The U.S. and the U.K. will continue to 
delay the conclusion of current 
negotiations on the High Aswan Dam.
3) The U.S. will continue to delay action on 
pending Egyptian requirements for... 
[grants of] grain and oil.
4) The U.S. will hold in abeyance any 
decision on a CARE program [of economic 
aid] for Egypt for 1956... or, 
alternatively, approve an $8 million 
program for the first quarter, leaving 
until later a decision on the balance [of 
$100 million] for the year.
5) Expanded radio facilities will be offered 
to Iraq to counter Egyptian broadcasts.
II. As regards other countries:
1) The U.S. and U.K. will commence 
negotiations with the Sudan with a view
to developing --  [DELETED] --- a
situation of influence in that country 
which would minimize Egyptian influence 
and its control of the headwaters of the 
Nile.
2) Intensify present efforts to stabilize 
the situation in Libya.
3) Encourage the U.K. to maintain present 
treaty relationships with Jordan and help 
it to prevent a situation in which a pro- 
Egyptian coup d'etat would
succeed...[DELETED]
4) Give increased support to the Baghdad 
Pact, without actually adhering to the 
Pact or announcing our intention of doing 
so. In addition to accelerated aid to 
the Pact countries, this support will 
consist of amending the nature of our 
participation in the Military Committee 
of the Pact, such as by assigning 
high-level officers who could join more 
actively in military discussions than our 
observers have in the past. We will also 
display an increased interest in the 
economic aspects of the pact by 
endeavoring to coordinate our aid with 
the Pact organization, wherever feasible, 
and by sending high-level officers to 
represent the U.S. in economic meetings
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related to the treaty organization.
5) We will undertake an intensified program 
in Ethiopia to enhance the Western 
position in that country.
6) We will continue to take all practicable 
steps to counter Egyptian and Soviet 
influence in Yemen and the o ther Arabian 
principalities. King Saud's assistance 
will be solicited.
7) The U.S. will seek to dissuade Israel 
from undertaking work at Banat Ya'qub, or 
from taking other precipitate steps which 
might bring about hostilities and thus 
endanger the whole Western position in 
the Near East to the direct advantage of 
the Soviets.
8) For a further indefinite period, the U.S. 
will continue to deny export licenses for 
major military items to Israel and the 
adjoining Arab States (this excepts Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq). We would, however, be 
sympathetic if other Western countries 
wished to sell limited quantities of 
defensive arms to Israel.
9) We will continue to press for effective 
United Nations action to reduce area 
tensions.
10) We will endeavor to strengthen pro- 
Western elements in Lebanon by 
immediately offering economic aid in the 
form of grants or loans for projects 
designed to create the most favorable 
impact on public opinion. (The French 
might sell limited quantities of military 
equipment.)
11) It is extremely important that the
American position in Saudi Arabia be
strengthened. We must find ways, in
connection with the new Dhahran [Air 
Base] agreement, to assure King Saud that 
some of his military needs will 
immediately be met and others provided 
for subsequently. We will press Britain 
for a generous agreement on the Buraimi 
issue...
III. In addition to the foregoing course of 
action, planning should be undertaken at 
once with a view to possibly more drastic 
action in the event that the above courses 
of action do not have the desired effect.
This plan should cover: [3 STEPS DELETED]
Foster Dulles' long-hand notes offer clues to 'more 
drastic' action. Pressure would be placed upon the price 
of Egyptian cotton through dumping of American supplies on
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the international market? Egyptian radio transmissions
would be jammed; an Export-Import Bank loan for Israel
would be arranged; and the U.S. would 'study Syrian
assets' for a possible coup if Damascus continued to
follow Nasser.61
That afternoon, Eisenhower considered the memorandum
at a meeting with Foster Dulles, Hoover, Allen, Rountree,
Reuben Robertson of the Department of Defence, Secretary
of Defence Wilson, and Radford. Eisenhower emphasized, 'We
should make sure we concert the overall plan with the
Britain i.e., with Eden and Lloyd.' At the same time,
the plan to build up King Saud to offset Nasser 'would
probably require a settlement of the Buraimi issue, for
which we might ask as a quid pro quo a better attitude on
the part of the Saudis toward Iraq.' Apart from the
precondition of an Anglo-Saudi agreement between the
British and the Saudis over Buraimi, Foster Dulles was
given a free hand to implement OMEGA.62 Eisenhower wrote
in his diary:
[I hope] that we begin to build up some 
other individual as a prospective leader of the 
Arab world.... My own choice of such a rival is 
King Saud....Arabia is a country that contains 
the holy places of the Moslem world, and the 
Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most 
deeply religious of all the Arab groups. 
Consequently, the King could be built up, 
possibly as a spiritual leader. Once this was 
accomplished, we might to urge his right
to political leadership.63
61 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 
1956 Diary, Foster Dulles memorandum, 28 March 1956; 
DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject, Alphabetical, 
Box 10, Israeli Relations 1951-1957 (4), Foster Dulles' 
long-hand notes, 27 March 1956.
62 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 
1956 Diary, White House meeting, 28 March 1956.
63 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 
1956 Diary, Eisenhower diary entry, 28 March 1956
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Two measures were immediately significant in the 
battle against Nasser. The first was the decision to let 
negotiations on the funding of the Aswan High Dam 
'languish.' Until late March, both Britain and the U.S. 
ensured that negotiations over the Dam proceeded, the 
Foreign Office and State Department intervening to prevent 
a breakdown of discussions between Egypt and the World 
Bank.64
In March, the Americans, for domestic reasons, began 
to have doubts about the Dam. The pro-Israeli lobby 
opposed any assistance to Egypt. Fiscal conservatives 
thought the Dam a wasteful foreign-aid project, and 
Congressmen from Southern states feared the increased 
output of Egyptian cotton would depress the price for 
cotton from their states. By 24 March, Secretary of the 
Treasury Humphrey and Undersecretary of State Hoover, both 
of whom opposed the negotiations with Egypt in December, 
were swinging Administration sentiment against the Dam. 
Even before approval of OMEGA, Hoover told Makins of the 
American doubts.65
Meanwhile, OMEGA confirmed the pivotal position of 
Syria in Middle Eastern affairs.66 Throughout 1955, 
British and American representatives in Syria sought a 
pro-Western coalition of right-wing parties that could
64 PRO, F0371/119047/JE1422/28, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 257, 17 January 1956; PRO, 
F0371/119051/JE1422/File? Love, p. 311.
65 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 14, March 
1956 Miscellaneous (6), Eisenhower to Thornton, 8 March 
1956.
66 See A. Gorst and W.S. Lucas, 'The Other Collusion: 
Operation '•Straggle” and Anglo-American Intervention in 
Syria, 1955-56,' Intelligence and National Security 
(July 1988), pp. 576ff•
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restore 'stability,' but a suitable leader could not be
found.67 With an internal solution unlikely, London and
Washington considered Iraq's desire for union with Syria.
On 4 October,1 Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id told the
British and American Ambassadors:
[I] would like at this stage to 'speak gently' 
with the Syrians and urge them to improve their 
regime and get rid of subversive elements and 
those unfriendly to Iraq. If this failed to 
achieve its object, [I] would want to intervene 
in Syria, if necessary by force.68
The Foreign Office opposed 'overt Iraqi action' but 
G.G. Arthur proposed a long-term program, coordinated with 
the Americans and Iraqis, for Iraqi-Syrian union:
(a) bribery within Syria, by or on behalf of 
Iraq. The Syrian Army should be the main 
target;
(b) the rapid buildup of the Iraqi forces...;
(c) propaganda in Syria in favour of Iraq, 
designed especially to bring home to Syrians 
the economic advantages to be derived from 
friendship with the Iraqis;
(d) ...efforts to subordinate the Syrian economy 
to Iraq's, e.g., by an Iraqi loan to Syria;
(e) measures, overt and covert, to counter Saudi 
influence in Syria;
(f) propaganda designed to bring home to the 
Iraqi public the importance to them of a 
stable and friendly Syria.69
Shuckburgh and Macmillan seized upon this as a
'Machiavellian scheme' for Iraqi-Syrian union. The British
Ambassador to Syria, John Gardener, reported that Britain
could 'bring about the merger of Syria with Iraq any time
. . • 70we like if given enough money.'/w
Despite Foster Dulles' complaints to Macmillan about
67 PRO, FO371/115946/VY1015/File.
68 PRO, F0371/115954/VY10393/2G, Foreign Office to 
Baghdad, Cable 1394, 8 October 1955; PRO, 
F0371/115947/V1015/94G, Stewart to Rose, 6 December 
1955; FRUS 1955-1957 XIII, pp. 543ff.
69 PRO, FO371/115954/VY10393/7G, Arthur minute, 10 October 
1955, and subsequent minutes.
70 Shuckburgh, pp. 289ff.
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Syrian behaviour, the State Department rejected
sponsorship of Iraqi-Syrian union, primarily because of 
Saudi Arabian opposition to a 'Greater Iraq' and Israeli 
suspicion of Iraqi forces on her border. Instead, the 
Americans thought immediate action 'needed to be directed 
towards bringing the right-wing groups [in Syria]
71 • .together.' A By the Eden-Eisenhower summit, Britain and 
the U.S. had neared agreement on a program similar to 
Arthur's memorandum and linked it to the Iraqi-Jordanian 
axis and further action against Egypt.72
On one level, the events of March 1956 drew the 
British and Americans into a 'conditional' alliance
against Nasser. While the interests of the two countries 
still differed, each recognised a long-term threat to its 
objectives and believed that coordination of policy was 
preferable to unilateral action. In another sense, 
however, there was no Anglo-American 'alliance' because 
there was no single British policy. The Foreign Office had 
secured Cabinet support for a program, but that policy was 
a long-term one. Meanwhile, Britain's intelligence 
services, under the general mandate given to them by Eden, 
prepared a 'shadow' Egyptian Government for power without 
consulting the Foreign Office and considered political 
changes in other Middle Eastern countries. Eventually, 
such action would conflict with American interests and the 
methods of OMEGA.
71 PRO, F0371/115954/VY10393/3G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2414, 6 October 1955, and VY10393/9G, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2616, 27 October 
1955, VY10393/10G, Record of Anglo-American meeting, 28 
October 1955, and VY10393/14G, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 855, 3 November 1955.
72 See above, p. 119.
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CHAPTER 7
APRIL-JULY 1956: THE 0HE6A DISCUSSIONS
The ideas of MI6 soon jeopardised Anglo-American
cooperation over OMEGA. On 31 March and 1 April, Wilbur
Eveland, a Middle Eastern specialist seconded by the CIA
from the Department of Defence, and James Eichelberger,
the CIA station chief in Cairo, held a series of meetings
with George Young, the Deputy Director of MI6 responsible
for Middle Eastern operations, Nigel Clive, MI6's
Political Officer, and other British officials. The
Americans were sent by the Dulles brothers to prepare an
'intelligence appreciation' with MI6 and to hear British
proposals for OMEGA'S implementation. Preliminary
discussions would lead to further talks between Allen
Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt, the chief CIA operative for
the Middle East, and MI6.
Young and Clive immediately defined Britain's enemy
for Eveland and Eichelberger:
Nasser's aims are total destruction of Israel; 
Egyptian domination of all Arab governments and 
elimination of all Western positions in the Arab 
area; material extension of Egyptian influence 
in North Africa, particularly Libya. In order to 
realize his ambitions, Nasser has accepted full- 
scale collaboration with the Soviets, and is 
prepared to allow the Soviets whatever role in 
area they desire in order to assure himself of 
their support. Nasser is now taking the
initiative for extension of Soviet influence in 
Syria, Libya, and French North Africa. Egypt 
must therefore be regarded as an out and out 
Soviet instrument.
Basing his assessment on the 25 reports sent by the 
MI 6 operative LUCKY BREAK from Cairo to London since 
November 1955, Young was sceptical of the CIA's more 
cautious view of Nasser. Since the Agency was 'apparently
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not yet prepared for categorical acceptance of [the
British] reappraisal of Nasser, [the CIA's] intelligence 
coverage in Egypt must be regarded as poor,' and CIA
reports passed to MI6 in recent months were 'rubbish.'
It is not certain whether LUCKY BREAK'S source was 
passing information he believed to be genuine or whether 
he was creating false reports to turn London against 
Nasser. In any case, the CIA had good reason to be 
suspicious of the British appraisal. The Agency had 
sources within the RCC and Nasser's 'inner circle' of 
advisors, and it maintained a regular channel to Nasser 
through Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, a confidant of the 
Egyptian leader. It is unlikely that the plans attributed 
to Nasser by MI6, if true, were unknown to the Americans.
Not content with an intelligence appreciation, Young 
presented a three-phase plan of operations, embellishing 
it with comments like 'Britain [is] now prepared to fight 
its last battle' and 'no matter what the cost we will
win.' The first phase was a 'complete change in Government
of Syria.' The British could achieve this alone, 'but, if 
necessary,' they would consider 'joint action with Iraq, 
Turkey, and possibly Israel.' The boundaries of Syria 
would not be changed but 'a firm pro-Iraqi government' 
would emerge in an 'extension of Hashemite influence.'
In the second phase, the British would 'undertake 
efforts to exploit splits in [Saudi] Royal Family and 
possibly utilize their position [in the] Trucial States to 
hasten fall of [King] Saud.' If the CIA was unwilling or 
unable to assist, the British would consider 'joint action 
with Iraqis or action behind Iraqi front.' Finally,
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Britain would prepare action against Nasser ' in
anticipation of violent Egyptian reaction to phases l and
2.' Possible measures ranged from sanctions...
...to use of force (both British and Israeli) to 
tumble the Egyptian Government. ...Extreme 
possibilities would involve special operations 
by Israelis against Egyptian supply dumps and 
newly acquired aircraft and tanks, as well as 
outright Israeli attack [upon] Gaza or other- 
border areas.'1
MI6's plans not only went beyond the guidelines of 
OMEGA but also threatened American interests in the Middle 
East, especially in Saudi Arabia. The Americans were taken 
aback. Eveland had joked to Eichelberger that Britain 
would ask the U.S. to do away with Nasser. Eichelberger 
responded seriously, 'If our British cousins [MI6] had 
their way, that would be just the plan.' Foster Dulles 
told Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations, after the follow-up meetings between Allen 
Dulles, Roosevelt, and MI6, 'The British are making more 
drastic plans than we are.'2
Some of the damage caused by MI6 was repaired in 
Anglo-American diplomatic and military discussions. Air 
Chief Marshal Sir William Dickson, the Chairman of the 
British Chiefs of Staff, met Eisenhower, and they agreed 
upon the 'large hazards in an Arab "bloc” extending from 
Pakistan to Dakar, with weak and unstable governments and 
institutions, and resulting vulnerability to Soviet 
penetration.' The President stressed 'the importance of 
[British and American] information, propaganda, and 
political warfare activities in the area' and the need to
1 CIA London Station to Director CIA, Cable LOND 7064, 1 
April 1956 (copy in author's possession).
2 Eveland, p. 168; Neff, p. 217.
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develop OMEGA:
We have very considerable assets in the area, if 
we would just make use of them....We should try 
to build up a "design” for our actions in the 
Middle East....Actions should be under the 
direction of selected, very astute individuals.
Shuckburgh told Ambassador Aldrich on 5 April that the
British were 'gratified a large measure of agreement re
Middle Eastern policy was achieved in the current
discussions in Washington,' and Aldrich reported to
Washington that the 'recurring panic in the highest
quarters here was allayed, at least for the time being.'4
The Foreign Office's caution was evident, as it tried
to prevent Nasser from learning of the Anglo-American
discussions. The Foreign Office instructed Ambassador
Trevelyan in Cairo to avoid any reference to Egypt's
blindness to the Communist threat, since this might
indicate how seriously the British viewed Nasser's
collaboration with the Soviet bloc, and requested that the
U.S. Ambassador, Byroade, inform the State Department, as
they were 'an important part of the plan for keeping
Nasser guessing.' When the British press, probably on
prompting from Number 10, published headlines of 'British
plans to hit back at Nasser,' the Foreign Office stated
publicly that the speculation was groundless. Lloyd
assured the State Department:
I have given no indication publicly or off the 
record that any new policy towards Nasser has 
been decided upon. I regard the whole matter as
3 PRO, FO371/121272/V1075/89G, Dean minute, 6 April 1956? 
PRO, F0371/118869/JE1071/4, Monckton to Lloyd, 10 April 
1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 15,
April 1956 Goodpaster, Record of Eisenhower-Dickson 
meeting, 3 April 1956.
4 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/4-656, Cairo to State 
Department, Cable 4467, 6 April 1956.
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still under confidential discussion with the 
U.S. Government, and when decisions are taken, 
their public handling pWill require careful 
consideration between us.
Trevelyan wrote Shuckburgh that he was disturbed by 
reports that the Treasury's representative in Egypt 
brought from a visit to London: 'High officials in the
Treasury particularly seem to have been very free with 
their proposals on what to do with Nasser, which include 
the most extreme solutions.' Shuckburgh commented, 'We 
have played the hand in exactly the opposite way from what 
we pretend to wish.' Possibly on the strength of briefings 
from 10 Downing Street, The Times continued to publish 
virulent anti-Nasser leaders, and A.J. Wilton, supervising 
the Egyptian desk, commented, 'British public feeling has 
seriously reduced the chances of our being able to 
temporise successfully.'6
Beside MI6's planning, two issues hindered Anglo-
American cooperation. The first was the continuing Anglo- 
Saudi dispute over Buraimi. On 24 March, the Saudis 
proposed high-level discussions in New York. British
acceptance of the American policy of detaching Saudi
Arabia from Egypt prompted London to consider the despatch 
of a British delegation to Riyadh to open negotiations 
with the Saudis. Lloyd authorised a mission, headed by the 
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, Douglas Dodds-
Parker, to visit Saudi Arabia by the end of April.7
5 PRO, FO371/118861/JE1053/13, Foreign Office to Cairo, 
Cable 988, 3 April 1956; PRO, F0115/4549, Foreign Office 
to Washington, Cables 1890 and 1891, 4 April 1956.
6 PRO, F0371/118861/JE1053/17G, Trevelyan to Shuckburgh,
5 April 1956, and JE1053/5G, Wilton minute, 14 April 
1956. See also USNA, RG 59, CDF, 611.74/4-656, Cairo to 
State Department, Cable 1996, 6 April 1956.
7 PRO, F0371/120765/ES1051/14, Jedda to Foreign Office,
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The second problem was the American relationship to
the Baghdad Pact. The commitment in OMEGA to increased
support for the Pact did not settle the issue of
accession, endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Eisenhower on 30 March.8 After discussions with State
Department officials, Foster Dulles told Makins on 1 April
that it was 'impossible in existing circumstances for the
United States to join the Baghdad Pact,' primarily because
of Congressional opposition to the U.S. commitment.
However, Foster Dulles added that the U.S. would send
high-level political and military observers to the April
meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council, contribute to the
Pact's technical assistance fund, and consider increased
military aid to Iraq.9
This was not enough for Lloyd, who hoped that
American observers could 'indicate in some striking and
positive form the manner in which the U.S. intends to show
that it is really behind the Pact.' Foster Dulles replied
with a reference to the Arab-Israeli question:
The U.S. purpose in supporting these pacts was 
to help build up strength against Soviet 
aggression, but they were anxious not to become 
involved in local disputes....Some of the 
countries joined these pacts just for the very 
purpose of securing American support against 
some neighbour with whom they had a quarrel.10
The debate continued within the Administration.
Cable 23, 26 March 1956, and subsequent minutes, and 
ES1051/18, Riches minute, 5 April 1956.
8 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 15, April 
1956 Goodpaster, Goodpaster memorandum, 2 April 1956; 
DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
MacArthur to Foster Dulles, 31 March 1956.
9 PRO, F0371/121250/V1073/108G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 819, 1 April 1956.
10 PRO, F0371/121250/V1073/108G, Foreign Office to
Washington, Cable 1919, 5 April 1956, and V1073/117G, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 875, 5 April 1956.
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Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson requested that the NSC 
consider accession, trapping Eisenhower between the 
military's views and those of the State Department. The 
President tested Foster Dulles, 'We were originally strong 
in favour of the Pact being formed....We were in favour of 
the pact between Pakistan and Turkey.' When Foster Dulles 
replied, 'The trouble was that the British have taken it 
over and run it as an instrument of British policy,' 
Eisenhower retreated, 'We can't do any one of these things
in a v a c u u m  have to look at rounded picture --
everybody has got to have something.'11
The Americans had compromised to some degree over the 
Pact, however, as the British had over Buraimi, and 
conversations proceeded on OMEGA. After speaking with 
Makins on 5 April, Foster Dulles reported to Eisenhower 
that British reactions, 'in the main, were favorable, 
although it looked as though Buraimi would be a sticking 
point' in the long run. By 13 April, Ambassador Aldrich 
was 'enthusiastic about what [Britain and the U.S.] are 
planning to do in the Middle East.'12
The first sign of progress was Anglo-American 
agreement to supply arms to Israel through Britain, 
Canada, and France. On 11 April, the U.S. approved the 
sale of 12 more Mystere IV jet fighters from France to 
Israel. Eden wrote that Britain had 'to continue [its] 
trickle' of arms to Israel and authorised delivery of six
11 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 15, April 
1956 Phone Calls, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 7 April 
1956.
12 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 4, Meetings with the President,
Foster Dulles memorandum, 6 April 1956; Shuckburgh, p. 
352.
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fighters and heavy artillery. Lloyd added that Canada 
should be encouraged to begin shipments to the Israelis, 
and the Cabinet agreed to a French request to refuel the 
Mysteres, en route to Israel, at British bases on 
Cyprus.13
The two sides continued discussions of possible
sanctions against Egypt,14 and Foster Dulles' talks with
Makins and American observers at the Baghdad Pact Council
brought further American concessions. American membership
of the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees and the
military liaison group were approved by Eisenhower on 19
April.15 Meanwhile, a paper by the British Chiefs of
Staff, 'Analysis of the Military Problems Involved in
Action under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950,' was
agreed in general between British and American staffs, and
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to further planning
talks with the British.16
Anglo-American cooperation was also fostered by the
visit in April of Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev
to London. Eisenhower wrote Eden:
At the back of our minds must be the very grave 
threat in the Middle East....I fully agree with 
you that we should not be acquiescent in any 
measure which would give the Bear's claws a grip
13 Neff, p. 225? PRO, F0800/735, Eden to Lloyd, 12 April 
1956, and Lloyd to Eden, 14 April 1956? PRO, CAB128/30, 
C.M.30(56), 19 April 1956.
14 See PRO, FO371/118862/JE1053/19G, Watson minute, 11 
April 1956? PRO, F0371/121762/VR1076/100G, Bailey to 
Rose, 14 April 1956.
15 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Hill to Foster Dulles, 16 April 1956, and Foster Dulles 
to Allen Dulles, 17 April 1956.
16 USNA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Geographical File 
1954-1956, Box 12, 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), S. 29, Picher 
to Currie, 4 April 1956? PRO, F0371/121272/V1075/100G, 
COS(56)150, 18 April 1956? PRO, FO371/121273/V1075/101G- 
105G, COS(56)151-155, 18 April 1956.
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on the production or transport of oil which is 
so vital to the defence and economy of the 
world. '
On 13 April, Foster Dulles told Makins:
If fighting came about after every effort had 
been exhausted to find a peaceful solution of 
the Middle Eastern problem which would not 
deprive Britain and Western Europe of the oil of 
the area.... We would find, 1Qin one way or 
another, a way to be with you. 8
Although little was decided at meetings with the Soviets,
Eden wrote optimistically to Eisenhower:
In the Middle Eastern talk, I made plain to them 
that we had to have our oil and that we were 
prepared to fight for it. They accepted this 
and, though they continued to inveigh against 
the Baghdad Pact. I think they may have begun to 
understand that it is a protective pad for our 
vital interests and not a dagger pointing at 
their guts.19
The developing Anglo-American policy was soon tested, 
as Franco-Israeli cooperation evolved into an 'alliance' 
against Nasser. Like Israel, France, trying to quell 
rebellion by Algerian nationalists, who were receiving 
money, training, and arms from Egypt, were suspicious of 
Nasser. French fear of British domination of the Middle 
East through the Baghdad Pact and her treaties with Iraq 
and Jordan also spurred Paris into a close relationship 
with Israel. Moreover, the French Socialists, who were the 
dominant party in the ruling coalition which took power in 
early 1956, were philosophically close to Maoai. the 
leading party in the Israeli Government.
17 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 14, April 
1956 Miscellaneous (5), Eisenhower to Eden, 5 April 
1956.
18 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 4, Meetings with President, MacArthur 
memorandum, 13 April 1956.
19 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eden to Eisenhower, 18 and 30 April 
1956.
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In mid-March 1956, however, French Foreign Minister 
Christian Pineau was encouraged by a visit to Nasser in 
Cairo.20 Pineau may have promised that France would show 
no interest in the Baghdad Pact in exchange for an 
Egyptian moratorium on training and aid to the Algerian 
rebels. Nasser refused to halt arms supplies but gave his 
'soldier's word of honour' that no rebels would be trained 
in Egypt. Pineau persuaded Mollet to allow French 
representatives to meet emissaries of the Algerian rebels, 
but the effort was abandoned when the plan leaked to the 
French press.21
The thaw in Franco-Egyptian relations was over. The 
French, circumventing the Near East Arms Coordinating 
Committee in Washington, increased deliveries of military 
equipment to Israel, and Mollet, Pineau, and other 
Ministers, without the knowledge of the French Foreign 
Ministry, decided to arm Arab countries outside Egypt to 
foster 'the hopes of many of them to remain independent in 
the face of the imperialism, the economic colonialism, of 
the two 'powers,' the U.S. and the Soviet Union.'22
The French support reinforced the hard-line policy of 
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and General Dayan, the 
Chief of Staff. In November and December 1955, they 
proposed that Israel seize Sharm-al-Sheikh at the southern 
tip of the Sinai Peninsula, guaranteeing Israeli control 
of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Moderates 
in the Israeli Cabinet narrowly rejected the proposal.
20 Christian Pineau, Suez 1956 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 
1978), p. 33.
21 Nutting, Nasser, pp. 125ff.
22 Neff, p. 234? Abel Thomas, p. 55, pp. 73ff., and pp. 
94ff.? Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. pp. 227ff.
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Israeli 'reprisals' continued. An attack upon the Syrians 
at Kinnaret on 11 December undermined the attempts of 
Foreign Minister Sharett to obtain American arms, but Ben- 
Gurion was unrepentant, He argued that, with the 
developing relationship with France, Israel would not need 
weapons from the U.S. Only the Anderson mission delayed
• • • • p*jfurther Israeli discussion of measures against Egypt.
In April, fighting on the Egyptian-Israeli border 
erupted, and Israeli forces bombarded the town of Gaza, 
killing more than 60 people and injuring more than 100. 
Nasser responded by sending commando units, fedayeen, into 
Israel. Fourteen Israelis and ten fedayeen were killed in 
the following five days.24
Initially, the Americans showed little concern,25 but 
the continued killings convinced Foster Dulles that 
American action was necessary to prevent war. A White 
House press release emphasized that the President
• . • • 0 fk'regarded the situation with utmost seriousness.Eden, 
partly to deter fighting, partly to quell criticism in 
Parliament, asked the Americans to state publicly that 
Britain and the U.S. had 'both made plans for intervention 
if necessary.' Foster Dulles refused, since the secret 
Anglo-American discussions on enforcement of the 
Tripartite Declaration were unknown to Congress. Instead, 
the Secretary sought preparations by the American 
military. The CIA agreed to consider the possibility that
23 Shlaim, pp. 193ff.
24 PRO, F0371/121773/VR1091/File.
25 See DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, White House 
Memoranda, Chronological, Box 4, Meetings with the 
President, Foster Dulles memorandum, 6 April 1956.
26 US DDRS, US84 002128.
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the Soviets would send 'volunteers' to support Arab 
forces, and Admiral Radford agreed to move the Sixth Fleet 
into the Eastern Mediterranean.27
Foster Dulles reinforced his actions with personal 
messages from Eisenhower to Ben-Gurion and Nasser which 
hoped that both sides would, 'even under extreme 
provocation, avoid retaliatory action which could have the 
gravest consequences.' Nasser, who had promised Byroade 
that he would halt the fedayeen raids, was 'pleased with 
the tone' of the note. Fighting flared again on the night 
of 11 April, but the danger passed as the remaining 
fedayeen left Israel.28
The Arab-Israeli situation had been calmed, but OMEGA 
encountered other problems. The British did not have the 
financial and economic strength to enforce sanctions 
against Egypt.29 In April the Foreign Office told the 
State Department that measures against the oil-producing 
states or even Egypt alone 'were fraught with danger for 
Britain,' including sabotage of the Iraqi and Saudi oil 
pipelines to the Mediterranean and blockage of the Suez 
Canal by Egypt. Shuckburgh called the preparation of a
27 PRO, F0371/121762/VR1076/86, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 926, 11 April 1956, and VR1076/87, Hancock 
to Lloyd, 9 April 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, 
Telephone Calls, Box 5, Foster Dulles to O'Connor,
Foster Dulles to Wilkins, Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 
and Foster Dulles to Radford, 9 April 1956, and Foster 
Dulles to Radford, 10 April 1956.
28 US DDRS, US81 192D and US84 000623? DDE, John Foster 
Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White House, Box 10, 
Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 11-13 April 1956.
29 PRO, F0371/121759/VR1076/9G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 351, 11 February 1956, and subsequent 
minutes, and VR1076/16, Bailey to Rose, 10 February 
1956, and subsequent minutes? PRO, F0371/121760/VR1076/ 
48, Jebb to Pink, 22 February 1956, and subsequent 
minutes? PRO, F0371/121761/VR1076/54G, Rose minute, 18 
February 1956.
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paper on sanctions 'unrealistic.' When the Americans 
pressed their request, he reluctantly conceded, 'I suppose 
it can do no harm as long as we don't lead anyone to think 
that "sanctions” can be applied by the Western Powers to 
the Arabs.'30
An even more significant problem was Eden's attitude. 
Plagued by the press and obsessed with the Persian Gulf 
situation, Eden nearly wrecked the agreement with the U.S. 
over Buraimi. He told Lloyd that, with recent Saudi 
attempts to subvert Britain's position in the Gulf, 
negotiations would be a sign of British weakness. Lloyd 
suspended the mission and, on Eden's instructions, asked 
the State Department about 'the precise means by which' 
King Saud would be detached from Nasser.31
Rountree, the Deputy Director of NEA, emphasized to 
the British Embassy that American friendship with Saudi 
Arabia was a vital part of OMEGA. Foreign Office officials 
admitted, 'Even half-hearted American support is better 
than none.' On 19 April, Lloyd authorised the despatch of 
the British mission to Saudi Arabia.32
Eden then took up the question of Britain's position 
in the smaller Arabian states, claiming that there was a 
'serious possibility that British forces might be needed 
to protect oil interests in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf.' 
Lloyd was sceptical, admitting that the attitudes of the
30 PRO, F0371/121762/VR1076/100G, Bailey to Rose, 14 April 
1956, and subsequent minutes, and VR1076/108G, Watson 
minute, 19 April 1956, and subsequent minutes.
31 PRO, F0371/120765/ES1051/19, Lloyd minute, 13 April 
1956.
32 PRO, F0371/120765/ES1021/20G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 964, 17 April 1956, and subsequent 
minutes.
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Bahraini ruler and his British adviser, Sir Charles 
Belgrave, were 'feudal,' regarding 'even reasonable 
constitutional demands as tantamount to rebellion.' 
Cabinet Secretary Brook cited a Cabinet Paper, endorsed by 
Eden in 1953, which argued that nationalism precluded the 
stationing of Western forces in Middle Eastern and Persian 
Gulf States. Brook concluded, 'If we believe that, in some 
of these countries, the nationalist movement will come 
uppermost, we ought to take steps to ensure that we are 
not found, at a crucial moment, to be backing the wrong 
horse.'33
Eden's Private Secretary, Frederick Bishop, wrote 
Brook, 'I wish I could say that the Prime Minister 
received your views with delight or even appreciation, but 
you will not be surprised to know that, having disagreed 
with the views expressed by the Foreign Secretary, he did 
not feel that the general principle you suggested could 
easily or safely be applied in Bahrain.' Pressed by Eden, 
Minister of Defence Monckton supported the despatch of 
another company to the Persian Gulf and possible 
reinforcements from Libya or Cyprus.34
Even this did not satisfy the Prime Minister, who 
insisted on immediate placement of a reserve battalion in 
Kenya. When the Ministerial Defence Committee asked the 
Chiefs of Staff for a full report on a Kenyan strategic 
reserve, Eden insisted on a full battalion in Aden, at the
33 PRO, CAB129/80, CP(56)80, 'Bahrain,' 14 April 1956?
PRO, PREM11/1440, Record of ad hoc ministerial meeting, 
13 April 1956? PRO, PREM11/1457, Brook to Eden, 14 April 
1956.
34 PRO, PREM11/1457, Bishop to Brook, 15 April 1956; PRO, 
PREM11/1440, Monckton to Eden, 25 April 1956, and Eden 
to Monckton, 29 April 1956.
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southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, to support British
troops in Bahrain. The debate dragged on until Nasser's
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956.35
Eden was also impatient about OMEGA, commenting, 'We
seem to have to do all the giving to please the Americans.
Hardly satisfactory.' Reviewing a letter from Eisenhower
to Churchill, he wrote:
Although [the Americans] are willing to work 
closely with us in discussing common policies 
for the Middle East, it is difficult for them to 
admit publicly that they are doing so, 
especially in an election year. There has been 
an unhappy revival of that phrase "no ganging 
up", and we have strongly protested against it.
Their unwillingness to let it be known that we 
are at one on this important issue diminishes 
the influence which each of us could exercise in 
the area. It puts a considerable strain on
our relations.3 6
In early May, Foster Dulles and Lloyd, attending the 
NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris, reviewed OMEGA. 
Despite Eden's interference, the Foreign Office was 
determined to establish a coordinated program. Adam 
Watson, the head of the African Department, minuted on 25 
April, 'We must push on with the various lines of 
action...to which the State Department have now in general 
agreed./J' To 'lull' Nasser, Watson authorised Ambassador 
Trevelyan to make gestures on the Jordan River plan, the 
Aswan High Dam, the status of the Sudan, British 
fulfillment of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and the 
forthcoming visit of an Egyptian trade mission to Britain. 
Trevelyan, uninformed about OMEGA, was unsure about the
35 PRO, PREM11/1440, D.C.(56)5th meeting, 1 May 1956, and 
subsequent minutes. See also AP, AP20/21/File.
36 PRO, F0800/735, Bishop to Logan, 18 April 1956? PRO, 
PREM11/1690, Eden to Churchill, 21 April 1956.
37 PRO, F0371/118862/JE1053/26G, Watson minute, 25 April 
1956.
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motive for this renewed spirit of friendship:
[If we were] to work with Nasser and not against 
him, then, with great patience and in time, it 
may be possible to get on terms of some 
confidence with him again. If, however, that is 
not our policy, then this will be impossible, as 
he will have periodical evidence of our actions 
in a sense hostile to him, e.g., efforts to 
detach King Saud [from Egypt]. 8
On 15 May, Watson replied in a harsher tone than that
of his previous letter:
If we are to preserve our essential positions in 
the Middle East, and particularly the oil, we 
must continue and intensify our discreet 
operations to weaken Nasser's ability to 
interfere in other Arab countries (and our own 
colonies) against us by stirring up public 
opinion. This process will take some time to 
bear fruit and in some areas, like Libya, has 
scarcely begun, but, as it takes effect, Nasser 
will inevitably be aware of what is happening. 9
Watson's firmer line was prompted by the Paris
meetings between Lloyd and Foster Dulles. The initial
talks on 3 May were disappointing for some participants,40
but a policy was agreed on the Aswan High Dam. When Foster
Dulles suggested that Britain and the U.S. 'drag our feet
but not...let the project drop,' Lloyd, 'We should let the
project languish, but without giving Nasser any excuse for
saying that it was our fault.'41
However, the issue of Saudi Arabia was still
troublesome. The British believed that they had satisfied
American conditions with the Dodds-Parker mission to
Riyadh, so the plan to detach King Saud from Nasser could
now be defined. The Americans wanted results from the
38 PRO, F0371/118862/JE1053/26G, Trevelyan to Watson, 5 
May 1956.
39 PRO, F0371/118862/JE1053/31G, Watson to Trevelyan, 15 
May 1956.
40 See Shuckburgh, p. 355.
41 PRO, FO371/121273/V1075/117G, Foster Dulles-Lloyd 
meeting, 3 May 1956.
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Anglo-Saudi talks before proceeding. When Lloyd asked 
about the status of U.S. plans for King Saud, Foster 
Dulles admitted that little progress had been made but 
commented that he attached great importance to improved 
Anglo-Saudi relations from the Dodds-Parker discussions. 
Lloyd finally showed his hand, saying that, to deter Saudi 
Arabia from its evil ways, the 'soft-pedalling' of the 
Saudis must be stopped.42 Rountree and Shuckburgh had 
heated but inconclusive exchanges about the issue, and no 
progress was made in the Anglo-Saudi talks before Nasser's 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July.43
Cooperation between the State Department and the 
Foreign Office was now so established, however, that the 
dispute over Saudi Arabia did not halt Anglo-American 
planning. Besides the decision on the Aswan High Dam, 
general agreement was reached on two measures. First, 
Foster Dulles and Lloyd approved the supply of more jets 
from third countries to Israel. Foreign Minister Pineau 
formally told his counterparts that, besides the first 12 
Mystere IVs delivered to Israel in April, France was 
sending 12 Mystere IV and 12 Mystere II fighters to Tel 
Aviv. Foster Dulles urged Canadian Foreign Minister Lester 
Pearson to supply F-86 fighters to Israel and recommended 
to Eisenhower that the U.S. fly 24 F-86s to Cyprus, to be 
taken over by Israeli pilots if an Arab state attacked 
Israel.44
42 Ibid.
43 Shuckburgh, p. 355? PRO, F0371/120755/ ES1021/30G, 
Shuckburgh minute, 4 May 1956; FRUS 1955-1957 XIII, p. 
377, p. 388, and pp. 392ff.
44 PRO, F0115/4549, Kirkpatrick to Dixon, 18 May 1956?
DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, May 1956, 
Paris to State Department, Cable DULTE 12, 6 May 1956.
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Second, Foster Dulles and Lloyd discussed STRAGGLE, 
the operation to intervene in elections or sponsor a coup 
in Syria. Soon after his return from Paris, Foster Dulles 
authorised a Middle Eastern tour by Wilbur Eveland, on
contract to the CIA, and CIA and State Department
evaluation of Syrian contacts who could put a pro-Western
government in power. A week later, Lloyd called a Foreign
Office meeting to consider the Middle Eastern situation. 
Discussion on Syria was devoted to STRAGGLE.45
Lloyd also informed Foster Dulles that the Jordanian 
Government could not maintain control without Western 
assistance. Serious problems had hindered the development 
of the Iraqi-Jordanian axis. Jordan was dissatisfied with 
the level of Iraqi economic aid from Iraq and the 
stagnation of Iraqi-Jordanian staff talks. When Colonel 
Abu Ali Nuwar, the Jordanian Deputy Chief of Staff, 
travelled to Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo in April for 
military discussions, Iraq suspended economic aid and 
recalled its Ambassador from Amman.46
Anglo-American plans were shaken when Egypt, to 
protect her supply of weapons, recognised Communist China 
on 16 May. During his visit to Britain, Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev indicated that Moscow would join any 
U.N. embargo on arms to the Middle East, and Nasser
45 PRO, F0371/121273/V1075/117G, Foster Dulles-Lloyd 
meeting, 3 May 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, 
Subject, Alphabetical, Box 10, Israeli Relations, 1951- 
57 (2), Foster Dulles-Lloyd meeting, 6 May 1956 
(classified)? PRO, F0800/723, Shuckburgh minute, 29 May 
1956? Eveland, p. 181.
46 PRO, F0371/121485/VJ10393/File? PRO, CAB129/81,
CP(56)106, 'Jordan,' 1 May 1956? PRO, CAB128/30,
C.M.32(56), 3 May 1956? PRO, FO371/121273/V1075/117G, 
Foster Dulles-Lloyd meeting, 3 May 1956.
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mistakenly believed that Eden had proposed the embargo to
the Soviets. Several days later, the Egyptians received
reports of the agreement between Foster Dulles, Lloyd, and
Pineau to supply arms, including the additional Mysteres,
to Israel. Nasser concluded that, under an arms embargo,
Egypt would be militarily inferior to a rearmed Israel.
His solution was to establish an alternate source of
supply through links with Communist China, who had been
barred by the U.S. from entering the U.N.47
Foster Dulles later encouraged the belief that
Egypt's recognition of Communist China forced him to turn
against Cairo. Indeed, his immediate reaction was to tell
the Egyptian Ambassador, Ahmed Hussein:
Every time I appear before Congress, the matter 
of the Dam is thrown at me. The situation in the 
Congress is boiling over the combination of arms 
for Saudi Arabia, no arms to Israel, [and] 
Egyptian recognition of Communist China. 8
However, after his anger subsided, Foster Dulles
refrained from punishing Cairo. On 23 May, he informed an
official from the U.S. Treasury:
Israel and others had recognized Red China. We 
don't act on basis of any one single fact. The 
whole situation has to be evaluated.
Foster Dulles admitted to C.D. Jackson, a former special
assistant to Eisenhower, 'I think recognition of Communist
China by Nasser was some indication that the Egyptians do
not feel confident that they can get arms indefinitely
from the Russians.'49
47 Nutting, Nasser, p. 138.
48 Hoopes, p. 336? Neff, p. 253. See also DDE, John Foster 
Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 5, Foster Dulles to 
Allen Dulles, 18 May 1956; PRO, F0371/118843/JE1022/28, 
Trevelyan to Shuckburgh, 26 May 1956.
49 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 
10, Foster Dulles to Snyder, 23 May 1956? Neff, p. 255.
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As Foster Dulles told Ambassador Hussein, the real 
effect of recognition was upon Congress. On 1 June, the 
U.S. Minister in London, Walworth Barbour, told 
Kirkpatrick, 'The Administration now thought that, in the 
altered climate of opinion, there was no chance whatever 
of inducing Congress to stump up money for the Aswan Dam.' 
The State Department's dilemma was that 'if Nasser turned 
to Russia and the Dam was built by a cloud of Russian 
technicians, that would be regarded as a diplomatic 
victory for Russia and a diplomatic defeat for Mr. 
Dulles.' The solution was to sustain Nasser's hope of aid 
for the Dam while privately carrying out the Foster 
Dulles-Lloyd agreement to let the project languish.50 The 
British were considering the same problem. Eden agreed 
with the Foreign Office that 'we should not be in a hurry 
to go back to the Egyptians.. .however.. .we must keep 
Nasser in play for the time being.'51
The flaw in the Anglo-American strategy was that the 
Soviets could offer to finance the Dam at any moment. The 
British and Americans would then have to agree to fund the 
Dam or withdraw their offer and accept the Soviet deal 
with Cairo. In mid-June, when Soviet Foreign Minister 
Dmitri Shepilov announced a trip to Cairo, it was reported 
that he would offer Soviet financing of the Dam to 
Nasser.52
Neither side was prepared to meet the Soviet
50 PRO, F0371/119054/JE1422/186G, Kirkpatrick minute, 1 
June 1956.
51 PRO, FO371/119054/JE1422/167G, Millard to Graham, 7 May 
1956.
52 PRO, F0371/119055/JE1422/198G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1344, 13 June 1956.
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challenge. On 12 June, Whitehall's Middle East Official
Committee reached no decision on the State Department's
suggestion of a riparian conference of states with
interest in the Nile Waters, including Sudan and Ethiopia,
to delay negotiations on the Dam. The next day Hoover
revealed to makins that the State Department also had no
definite strategy. The alternatives were to resume
negotiations with Nasser, persist with the proposal of a
riparian conference, or withdraw using the 'best possible
formula,' for example, the suggestion that the Dam's cost
would cause undue interference with Egypt's economy and
internal affairs.53
Confusion reigned in London and Washington. The
Foreign Office abandoned the idea of the riparian
%
conference and proposed a resumption of negotiations with 
Egypt, spinning out the discussions as long as possible. 
Foster Dulles and Hoover decided, however, 'to wait for 
developments so as not to give in to blackmail.' The 
Foreign Office deferred to Washington's wishes.54
Further delay by Britain and the U.S. increased 
misunderstanding with the World Bank and the ill will of 
Nasser. On 20-21 June, Eugene Black, the President of the 
Bank, visited Cairo. Black, unaware of OMEGA, could not 
understand why Nasser could not reach agreement with 
Britain and the U.S. when the Bank and Egypt were ready to 
proceed. When he asked for the reason, Nasser complained
53 PRO, CAB134/1298, ME(0)C (56)35, 'High Aswan Dam,' 12 
June 1956.
54 PRO, F0371/119055/JE1422/198G, Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 2901, 14 June 1956, and JE1422/199G, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1366, 14 June 1956, 
and subsequent minutes.
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that London and Washington had not replied to Egypt's 
amendments, proposed in February, to the Western aide- 
memoires. The Foreign Office and State Department 
disregarded Black's advice to make a definite statement in 
reply to the Egyptian amendments, and the Bank was never 
told of the Foster Dulles-Lloyd decision to let funding 
'languish.'55
Between 11 and 13 July, Foster Dulles shifted from 
the 'wait-and-see' attitude towards withdrawal of the
Western offer. On 27 June, Assistant Secretary Allen told 
Foster Dulles that Shepilov's visit to Cairo had not
produced a Soviet offer on the Dam. With the Soviet threat 
receding, Foster Dulles could risk rebuffing the 
Egyptians.56 He had already recalled the embattled Byroade 
from Egypt despite the Ambassador's close relationship
with Nasser.57 On the morning of 13 July, Foster Dulles 
visited Eisenhower, who was recovering from surgery for 
ileitis at his farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Foster 
Dulles said:
Instead of [Shepilov's visit] leading to a 
Russian proposal to build the dam as many had 
anticipated, the Egyptians were now back saying 
they would take our proposal on the original 
terms and withdraw their own counterproposals.
.. .We were not in a position now to deal with 
this matter because we did not know of the 
legislative situation. Also our views on the
merits of the matter had somewhat altered....We 
were considering this carefully and would
55 PRO, FO371/119055/JE1422/206G, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
21 June 1956, and JE1422/219, Bailey to Watson, 30 June 
1956. See also Eisenhower, p.32? Lloyd, p. 69? Love,
325? DDE, Oral History Collection, OH-341, Eugene Black 
oral history, 13 May 1975.
56 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Allen, 27 June 1956.
57 See USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/4-1956, Cairo to State 
Department, Cable 2020, 19 April 1956, and 611.74/7- 
1256, Byroade to State Department, 12 July 1956.
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consult with the President next week.
The State Department was controlling American policy. 
Eisenhower was told little of Foster Dulles' views and he 
was not asked on 13 July to make or approve any 
decision.58
Foster Dulles returned to Washington to tell Makins 
that 'he had mentioned the matter to the President at 
Gettysburg this morning and would be discussing it with 
him early next week.' He added that 'his opinion was hard 
against proceeding' for several reasons, notably 
Congress's attitude, Egyptian discontent at the economic 
austerity and reduced military spending that would be 
required to finance the Dam, and the 'serious inflationary 
effect' of the project. He concluded, 'Assuming that we 
decided to take this course, it might be better to tell 
the Egyptians what the situation was, while holding out 
hope that they would recover economic aid in some other 
form.'59
Although the Aswan High Dam dominated discussion of
58 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 4, Foster Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, 
13 July 1956.
Between December 1955 and July 1956, there is only 
one recorded instance of Eisenhower expressing an 
opinion, let alone making a decision about the Dam, and 
on that occasion, his thoughts were superfluous because 
of the development of OMEGA. Furthermore, Eisenhower was 
effectively removed from office on 8 June with a severe 
attack of ileitis that required surgery, and he did not 
return to the White House until 15 July. Although 
Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, claimed that 
the President was fit enough to walk about within days 
of the operation, there is no evidence that he met 
Foster Dulles between 8 June and 13 July or considered 
foreign policy matters, except for the authorisation of 
missions by the U-2 reconnaissance plane. (Adams, pp.
182ff.? Records in Eisenhower Library)
59 PRO, F0371/119056/JE1422/229G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1508, 13 July 1956.
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OMEGA, other elements of the plan were implemented between 
May and July. While Wilbur Eveland visited Syria for the 
CIA, political turmoil highlighted the threat to the 
Western position. On 2 June, the Government of Sa'id el- 
Ghazzi resigned over student protests about Syria's 
economic links with France and French policy in Algeria. 
For two weeks, a series of Syrian politicians failed or 
refused to form a Cabinet, as right-wing parties failed to 
reconcile their differences. On 14 June, Sabri el-Asali, 
who served as Prime Minister in 1954 and 1955, formed a 
Cabinet with two Ministers of the Ba'ath (Socialist) 
Party, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Salah Bitar. 
The British Ambassador, John Gardener, cabled London, 
'Situation here is serious? if the pro-Iraqi elements now 
succumb, it will be some time before they can reemerge.'60 
Gardener subsequently warned that several sources 
indicated that el-Asali and the Ba'ath leader, Akram el- 
Haurani, had agreed on a statement of government policy, 
including the proclamation of an Egyptian-Syrian union 
'open to all Arabs who have no defence treaties with 
Foreign Powers.' Left-wing Army officers, led by Colonel 
Mustafa Hamdun and Captain Abdel Hamid Sarraj, threatened 
a coup if the statement was not issued. A
Gardener's hopes rested with a group of officers who 
formed the anti-leftist Arab Liberation Party. If that 
group cooperated with political figures, notably Mikhail 
Ilyan, prominent in Syrian affairs since the 1940s, the 
Ba'ath and the left-wing Army officers might be checked.
60 Eveland, pp. 181ff.? PRO, F0371/121858/VY1015/File.
61 PRO, F0371/121858/VY1015/File.
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Gardener asked the Foreign Office:
Would it be possible when discussing the 
situation with Nuri to urge that Lian [Ilyan] 
and Co. should be encouraged financially to 
continue their struggle? Also Jallal ul Sayid 
[an agent for Britain working inside the Ba'ath 
Party]?62
The CIA had the same idea. On 1 July, Kermit and 
Archie Roosevelt met Ilyan, who requested aid to offset 
spending by the Egyptians, Saudis, and Soviets. To defeat 
left-wing elements, Ilyan sought control of Damascus and 
Aleppo with the help of a few senior Army officers and 
newspapers bought from Egypt and Saudi influence with 
Western money.63
British and American efforts soon yielded dividends. 
Support was obtained from the tribes on the Iraqi-Syrian 
border and the Moslem Brotherhood. With Iraqi assistance, 
former President Hashim el-Atasi returned from Rome to 
build a right-wing coalition. Colonel El-Nafuri of the 
Arab Liberation Party was introduced by the Iraqi Minister 
in Damascus to Ilyan. The Syrian Chief of Staff, General 
Shawkat Shuqayr, after a row with the Minister of Defence 
and right-wing officers, resigned on 7 July. Gardener was 
'reliably informed' that Ilyan and Adnan el-Atasi, the son 
of the former President, had decided to 'eliminate' 
leading left-wing Army officers and form a right-wing 
government without el-Asali, the Ba'ath, and the military. 
Ilyan and his collaborators 'fled' to Lebanon on 13 July, 
possibly because of a left-wing backlash against their 
efforts, possibly to meet American, British, or Iraqi
62 PRO, F0371/121858/VY1015/37, Damascus to Foreign 
Office, Cable 311, 20 June 1956.
63 Eveland, p. 189.
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representatives in Beirut.64
At the same time, the Foreign Office fought off a
challenge to its Iraqi-Jordanian policy. The Permanent
Undersecretary, Kirkpatrick, thought Britain's annual
subsidy of £12 million to Jordan was being wasted, and he
instructed Ambassador Wright in Baghdad to consult Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id. Wright rebuffed Kirkpatrick:
[This] would suggest we are prepared to abandon 
Jordan to Egypt and Syria before Jordan has 
crossed the Rubicon by her own action? it would 
not do much to explain our motives in terms of 
the situation as a whole? and I would expect the 
effect on [Nuri] to be extremely depressing, 
with possible consequences on his conduct of 
policy.
Eden wrote Lloyd, 'Clearly we must do all we can to hold 
on to Jordan until better arrangements are possible 
elsewhere.' British officials considered a £2,000 
'subsidy' to General Nuwar, who was about to become Chief 
of Staff of the Arab Legion.65
Foreign Office officials, after the meeting of 30 May 
reviewing Middle Eastern policy, instructed Wright to tell 
Nuri that, while Britain would maintain its subsidy to 
Jordan, the Iraqis should assume a share of the 
contribution. Nuri avoided financial commitment, telling 
Wright that the U.S. had agreed to his request for $8 
million in economic aid to Jordan and indicating this 
might be coordinated with Iraqi projects. °
On 17 June, Wright reported that General Nuwar and
64 PRO, F0371/121858/VY1015/File.
65 PRO, F0371/121495/VJ1051/126, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 567, 17 May 1956? AP, AP20/21, Eden to 
Lloyd, 15 April 1956.
66 PRO, F0371/121495/VJ1051/127, Foreign Office to 
Baghdad, Cable 1166, 4 June 1956, and VJ1051/132G, 
Baghdad to Foreign Office, Cable 655, 11 June 1956.
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the Iraqis had agreed upon an Iraqi-Jordanian Defence 
Committee. If Israel attacked Jordan, an Iraqi division
would assist the Jordanians. The immediate barrier to 
further progress was Nuwar's request for small arms,
ammunition, and equipment worth £800,000. Nuri, contending 
that Iraq was short of funds, asked if Britain could 
finance the purchases. In reply, the British offered to 
strengthen the Royal Jordanian Air Force with 12 Venom
fighters in 1957 and 24 Gnat fighters in 1958-59.67
Once again, British plans were affected by Arab-
Israeli tension. On 2 July, General E.M. Burns, the
commander of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organisation, told 
the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Edward Lawson, that talks 
with Ben-Gurion and the new Israeli Foreign Minister, 
Golda Meir, indicated that 'the Israelis [were] now likely 
[to] take unilateral action with Jordan in event border 
incidents continued.' The next day, King Hussein told the 
British Ambassador and the U.S. Charge d'Affaires that
Ben-Gurion was contemplating a large-scale attack upon 
Jordan. Jordanian troops were mobilised and the Arab
Legion requested £1 million of ammunition from British 
stocks.68
Burns' initial reports were exaggerated, and an 
Israeli source, probably the Director-General of Ben-
Gurion' s office, Teddy Kollek, said the Israelis had
67 PRO, F0371/121485/VJ10393/45G, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 676, 17 June 1956, and subsequent minutes? 
PRO, F0371/121554/ VJ1203/File.
68 PRO, F0371/121728/VR1073/195, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cable 935, 3 July 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.85 
Series, Tel Aviv to State Department, Cable 1, 2 July 
1956, and Amman to State Department, Cable 8, 5 July 
1956. See also PRO, F0371/121728/VR1073/195, Laurence 
minute, 4 July 1956.
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decided upon no further reprisals. The source added, 
however, 'In case of future serious...incidents 
originating from Jordan, Ben-Gurion was authorized to take 
the necessary action without further Cabinet 
consideration.' The State Department agreed with Makins 
that Israel had established, for the record, that all
fiQpeaceful processes were exhausted.
The Israeli threat hastened Britain's reevaluation of 
its position in Jordan. The Chiefs of Staff had concluded 
in late June that the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was 'now an 
embarrassment and...of little further value' and that 'the 
stationing of British forces in the country was not 
strategically necessary.' They added, however, that a 
British presence was desirable if it satisfied Britain's 
political aims, and the Foreign Office decided that 
political objectives outweighed the cost of the subsidy 
and the commitment of British troops. At the Anglo- 
Jordanian Defence Board in mid-July, British 
representatives told Nuwar that Britain would defend
• 70Jordan with air and naval forces if Israel attacked.
Britain also accelerated its psychological campaign 
against Nasser. In March, Sydney Hebblethwaite of the 
Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD), 
responsible for covert propaganda, urged British
69 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.85/7-1356, Tel Aviv to State 
Department, Cable 39, 13 July 1956? PRO, F0371/121729/ 
VR1073/243, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1512, 14 
July 1956. See also PRO, F0371/ 121730/VR1073/253, 
Chancery (Tel Aviv) to Levant Department, Despatch 
10310/56, 16 July 1956, and VR1073/265, Duke to Rose, 4 
August 1956.
70 PRO, F0371/121496/VJ1051/154G, Chiefs of Staff brief,
27 June 1956; PRO, F0371/121730/VR1073/266G, British 
Defence Coordinating Committee (Middle East) to COS, 
Cable MECOS 162, 9 August 1956.
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information officers in the Middle East to use /their best
endeavours to cultivate the appropriate key personalities
of the small broadcast stations in their countries so as
to ensure that through such friendly contacts, anti-
British criticism is reduced and a little more space is
given to objective news about Britain.' Hebblethwaite
subsequently asked the Regional Information Officer in
Beirut to remind information officers to 'report two or
three times a year on the success of their attempts to
penetrate local broadcast stations.'71 Newer and more
powerful transmitters were considered for British stations
in Libya, Aden, and Kuwait, and after extensive efforts by
the Foreign Office, the Iraqis erected a transmitter in
September 1956 which was more powerful than any Egyptian
station.72 Jack Rennie, the head of IRD, and his deputy,
Norman Reddaway, told Press Secretary Clark of their
desire for more 'black' propaganda from British radio
stations.73 Lloyd even pressed Ian Jacob, the Director-
General of the BBC, to help:
The BBC was too respectable. In most instances, 
it was good, but in others it might be more 
aggressive, although certain aspects of 
offensive broadcasting^ had better be done 
through other agencies. 4
In June, Douglas Dodds-Parker, the Parliamentary 
Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, chaired an ad hoc 
committee directed to study non-military measures to
71 PRO, F0953/1650/PB1041/30, Hebblethwaite minute, 27 
March 1956.
72 PRO, F0953/1658/PB1045/File; PRO, F0953/1659/PB1045/ 
109, Baghdad to Foreign Office, Cable 974, 3 September 
1956, and subsequent minutes. See also AP, AP20/21, Eden 
to Lloyd, 4 May, 15 May, and 3 June 1956.
73 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 2 May 1956.
74 PRO, F0953/1641/PB1011/20, Dodds-Parker minute, 11 July 
1956.
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maintain Britain's Middle Eastern position. The Middle
East (Official) Committee had recommended a one-off
allocation of £50,000 to build VHF radio stations and
supply receivers 'to counter Egyptian propaganda in the
Middle East.' The Dodds-Parker Committee expanded this to
propose an increase of £568,000 in annual spending and
£330,000 in capital expenditure for broadcasting. Besides
the second short-wave transmitter in Aden and two
transmitters in Libya, the Committee endorsed a medium-
wave relay station in Cyprus for the BBC, and a system of
VHF broadcasting for the Persian Gulf.75
After the early stumbles in the planning of OMEGA,
the Foreign Office had linked plans for Iraq, Jordan,
Syria, and Saudi Arabia with the isolation of Nasser in
the Middle East without provoking open Anglo-Egyptian
conflict.76 Lloyd told the Egyptian newspaper Al-Akhbar on
18 June, 'There are no actual disputes or conflicts
between Great Britain and Egypt which justify the present
lack of confidences between the two countries.' A week
later, the Daily Herald printed Nasser's reply:
Now that the Egyptian people have won their 
independence and that there are no longer any 
foreign troops on Egyptian soil, a completely
new chapter opens and we want that chapter to be 
one of friendship and of friendly
cooperation.
The rapprochement was an illusion. A Cabinet Paper, 
drafted by the Foreign Office, considered whether Britain
75 PRO, CAB134/1298, ME(O)C(56)33, 'Working Paper on 
Middle Eastern Expenditure,' 11 June 1956? PRO, 
F0371/120812/UEE10062/9G, Dodds-Parker minute, 19 July 
1956.
76 See PRO, F0371/118862/JE1053/ 37G, Shuckburgh to Middle 
Eastern posts, 28 May 1956.
77 Love, p. 218.
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'should move over to a more overtly hostile line towards
[Nasser].' The paper noted:
[Our] policy, as agreed with the Americans, has 
been not to adopt an attitude of open hostility 
to Nasser but rather to keep him guessing about 
our ultimate intentions, while doing what we can 
to weaken his influence in Egypt and other Arab 
states by covert methods.... The time for a 
change may come after we have dealt with the 
Aswan Dam, but there is no alternative regime in 
sight in Egypt and such a change will push him 
[Nasser] more firmly in the hands of the 
Russians and covert reprisals against our 
economic interests.
However, once Nasser was weakened by the measures in
OMEGA, the memorandum concluded:
We shall be able to indulge in activities which 
he will see are directed against him by us. It 
is in preparation for that phase that we must 
have our machinery ticking over. 8
\
78 PRO, FO371/118864/JE1053/67G, Wilton minute, 5 July 
1956, and JE1053/74G, Lloyd memorandum, 20 July 1956.
187 
CHAPTER 8
19 JULY-26 JULY: WESTERN ATTACK, EGYPTIAN COUNTERATTACK
At 4 p.m. on 19 July, Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador
to Washington, walked into Foster Dulles' office. When he left the
office an hour later, Foster Dulles had withdrawn American support
for the Aswan High Dam.
Blaming Egypt for the events leading to the Suez crisis,
American officials perpetuated the myth that Foster Dulles was
forced into the withdrawal. Hussein allegedly entered the office
and demanded 'a huge commitment over a period of years' from the
U.S., and threatening that the Egyptians had a Soviet offer 'in
their pocket.' Foster Dulles replied that, in that case, Egypt
would not need American help.1
In fact, Hussein's behaviour had nothing to do with the
withdrawal, which had been planned by Foster Dulles over the past
six days. At 3:40 p.m., Foster Dulles told his brother Allen:
If [I do] nothing, Congress will chop [funding for the 
Dam] off tomorrow and [I] would rather do it....If [the 
Soviets] do make this offer, we can make a lot of use of 
it in propaganda with the satellite bloc. [We will say 
that] you don't get bread because you are being squeezed 
to build a dam.
When Allen Dulles asked how the decision would be justified, Foster
Dulles replied that 'he would put it on the ground that since the
offer was made, the situation has changed and so on. On the whole,
it is too big an affair to swing today.'2
When Hussein entered the office, Foster Dulles threw an
'artificial tantrum':
We believe that anybody who builds the High Dam will earn 
the hatred of the Egyptian people because the burden will 
be crushing....We don't want to be hated in Egypt? we are
1 Eisenhower, p. 32; Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors 
(London: Collins, 1964), p. 459.
2 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, Foster 
Dulles to Allen Dulles, 19 July 1956.
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leaving this pleasure to the Soviet Union if they really 
want to do it!
Foster Dulles added, 'We doubted that we could obtain funds
from Congress to carry out the work....No single project in the
Mutual Security Program was as unpopular today at the Aswan Dam.'
Hussein then replied:
Although he himself still thought it would be a mistake 
for Egypt to accept the Russian offer, he feared it would 
be extremely difficult for his Government to do so. The 
Egyptian people had been told that they need arms and the 
High Aswan Dam, and it would not be easy to explain to 
them that they could not have the latter if the Russians 
were willing to provide it.
The Egyptian Ambassador left the office to face reporters armed
with a statement from the State Department asserting that
'developments' meant 'the ability of Egypt to devote adequate
resources to assure the project's success has become more uncertain
than at the time the offer was made.'3
In fact, Foster Dulles' hand had been forced by Congress. On
16 July, the Senate Appropriations Committee, reviewing the foreign
aid bill for fiscal year 1957, insisted upon an amendment
prohibiting finance for the Dam without the authorisation with the
Committee. The White House had spent two years resisting
Congressional attempts to limit Executive control of foreign
policy, narrowly defeating the Bricker Amendment, which required
Congressional approval of any Executive agreement with a foreign
country. If Congress approved the Appropriations Committee's
amendment, any allocation of foreign aid might be subject to
Congressional veto.
William Knowland, the Republican leader in the Senate, warned
Foster Dulles on 17 July that the Administration would 'proceed at
its peril' if it tried to fund the Dam. Foster Dulles hinted, 'We
3 Ibid.: PRO, F0371/119056/JE1422/247G, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1552, 19 July 1956? Mosley, p. 402? Love, p. 316.
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have just about made up our minds to tell the Egyptians we will not
do it.' When Knowland indicated that 'the committee won't be taking
[the amendment] until Friday [20 July],' Foster Dulles assured, 'It
might well be taken care of by then and action on the bill won't be
necessary.'4 On 18 July, the State Department told Makins of the
imminent withdrawal. The Ambassador informed the Foreign Office
that 'no final decision will be taken until tomorrow morning,' but
added, 'My impression is that Mr. Dulles will leave [Hussein] in no
doubt that the offer of last December is withdrawn.'5
Just as it was convenient for the Americans to blame the
Egyptians for withdrawal of finance for the Dam, British
politicians later criticised Foster Dulles for triggering the Suez
crisis with his unilateral and abrupt actions.6 In fact, Eden knew
of Makins' conversation of 13 July with Foster Dulles and agreed
with the intention to cut off funding. Lloyd told the Cabinet on 17
July of American plans and added:
It would probably be best to indicate to the Egyptians 
that, in view of their commitments for expenditure on 
armaments and military installations, the two Governments 
had been forced to the conclusion that the financing of 
the Dam, even with the assistance which had been 
proposed, would be beyond Egypt's resources.7
The next day, the Foreign Office informed Makins, 'It will suit us
very well if Mr. Dulles speaks as you foresee.'8
On the morning of 19 July, Foster Dulles told Makins of his
final decision. Makins responded that the British 'point of view on
4 PRO, F0371/119056/JE1422/232G, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1528, 17 July 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, 
Box 5, July 1956, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 16 July 1956?
Neff, p. 260.
5 PRO, FO371/119056/JE1422/230G, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1541, 18 July 1956.
6 See Eden, p. 422? Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm (London: 
Macmillan, 1971), p. 98.
7 PRO, FO371/119056/229G, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1508, 13 July 1956? PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.50(56), 17 July 1956.
8 PRO, FO371/119056/JE1422/230G, Foreign Office to Washington, 
Cable 3256, 19 July 1956.
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the substance of the problem seemed to [him] much in line with the
U.S. view [although Britain] would prefer to play it very much
longer and not give a definite refusal.' Foster Dulles said he
preferred this...
...but, after consultation with [the] President, he had 
come to the conclusion that Congressional circumstances 
simply did not allow this....He was not prepared to let 
the control of foreign policy pass to the Congress.9
Foster Dulles then told Eisenhower, who was about to leave for
Panama, of his decision and showed the President the State
Department's proposed statement. Eisenhower made no changes. The
meeting lasted 12 minutes.10
The British were not agitated about Foster Dulles' action.
Lloyd merely told the Cabinet on 20 July that it was 'clear that
the U.K. Government should similarly withdraw.' The Cabinet
authorised an announcement at noon that would 'emphasize the
economic considerations which led us to this decision and would
give the Egyptian Government no ground for assuming that it had
been taken for political reasons.'11
Nasser was returning with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru from a summit with Yugoslav ruler Tito when he heard the news
of the withdrawal.12 The Egyptian President was especially incensed
at the implication in the State Department's statement that Egypt
had neither the resources nor the management skills to the
construct the Dam, operate the economy, and expand military forces.
He told Ambassador Byroade:
9 PRO, F0371/119056/JE1422/245, Washington to Foreign Office,
Cable 1545, 19 July 1956. See also PRO, F0371/119058/JE1422/
297G, Wright minute, 27 November 1956, and subsequent minutes.
10 Neff, p. 260. See also DDE, Oral History Collection, OH-14,
Dwight Eisenhower oral history, 28 July 1964.
11 PRO, FO371/118864/JE1053/74G, Lloyd memorandum, 20 July 1956;
PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.52(56), 24 July 1956, and C.M.53(56), 26 July 
1956.
12 See Peter Calvocoressi, Suez: Ten Years After (London: BBC,
1967), p. 41? Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, p. 115.
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This action of Mr. Dulles is an action against me by a 
great power, and no great power can take action against 
me without taking into account the necessary consequences 
of it....The necessary consequences are that you fellows 
are out to kill me, and all I can do is protect myself. I 
tell you this. I am not going to be killed.13
After Nehru left Cairo, Nasser considered Egyptian reaction to
the withdrawal. One option was nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Company (SCC), a symbol of Western involvement in Egyptian affairs.
More than 80 percent of its stock was held by French and British
shareholders, and its concession to oversee shipping through the
Suez Canal expired in 1968. Since 1954, the Egyptians had
considered their eventual takeover of the SCC's activities.14 In
early July, when Nasser told Hussein to accept the American
conditions on funding for the Dam, he added:
Ahmed, do you know Egyptian history? Do you know about 
the Suez Canal? Before you go back to Washington, ao to a 
bookshop in Cairo and buy a book about the Canal.1J*
Nasser completed an 9 appreciation' of the situation on 23
July. Egyptian emissaries were sent to Cyprus, where guerrillas
fighting for union with Greece provided photographs of British
military installations and radio stations, and to Malta, where the
labour movement provided reports. Nasser recognised that Britain's
immediate impulse would be to reverse the nationalisation, but he
realised weeks of preparation would be needed to assemble the
equipment and the troops necessary to occupy the Canal Zone. As
time passed, the pressure of public opinion would dissuade Britain
from action and push it into negotiations with Egypt, and a
settlement would be reached within the three months the British
required to complete military plans. Nasser did not expect France
to support British military action because of Anglo-French
13 Mosley, p. 404.
14 See Calvocoressi, p. 43.
15 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/7-3056, Cairo to State Department, 
Cable 176, 30 July 1956.
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conflicts in the Middle East. 'Least of all,' according to his 
confidant Mohammed Heikal, 'did it enter Nasser's head at any stage 
in the Suez crisis that France and Britain would destroy every 
vestige of their influence and good name in the Arab world by using 
Israel as their stalking-horse for an attempt to seize the Canal by 
force./16
The main deterrent to nationalisation was the economic risk
for Egypt. The country had little foreign exchange to compensate
the SCC's shareholders, and it did not have the technical expertise
to build the Aswan High Dam alone. Moscow could not be relied upon
to provide aid for the Dam: on 21 July, Foreign Minister Dmitri
Shepilov said the Soviet Union was 'not interested in financing it
[as] Egypt was in need of general economic development.' Nasser
apparently gambled that Egypt could keep the Canal open and earn
enough revenue to keep its economy afloat. He later told a British
reporter that the Egyptians had £60 million in reserves which, with
an additional £10 million of Egyptian holdings that the British
were due to release in January 1957, would compensate the SCC. The
net profits from supervision of Canal transit would then support
their economy the SCC had made £19 million in 1955. Egyptian
assets would be set against the £61 million in gold held by the SCC
in Cairo to meet any problems of foreign exchange.17
In a speech on 24 July, Nasser responded to the withdrawal of
funding for the Dam:
Our reply today is that we will not allow the domination 
of force and the dollar. I will tell you on Thursday, God
willing, how Egypt has acted so that all its projects --
such as [the Dam] ---- may be projects of sovereignty,
dignity, and not those of humiliation, slavery,
16 Heikal, Nasser, p. 90, and Cutting the Lion's Tail, p. 117; 
Love, p. 335; Nutting, Nasser, p. 147.
17 PRO, FO371/119056/JE1422/248, Moscow to Foreign Office, Cable 
1002, 21 July 1956; PRO, FO371/119087/JE14211/291, Cairo to 
Foreign Office, Cable 1430, 5 August 1956.
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domination, rule, and exploitation.18 
Thursday was 26 July, the culmination of celebrations of the 
anniversary of the 1952 Revolution. The centrepiece was Nasser's 
speech, to be broadcast by the Voice of the Arabs, in Liberation 
Square in Alexandria. A reference in the speech to 'De Lesseps,' 
the industrialist who supervised the Suez Canal's construction, was 
the signal for three groups of men to seize SCC offices in Cairo 
and at both ends of the Canal.
'By turns sarcastic, condescending, and occasionally 
facetious,' speaking in a heavily colloquial dialect, a relaxed 
Nasser began the 2 1/2-hour speech with a long review of
'imperialistic efforts to thwart Egyptian independence.' He then 
recounted the story of the Aswan High Dam from its inception to the 
American withdrawal. During the story, Nasser compared Eugene 
Black, the President of the World Bank, to 'De Lesseps.' Fearful 
that his collaborators would not hear the signal, Nasser repeated 
the name 13 times in his address. Nasser then announced the 
nationalisation, setting off a 10-minute ovation. The U.S. Consul 
summarised:
In the space of a half-hour, Nasser succeeded for the 
first time in capturing the imagination of the rank and 
file and converting them into active supporters....Among 
normally pro-Westerners, there is grudging admiration for 
the man who in one week managed to recover from a major
setback on the High Dam to administer a stinging blow to
Western powers.19
The nationalisation surprised the West. The State Department's 
deliberations over the Egyptian response to withdrawal of funding 
for the Dam never considered the possibility. Instead, the U.S.
Embassy in Cairo predicted that Nasser would terminate the
18 Hoopes, p. 345.
19 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301 Series, Cairo to State Department, 
Cable 146, 26 July 1956, and Alexandria to State Department,
Cable 20, 28 July 1956, and 774.11/7-2856, Alexandria to State 
Department, Despatch 1, 28 July 1956.
194
operations of the U.S.-backed International Cooperation 
Administration. Only the French Ambassador to the U.S., Maurice 
Couve de Murville, warned of nationalisation.20
Nasser's action altered the implementation of OMEGA. After the 
CIA's 'probing operation' in Syria, the Dulles brothers did not 
endorse working with Ilyan, but they agreed that CIA funds should 
subsidise bids by American oil companies for the construction of 
the refinery at Horns. Other steps included the 'buying' of support 
for the West in Jordan, the forging of pro-Western links between 
Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and pressure upon 
King Saud to renew American rights to use the Dhahran Air Base and 
to break his 'alliance' with Nasser. George Young of MI6 warned 
Wilbur Eveland, working for the CIA, that Britain and Iraq would 
proceed with plans for a coup in Syria and complained about 
Washington's 'foot-dragging' in accepting British operations. 
However, when Eveland asked if a coup had been planned against 
Nasser, Archie Roosevelt, supervising operations against Syria, 
replied, 'Certainly not yet. We'll watch [Nasser] carefully and 
concentrate on creating a friendly bloc of Iraq, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, and Jordan.'21
Nasser's nationalisation of the SCC changed these plans. The 
CIA decided, in the new circumstances, that the electoral process 
would take too long in Syria and that Operation STRAGGLE, the plan 
for a coup, must be implemented. Ilyan asked Eveland and Archie 
Roosevelt for a 'half-million and at least 30 days' to install a 
new regime. The target date was the end of August.22
Most importantly, the nationalisation of the SCC threatened
20 PRO, PREM11/1100, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 1 September 1956? 
Calvocoressi, p. 39? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 611.74/7-2556, Cairo to 
State Department, Cable 133, 25 July 1956? Love, p. 217.
21 Eveland, pp. 192ff.? Private information.
22 Ibid.
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Foreign Office control of a long-term program against Nasser. After 
26 July, British policy was defined by a number of committees. At 
the top, Eden and a select group of Ministers supervised action 
through the Egypt Committee, while the Egypt Official Committee, 
composed of senior civil servants and chaired by Cabinet Secretary 
Brook, established the political aims of a military operation to 
overthrow the Egyptian Government. The Defence Transition Committee 
of middle-level officials considered administration of Egypt by a 
British Military Government. A select group of military planners, 
most of whom had served on the Suez Canal Zone base, drafted 
operations to meet the instructions of the Egypt and Egypt Official 
Committees.
Middle Eastern planning remained under the Foreign Office's 
supervision, but the ad hoc system of committees disrupted its 
efforts. If the work of the Foreign Office and the military was 
considered by the Egypt Committee, problems could be addressed, but 
Eden was obsessed with toppling Nasser and Macmillan, formerly the 
Foreign Office's defender, was even more determined than the Prime 
Minister. Other members of the Egypt Committee, notably 
Commonwealth Secretary Lord Home and Colonial Secretary Alan 
Lennox-Boyd, shared these views.
In the confusion, MI6 was encouraged to implement its own 
policy. While the Foreign Office and the military coordinated OMEGA 
with the Americans, MI6, after the talks with the CIA in April that 
nearly destroyed the planning, only discussed general objectives 
with the U.S. and the Foreign Office. It remained to be seen 
whether the Foreign Office and the State Department could again 
pull the Eden Government back from direct confrontation with Egypt.
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CHAPTER 9
26 JULY-14 AUGUST 1956: BRITAIN'S QUEST TO 'HIT, HIT NOW,
AND HIT HARD'
Eden was dining with King Feisal II, Crown Prince
Abdul-Illah, and Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id of Iraq when
news came of Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Company. Nuri allegedly told Eden:
You have only one course of action open and that 
is to hit, hit now, and hit hard. Otherwise it 
will be too late. If [Nasser] is left alone, he
will finish all of us.
After the Iraqis left, Eden summoned the Chiefs of Staff,
French Ambassador Jean Chauvel, and American Charge
d'Affaires Andrew Foster to 10 Downing Street. Foreign
Secretary Lloyd, the Lord President, Lord Salisbury, the
Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, and Commonwealth Secretary
Home joined the discussion. Eden's Press Secretary, Clark,
recorded:
Eden made it absolutely clear that military 
action would have to be taken and that Nasser 
would have to go. Nasser could not be allowed, 
in Eden's phrase, 'to have his hand on our 
windpipe.'2
Foster cabled Washington, '[British] Cabinet takes an 
extremely grave view of situation and very strong feelings 
were expressed, especially by Eden, to the effect that 
Nasser must not be allowed to get away with it.'3
The military was unable to carry out Eden's wishes, 
however. Fulfilling the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954,
1 Heikal, Nasser, pp. 96ff.
2 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 26-27 July 
1956.
3 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, July 
1956, London to State Department, Cable 481, 27 July 
1956.
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British troops completed their evacuation from the Suez 
Canal Zone in June 1956. The Chiefs of Staff had concluded 
in March that a landing of three to four divisions was 
necessary to reoccupy the Zone and keep the Canal open. On 
3 July, the Chiefs assessed, as did the civilian Dodds- 
Parker Committee, 'We can no longer rely solely on the 
threat of military force to attain political stability, 
and we must therefore devote much more of our non-military 
resources to this end.' Britain should not retain rights 
to the Canal Zone Base after the expiry of the 1954 Anglo- 
Egyptian Treaty in 1961, since 'the relatively small 
functions which [the Base] fulfill in the Cold War could 
be met by other arrangements.'4
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir 
Gerald Templer, opposed landing a lightly-armed force in 
Egypt while General Hugh Stockwell noted that paratroops 
were out of training and landing craft were out of 
commission. Furthermore, British forces had serious 
problems with equipment. Hunter fighters suffered from 
jammed guns and engines that surged unexpectedly. Valiant 
bombers had no bomb sights, and Canberra bombers were not 
cleared for high-altitude flights.5
Lord Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, advised Eden 
that the British fleet could sail from Malta within a few 
hours, collecting Royal Marine Commandos at Cyprus and 
landing them at Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez 
Canal, in three to four days, but he continued:
4 PRO, CAB131/17, DC(56)17, 'U.K. Requirements in the 
Middle East,' 3 July 1956.
5 Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten (London: Collins, 1985), p. 
538; Lamb, p. 199.
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Though the 1200 Marines could seize the 
Causeway, they would have great difficulty 
maintaining themselves there in the face of 
Egyptian opposition. I recommend that unilateral 
action by the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines 
should not be taken.
The three Chiefs of Staff closed the discussion by
threatening to resign if immediate operations were
pursued. They formally agreed the next day that it was
essential that the operation have 'overwhelming force from
the outset.'7
As Britain was unable to act alone, 'the question
confronting [British] Cabinet tonight,' Foster recorded,
'was, of course, extent to which U.S. would go in
supporting and participating in firm position vis-a-vis
Nasser in terms of economic sanctions and, beyond that if
necessary, military action.' With no authority to give an
answer, Foster could only agree to meet Lloyd and Eden the
following afternoon.8
The next morning, the Cabinet authorised Eden to ask
Eisenhower to send a representative for consultations with
Britain and France. After reviewing economic factors, the
Cabinet considered its legal position. Contrary to the
Government's claims during the crisis, Ministers
recognised that Britain was...
...on weak ground in basing our resistance on 
the narrow ground that Colonel Nasser had acted 
illegally....From a narrow legal point of view, 
his action amounted to no more than a decision 
to buy out the shareholders.
Unable to use existing law to justify military action, the
6 Ziegler, p. 538.
7 AP, AP23/37/24B, Head to Eden, 3 May 1962, and AP33/2, 
Templer to Eden, 21 August 1976.
8 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, July 
1956, London to State Department, Cable 481, 27 July 
1956.
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Cabinet constructed a new legal principle 'on wider
international grounds':
The Canal was a vital link between the East and 
the West, and its importance as an international 
waterway, recognised in the [Constantinople] 
Convention signed in 1888, had increased with 
the development of the oil industry and the 
dependence of the world on oil supplies. It was 
not a piece of Egyptian property but an 
international asset of the highest importance, 
and it should be managed as an international 
trust.
Having concocted a formula for the use of force, the 
Ministers reviewed Britain's military options. The Chiefs
of Staff estimated that the three divisions necessary to
defeat the Egyptians 'could be made available...but, as a 
great quantity of vehicles and other heavy armoured 
equipment would have to be transported to the area by sea, 
the necessary preparations for mounting the operation 
would take several weeks.' They also warned, 'It was 
important that the operations should be so planned as to 
reduce to the minimum the risk the other Arab States would 
be drawn into supporting Egypt.'
Led by Eden, the Cabinet dismissed the military's 
caution:
Failure to hold the Suez Canal would lead 
inevitably to the loss, one by one, of all our 
interests in the Middle East, and even if we had
to act alone, we could not stop short of using
force to protect our position if all other means 
of protecting it proved unavailable.
The Chiefs would prepare a military plan, while
Mountbatten requisitioned necessary shipping and
strengthened the naval presence in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The Board of Trade would
prepare for the restriction of Middle Eastern oil
deliveries to Britain and ensure an adequate supply of
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shipping for trade and the military operation. With
France, the Treasury would block Egyptian currency
balances in London and Paris. Most significantly, the
Egypt Committee, consisting of Eden, Salisbury, Lloyd,
Home, Minister of Defence Monckton, and Chancellor of the
Exchequer Macmillan, was appointed to oversee British
policy. Eden's goal was clear: plans would be made for...
...the worst case, that is, the British having 
to "go it alone" without the allies and it was 
made pretty clear that the French are almost 
certain to join in....The Prime Minister stated 
that his object was to get rid of Colonel Nasser 
personally and his regime, whom he regarded as 
the principal enemies.
The timing of Nasser's nationalisation forced 
Eisenhower, who had little to do with American policy in 
the Middle East, into action. The President decided that 
the crisis was not serious enough to recall Foster Dulles, 
who was visiting Peru, to the U.S. Significantly, 
Eisenhower refused to condemn the nationalisation as 
illegal. He distinguished the Suez crisis from the case of 
Iran in 1953, when the CIA and MI6 sponsored the overthrow 
of the Government that nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company was 
'not the same as nationalising oil wells,' since the 
latter exhausted natural resources while use of the Canal 
built them up. The logic was spurious, but it established 
that Eisenhower would not sponsor force against Nasser 
just to regain control of transit through the Canal.10
9 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.54(56), 27 July 1956? PRO, ADM205/ 
117, First Sea Lord to Vice Chief Naval Staff, 27 July 
1956.
10 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 16, July 1956 
Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 27 July 
1956. See also DDE, Oral History Collection, Dwight 
Eisenhower oral history, 28 July 1964.
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Like the British Cabinet, the President considered 
whether action against Egypt could be supported on 'wider 
international grounds.' Undersecretary of State Hoover 
noted that Nasser had violated the concession granted to 
the SCC in 1869 and that Egypt might interfere with use of 
the Canal, breaking the 1888 Convention guaranteeing 
freedom of transit to all nations. Eisenhower showed some 
sympathy for British feelings, noting, 'No nation is 
likely to allow its nationals to be held in what amounts 
to slavery, operations of the Canal may suffer, and we and 
many other countries have a concern over its operations,' 
but he took no action other than a public statement 
emphasizing that the U.S. regarded the situation 'with 
utmost seriousness and [was] consulting with others 
affected.'11
The State Department informed Foster in London, 
'Nasser's action in expropriating an international utility 
was in a very different category to the expropriation of, 
e.g., an oil company,' and suggested taking the case to 
the U.N. When Foster presented these views, Lloyd 
countered:
[We] must, from the outset, be prepared to take 
military measures, if necessary. Political and 
economic measures were not enough. Nasser would 
laugh at them. We must first establish between 
our three Governments that we are prepared to go 
to the limit.
A tripartite note to Egypt should reject nationalisation
and demand that an international body control the Canal:
If the Egyptians refused, we should have to take 
strong action. This might mean denouncing the
11 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 16, July 1956 
Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 27 July 
1956.
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1954 [Anglo-Egyptian] Agreement and reoccupying 
the Canal Zone (with the support of other 
Governments). Among other possibilities it might 
mean the use of naval escorts to ensure free 
passage through the Canal.'12
Eden wrote Eisenhower on 27 July, 'If we do nothing,
our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will,
we are convinced, be finally destroyed.' He then presented
the Cabinet's legal justification for action:
We should not allow ourselves to become involved 
in legal quibbles about the rights of the 
Egyptian Government to nationalise what is 
technically an Egyptian company or in financial 
arguments about their capacity to pay the 
compensation which they have offered. I feel 
sure that we should take issue with Nasser on 
the broader international grounds.
Most significantly, Eden rejected OMEGA in favour of overt
measures:
We are unlikely to attain our objective by 
economic pressures alone....My colleagues and I 
are convinced that we must be ready, in the last 
resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his 
senses. 3
Eden's message finally convinced the Americans that
Anglo-Egyptian war was possible, and Eisenhower and Hoover
agreed that Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy
should immediately go to London. However, they did not
absolutely reject support for the use of force:
If the British or the French were to pull out 
their pilots, insurance companies would not then 
cover ships in passage through the Canal? the 
result would be a halt in operations. If they 
[the Egyptians] tried to seize or hold the 
pilots, the U.K. would undoubtedly use force and 
would undoubtedly be justified in the eyes of 
the world.
12 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/7-2756, State Department to 
London, Cable 545, 27 July 1956 (classified)? PRO, 
F0371/119092/JE14211/ 421G, LIoyd-Chauvel-Foster 
meeting, 27 July 1956.
13 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 19, Eden, 
Eden to Eisenhower, 27 July 1956.
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Hoover added that 'his feeling, in which Secretary [of the
Treasury] Humphrey agrees, is that we must move strongly
in the Middle E a s t  otherwise the whole Middle East
position will be quickly challenged.' The Joint Chiefs of
Staff asserted that nationalisation was 'militarily
detrimental' to U.S. control of military bases and NATO:
[Action was required] which can reasonably be 
expected to result in placing the Suez Canal 
under a friendly and responsible authority at 
the earliest practicable date....If action short 
of the use of military force cannot reasonably
be expected to achieve this result, the U.S.
should consider the desirability of taking 
military action in support of the U.K., France, 
and others as appropriate. 4
The Americans simply wanted time to obtain support,
both inside and outside the U.S., for the use of force if
it was necessary. Eisenhower replied to Eden:
While we agree with much that you have to say, 
we rather think there are one or two additional
thoughts that you and we might profitably
consider....We are of the earnest opinion that 
the minimum number of maritime nations affected 
by the Nasser action should be consulted quickly 
in the hope of obtaining an agreed basis of 
understanding.15
On 27 and 28 July, the Egypt Committee drafted a plan 
of action. To limit Egypt's room for financial manoeuvre, 
Macmillan was authorised to secure control of the SCC's 
assets and £130 million in Egyptian sterling balances in 
London. Ministers authorised the deployment of a second 
carrier to the Mediterranean, the preparation of two ships 
to transport Army and RAF personnel and equipment, and 
four-day notice for a cruiser and three destroyers of the
14 USNA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Geographical File 
1954-1956, Box 15, 092 Egypt (7-28-56), S. 1, JCS draft 
to Secretary of Defence, undated.
15 U.S. DDRS, US81 384B; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, 
International, Box 19, Eden, Eisenhower to Eden, 28 July 
1956.
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Home Fleet to sail to the Middle East.
At the Committee, the Chiefs of Staff raised the
subject of cooperation with Israel:
Militarily, it would be to our advantage if the 
Egyptian armoured division now astride the Canal 
could be induced to move east of the Canal. A 
demonstration by Israel might achieve this, but 
such a move would tend to range the other Arab 
States on the side of Egypt, and it was an 
essential aim of our policy to isolate Egypt
from the other Arab countries. 6
The Foreign Office agreed. Israeli Ambassador Eliahu Elath
on 28 July was 'unofficially' told that British
preparations were to Israel's advantage but 'it was
essential that Israel should keep out and that [Israeli
Prime Minister] Ben-Gurion should keep quiet.' Lloyd
warned the French against sending Mystere jet fighters to
Tel Aviv 'to keep Israel out of the situation, as much in
Israel's interest as anyone.' 17
The first signs of division in the Anglo-American
alliance were appearing. The Egypt Committee brusquely
subordinated Eisenhower's request for consultation with
maritime nations to the military option:
It was not... thought wise to hold such a
conference immediately? it would be preferable 
to delay until military preparations were 
sufficiently advanced to enable forceful action 
(should this be necessary) to follow hard upon 
the presentation to the Egyptian Government of 
any plan approved by maritime countries. 8
In contrast, Eisenhower told Murphy and Hoover, 'If any
sweeping action...[was] taken, (it) should involve all the
maritime powers.'
16 PRO, CAB134/126, E.C(56)lst and 2nd meetings, 27-28 
July 1956.
17 PRO, F0371/121706/VR1052/23G, Ross minute, 28 July 
1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/7-2756, London to State 
Department, Cable 510, 27 July 1956.
18 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)2nd meeting, 28 July 1956.
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Hoover told Makins that the U.S. sought international
administration for the Canal but 'at present, that is to
say in default of some further overt act by Egypt (riotous
action against foreigners, imprisonment of pilots),
military action could not be justified.'19
With the U.S. reluctant to join military operations,
Britain turned to France. The day after the
nationalisation, Foreign Minister Pineau warned U.S.
Ambassador Douglas Dillon:
French Government takes most serious view of the 
affair and likens it to seizure of Rhineland by 
Hitler.... Inevitable result [of failing to 
oppose Nasser] would be that all of Middle 
Eastern pipelines would be seized and 
nationalized within the next three months and 
Europe would find itself totally dependent on 
the goodwill of the Arab powers.20
The French Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Nomy, who
accompanied Pineau to London on 29 July, allegedly said,
'[Anglo-French action] would teach those damned Arabs the
lesson they long needed.' Lloyd reported, after discussion
with Ambassador Chauvel:
The French were ready to go all the way with us.
They would be prepared to put French forces 
under British command if this was necessary, and 
they contemplated making land and air forces 
available as well as naval forces.
Eden, without consulting the U.S., instructed the Chiefs
of Staff to talk informally with Nomy.21
Before meeting Pineau and Lloyd, Murphy cabled
19 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, July 
1956, Goodpaster memorandum, 28 July 1956? PRO, PREM11/ 
1098, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1609, 28 July 
1956.
20 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, July 
1956, Paris to State Department, Cable 469, 27 July 
1956.
21 PRO, ADM205/117, First Sea Lord to Vice Chief of Naval 
Staff, 30 July 1956? PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)3rd 
meeting, 29 July 1956.
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Washington to define U.S. policy on collaboration with
Britain and France. The telegram, endorsed by the State
Department, if not by Eisenhower personally, became the
cornerstone of the American position:
We do not believe that our action should relate 
principally to the question of the legal right 
of Egypt to effect a nationalization of this 
company. The American interest relates rather to 
the right freely to use an essential 
international waterway, the free access to which 
is guaranteed by the Constantinople Convention 
of 1888...
We believe that whatever action is decided 
should be taken only after an estimate of the 
facts and that the decision should take fully 
into account the effect of such action on world 
public opinion. We desire to have the closest 
affiliation possible with the U.K. and France, 
but we believe that whatever action is taken 
should, if possible, have a broader basis than 
the interests, however important, of those three 
powers. The interest of other nations, 
especially maritime and trading nations, is 
important and their association and support, it 
seems to us, is essential....
The question of eventual military 
intervention does not seem to arise. It would 
depend on developments. For the present we 
believe it should delegated to the background.
We feel equally strongly that the Arab-Israeli 
question should be segregated from the present
The first tripartite meeting nearly collapsed because
of Pineau's distaste for U.S. policy. He told Lloyd:
The question for [France] was not only of the 
Middle East but also of Algeria....One 
successful battle in Egypt would be worth ten in 
North Africa.
Lloyd agreed with Pineau but carefully described the
position to Murphy:
Political and economic pressure was unlikely to 
have any effect on Nasser unless he knew that 
there were military sanctions in the background.
It was therefore necessary to proceed with 
military preparations as far as possible, in
22 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, July 
1956, London to State Department, Cable 517, 29 July 
1956 (italics added).
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case it was necessary to take military action.
In contrast, Pineau was blunt to the point of being 
offensive:
[I do] not agree with the U.S. approach to this 
whole question.... [Nationalisation] was a 
direct result of the decision made by the U.S. 
Government not to finance the Aswan Dam.
Only Lloyd's assurance that 'it was not intended to make
any military ultimatum to Nasser at the present stage'
saved the talks. Murphy held out against Lloyd's pressure
for immediate financial measures against Egypt, and it was
agreed that, for the moment, the SCC should not order its
pilots to quit.23
The next day, 30 July, Eden invited Murphy to lunch.
The Prime Minister accepted the American desire to avoid
force but requested, in the event of Anglo-French action,
that the U.S. 'keep a watchful eye on the Soviet Union
and...restrain Israel.'24
Eden had not retreated from military action but
intended to use the Conference for diplomatic cover. He
told Lloyd and Pineau:
Action against Egypt if it were necessary 
would...in any case, take time to prepare. If 
the Conference could achieve this end without 
prejudicing the eventual action that might be 
necessary, it might be admirable.
The Prime Minister's policy was accepted by the Egypt
Committee later in the day.25
Eden thought he had accommodated the Americans. In
23 PRO, FO371/119081/JE14211/124G, Lloyd-Pineau meeting, 
29 July 1956, and JE14211/121G-122G, lst-2nd Lloyd- 
Pineau-Murphy meetings, 29 July 1956.
24 Rhodes James, p. 470; PRO, PREM11/1098, Lloyd minute, 
31 July 1956.
25 PRO, FO371/119081/JE14211/125G, Eden-Lloyd-Pineau 
meeting, 31 July 1956? PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)4th 
meeting, 30 July 1956.
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fact, hard-line British Ministers horrified Murphy. At
dinner, Macmillan emphasized:
[The] British Government has decided to drive 
Nasser out of Egypt. The decision...is 
firm....Military action is necessary and 
inevitable.
Three British divisions could defeat Egypt within the next
six weeks at a cost of £400-500 million 'which [Britain]
couldn't afford but would pay.' He concluded, 'If
[Britain] had to go down now, the Government and...British
people would rather do so on this issue than become
perhaps another Netherlands.'26
Lloyd later argued that Macmillan's comments to
Murphy 'led to a misunderstanding of [the British]
position, particularly by Eisenhower,' since 'up to then,
Murphy had no reason to think that we were contemplating
hasty action.' Macmillan wrote in his diary:
It seems that we have succeeded in thoroughly 
alarming Murphy. He must have reported in the 
sense which we wanted, and Foster Dulles is now 
coming over post-haste.
In fact, Macmillan's comments differed little in essence
from those by Lloyd and Eden, who merely added the proviso
'in the last resort' regarding force.27
Foster Dulles, who had returned from Peru, told
Eisenhower, after Murphy's lunch with Eden but before his
dinner with Macmillan, 'It looks as though the impression
we got from Murphy at noontime that they were more
moderate has given way to a stronger line they want to
take.' Foster Dulles obtained the President's agreement
that Murphy insist upon the international conference and
26 Murphy, pp. 462ff.? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 674.84A/7-3156, 
London to State Department, Cable 550, 31 July 1956.
27 Lloyd, pp. 91ff? Horne, p. 398.
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avoidance of force.
The Secretary told Makins, 'The U.S. Government would
not be in sympathy with any attempt to make the Egyptian
Government rescind their nationalisation decrees, or to
regard them as inoperative, under the threat of force.'
His only concession was that 'if the Egyptians refused to
attend the conference or if, when there, they refused to
consider reasonable proposals for the international
supervision of the canal and of the provisions of the Suez
Canal Convention, then the situation would be created
which might call for a different approach.'28
Macmillan's comments merely hastened Foster Dulles'
departure for London. In a White House meeting on 31 July,
Foster Dulles noted, 'The British had taken a firm,
considered decision to "break Nasser" and to initiate
hostilities at an early date for this purpose.' The
meeting almost unanimously condemned the British.
Eisenhower noted, 'The British were out of date in
thinking of this as a mode of action in the present
circumstances,' and Humphrey added, 'It looked as though
[the British] were simply trying to reverse the trend away
from colonialism and turn the clock back 50 years.' Only
the Chief Naval Officer, Admiral Arleigh Burke, defended
the use of force:
Nasser must be broken....This should be
accomplished with economic and political means.
If, however, these are tried and prove 
insufficient, the U.K. should then use armed 
force, and we should declare ourselves in 
support of their action.
28 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 30 July 
1956? PRO, F0371/ 119080/JE14211/87G, Washington to 
Foreign Office, Cable 1613, 30 July 1956.
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The meeting considered financial sanctions against
the Egyptians but merely decided to suspend Egypt's
transfer of $10 million from the U.S. to Cairo.29 A letter
was drafted from the President to Eden, to be hand-
delivered by Foster Dulles:
I received the message, communicated to me 
through Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan, 
telling me on a most secret basis of your 
decision to employ force without delay or 
attempting any intermediate and less drastic 
steps....I cannot overemphasize the strength of 
my conviction that some such method [of 
negotiation] must be attempted before action 
such as you contemplate should be 
undertaken....Public opinion here, and I am 
convinced, in most of the world, would be 
outraged should there be a failure to make such 
efforts. Moreover, initial military successes
might be easy, but the eventual price might 
become far too heavy....
Foster Dulles, in a handwritten note, cautioned Eden that
the U.S. was not consenting 'to the going through the
motions of having an intermediate conference but to the
use of intermediate steps as a generous and sincere effort
. /into settle the problem and avoid the use of force.
Tensions increased when the Egypt Committee refused
the American request that the new international body
controlling the Canal act under U.N. auspices, condemned 
the three-power communique drafted by the U.S., because it 
mentioned Soviet participation in the conference, and
suggested that Britain and France convene a conference on
29 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 16, July 1956 
Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 31 July 
1956.
30 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 19, Eden, 
Eisenhower to Eden, 31 July 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman 
Series, DDE Diaries, Box 15, July 1956 Miscellaneous 
(1), Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 31 July 1956; DDE,
John Foster Dulles Series, Subject, Alphabetical, Box 
11, Miscellaneous Papers - U.K. (4), Foster Dulles to 
Eden, 1 August 1956.
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their own. Lloyd noted:
There might be advantage in going ahead together 
and leaving the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on the 
sidelines. The Americans often followed where 
others took action. 1
When Foster Dulles arrived in London on 1 August, he
tried to calm the situation, telling Harold Caccia, Deputy
Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, that 'the Americans
were entirely at one with [the British] in considering it
to be intolerable that the the future management of the
Canal should be in the sole hands of Colonel Nasser.' He
added, however, 'Steps should be taken which showed a
genuine desire to reach an acceptable international
solution for the control of the Canal by means other than
the use or the threat of the use of force.'32
In contrast, Lloyd adopted Macmillan's tone when he
met Foster Dulles:
If Nasser were to get away with his action, we 
should lose the pipelines and our oil supplies.
Our economy would then be slowly 
strangled....Nasser was a paranoiac and had the 
same type of mind as Hitler.
Foster Dulles did not waver, but he tried to present the
American rejection of force and preference for OMEGA in
terms acceptable to the British:
Egypt was under the dictatorship of a man who 
had avowed that the use of the Canal was not for 
the benefit of the nations of the world but for 
the satisfaction of his own national ambitions.
A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge 
what he was attempting to swallow.
Foster Dulles then clearly stated:
The U.S. Government did not exclude the use of
31 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)5th and 6th meetings, 31 July 
1956; PRO, F0371/119083/JE14211/212G, Lloyd-Pineau 
meeting, 31 July 1956.
32 PRO, F0371/119088/JE14211/307G, Caccia minute, 1 August 
1956.
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force if all other methods failed. However, the 
use of force, if not backed by world opinion, 
would have disastrous results. It would involve 
the loss of Western influence in all the Moslem 
countries, unless it were intended to take the 
whole of the Middle East by force. Such action 
would be highly dangerous, and even if the 
Soviets did not openly intervene, they would 
activate resistance, send 'volunteers,' and 
supply weapons....He doubted if the U.S. 
Government would be able to associate themselves 
with an operation involving force, which had not 
been preceded by genuine efforts to reach a 
satisfactory solution by negotiation. In such a 
case it would not be possible to .get the 
necessary legislation through Congress. 3
Lloyd understood, but Foster Dulles made the mistake
of using the same approach with Eden. When Foster Dulles
spoke of making Nasser 'disgorge the Canal,' Eden,
ignoring the rest of Foster Dulles' statement, assumed
that the Secretary had been won over by British firmness.
Foster Dulles' proviso of 'force if all other methods
failed' was interpreted by Eden as a request to go through
the ritual of an international conference before invading
Egypt.
Foster Dulles and Eden met twice: at lunch on 1
August, with Lloyd, Salisbury, Murphy, Aldrich, and 
advisers, and on the morning of 2 August on their own. 
American observers at the first meeting were struck by 
uneasiness between Foster Dulles and Eden and critical of 
British intransigence.34 Foster Dulles clearly stated that 
'the question was how [Nasser's] course should be reversed 
and he could be brought to "disgorge”,' but he again 
objected to military action. U.S. public opinion would not 
support a venture 'which, at this stage, could be
33 PRO, PREM11/1098, Lloyd-Foster Dulles meeting, 1 August 
1956; Lloyd, p. 99.
34 See Murphy, p. 467; Mosley, p. 410.
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plausibly portrayed as motivated by imperialist and
colonialist ambitions in the general area.' Not only would
Britain and France face sturdy Egyptian opposition,
assisted by the Soviet Union, but 'all the Arab and part
of the Moslem world would be arrayed against the U.K. and
France' and Britain 'would be in trouble in the United
Nations.' Eden conceded that he would 'give a try to the
conference method, if it could be pushed ahead quickly.'35
The meeting on 2 August later aroused controversy. In
his memoirs, Eden faithfully recorded Foster Dulles'
opinion that 'a way had to be found to make Nasser
disgorge what he was attempting to swallow.' Eden also
noted that Foster Dulles believed:
It should be possible to create a world opinion 
so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated.
Then if a military operation had to be 
undertaken, it would be more apt to succeed and 
have less grave repercussions than if it had 
been taken precipitately.
These comments did not differ from those made to Lloyd,
but Eden also claimed that Foster Dulles assured him that,
'in the event of an Anglo-French military operation
against Egypt,' Britain 'could always count on the moral
support and sympathy of the United States.' This claim is
unsupported by any account, even Lloyd's. Moreover, the
next day, Eden told Iverach Macdonald of the Times that,
while Foster Dulles had 'freely committed himself to an
international authority,' he had not promised American
support for force if the conference failed: 'Nothing had
been decided [except] that each of the three powers would
then have full liberty of action to do whatever seemed
35 Eden, p. 437; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/8-156, Foster 
Dulles memorandum, 1 August 1956.
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necessary.'36
Foster Dulles had not given Eden a blank cheque for 
military action. He merely restated the American position 
but, using OMEGA to satisfy Eden's determination to topple 
Nasser, he fostered the illusion that the U.S. would not 
oppose unilateral British measures. Robert Bowie, the head 
of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, 
summarised:
It was a sort of cat and mouse game, in which 
Dulles was constantly trying to manoeuvre the 
situation so that force wouldn't have to be used 
and that still a satisfactory solution could 
have been gotten. Eden was trying to maneuver 
the situation in such a way that the use of 
force would be legitimately justified. 7
In contrast, Lloyd reached agreement with Foster
Dulles over the international conference. Foster Dulles
accepted that the tripartite communique 'should contain a
strong condemnation of Egypt's action and an affirmation
of the need to place the Canal under international
control' and that the U.N. should not supervise that
international control. In return, Lloyd agreed to a
conference attended by the eight signatories of the 1888
Constantinople Convention, including the Soviet Union,
five leading users of the Canal, and six powers with a
'vital interest' in the Canal. Eden was dissatisfied but
the Cabinet agreed that, 'if this was the price of U.S.
cooperation, it must reluctantly be accepted.'38
However, the agreement over conference arrangements
36 Eden, p. 437; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/8-156, Foster 
Dulles memorandum, 1 August 1956? Lloyd, pp. 99ff.; 
Carlton, Anthony Eden, p. 414. See also Maurice Vaisse, 
'France and the Suez Crisis,' in Louis and Owen, p. 140.
37 Carlton, pp. 410 and 413.
38 PRO, F0371/119092/JE14211/422G, Lloyd-Pineau-Foster 
Dulles meeting, 1 August 1956.
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did not mitigate the fundamental division over force.
Inviting Foster Dulles to dinner, Macmillan emphasized:
If we should be destroyed by Russian bombs now 
that would be better than to be reduced to 
impotence by the disintegration of its entire 
position abroad. No one wanted to see another 
Munich.
Foster Dulles told Eisenhower on 1 August that he believed 
he had persuaded London and Paris to refrain from force 
'unless and until they have made a genuine effort to 
mobilize world opinion in favour of an international 
solution of the Canal problem.'39
The bargaining continued the following day. Finally, 
after two long meetings with Lloyd and Pineau, Foster 
Dulles agreed to the conference starting on 16 August and 
accepted that the three powers 'would not consider 
ourselves bound by an adverse majority [at the 
conference]' and 'it should not last more than one week.' 
He cabled Eisenhower, 'I think we have introduced a 
valuable stopgap into a dangerous situation and, while the 
danger is still there, we have perhaps made it more remote 
and more manageable.'40
If conflict with Egypt was 'manageable,' the Egypt 
Committee did not consider it 'remote.' The Cabinet had 
approved the callup of 20,000 reservists, with the Queen 
signing the order on the rear end of a racehorse at 
Goodwood racecourse, and the Committee accepted joint 
planning with the French in principle. Admiral Nomy,
39 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August 
1956 (2), London to State Department, Cable DULTE 2, 2 
August 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/8-156, Murphy 
and Aldrich memoranda, 1 August 1956.
40 PRO, F0371/119092/JE14211/423G and 424G, Lloyd-Pineau- 
Foster Dulles meetings, 2 August 1956.
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accompanied by high-ranking officers from the French Army 
and Air Force, returned to London on 2 August for 
discussions.41
Other opinion offset American opposition to a firm 
British line. The British Embassy in Paris reported 'the 
remarkable unanimity of French parliamentary and public 
opinion' for a showdown with Nasser. While the Indians 
sought a negotiated settlement and the Canadians were 
concerned about the use of force, New Zealand's Prime 
Minister Stuart Holland supported Eden and Australian 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies, who initially advised that 
the use of force 'would split the Western world,' soon 
endorsed 'the prompt and firm reaction of the U.K. 
Government.' In Iraq, Nuri suggested that Western ships 
not pay dues to Egypt, since Nasser would halt traffic, 
giving 'the maritime powers a good case for military 
action.' The British Ambassador to Moscow, William Hayter, 
and his French and American colleagues believed Soviet 
intervention against Britain was unlikely.42 The British 
press, with the exception of the Manchester Guardian, 
urged an immediate show of British strength.43
Most importantly, the Government received all-party
41 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.57(56), 2 August 1956; PRO, 
CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)9th, 2 August 1956; William Clark 
Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 2 August 1956.
42 PRO, F0371/119083/JE14211/209, Paris to Foreign Office, 
Cable 196, 2 August 1956; PRO, F0371/119085/JE14211/249, 
Paris to Foreign Office, Cable 303 Saving, 3 August 
1956; PRO, F0371/ 119080/JE14211/69, San Francisco to 
Foreign Office, Cable 2, 28 July 1956; PRO, F0371/ 
119081/JE14211/132G, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1624, 31 July 1956, and Cable 1633, 2 August 1956; PRO, 
F0371/121662/VQ1051/43G, Wright minute, 30 July 1956, 
and VQ1051/45G, Lloyd-Nuri-Abdul Illah meeting, 3 August 
1956; PRO, F0371/119083/JE14211/193, Moscow to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1054, 2 August 1956.
43 See, for example, The Times. 2 August 1956.
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support in the House of Commons debate on 2 August, the 
last day before the summer recess. Hugh Gaitskell, the 
leader of the Labour Party, was present at Eden's dinner 
for King Feisal II of Iraq on 26 July. He wrote in his 
diary:
I said that I thought they [the Government] 
ought to act quickly, whatever they did, and 
that as far as Great Britain was concerned, 
public opinion would almost certainly be behind 
them, but I also added that they must get 
America into line.
The next day, Gaitskell told the Commons, 'We deeply
deplore this high-handed and totally unjustifiable step by
the Egyptian Government.' After a meeting of the Shadow
Cabinet on 30 July, Gaitskell told Eden that 'force would
be appropriate in self-defence or, at any rate, in
circumstances which could be properly justified before the
United Nations.' He also suggested that Britain and the
West increase arms shipments to Israel.44
In the debate of 2 August, Gaitskell vehemently
denounced Nasser, asserting:
This episode must be recognised as part of the 
struggle for the mastery of the Middle 
East....It is all very familiar. It is exactly 
the same that we encountered from Mussolini and 
Hitler in those years before the war.45
Yet Gaitskell did not offer unconditional support for the
Government, as Eden later claimed. Labour MPs Douglas Jay,
who had learned from W.N. Ewer of the Daily Herald of the
Government's military preparations, and John Hynd
persuaded Gaitskell to mention Britain's obligations to
the U.N.: 'We must not...allow ourselves to get into a
position where we might be denounced in the Security
44 Williams, p. 552 and pp. 561ff.; Hansard. 27 July 1956.
45 Hansard. 2 August 1956.
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Council as aggressors or where the majority of the
Assembly were against us.' Any dispute over the legality
of Nasser's action should be taken to the International
Court of Justice.46
Gaitskell's position was similar to the American
policy, but his bellicose comments about Nasser were
seized upon by the press, the Commons, and the Government.
If Britain resorted to force without U.N. support in the
immediate future, Gaitskell could either accept the
invasion or support the hated Nasser against Britain.
Following the debate, Jay told Gaitskell of Ewer's
information that the Foreign Office was 'contemplating
war.' After reading the press of 3 August, Gaitskell tried
to protect his position, writing Eden:
While one or two members of our Party indicated 
in the debate that they would support force now, 
this is, I am pretty sure, not the general 
view....If Nasser were to do something which led 
to his condemnation by the United Nations as an 
aggressor, then there is no doubt, I am sure, 
that we would be entirely in favour of forceful 
resistance, but I must repeat, [as] I said in my 
speech yesterday, that, up to the present, I 
cannot see that [Nasser] has done anything which 
would justify this.
Eden gave no specific assurances about the use of force,
and the Egypt Committee proceeded with military
planning.47
British Ministers even considered MI6's idea of 
collaboration with Israel. In December 1955, Lloyd asked 
Ambassador Elath if Israeli forces could invade Egypt and 
reach the Suez Canal within five days. When Elath replied
46 Douglas Jay, Change of Fortune (London: Hutchinson, 
1980), p. 254.
47 Jay, p. 254? PRO, PREM11/1159, Gaitskell to Eden, 3 
August 1956.
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that this was possible, Lloyd asked if '[Israel] would
return to [its] borders' after the invasion.48 At the
Egypt Committee on 2 August, Macmillan commented, 'It
would be helpful if Egypt were faced with the possibility
of a war on two fronts.' The following day, the Chancellor
chaired a special meeting with Salisbury, Leslie Rowan of
the Treasury, the British Ambassador to France, Gladwyn
Jebb, and Foreign Office officials. After the meeting
agreed that Britain's 'primary object should be the early
establishment of an acquiescent Government in Cairo,' the
idea of Israeli cooperation was accepted:
The disadvantages of Israeli participation did 
not outweigh the disadvantages of failing in the 
military enterprise, but the meeting was of the 
opinion that Israeli assistance should, if 
possible, stop short of active intervention. 
Israel's presence alone should tie down 
considerable Egyptian forces. The meeting 
recognised that it would probably be difficult, 
perhaps impossible to restrain the Israelis, who 
could in any case be expected to try to extract 
a price for meeting our wishes.49
Macmillan then presented his proposal to the Egypt 
Committee. Lloyd, fearing association with the Israelis 
would ruin Britain's position in the Arab world, opposed 
the Chancellor. Eden was furious with Macmillan for 
intervening, commenting, 'None of his business anyway,' 
and the Committee agreed that the Israelis should not act 
before the maritime conference. Lloyd subsequently told 
Elath 'in no uncertain terms how important it was to 
Israel's interests, not only to keep right out of the Suez
48 Israeli State Archives, 193/1, Eytan to Eban, 2 
February 1956. I am grateful to Orna Almog for this 
information from her forthcoming doctoral thesis.
49 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)9th meeting, 2 August 1956? 
PRO, CAB134/1217, EC(56)9, 'France and the Middle East,' 
7 August 1956.
220
Canal question, for the time being, but to exercise the 
greatest possible restraint during this time to keep the 
situation on the frontiers with her Arab neighbours 
quiet.'50
The French were not as hesitant. In June, Ben-Gurion 
removed the greatest obstacle to collaboration with France 
against Egypt when he forced the resignation of Foreign 
Minister Sharett, who favoured Israeli cooperation with 
Washington rather than Paris, and replaced him with Golda 
Meir. Within days, the Director-General of the Ministry of 
Defence, Shimon Peres, travelled to France and agreed with 
French Minister of Defence Maurice Bourges-Maunoury upon a 
Franco-Israeli 'preventive' attack against Egypt. Bourges- 
Maunoury authorised the delivery of 72 Mystere IV fighters 
to Israel, including the 24 already cleared with Britain 
and the U.S. and 48 to be supplied without their 
knowledge. On 22 June, Peres, General Dayan, and the Chief 
of Army Intelligence, General Yehoshafat Harkavi, met 
representatives from the French Ministry of Defence and 
intelligence services to confirm the arrangements.51
The day after Nasser's nationalisation, the French 
Chief of the General Staff, General Paul Ely, the Chief of 
the Air Staff, General Maurice Challe, and Colonel Louis 
Mangin, an 'aide' to Bourges-Maunoury who also worked for 
the French foreign intelligence service, SDECE, asked
50 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)10th meeting, 3 August 1956? 
PRO, F0371/119090/JE14211/368G, Lloyd-Elath meeting, 3 
August 1956.
51 Brecher, pp. 264ff.; Moshe Dayan, The Storv of Mv Life 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p. 149; Bar- 
Zohar, Ben-Gurion. pp. 228ff; Matti Golan, Shimon Peres: 
A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp. 
45ff.
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Peres for information on the strength and location of 
Egyptian troops. Ben-Gurion agreed, and Dayan proposed 
three alternative plans: seizure of the Sinai Peninsula, 
the capture of Sharm el-Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf 
of Aqaba, closed by Egypt to Israeli shipping, or 
annexation of the Gaza Strip. Ben-Gurion, fearing Egypt's 
Soviet-made bombers and fighters, said Israel was not 
equipped for war and should await its opportunity to take 
advantage of the Suez Crisis.52
The Israeli military swiftly acted to correct its 
deficiencies. On 7 August, Peres met Bourges-Maunoury, 
Ely, Bourges-Maunoury's chief aide, Abel Thomas, and 
Admiral Pierre Barjot, later the Deputy Commander-in-Chief 
of the Anglo-French military operation against Egypt. 
Bourges-Maunoury asked Peres how long Israeli forces 
needed to reach the Suez Canal. Peres replied, 'Five to 
seven days.' Asked if Israel would work with France, Peres
C
immediately assented.
Eden maintained British pressure on the Americans 
with a letter to Eisenhower on 5 August. He combined 
acceptance of diplomatic steps with a resolution to stand 
firm:
We have... gone to the very limits of the 
concessions which we can make....I have never 
thought Nasser a Hitler, he has no warlike 
people behind him, but the parallel with 
Mussolini is close....The removal of Nasser and
52 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, pp. 149ff; 'Ben-Gurion's 
Diary,' 3 August 1956, in Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe 
Shemesh (eds.), The Suez-Sinai Crisis of 1956: 
Retrospective and Reappraisal (London: Frank Cass, 
1990), p.292.
53 Brecher, p. 264? Golan, p. 48? Abel Thomas, p. 94. See 
also PRO, F0371/118871/JE1073/6G, Paris to Foreign 
Office, Cable 227, 11 August 1956? PRO, PREM11/1100, 
Lloyd-Pineau meeting, 24 August 1956.
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installation in Egypt of a regime less hostile 
to the West must therefore also rank high among 
our objectives.54
The Chiefs of Staff, assuming that they were to
achieve Britain's public objective, the seizure of the
Suez Canal Zone, recommended an assault upon Port Said at
the northern end of the Canal, but Macmillan was committed
to the unstated goal of overthrowing Nasser. Conferring
with Churchill on 5 August, he asserted, 'Surely if we
landed, we must seek out the Egyptian force, destroy them,
and bring down Nasser's government.' The next day,
Churchill wrote to Eden:
I was very glad to hear that there would be no 
weakening about [the invasion of Egypt from]
Libya....On the other side a volte face should 
certainly free our hands about Israel. We should 
want them to menace and hold tl^ e Egyptians and 
not be drawn off against Jordan. 5
On 7 August, the Egypt Committee debated Macmillan's 
proposal for an attack upon Alexandria, Egypt's second- 
largest city, from Libya. Supporters noted that British 
commanders had doubts about a landing in the Canal Zone 
and preferred striking Alexandria if French troops were 
available. Critics pointed to the difficulties of eventual 
operations against Cairo and asserted that an attack on 
Port Said was needed to sustain Britain's public claim 
that her only goal was international control of the Canal. 
Lloyd again tipped the balance, noting that an attack from 
the west upon Alexandria 'would precipitate serious 
political trouble in Libya' and might lead to abrogation
54 PRO, PREM11/1098, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
3568, 5 August 1956.
55 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Volume VIII:
Never Despair. 1945-1965 (London: Heinemann, 1988), pp. 
1203ff.; Horne, p. 403.
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of the Anglo-Libyan Treaty.56
On 9 August, the Committee formally linked diplomatic
and military processes:
Some diplomatic exchanges with the Egyptian 
Government would have to be carried through 
after the end of the Conference... .On the other 
hand, a military operation, once it was mounted, 
could not easily be delayed for more than a few 
days, and, if force was to be applied with 
sufficient speed after a final Egyptian 
rejection of our reasonable demands, the 
preparatory movements must begin at a relatively
early stage ---  some of them, indeed, before the
end of the international conference.
The dilemma for Britain was how to force Nasser's downfall
while retaining the favour of world opinion. The solution
became the cornerstone of British policy:
Any military action against Egypt should be 
launched in retaliation against some aggressive 
or provocative act by the Egyptians... .The 
Government might be compelled to take advantage 
of any provocative act by Egypt, even though it 
came at a time when the proportions for military 
operations were lgjss well-advanced than might 
have been desired.57
The Chiefs of Staff, accepting the Egypt Committee's 
private goal of overthrowing Nasser, now endorsed 
Macmillan's concept of an assault against Alexandria, 
albeit from sea rather than from Libya. An attack on Port 
Said would overcome light Egyptian defences to take 
immediate control of the Canal, but it was a poor starting 
point for an advance into Egypt. Beaches were shallow and 
muddy, and the port facilities were close to the town and 
limited in their capacity for the unloading of troops. The 
march along the Canal on a narrow causeway was hazardous 
and would delay an assault on Cairo.58
56 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)llth meeting, 7 August 1956.
57 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)13th meeting, 9 August 1956.
58 PRO, DEFE32/5, C0S(56)78 C.A., 'Operation MUSKETEER - 
Force Commanders' Outline Plan,' 9 August 1956.
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Alexandria had excellent harbours and good beaches. 
Although Egyptian defences were heavier there than at Port 
Said, they could be 'taken out without difficulty,' and 
the airfield could be quickly occupied. Alexandria was 
also 200 miles closer than Port Said to Malta, the main 
launching point for operations. On 10 August, the Egypt 
Committee approved the plan, and General Sir Charles 
Keightley, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle 
East, was appointed supreme commander of the operation, 
codenamed MUSKETEER.
In Committee discussion, 'serious misgivings were 
expressed about...discussing these details with the French 
military authorities' because 'French security was 
notoriously bad.' Plans for the use of French troops could 
be discussed, provided their destination was not revealed. 
It is not recorded whether the Chiefs of Staff thought 
this policy was realistic.69
As the Committee established its policy of military 
plans supported by a diplomatic pretext for action, the 
Americans tried to convert that pretext into genuine 
negotiations between Britain and Egypt. On 30 July, Nasser 
told U.S. Ambassador Byroade that, while he 'knew he was 
fighting with his back to the wall,' he was anxious not to 
provide a pretext for military action. Egypt would 
compensate the SCC's shareholders and maintain efficient 
operation of the Canal.60 Four days later, Nasser bluntly 
informed Byroade that acceptance of international control 
for the Canal 'would mean a return of colonialism.' He
59 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)14th meeting, 10 August 1956.
60 PRO, F0371/119080/JE14211/89, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1330, 30 July 1956.
225
could not attend the maritime conference, as 'it was clear 
that not only was the agenda fixed but the decisions were 
already made.' Instead, he would sign a new agreement 
guaranteeing international use of the Canal.61
Establishing the link with Byroade, Nasser made his 
views known in Washington and possibly checked American 
support of military action. Nasser also hoped that he 
would receive information of Anglo-French plans from the 
State Department, the U.S. Embassy, and the CIA station. 
Foster Dulles allegedly passed a message to Cairo through 
the Ambassadors of Baghdad Pact countries that 'Eden would 
stop at nothing in order to harm Nasser' and that Egypt 
would be wise to compromise over the Canal.62
Only the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to argue for 
support of Anglo-French military action, but on 8 August, 
Eisenhower blocked initiatives by the U.S. military, 
informing Foster Dulles, 'In the [National Security] 
Council, he welcomes anybody, but in the main he looks to 
[Foster Dulles] for judgement in political matters and to 
the military for various consequences.' Eisenhower wrote 
in his diary that force under extreme circumstances might 
be necessary, but 'if Nasser were to prove (1) that Egypt 
could operate the Canal and (2) would indicate an 
intention to abide by the Treaty of 1888, then it would be 
nearly impossible for the U.S. ever to find real 
justification, legally or morally, for use of force.' The
61 PRO, F0371/119086/JE14211/281, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1414, 4 August 1956. See also USNA, RG 59, CDF, 
974.7301/8-656, Cairo to State Department, Cable 272, 6 
August 1956.
62 Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, p. 100.
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NSC meeting endorsed this position on 9 August.63
Makins believed that if Britain and the U.S.
cooperated on non-military measures, Nasser's control of
the Canal could be blocked. On 10 August, the Ambassador
met Arthur Flemming, the Director of the Office of Defence
Mobilisation, about the supply of American oil to Britain
in an emergency. Letters were despatched to U.S. oil
companies enlisting their cooperation, and a meeting was
set for 15 August.64
Makins optimistically reported that Eisenhower's
decision to summon Congressional leaders to Washington,
possibly to consider a special Congressional session, was
'a convincing demonstration of the gravity with which the
Administration view the situation.' Foster Dulles
confirmed to certain journalists, off-the-record, that the
U.S. was prepared to provide oil to Europe and might
finance part of the cost. At a press conference on 8
August, the President fulfilled Makins' request to
emphasize the seriousness of the situation, although he
then stressed:
I can't conceive of military force being a good 
solution, certainly under considerations as we 
know them now, and in view of our hopes that 
things are going to be settled 
peacefully....Here is something that is so
important to the whole world that I think a 
little sober second thinking is going to prevail 
in a good many quarters.65
63 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Anderson to Foster Dulles, 8 August 1956? 
DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 17, August 
1956 Diary, Eisenhower diary entry, 8 August 1956? DDE, 
Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, ?, ?th 
NSC meeting, 9 August 1956
64 PRO, PREM11/1099, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
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65 PRO, F0371/119260/JE15310/3, Washington to Foreign 
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Makins' assessment was astute. Eisenhower, in an
election year, and Foster Dulles, fearing renewed attempts
to curb executive control of foreign policy, were unable
and unwilling to act without Congressional authority.66
The Administration was also concerned that the status of
the Panama Canal, controlled by the U.S. under a treaty
with the Panamanian Government, might be questioned if
international control was sought for the Suez Canal. Using
the 1888 Constantinople Convention as the basis for an
international conference, Foster Dulles hoped to
distinguish Suez from Panama, since the latter had never
been regulated by international agreement.67
Eden was in no mood to be patient. On 8 August,
broadcasting on television and radio, he directly
challenged Nasser:
We cannot agree that an act of plunder which 
threatens the livelihood of many nations shall 
be allowed to succeed, and we must make sure 
that the life of the great trading nations of 
the world cannot, in the future, be strangled at 
any moment by some interruption to the free 
passage of the Canal....Our quarrel is not with 
Egypt, still less wjJth the Arab world? it is 
with Colonel Nasser. 8
Makins reported that the speech was 'thought to have 
clarified the issues very well and to have hit just about 
the right note.' Ambassador Jebb wrote from Paris, 
'Everybody thought it first-class.' In a British Gallup 
poll of 10 August, 74 percent of respondents favoured the
66 See DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Ann Whitman Diary, Box 8, 
August 1956 Diary, Ann Whitman diary entry, 12 August 
1956? Neff, p. 292.
67 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 16, August 
1956 Press Conferences, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 8 
August 1956. See also DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, 
White House Memoranda, Chronological, Box 5, Foster 
Dulles memorandum, 14 August 1956.
68 Rhodes James, p. 492? Love, p. 395? Eden, p. 444.
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freezing of Egyptian assets in Britain, and 65 percent 
approved of the military preparations.69
Any British optimism was misguided. Makins overlooked 
the American press, which highlighted the Eisenhower 
Administration's role as peacemaker. In a veiled attack on 
Eden, the Washington Post praised Eisenhower's press 
conference of 8 August as a 'calm expression of hope...in 
marked contrast to some of the exhibitions of muscle- 
flexing abroad.' At home, Gaitskell wrote Eden that 
nationalisation was 'only a threat not, in my opinion, 
justifying retaliation by war.' While most British people 
polled by Gallup favoured steps short of force, only 33 
percent endorsed military action.70
Most importantly, Eden's challenge to Nasser exposed 
the charade of British efforts at a diplomatic settlement. 
Nasser had informed Byroade and the Indian Ambassador that 
Egypt would call its own international meeting. After 
Eden's speech, Nasser could publicly claim that he 'had 
been inclined to accept the invitation to the London 
Conference because he was sure of Egypt's rights but to 
accept the invitation would now be against Egypt's dignity 
owing to the military threats and the Prime Minister's 
announcement that he did not trust Nasser.'71
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The Eden speech did strengthen Anglo-French ties. The 
British finally agreed that French commanders could be 
given full details of military plans, provided Mollet and 
Bourges-Maunoury were the only French politicians to
• # . 77receive the information. *
After three days of talks between Ambassador Jebb and 
French officials, it was agreed that military operations 
would seek free passage through the Canal and a 
'democratic, non-militarist Government' in Egypt. France 
agreed to discourage Israel 'by all possible means' from 
attacking its neighbours and to accept the Baghdad Pact, 
although 'very great prudence should be exercised in 
seeking to extend its membership,' a reference to Syria
71and the Lebanon.
All that remained was confirmation of the military 
arrangements. Eden did not raise the issue in Cabinet on 
14 August. Some Ministers, searching for alternatives, 
introduced OMEGA and Makins' idea of non-military 
measures:
The effect of any economic sanctions would...be 
greatly increased if the United States were 
prepared to cooperate. The main objective should 
be to ensure that it was made apparent to the 
Egyptian people that Colonel Nasser's action had 
failed to fulfill his promises of improving 
their standard of living. If Colonel Nasser 
could be discredited in this way in the eyes of 
his own and other Arab peoples, a reaction might 
quickly set in.
Eden, without going into details, continued to emphasize
the military option:
72 PRO, F0371/118871/JE1073/File.
73 PRO, PREM11/1099, E.C.(56)18, Staff Conference of 11 
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Agreement to pay all [Canal] dues to a blocked 
account... should quickly cause Colonel Nasser 
to lose prestige. If he were to retaliate by 
stopping shipping from using the Canal or by 
taking action against the employees of the Suez 
Canal Company, a new situation would have arisen 
which would warrant use of force against 
Egypt.74
The Prime Minister waited until the Egypt Committee 
in the afternoon to present a timetable for military 
action, drafted by Cabinet Secretary Brook. Brook assumed 
the completion of the London Conference by 23 August, 
rejection of the Conference proposals by Egypt on 5 
September, sailing of the assault force from the United 
Kingdom on 7 September, and the landing in Egypt on 20 
September. Acutely aware of the need for a pretext, Eden 
suggested postponing the military timetable five to six 
days to ensure all necessary diplomatic steps had been 
taken.75
The strain was beginning to affect Eden, who exploded 
at headlines in the tabloids and berated Foreign Office 
officials for statements such as 'we believe in peace.' 
Suffering recurrent pain from his bungled gall bladder 
operation of 1953, Eden took Pethidin, commonly given to 
women in childbirth, during the worst of the attacks. 
Clark, noting that Eden's doctor was also giving the Prime 
Minister various placebos, wrote, 'Certainly [Eden] 
remains pretty easily triggered and Clarissa does her best 
to set him off at every turn.'76 Frederick Bishop, Eden's 
Private Secretary, returned from Chequers to tell Clark 
'of terrible tantrums over the weekend [of 11 August] with
74 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.59(56), 14 August 1956.
75 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)15th meeting, 14 August 1956.
76 AP, AP20/1, Eden diary, August 1956? William Clark 
Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 22/8/56.
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him slamming the door and PM bouncing out of bed to shout
at him.' Richard Powell, the Permanent Undersecretary at
the Ministry of Defence, later recalled:
[Eden] was very jumpy, very nervous, very 
wrought up....He regarded almost the destiny of 
the world as resting on his shoulders....I had 
to have a scrambler telephone installed in my 
flat so that he could ring me up and talk about 
these things.
William Dickson, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, said
that he 'had never been spoken to in his life in the way
the PM several times spoke to him.' Commonwealth Secretary
Home later admitted:
We were under extreme pressure, and the pressure 
wasn't of course lessened because the Prime 
Minister was not undoubtedly well. The meetings 
were probably not methodically conducted as they 
would have been in times of lesser stress. 7
The tension spilled over into conflict with the
British Broadcasting Corporation. Even before the Suez
Crisis, the Eden Government was considering measures to
exercise control over the BBC.78 The Prime Minister was
extremely angry when the BBC refused a broadcast by
Australian Prime Minister Menzies, as this would mean
three pro-Government broadcasts without Opposition reply.
The Corporation relented after a call from Clark warning
that Eden might 'take some drastic action which would be
permanently harmful to the BBC.' Eden asked Clark to stop
transmission of a program on 15 August featuring Salah
Salem, the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, but the
Press Secretary replied this was impossible. The next day,
Eden wrote Sir Alexander Cadogan, chairman of the BBC
77 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 8 August 
1956? British Broadcasting Corporation Radio Four, A 
Canal Too Far (1987), interview with Lord Home.
78 See PRO, CAB134/1215, PR(56)9th meeting, 25 July 1956.
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Board of Governors and former Permanent Undersecretary of
the Foreign Office:
Of course, the Government have no intention of 
interfering with the freedom of the BBC to try 
and reflect, as well as educate, public opinion 
in this country, but I hope that the Governors 
will bear in mind the very heavy responsibility 
which rests on the BBC at this crucial time.
Clark recorded, 'Other ministers, including the Chancellor
and the Colonial Secretary [Alan Lennox-Boyd], are even
fiercer [than Eden] and are looking up the rules to see
how they could control broadcasting.' The immediate crisis
passed with a meeting between Eden and Ian Jacob, the
Director-General of the BBC, on 17 August, but Kirkpatrick
warned Jacob that Ministers were considering 'governmental
control in the Overseas Services and...the curtailment of
the £5 million grant in aid of the BBC and its expenditure
in other propaganda enterprises.'^9
Three weeks after Nasser's nationalisation, Britain
was no closer to an effective riposte. Immediate military
action could not be carried out, and effective punishment
of Egypt required American support. Ministers recognised
that Foster Dulles' vision of Egypt 'disgorging' the Canal
relied upon diplomatic procedures and the formation of an
international coalition, but 'hawks' like Eden and
Macmillan were unwilling to set aside the military option.
The more Eden insisted to Eisenhower that military
measures were necessary, the more the President sought a
compromise to prevent bloodshed. by 14 August, the
79 Grace Wyndham-Goldie, Facing the Nation: Television and 
Politics. 1936-1976 (London: The Bodley Head, 1977), p. 
178? Clark, pp. 174ff.? PRO, PREM11/1089A/ File? Peter 
Partner, Arab Voices: The BBC Arabic Service. 1938-1988 
(London: BBC, 1988), p. 101. See also Gilbert, p. 1208.
President was suggesting a 'supervisory board of five 
persons designated by such countries as Egypt, France, 
India, and Sweden, who would have a voice in the selection 
of a general manager who would be in charge of Canal 
operations.' Foster Dulles replied that the idea was 'in 
line with my thinking.... It might even be necessary to 
minimise the role of Britain and France, assuming 
dependable alternatives could be found.'80
80 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 5, Foster Dulles memorandum, 14 
August 1956.
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CHAPTER 10
15 AUGUST-3 SEPTEMBER 1956: WASHINGTON'S LEASH UPON LONDON
At the London Conference, Foster Dulles again
assuaged British sensibilities without deferring to
British policy. He dismissed press reports that he and
Eisenhower told Congressional leaders that the U.S. would
accept an international body with 'advisory,' not
controlling, powers and expressed concern 'at the
suggestions in some U.S. papers that there was a
difference between the U.K. and U.S. positions.' After
lunch with Foster Dulles, Eden wrote in his diary:
Foster seemed quite as firm as before and ready 
to table the [tripartite] resolution himself. He 
also seemed not to exclude possibility of joint 
use of force.
Foster Dulles' sympathy allowed Eden to cling to the 
hope that the U.S. would accept London's plans. He 
reported to the Egypt Committee on 16 August that Foster 
Dulles 'had implied that [the U.S.] recognised the 
possibility that force might be used in the last resort, 
since he had asked whether we will be ready to justify 
such action before the United Nations.' Military 
preparations would not be postponed, despite indications 
that Nasser would not give the necessary pretext for the 
use of force.2
Lloyd's cooperation and Eden's complacency led Foster 
Dulles to conclude that the American view was prevailing 
with Britain. He cabled Eisenhower:
1 Rhodes James, p. 501? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/8- 
1656, London to State Department, Cable SECTO 5, 16 
August 1956.
2 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)16th meeting, 16 August 1956.
235
There is, I think, a growing realization of 
magnitude of the task of military intervention 
and of the inadequacy of their military 
establishments to take on a real fighting job of 
this size....I do not mean to imply that they 
may not take the plunge if things go badly here, 
but they are much less apt to do so than two 
weeks ago.3
The atmosphere of Anglo-American agreement, based
upon mutual misunderstanding, continued when the London
Conference opened on 16 August. Introducing the
resolution, Foster Dulles contended that Egypt's
nationalisation violated the 1888 Constantinople
Convention because it denied the international character
of the waterway. He proposed that a new Convention
establish an international body, with Egyptian
representation, to control the Canal's operation. Egypt's
sovereign rights would be recognised, and it would be
guaranteed a fair return in Canal revenues.4
The fundamental difference between Britain and the
U.S. soon resurfaced. Hosting Foster Dulles at dinner on
18 August, Macmillan stated:
There are only three choices: (1) Nasser
voluntarily takes a proposal along lines of U.S. 
paper or (2) we compel Egypt to take it? (3) we 
accept Nasser's refusal. In the last event, 
Britain is finished, and, so far as I am 
concerned, I will have no part in it and will 
resign.
Eden warned Foster Dulles the next evening that 'he had 
suspended military preparations during...the Conference
3 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August 
1956 (2), London to State Department, Cable DULTE 1, 16 
August 1956.
4 Lloyd, pp. 115ff.; Rhodes James, p. 501; Macmillan, 
Riding the Storm, p. 107? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, 
Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August 1956 (2), London to State 
Department, Cable DULTE 4, 16 August 1956.
5 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August 
1956 (1), London to State Department, Cable DULTE 10, 18 
August 1956. See also Horne, p. 393.
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but further action could not long be delayed.'6
Macmillan claimed that Foster Dulles 'really agreed 
with our position.' In fact, Foster Dulles commented, 
'Support [in Britain] for a strong line has dwindled to a 
point where if Nasser rejects, the Macmillan policy can 
scarcely be carried through and...some form of a
. • 7governmental crisis may result.''
Eisenhower worried that insistence upon international 
control of the Canal might bring a breakdown in 
negotiations and British use of force. He again proposed a 
body with supervisory capacity. Nasser could appoint the 
operations manager of the Canal, who would be approved by 
an international board of directors. In effect, Eisenhower 
was supporting a plan presented by the Indian delegation
o ,
to the Conference on 17 August. Foster Dulles replied 
that it would be 'very difficult and perhaps impossible' 
to get Britain and France to abandon the concept of an 
'international operating authority.' Eisenhower finally 
conceded the argument, writing that he 'merely hoped that 
negotiations would not collapse over detail of operating 
arrangements.'9
The tripartite proposal for international control of 
the Canal was accepted by 18 of the 22 delegations on 23 
August. India, Ceylon, Indonesia and the Soviet Union
6 USNA, RG 59, Lot 62 D 11, Suez Conference Files, Box 1, 
Foster Dulles-Eden meeting, 19 August 1956.
7 Horne, p. 408? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, 
Box 5, August 1956 (1), London to State Department,
Cable DULTE 12, 19 August 1956.
8 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August
1956 (1), Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 19 August 1956.
9 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August
1956 (1), London to State Department, Cable DULTE 17, 20
August 1956.
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opposed the plan, but Foster Dulles thought the support of
18 countries 'a more impressive result than we
anticipated.'10
The British left the conference with mixed feelings.
They obtained substantial backing for the principle of
international control of the Canal, which would not be
sacrificed in negotiations with Egypt. On the other hand,
the 18-Power Plan could only serve as a pretext for force
if the U.S. endorsed military action when Nasser rejected
the proposals. Eden, certain of American support on 16
August, was unsure after dinner with Foster Dulles three
days later. He told the Egypt Committee that Foster Dulles
'was not in favour of provoking Colonel Nasser into taking
further action which would justify the use of military
force' nor would U.S. troops join an operation because
'the U.S. Government could not justify going to war over
oil in the Middle East.' Eden insisted on misconstruing
Foster Dulles' words to sustain the illusion of American
backing for force:
Mr. Dulles had warned the Soviet Foreign 
Minister that the U.S. Government would not 
stand by if the U.K. and France were involved in 
a war, which suggested that, in the event of 
hostilities, the U.S. would at last materially 
help.'11
The Egypt Committee, noting the conclusions of a 
Treasury working party, acknowledged that Britain could 
not administer unilateral economic sanctions against 
Egypt, as the Egyptians could retaliate by closing the 
Suez Canal and Arab countries might interfere with oil
10 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, August 
1956 (1), London to State Department, Cable DULTE 22, 22 
August 1956.
11 PRO, CAB134/126, E.C.(56)18th, 20 August 1956.
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pipelines. However, the U.S. would not join Britain. In a 
'very unsatisfactory' talk with Macmillan, Foster Dulles 
said the U.S. Government would not advise American-owned 
ships to withhold dues from the Egyptian Canal Authority, 
and the State Department had no authority over U.S. ships 
operating under Liberian or Panamanian flags. Foster 
Dulles told Eden on 19 August, '[There was] little more 
that the U.S. Government could do in the way of exerting 
economic pressure.'
Foster Dulles' hesitancy stemmed from division within 
the Eisenhower Administration. Secretary of the Treasury 
Humphrey opposed measures which interfered with American 
markets and only agreed to block Egyptian assets after 
Foster Dulles argued that the funds were needed to offset 
the claims of American shipowners forced to pay to Cairo.
v
If Foster Dulles asked for payment of dues into a 
'blocked account,' rather than to Cairo, Humphrey would 
argue that the freezing of Egyptian assets was no longer 
justified.
Eden presented his dilemma to the Cabinet on 21
August:
Care would have to be taken to avoid giving the 
impression that the [Menzies] Committee [taking 
the 18-Power Plan to Cairo] were prepared to 
negotiate with the Egyptian Government....They 
would... have the function of bringing pressure 
to bear on the Egyptians to accept the 
declaration of principle as a basis for the 
subsequent negotiation of a treaty.
Pressure depended upon American enforcement of the Plan,
however, and Foster Dulles 'seemed at present to be
reluctant to contemplate any further financial or economic
12 PRO, T236/4625, Macmillan memorandum, 17 August 1956? 
PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)18th meeting, 20 August 1956.
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pressures on Egypt.' when Lloyd asked that evening what
should be done if Nasser rejected the proposals, Foster
Dulles requested discussions 'without commitment' because
'the economic problems that would be raised were of a very
complicated nature.
After the Conference, Lloyd tried again, telling
Foster Dulles:
Colonel Nasser.. .would look like a fool if he 
could not lay his hands on any dues. The result 
would probably be that he would stop ships going 
through the Canal.
Foster Dulles objected:
If pressure to bear on Colonel Nasser meant that 
our ships would have to go around the Cape, this 
would result in a serious loss of revenue, 
Western Europe would be deprived of oil, and the 
price would go up....[The Administration] were 
prepared to use their influence with the oil 
companies to send tankers around the 
Cape...[but] it would be impossible to take any 
of these measures without preparing public 
opinion in the U.S. 4
Some Ministers began to consider the unthinkable:
acting without the U.S. A paper by the Egypt (Official)
Committee defined the first objective as a new Egyptian
Government. While 'some difficulty [might] be experienced
in finding competent Ministers,' a large number 'of
formerly prominent and able figures, not necessarily of
marked party affiliation,' were dissatisfied with Nasser.
Press Secretary Clark commented:
[I] read [the paper] with some cold shivers....I 
still find it quite impossible to believe that 
we really shall do all this.15
13 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.60(56), 21 August 1956? PRO, 
PREM11/1099, Lloyd-Foster Dulles meeting, 21 August 
1956.
14 PRO, PREM11/1099, Lloyd-Foster Dulles-Pineau meeting, 
23 August 1956.
15 PRO, PREM11/1100, E.C.(56)28, 'Egypt: Military 
Planning,' 20 August 1956? Clark, p. 177.
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The Information Research Department, technically in 
the Foreign Office but working closely with the 
intelligence services, emphasized the use of radio to 
destabilise Nasser's regime. While Britain's network of 
Middle Eastern radio stations openly provided 
'information' supporting the British case over Suez, 
British and French 'black' stations began broadcasting 
'disinformation' into Egypt on 28 July. A 'Free Egyptian' 
station, transmitting from France, operated on a frequency 
close to that of the Voice of the Arabs.16 Israeli 
monitors detected covert broadcasts, suspecting they were 
coming from the British colony of Aden. The Foreign 
Office's Archibald Ross, overseeing British operations 
with the Permanent Undersecretary's Department, confirmed 
that the station was in Aden, although he would not admit 
the station was British-run.17 At home, the IRD supplied 
the BBC with material on Nasser.18
All that remained was a pretext for military action. 
The Lord President, Salisbury, told Macmillan, 'It must, I 
feel, now be for the Foreign Office to produce one 
[provocation] which is likely to exasperate Nasser to such 
an extent that he does something to give us an excuse for 
marching in.' A group of Ministers suggested removing 
munitions from the Suez Canal Base, which was still 
overseen by British 'technicians,' but six weeks were
16 Nutting. Nasser. D. 152: PRO, F0953/1659/PB1045/100, 
Dodds-Parker minute, 3 August 1956. See also USNA, RG 
59, CDF, 974.7301/8-2256, State Department to London, 
Cable TOSEC 45, 22 August 1956.
17 PRO, F0953/1659/PB1045/99, Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, 
Cable 343, 3 August 1956, and subsequent minutes. See 
also USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.00(WJ/9-656, SANA to State 
Department, Despatch 189, 6 September 1956.
18 Author's interview with Norman Reddaway.
needed to move the supplies, since the Egyptians were
responsible for the transportation. On 22 August, the
Egypt Committee delayed the target date for military
action four days to 19 September.19
The question of proceeding with military action now
provoked divisions within the British Cabinet. Macmillan's
avid leadership of the 'hawks' was already raising
suspicion. w Clark recorded that Commonwealth Secretary
Home was firm about the need for force but...
...regretted (and [I] think [Cabinet Secretary]
Brook does too) the hurry with which the PM 
pushed that vital decision through Cabinet 
without time for a proper discussion. In fact, I 
gathered the whole Cabinet is a bit weak and 
searching almost desperately for a moral basis 
for action. In particular RAB [Lord Privy Seal 
R.A. Butler] is discouraged by the whole outlook 
and has come back from holiday a very damp 
influence. The worst part is the thought of 
bombing which may really revolt the conscience 
of the nation but which is, he [Home] says, 
necessary to control [Egypt].
Home was also concerned about Commonwealth opinion:
Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey was 'bending
over backwards to avoid being taken' for the British,
'Canada was terribly wobbly, and India, including [Prime
• t 91Minister] Nehru, as bad as could be.'*A
While Home wrote Eden of Butler's concern 'that we 
have got ourselves into a position where we should press 
the button before we have a moral basis for action which 
will carry conviction in the country, the Free World, and 
the Conservative Party,' the Prime Minister wrote Minister 
of Housing Duncan Sandys, who questioned the Cabinet's
19 Horne, p. 427? PRO, W032/16709, Key to Head, 21 August 
1956? PRO, CAB134/1216, E .C.(56)19th meeting, 22 August 
1956.
20 See Clark, p. 178.
21 Clark, p. 179.
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exclusion from discussion of military operations:
Knowledge of these details must, for obvious 
reasons of security, be confined within the 
narrowest possible circle. Such political 
guidance as the military authorities may need in 
the preparation of their plans must continue to 
be given by me, in consultations with a small 
number of my most senior Cabinet colleagues and, 
as necessary, such Departmental Ministers as may 
be concerned.22
If doubts were limited to Ministers outside the Egypt 
Committee, Eden might continued to circumvent the Cabinet. 
The Prime Minister faced a revolt within the Committee, 
however, when Minister of Defence Monckton rowed with the 
'hawks' on 24 August. Discussing the diplomatic and 
military timetable, Lloyd noted that U.N. deliberations 
could only begin about 4-5 September after Nasser rejected 
the 18-Power Plan. Minister of War Antony Head noted the 
consequences: since the Security Council's conclusions
might not be known until 11 September, the 17-day interval 
between the decision for military action and and the 
beginning of the attack meant another delay in D-day from 
19 September to 28 September.23
Eden and Macmillan asked for a commitment that 
Nasser's rejection of the 18-Power Plan and the Security 
Council's support of international control of the Canal 
would be sufficient for the use of force. Moreover, the 
Committee could order military operations before the 
Council's decision was announced, reducing the gap between 
U.N. action and D-day.24 Monckton was aghast that the 'PM 
and Chancellor were trying to rush things through....He
22 PRO, PREM11/1152, Home to Eden and Eden to Sandys, 22 
August 1956.
23 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)21st, 24 August 1956.
24 Ibid.
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could not agree to press the button now, which made war 
inevitable.' Eden, 'strongly supported' by Macmillan, 
Salisbury, and Home 'took the view that [Britain] had no 
alternative. We must secure the defeat of Nasser, by one 
method or another.' The hawks triumphed. Although the 
Committee did not commit itself to invasion of Egypt after 
the U.N. discussions, it asked Monckton to work with Head 
and the Chiefs of Staff to deploy forces in the 
Mediterranean, decreasing the 17-day interval between 
political decision and military action.25
Monckton had been isolated in the Committee. Clark 
concluded that Eden and Macmillan had 'made [Monckton] 
feel very low, no longer essential, and he will have to go 
when the crisis is over.' Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd 
wrote Eden:
I remain firmly convinced that if Nasser wins, 
or even appears to win, we might as well as a 
government (and indeed as a Country) go out of 
business....I was horrified by the doubts 
expressed by the Minister of Defence.26
However, members of the Committee urged Eden to
obtain Cabinet support, since Monckton's alliance with
Butler, the senior Minister outside the Committee, and
discontented junior ministers could produce a rebellion.
Home wrote:
Even before Walter's outburst at our Committee 
this morning, I had thought that I had better 
warn you that I see a definite wavering in the 
attitude of some of our colleagues towards the 
use of force....[Minister of Agriculture] Derry 
Amory, for instance, who is one of the most 
stable of our colleagues, feels the deepest 
anxieties, but I think would be ready to face up
25 Clark, p. 180; PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)21st, 24 
August 1956.
26 Clark, p. 180; PRO, PREM11/1152, Lennox-Boyd to Eden, 
24 August 1956.
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to it if all the processes of UNO had been 
exhausted....The anxiety of some, Rab for 
instance, might be removed if we didn't have to 
go on thinking in terms of button-pushing and 
dates and had plenty of time for diplomatic 
manoeuvre. 7
Salisbury, who favoured a token appeal to the U.N.
followed by military action, advised the Prime Minister:
Both you and I knew that [Monckton] had, for 
some time, had doubts about a firm policy over 
Suez, but I suspect that there will be a measure 
of support for his views when the Cabinet meets 
on Tuesday [28 August]. Rab is clearly not 
happy, and I gather... that he has been making 
enquiries and finds there are quite a number of 
others, especially among the younger members of 
the Cabinet, who have not yet made up their 
minds.28
Brook gave Eden an 'intelligence report':
The Cabinet are...agreed that we must stop 
[Nasser's] action at all costs and that, in the 
last resort, if all other methods fail, we must 
be able to show that we have made an honest 
effort to reach settlement by peaceful means and 
have exhausted all the 'other methods.
The division lay between Ministers who favoured
postponement of force until genuine negotiations were
exhausted and those who wished to use the diplomatic
process to establish a pretext for invasion. Among the
former were...:
...W.M. [Monckton], RAB, Selkirk, Chief Whip 
[Edward Heath]...Kilmuir (?), [Minister of 
Labour Ian] MacLeod, Amory (?) . The unknown 
quantities might be J.S. [James Stuart, 
Secretary of State for Scotland], B-H [Minister 
of Works Patrick Buchan-Hepburn], and D.E.
[Minister of Education David Eccles]. The rest I 
would expect to be pretty solid.
While suspect in places Kilmuir was actually a firm
supporter of force --  the analysis was generally
27 PRO, PREM11/1152, Home to Eden, 24 August 1956.
28 PRO, PREM11/1152, Salisbury to Eden, 24 August 1956.
See also AP, AP20/33, Salisbury to Eden, 24 August 1956.
245
correct.29
The issue was complicated when a split occurred among 
Ministers seeking a pretext for military measures. Lloyd, 
increasingly concerned with the need for American support 
'at the highest level,' insisted upon the approach to the 
U.N. If Britain delayed, the Soviet Union would probably 
ask the Council to prevent Anglo-French use of force, and 
moderate opinion at home and abroad required appeasement. 
Eden was sceptical, fearing that opponents of Anglo-French 
action would protract the discussions. Instead, he 
suggested tabling the issue in NATO, a safe audience for 
Britain. The Egypt Committee finally authorised Lloyd to 
confer with the U.S. and France about the U.N. approach, 
as Eden probably accepted Salisbury's suggestion of 
linking the Council's decision with military action.30
Eden cleverly used the Committee's decision to seize 
the initiative in the Cabinet on 28 August, obtaining 
agreement that Britain would approach the Security Council 
'if the support of the U.S. and others was assured.' Lloyd 
then asked that the Government not advise pilots to leave 
the Egyptian Canal Authority, despite the Suez Canal 
Company's wishes for a stoppage on 7 September.
With these conciliatory moves, the 'hawks' won one 
tactical victory. They earned a second by introducing 
military action as a defensive move against Egypt. 
Macmillan presented a Treasury paper which concluded that 
the costs of military preparations (£12 million through
29 PRO, PREM11/1152, Brook to Eden, 25 August 1956.
30 PRO, PREM11/1100, Lloyd minute, 'The U.N. and Suez,' 
undated, and Eden to Lloyd, 26 August 1956; PRO, 
CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)22nd meeting, 27 August 1956.
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September 1956 and £25 million each subsequent year) and
military action (up to £100 million) were small compared
to the cost of a cutoff of British oil through the Suez
Canal and Middle Eastern pipelines.
Monckton, using arguments similar to those of the
Americans, counterattacked:
If together with the French, we took military 
measures against Egypt, our action would be 
condemned by a substantial body of public 
opinion in countries overseas, including several 
of the independent countries of the 
Commonwealth. Within the United Kingdom, opinion 
would be divided. Our vital interests in other 
parts of the Middle East would also be affected; 
we must, in particular, expect sabotage against 
oil installations in other Arab countries. 
Moreover, once we had sent military forces into 
Egypt, it would not be easy to extract them; we 
might find ourselves saddled with a costly 
commitment.
Salisbury, however, used the decision to appeal to the
U.N. to steer a course between Macmillan and Monckton:
[If] we were satisfied that the success of 
Colonel Nasser's policy would undermine our 
national economy and destroy our influence as 
world Power, we should be resolved to take 
whatever action was necessary to defeat that 
policy....Before any military measures were 
taken, we should have recourse to the procedures 
of the United Nations, but if the United Nations 
failed to secure international justice, it would 
have failed to fulfill its purpose.
Butler, who might have led a movement against force, was
cautious, saying only, '[The Egypt Committee] should be
able to show that, before resorting to force, they had
taken all practicable steps to secure a satisfactory
settlement by peaceful means.'
Eden had obtained Cabinet deference to the Egypt
Committee. He summarised:
It was evident that the Cabinet was united in 
the view that the frustration of Colonel 
Nasser's policy was a vital British interest
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which must be secured, in the last resort, by 
the use of force. He fully recognised that, 
before recourse was had to force, every 
practicable attempt should be made to secure a 
satisfactory settlement by peaceful means, and 
it must be made clear to the public, both here 
and overseas, that no effort to this end had 
been spared. At the same time, we could not 
afford to allow these efforts to impose an undue 
delay.31
The Egypt Committee later agreed to a new D-day of 26 
September.32
The question remained whether Britain could act 
without the Americans, who were secretly pursuing a 
solution through King Saud of Saudi Arabia. On 23 August, 
Eisenhower's envoy, Robert Anderson, met King Saud and the 
Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Feisal, in Riyadh. Asking 
the Saudis to urge Nasser's acceptance of international 
control of the Canal, Anderson threatened that 
nationalisation of the Canal could render 'Saudi Arabia's 
petroleum worthless, as the U.S. would help Europe develop 
nuclear energy as an alternative to oil. Feisal dismissed 
the idea as impossible and warned that the Saudis would 
not tolerate Anglo-French action with Israel against 
Egypt.33 Despite Anderson's failure, the Americans 
encouraged Saudi mediation, with Eisenhower and Saud 
exchanging messages throughout September and October and 
the King sending his close adviser, Yusuf Yassin, to Cairo 
to meet Nasser.34
31 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.62(56), 28 August 1956.
32 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)23rd, 28 August 1956.
33 U.S. DDRS, US87 000570? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, 
International, Box 42, Saudi Arabia, King Saud 1952-1956 
(3), Eisenhower to Saud, 20 August 1956? Eveland, pp. 
209ff.? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, 
August 1956 (1), Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 31 August 
1956.
34 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301 Series, State Department to 
Jedda, Cable 180, 10 September 1956, and Cable 199, 19
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On 27 August, Eden played the Communist card, writing 
Eisenhower:
I have no doubt that the Bear [the Soviet Union] 
is using Nasser, with or without his knowledge, 
to further his immediate aims...first to 
dislodge the West from the Middle East and 
second to get a foothold in Africa so as to 
dominate that Continent in turn....This policy 
is clearly aimed at Wheelus Field [U.S. air base 
in Libya] and Habbaniya [Iraqi air base used by 
Britain] as well as at our oil supplies.
All this makes me more than ever sure that 
Nasser must not be allowed to get away with it 
this time. 5
Eden's rhetoric no longer affected the
Administration. On 30 August, Foster Dulles used the
Communist threat to justify American opposition to force:
Regrettable as it might be to see Nasser's 
prestige enhanced even temporarily, I did not 
believe the situation was one which should be 
resolved by force....[Britain and France] would 
make bitter enemies of the entire population of 
the Middle East and much of Africa. Everywhere 
they would be compelled to maintain themselves 
by force, and in the end their own economy would 
be weakened virtually beyond repair and the 
influence of the West in the Middle East and 
most of Africa lost for a generation, if not a 
century. The Soviet Union would reap the benefit 
of a greatly weakened Western Europe and would 
move into a position of predominant influence in 
the Middle East and Africa.
The President, Foster Dulles recorded, 'entirely agreed
with me in this basic analysis... .This was not the issue
upon which to try to downgrade Nasser.'36
At the NSC, Admiral Radford made one last attempt at
American support for Anglo-French military action, but
Eisenhower concluded, 'The limit of what we can consider
doing now is to take the necessary steps to prevent the
enlargement of the war if it immediately breaks out.'
September 1956.
35 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eden to Eisenhower, 27 August 1956.
36 U.S. DDRS, US85 000276.
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Significantly, he decided that the recall of Congress in
special session was unnecessary.37
Replying to Eden's letter on 3 September, Eisenhower,
using Foster Dulles' draft, agreed 'that the underlying
purpose of [Soviet] policy in this problem is to undermine
the Western position in the Near East and Africa and to
weaken the Western nations at home,' but he added:
I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point 
onward our views on the situation 
diverge....Even now military preparations and 
civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem 
to be solidifying support for Nasser which had 
been shaken in many important quarters....I must 
tell you frankly that American public opinion 
flatly rejects the thought of using force, 
particularly when it does not seem that every 
possible peaceful means of protecting our vital 
interests has been exhausted without result.38
Eden had no reason to misinterpret this unambiguous
position, but he continued to delude himself. 'Racing
back, almost in despair,' from his vacation home in
Broadchalke to London, he insisted, 'U.S. was in favour of
our continued moves.... Foster advocated going on.' The
Prime Minister 'expressed horror' when Loy Henderson, the
U.S representative on the Menzies Committee presenting the
18-Power plan to Nasser, said he was leaving for Cairo on
31 August, a 24-hour delay in the British diplomatic and
military timetable.39
The Americans were not the only irritant for Eden.
Oliver Poole, the Chairman of the Conservative Party,
37 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
7, 295th NSC meeting, 30 August 1956.
38 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eisenhower to Eden, 3 September 1956.
39 Clark, p. 183; PRO, PREM11/1100, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1761, 29 August 1956, and DeZulueta 
minute, 28 August 1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/8- 
2856, London to State Department, Cable 1131, 28 August 
1956.
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informed Eden that 'an increasing number of people became
less prepared to support armed intervention' as time went
on. Poole concluded:
The fact is that the majority of people in this 
country want the best of both worlds. They want 
negotiations with Nasser to end in a diplomatic 
victory for this country with as much loss of 
face to Nasser as possible and with a solution 
to the control of the Suez Canal which will be 
acceptable to Great Britain and France, and at 
the same time, they are unwilling to take the 
final step of military intervention, 
particularly if this is to be done by Great 
Britain on her own.
Although 59 percent of the respondents in a Gallup poll of
31 August approved of the Government's handling of the
situation, the poll did not determine if the approval was
of military steps or negotiations.40
On the other hand, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id
still hoped that Britain could...
...see the matter through, using force if 
necessary, but in such a way that Nasser would 
be obliged either to give in or to fire the 
first shot....It was life or death for the West 
as well as Nasser.
Nuri's statements were repeated by Crown Prince Abdul-
Illah. Eden circulated copies of the Iraqi comments to
Cabinet members, commenting, 'All this points to our
having little time in hand.'41 MI6 also persisted with
plans to overthrow the Egyptian Government. After Allen
Dulles reported his talks with MI6 officers, Foster Dulles
told Frank Wisner, the CIA's Deputy Director of
Operations, that his brother 'hadn't put his point
across...."They” were more determined than ever to proceed
40 PRO, PREM11/1123, Poole to Eden, 29 August 1956, and 
News-Chronicle Gallup poll, 31 August 1956.
41 PRO, F0371/118857/JE10393/2G, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 914, 20 August 1956, and subsequent 
cables and minutes.
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along a certain line.' Wisner replied, 'It was clear to 
[the CIA] that [Britain and France] were still pulling the 
throttle open, undoubtedly connecting it with other 
matters./42
With its Permanent Undersecretary, Kirkpatrick,
agreeing with the 'hawks' that Nasser should be punished
publicly, the Foreign Office could not check Eden or MI6.
When Assistant Undersecretary Harold Beeley wrote 'that
the gravest consequences would follow from a failure [of
the use of force] to deprive Colonel Nasser of control
over the Canal,' Kirkpatrick challenged:
It seems to me easy to enunciate these views --
which are sound and, I think, generally accepted 
here, but it is more difficult to draw up a
program which will achieve the end, 'Defeating
Nasser without resort to force'....I shall be 
grateful for ideas. 3
Kirkpatrick commented on Eisenhower's letter of 3
September:
We might bulldoze [the Americans] into suitable 
economic and psychological measures simply by
threatening that, if they do not agree, we shall 
have no alternative but to have recourse to 
force. 4
Kirkpatrick immediately drafted a message, which Eden
amended and sent to Eisenhower on 6 September. Using his
experience at the British Embassy in Berlin in the 1930s,
Kirkpatrick justified the maintenance by force of
Britain's Middle Eastern position:
In the 1930s Hitler established his position by 
series of carefully planned movements....
In more recent years Russia has attempted
42 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Wisner, 30 August 1956.
43 PRO, F0371/119128/JE14211/1390G, Beeley minute, 18 
August 1956, and subsequent minutes.
44 PRO, F0371/119154/JE14211/2127, Kirkpatrick to Lloyd, 4 
September 1956.
252
similar tactics....The seizure of the Suez Canal 
is, we are convinced, the opening gambit in a 
planned campaign designed by Nasser to expel all 
Western influence and interests from Arab 
countries. He believes that, if he can get away 
with this and if he can successfully defy 18 
nations, his prestige in Arabia will be so great 
that he will be able to mount revolutions of 
young officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, 
and Iraq. (We know from our joint sources that 
he is already preparing a revolution in Iraq, 
which is the most stable and progressive.) These 
new Governments will in effect be Egyptian 
satellites if not Russian ones. They will have 
to place their united oil resources under the 
control of a united Arabia led by Egypt and 
under Russian influence. When that moment comes, 
Nasser can deny oil to Western Europe and we 
shall all be at his mercy....
I agree with you that prolonged military 
operations as well as the denial of Middle 
Eastern oil would place an immense strain on the 
economy of Western Europe. I can assure you that 
we are conscious of the burdens and perils 
attending military intervention. But if our 
assessment is correct and if the only 
alternative is to allow Nasser's plans quietly 
to develop until this country and all Western 
Europe are held to ransom by Egypt acting at 
Russia's behest, it seems to us that duty is 
plain. We have many times led Europe and the 
fight for freedom. It would be an ignoble end to 
our long history if we tamely accepted to perish 
by degrees. 5
Kirkpatrick, with little first-hand knowledge of the 
U.S. and no love lost for Americans, was misguided in his 
attempts to scare the Eisenhower Administration. The U.S. 
never accepted the contention that Egypt was 'acting at 
Russia's behest' in nationalising the Suez Canal Company, 
and Britain's repeated allegations of Nasser's intentions 
were unsupported by further evidence. The only Middle 
Eastern leaders who called for Nasser's overthrow by force 
were those in Iraq, Egypt's rival for leadership of the 
Arab world, and even Nuri had retreated, saying 'the 
pressure of opinion of many countries' was preferable to
45 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eden to Eisenhower, 6 September 1956.
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the use of force.46 The Shah of Iran 'gave getting rid of 
Nasser a very high priority' but did 'not believe that 
this [would] be achieved by the use of force...because it 
would require the total occupation of Egypt, making Nasser 
a martyr, and arouse the whole Arab world.' The Libyan 
Ambassador in London may have said 'that wise men must see 
the danger of Nasser succeeding,' but his Government would 
not allow British troops to march from Tripoli into Egypt. 
The British claim that Saud had said to Prince Za'id of 
Iraq 'that it would be bad if Nasser emerged triumphant, 
for...if he succeeded the regimes in Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
would be swept away' did not impress the Americans, who 
had a more accurate view of the Saudis from the Anderson 
mission. King Saud asked the U.S. to withdraw its economic 
measures against Egypt and to persuade Britain and France 
to halt their military preparations.47
The only evidence in British records of Nasser's 
'subversion' was an MI6 report, 'from rather a direct 
source,' of the development of an Egyptian organisation in 
Libya 'to sabotage British equipment and attack British 
troops and communications.' The British decided to warn 
King Idris 'and obtain his cooperation' while exposing the 
plot and 'pointing the moral to King Saud and others.' 
British officials in Libya clearly indicated, however, 
that the Egyptian actions were not designed to overthrow 
the Libyan Government or kill Idris but to prevent British
46 PRO, F0371/119107/JE14211/812, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 892, 15 August 1956. See also USNA, RG 59, 
CDF, 974.7301/9-656, Baghdad to State Department, Cable 
374, 6 September 1956.
47 Lloyd, p. 109; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301 Series, State 
Department to Jedda, Cable 180, 10 September 1956, and 
Cable 199, 19 September 1956.
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forces invading Egypt from Libya.48
Eisenhower told Foster Dulles, 'The British had 
gotten themselves into a box in the Middle East. They have 
been choosing the wrong issue in which to get tough,' as 
they had with the Anglo-Saudi dispute over Buraimi. To 
halt the trans-Atlantic exchanges, Eisenhower personally 
drafted the reply to Eden, noting, 'The only usefulness it 
might have is in its attempt to destroy Anthony's apparent 
fixation that delay or long, drawn-out negotiations might 
result in catastrophe for Great Britain and the West.'49
The note to Eden, revised by Foster Dulles, 
emphasized OMEGA and Foster Dulles' recent idea of the 
Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) as methods to curb 
Nasser:
The result that you and I both want can best be 
assured by slower and less dramatic processes 
than military force....We can, for example, 
promote a semi-permanent organisation of the 
user governments to take over the greatest 
practical amount of the technical problems of 
the Canal, such as pilotage, the organisation of 
the traffic pattern, and the collection of dues 
to cover actual expenses....
There are economic pressures which, if 
continued, will cause distress in Egypt.
There are Arab rivalries to be exploited and 
which can be exploited if we do not make Nasser 
an Arab hero.
There are alternatives to the present 
dependence upon the Canal and pipelines which 
should be developed, perhaps by more tankers, a 
possible new pipeline to Turkey, and some 
possible rerouting of oil, including perhaps 
more from this hemisphere....
Gradually it seems to me we could isolate 
Nasser and gain a victory which would not only 
be bloodless but would be more far-reaching in 
its ultimate consequences than could be anything
48 PRO, W032/16709, Troopers to Middle East Main, Cable 
05718/DMO, 1 October 1956, and subsequent minutes; PRO, 
DEFE32/5, COS(56)100(4) C.A., 12 October 1956.
49 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 7 September 
1956.
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brought about by force of arms. In addition, it 
would be less costly both now and in the 
future.50
When Nasser rejected the 18-Power Plan and the 
Security Council called for international control of the 
Canal, Britain and France either had to use force without 
the Americans or renounce the military option. Ironically, 
Eden was saved from his dilemma by Foster Dulles, who had 
devised a new proposal for Anglo-American cooperation 
against Egypt.
50 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eisenhower to Eden, 8 September 1956.
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CHAPTER 11
4 SEPTEMBER-18 SEPTEMBER 1956: NEW PLANS, NEW FAILURES
The outcome of the Menzies Committee's mission was 
settled before the first meeting with Nasser. Australian 
Prime Minister Menzies was instructed by Eden to stand
firmly upon the 18-Power Plan, but Nasser had publicly 
stated on 12 August that he would never accept 
international control of the Suez Canal.1
Menzies was affable when the five Committee members 
first met Nasser, but he was not as good-natured when he 
saw Nasser alone. Menzies cabled the British Foreign 
Office:
I had good reason to know that the U.K. and
French Governments take a most serious view of 
Egypt's actions. Nasser would be most unwise to
assume that the use of force was ruled out in
the absence of a satisfactory settlement by 
agreement.
Nasser complained to Loy Henderson, the American member of
the Committee, 'I want to reach an agreement; instead you
send this Australian mule to threaten me.'2
The next afternoon, Menzies, after explaining the 18-
Power Plan, repeated the threats: 'If there is an
agreement [by the 18 Powers] to create a users' committee, 
you say there will be trouble, but if there is no such 
agreement, I can assure you that there will be trouble.' 
Nasser replied, 'If Menzies was trying to convey the idea 
that rejection of these proposals would lead to trouble, 
he was quite prepared to let it come at once.' Only then 
did Menzies retreat:
1 For Egyptian impressions of Menzies, Peter Lyon, 
Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1974), p. 694? Hoopes, p. 356.
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Nasser had misunderstood his meaning? we 
certainly did not intend to make direct or 
implied threats? he was trying to point out that 
the international tension would continue to 
exist until satisfactory arrangements for the 
future of the canal could be concluded.
On the evening of 5 September, Nasser rejected the
18-Power Plan as a 'restoration of collective colonialism'
and a form of 'domination or seizure' but expressed his
willingness to consult with user nations over rates and
freedom of transit. Menzies later claimed that his
position was undermined by Eisenhower's press conference
that morning, in which the President said, 'We are
determined to exhaust every feasible method of peaceful
settlement.... [The U.S. position] is not to give up, even
if we do run into other obstacles.'3
Eisenhower's statement might have removed the threat
of force carried by Menzies to Cairo, but it did not
prevent a possible settlement. Given the seven-hour time
difference between Cairo and Washington, Nasser could not
have learned of Eisenhower's statement before the meeting
with the Committee. Even if Nasser knew, British
Ambassador Trevelyan noted:
[The statement] was not crucial at this point. 
Nasser would not have given way in any case.
Henderson had informed Washington on 4 September that the
Committee could not get Egyptian agreement and Menzies
wanted to break off talks, only the efforts of Henderson
and the Iranian and Swedish members persuading him to
2 Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, p. 151? DDE, Ann 
Whitman Series, International, Box 43, Suez Summaries, 
Number 2, 5 September 1956.
3 PRO, PREM11/1100, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1919,
5 September 1956? PRO, F0371/119126/JE14211/1339, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1808, 5 September 
1956
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continue. Menzies/ report of 5 September did not mention
Eisenhower's speech as an influence upon Nasser.cc4
Nasser's counterproposal for a new convention fixing
tolls for Canal passage divided the Committee. Menzies
said the mission could not discuss the counterproposals,
but Henderson, backed by the Iranian and Swedish
representatives, insisted on a further meeting to discuss
Nasser's views. Menzies, instructed by the British that
Nasser's rejection of the 18-Power Plan had to be
publicised by 8 September so Britain could appeal to the
Security Council, stemmed dissent by giving an aide-
memoire of the Committee's position to the Egyptians on 7
September.5 Nasser replied at length two days later. Both
documents were 'memoranda for the record' rather than
efforts at negotiation.6
Menzies, writing Eden, launched a vitriolic diatribe
against Nasser:
Egypt is not only a dictatorship, but it has all 
the earmarks of a Police state. The tapping of 
telephone lines, the installation of 
microphones, the creation of a vast body of
security policy --  all these things are
accepted as commonplace.
In his memoirs, Menzies recorded:
4 Trevelyan, p. 98? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9-556, 
Cairo to State Department, Cable 613, 5 September 1956? 
PRO, PREM11/1100, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 1919, 5 
September 1956. See also PRO, PREM11/1101, Menzies to 
Eden, 9 September 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9- 
956, Cairo to State Department, Cable 674, and State 
Department to Cairo, Cable 722, 9 September 1956.
5 PRO, PREM11/1100, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cables 1936 
and 1942, 6 September 1956, and Cable 1980, 7 September 
1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 43, 
Suez Summaries, Number 3, 6 September 1956? PRO, 
F0800/740, Foreign Office to Cairo, Cable 2745, 6 
September 1956.
6 PRO, PREM11/1100, Cairo to Foreign Office, Cable 2010,
9 September 1956.
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Nasser was a man of imposing physique and 
presence; obviously the master of his
Government, of much intelligence, but with some 
marks of immaturity and inevitable lack of 
experience. But he was impressive and clearly 
courageous.
However, he wrote Eden at the time, 'So far from being 
charming, [Nasser] is rather gauche, with some irritating 
mannerisms, such as rolling his eyes up to the ceiling 
when he is talking to you and producing a quick, quite 
evanescent grin when he can think of nothing else to do.' 
Menzies also failed to mention the Egyptian offer to 
consult with user nations on tolls and freedom of transit, 
giving Eden the false impression that Nasser had not put 
counterproposals to the Committee.7
Britain now wanted perfunctory discussions at the 
U.N. followed by military action. Allen Dulles learned 
from Lloyd 'that if the 18-power proposals were rejected, 
then military intervention by the British should be 
regarded as a very serious possibility,' and the U.S. 
Embassies in London and Paris, reported British and French 
eagerness to invade Egypt.8
Spending Labour Day weekend at his vacation home in 
Canada, Foster Dulles 'reflect[ed] in semi-retirement.' 
The 1888 Constantinople Convention affirmed the right of 
ships to pass 'freely' through the Suez Canal. Since 
'probably 98 percent of the traffic would voluntarily
7 PRO, PREM11/1101, Menzies to Eden, 9 September 1956? 
Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light (London: Cassell, 1967), 
p. 164.
8 D.R. Thorpe, Selwvn Llovd (London: Jonathan Cape,
1989), p. 222; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, 
Box 5, September 1956 (2), London to State Department, 
Cable 1249, 1 September 1956, and Paris to State 
Department, Cable 1050, 2 September 1956. See also 
William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 20 September 
1956.
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follow non-Egyptian guidance,' Britain, France, and other
user nations could supply pilots for ships, and any
problems could be handled 'through the Naval craft
authorized to be stationed at each end of the Canal.' If
Egypt did not keep the Canal clear of obstructions, the
user nations had a right to keep the Canal 'free.' Foster
Dulles thought the plan would...
..."deflate" Nasser and be a better alternative 
than force....It rests squarely on the 1888 
Treaty and, if Nasser uses force to obstruct 
this program, he would be violating the [U.N.] 
Charter and its "renunciation of force" 
Covenant.'9
On 4 September, the Secretary told John Coulson, the
British Charge d'Affaires:
The users would run the Canal 
themselves....Nasser would thus see the dollars 
slip out of his hands. He was much more likely 
to be deflated by the loss of these revenues 
than by the threat of force.
Eden welcomed the 'promising suggestion,' provided that
the U.S. employed the pilots of the user nations to guide
ships through the Canal and paid transit dues to a users'
account. Lloyd cabled Foster Dulles on 6 September that it
was 'most urgent' to coordinate the move to the U.N., but
an users' association could be included in the
presentation of the 18-Power plan to the Security
Council.10
The introduction of Foster Dulles' plan coincided 
with a British review of MUSKETEER. The military operation
9 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, White House, Box 4, 
Meetings with the President, Foster Dulles memorandum, 2 
September 1956.
10 PRO, PREM11/1100, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1804, 4 September 1956, and Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 4032, 5 September 1956, and Cables 
4062 and 4069, 6 September 1956.
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had every chance of success until 26 September, but 
because of deteriorating weather in the Mediterranean, it 
could not be launched after 6 October until the spring. 
With the 17-day interval between the decision to launch 
operations and the invasion, the Egypt Committee had to 
act by 19 September. With Nasser's reply to the Menzies 
mission coming on the 9th, there was insufficient time to 
complete discussions in the Security Council and convene a 
special Parliamentary session to endorse an attack against 
Egypt.
General Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief of
MUSKETEER, was also concerned about the political effects
of operations:
It is...of the greatest importance that this 
invasion of Egypt is launched with our moral 
case unassailable and the start of the war 
clearly and definitely Nasser's responsibility 
and no one else's... .The problem is whether it 
appears likely that this moral case can be 
achieved within the next few weeks and, if not, 
whether some other plan which can be launched at 
a much later date is required.
Keightley devised a new plan, MUSKETEER REVISE, which
could be operational until the end of October and required
only eight days between decision and implementation.
Instead of an assault upon Alexandria followed by an
advance upon Cairo, economic, air, and naval action,
supported by psychological warfare, would 'lead to the
breakdown of Egyptian resistance to Western operation of
the Suez Canal and enable Allied forces to secure the
Canal Zone.' In Phase I, Allied bombing would destroy the
Egyptian Air Force to prevent counterattacks against
British and French forces on Cyprus. When this was
accomplished, Phase II, an air offensive upon key military
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and economic targets accompanied by propaganda from 
'black' radio stations, leaflets, and announcements from 
'voice' aircraft, would turn the Egyptian population 
against Nasser, forcing his resignation or a coup d'etat. 
After Nasser's fall, British and French troops would land 
at Port Said in Phase III, taking control of the Canal 
Zone before occupying Cairo and establishing a Military 
Government.11
Eden's immediate reaction was consternation, as 
REVISE had no provision for a quick occupation of 
Alexandria and Cairo. He disputed the estimate of 
'unpredictable' autumn weather in the Mediterranean, the 
assumption of an 18-day lead time for MUSKETEER, and the 
claim that MUSKETEER could not be maintained beyond 6 
October. On the morning of 7 September, he confronted the 
Chiefs of Staff, claiming that the devastation and loss of 
life caused by REVISE'S extensive air assault would be 
greater than that of MUSKETEER, since Egypt would not 
resist a landing at Alexandria. General Templer, the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, replied that the advance 
from Alexandria to Cairo would take 23 days if the 
Egyptians resisted the invasion. Eden retorted that the 
Egyptians were cowards, an assertion challenged by 
Mountbatten and Keightley.12
However, because of his inability to establish a 
diplomatic pretext to launch MUSKETEER in the near-future, 
Eden had no choice but to give way. He told the Egypt
11 PRO, PREM11/1104, EC(56)43, 'Operation MUSKETEER: 
Implications of Postponement,' 6 September 1956.
12 PRO, PREM11/1104, EC(56)43, 'Operation MUSKETEER: 
Implications of Postponement,' 6 September 1956, Rhodes 
James, p. 501; AP, AP20/1, Eden diary, 7 September 1956.
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Committee that the new plan had advantages given 'a 
reasonable certainty that it would be effective.' The 
Committee agreed to resume their discussion of REVISE in 
three days' time.13
To prepare a pretext for the use of REVISE, the 
Committee decided 'that no further advice should be given' 
to Suez Canal Company employees to remain at their posts. 
The Foreign Office informed the French, and the stoppage 
of work was scheduled for 15 September.14 Minister of 
Transport Harold Watkinson linked the employees' 
withdrawal to American plans, as well as military action. 
Britain and France, followed by the U.S. and other 
maritime nations, would instruct their ships to withhold 
transit dues from Nasser and join the Suez Canal Users 
Association. Meanwhile, Operation PILEUP would congest the 
Canal with enough ships to bring complaints from 
shipowners and the maritime nations. 'All offers [by 
Egypt] of compromise methods of transit [would] be refused 
as unsafe,' and Operation CONVOY would station pilots, 
employed by SCUA, on warships at each end of the Canal. If 
Nasser refused passage to ships with these pilots, the 
warships would lead a convoy through the Canal. Further 
resistance by Egypt would bring war, while acceptance of 
the convoy by Nasser would render Egyptian control of the 
Canal worthless.15
Anticipating the British review, the Americans acted
13 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)25th meeting, 7 September 1956.
14 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)25th meeting, 7 September 1956; 
PRO, F0371/119134/JE14211/1549, Foreign Office to Paris, 
Cable 1623, 8 September 1956; PRO, F0371/119135/ 
JE14211/1590G, Anglo-French meeting, 8 September 1956.
15 PRO, F0371/119141/JE14211/1784G, Watkinson minute, 10 
September 1956.
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quickly to block military action. When the Foreign Office 
notified the State Department that it could not delay 
announcing recourse to the Security Council for more than 
24 hours, Foster Dulles told British Charge d'Affaires 
Coulson, 'What [Britain was] proposing was in effect to 
enlist support to force upon Egypt the conclusion of
« • M Ctreaty bestowing new rights on the users of the Canal.
He refused to co-sponsor a draft resolution with Britain
and France and would not promise opposition to any
amendment prohibiting the use of force against Cairo.17
Lloyd cabled Makins that Britain and the U.S. were...
...further apart than at any time since July 26.
I cannot accept the present U.S. thinking that 
the two problems of settling the Canal issue and 
deflating Nasser can be separated...and there 
appears to be little common ground between us at 
the moment as to how to achieve either of those 
objectives.18
Foster Dulles reassured Makins about American intentions:
Of course, Nasser could not be allowed to win in 
this contest....The President did not exclude 
the use of force in the last resort. Between us 
we could get Nasser down, and the U.S. 
Administration were quite determined that this 
should happen.
However, Foster Dulles reminded Makins, '[The U.S.] saw no 
end to the consequences of military intervention....She 
did not believe the methods and the tempo which [Britain 
and France] were advocating were the right ones.'19
Britain's hope for American cooperation lay in strong 
economic sanctions. To make SCUA attractive to London,
16 PRO, PREM11/1100, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1823, 7 September 1956.
17 PRO, PREM11/1100, Washington to Foreign Office, Cables 
1827-1832, 7 September 1956.
18 PRO, PREM11/1100, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
4102, 8 September 1956.
19 PRO, PREM11/1100, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1838, 8 September 1956.
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Foster Dulles offered help with emergency oil shipments
and economic measures against Egypt. He concluded:
We were in a position to bring great pressure on 
Nasser short of armed force. Nasser could be 
forced to accept cooperation with the West or 
else take the onus of the consequences of his 
action....His proposal was therefore three­
pronged: the Users Association, the oil
operation, and other economic pressures.20
Makins optimistically cabled, 'Mr. Dulles' statement that
the Administration are determined to join with us in
cutting Nasser down seems to me very significant*,'
although he warned that the American attitude was
conditional upon British abstinence from military
action.21
Kirkpatrick told U.S. Minister Walworth Barbour that 
the combination of Eisenhower's message of 9 September to 
Eden, which emphasized 'alternative measures' to topple 
Nasser, and Foster Dulles' presentation to Makins 
'encouraged' the Foreign Office to believe 'there [was] a 
large measure of identification of views between' Britain 
and the U.S. Neither he nor Makins realised, however, that 
Foster Dulles' immediate motive was appeasement of British 
opinion rather than action against Nasser. He told 
Eisenhower:
We had to keep the initiative and to keep 
probing along various lines, particularly since 
there was no chance of getting the British and 
the French not to use force unless they had some 
alternatives that seemed to have in them some 
strength of purpose.22
20 PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to State Department,
Cables 1845-1847, 9 September 1956.
21 PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to State Department, Cable 
1849, 9 September 1956.
22 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 43, Suez 
Summaries, Number 6, 11 September 1956; USNA, RG 59,
CDF, 974.7301/9-1056, London to State Department, Cable 
1366, 10 September 1956; DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers,
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On 10 September, the Egypt Committee met for final 
decisions on REVISE, U.N. proceedings, and SCUA. Ministers 
could support Foster Dulles' plans while refraining from 
the use of force or they could proceed with a new 
timetable for military action. They sought the best of 
both worlds. The approach to the U.N. was postponed to 
explore Foster Dulles' 'ingenious' proposals, although 
they might be 'more in the nature of delaying tactics to 
provide time for further reflection and negotiation in an 
election year.' At the same time, REVISE was approved and 
Watkinson was authorised to proceed with Operations PICKUP 
and CONVOY.23
REVISE'S adoption increased the emphasis upon 
psychological warfare and covert operations to overthrow 
Nasser. At the outset of the Suez Crisis, the Chiefs of 
Staff 'strongly supported' General Templer's plan for 
psychological warfare as an element of military 
operations, and the Egypt Committee authorised its 
development.24 An interdepartmental working party 
established the Information Coordination Executive (ICE), 
which had members from the Foreign, Commonwealth 
Relations, and Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence, 
Chiefs of Staff, MI6, Central Office of Information, and 
the BBC. The ICE oversaw the work of a psychological 
warfare unit, commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel in London 
with a forward element in Cyprus. By early September, a
Subject, Alphabetical, Box 4, Miscellaneous Paper - U.K. 
(1), Foster Dulles memorandum, 8 September 1956.
23 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)26th meeting, 10 September 
1956.
24 PRO, DEFE4/89, COS(56)77th meeting, 2 August 1956; AP, 
AP20/28, EC(56)9th meeting, 2 August 1956.
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special 18-man unit was formed at Aldershot.25
Phase II of REVISE formally authorised 'all necessary 
resources for carrying out an intensive campaign of 
propaganda which will have the object of inducing the 
Egyptian Government, people, and armed forces to cease 
resistance, of raising popular pressure on the Government, 
and of intensifying the effects on Egyptian morale of 
[Anglo-French] air attacks.'26 Meanwhile, the buildup 
of British propaganda services in the Middle East was 
accelerated. The number of stories 'planted' with British 
newspapers, the BBC, and the London Press Service 
increased, and a BBC relay station in Cyprus, broadcasting 
in medium-wave through the Middle East, was completed in 
October. The Information Research Department and MI6 
supervised covert operations, with 'black' radio stations 
operating from Aden, Libya, and Cyprus.27
Propaganda operations were complemented by extensive 
collection of intelligence and development of covert 
operations against Nasser. Since spring 1956, the Egyptian 
Embassy in London was a priority target for code-breaking 
by Britain's domestic intelligence service, MI5. 
Specially-modified Washington aircraft of 192 Squadron 
carried out electronic surveillance of Egypt and other 
Middle Eastern countries and sent the results to the 
General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) at Cheltenham. 
On 20 September, Lloyd congratulated E.M. Jones, the 
Director of GCHQ, 'Since the tension in the Middle East
25 PRO, W0288/38/File.
26 PRO, PREM11/1104, COS(56)360, 'Alternative to 
MUSKETEER,' 18 September 1956.
27 PRO, PREM11/1149/File.
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began to grow and particularly since Nasser's seizure of
the Suez Canal, I have observed the volume of material
which has been produced by GCHQ relating to all the
countries in the Middle East area.'28
Although MI6 drafted plans for Nasser's
assassination, the service recognised that this would
probably make Nasser a martyr and reinforce anti-British
opinion in Egypt unless the public was turned against the
regime and a successor government was groomed for power.
Instead, MI6 linked Nasser's overthrow to REVISE. An
Anglo-French attack upon Egypt, supported by psychological
warfare, would arouse so much public discontent that
dissident Egyptian politicians and military officers could 
29seize power. *
MI6 suffered a blow in late August when the Egyptians 
broke up the service's operations in Cairo, arresting 
thirty people, including three British and one Maltese, 
and expelling two officials of the British Embassy. The 
arrests, however, did not affect the contacts between 
dissident Egyptian officers, 'The Supporters of Justice,' 
and MI6 outside Egypt, and Conservative MP Julian Amery 
and two MI6 officers met the conspirators in France. The 
officers conferred with Saleh ed-Din, Foreign Minister in 
the Wafd Government from 1950 to 1952, and Abdul Fattah 
Hassan, another Minister in the Wafd Government, about the 
assassination of Nasser and his Ministers and the
• , i n
installation of a Government headed by Saleh ed-Dm. w
28 Wright, p. 81? AIR20/10216/File? PRO, AIR20/10621,
Lloyd to Jones, 20 September 1956.
29 Author's interview with Sir Patrick Reilly.
30 PRO, F0371/118304-118307/JE1693/File? PRO, 
FO371/125423/JE1019/ File; PRO, F0371/125612-
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In another plot, the British worked with Squadron
Leader Mohammed Khalil, the Chief of Intelligence for the
Egyptian Air Force, after representatives of Mustafa al-
Maraghi, a former Wafd Minister of the Interior, and
Husayn Khayri and Prince Namouk, relatives of King Farouk,
contacted Khalil about the assassination of Nasser.
Meetings between MI6 operatives and Khalil occurred in
Beirut, Rome, Geneva, and Munich.31
Critics of British operations against Egypt later
argued that Britain never found an alternative to Nasser.
Assistant Undersecretary Ross had noted on 28 July:
Nasser's grip is strong. There is no alternative 
in sight; the man who expelled foreign troops 
from Egypt, the spokesman of Arab nationalism 
and the champion of Arab military strength has a 
powerful hold over the people.32
Yet a specific alternative to Nasser was not a
prerequisite for implementation of REVISE. A military
intelligence report admitted, 'One of the main strengths
of the present regime is the absence of any coherent
opposition in the country and the at-least outward unity
of the Army,' but added that there was 'a considerable
element of the population which, if not disillusioned by
the unfulfilled promise of EUTOPIA [sic], are at least
critical of the regime' and that the unity of the armed
forces might 'well be only skin deep even in the
Army... .Rifts have outwardly been healed but it is
considered likely that little would be needed to reopen
125621/JE1691/File? West, pp. 113ff. See also PRO, 
F0371/125423/JE1019/1, Brenchley minute, 26 July 1957, 
and subsequent minutes.
31 Ibid. See also PRO, F0371/125423/JE1019/7, Brenchley 
minute, 24 December 1957, and subsequent minutes.
32 PRO, FO371/118864/JE1053/79, Ross minute, 28 July 1956.
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them.' The report set the priorities of 'increasing
diversity or rivalry as between the services and within
the Army itself, making the paramilitary forces and even
armed civilians feel that they have been let down by the
Regular Army and Air Force' and 'the weakening of popular
support for the regime which will, as it weakens,
progressively reduce the internal security threat facing
the Allied Task Force.' The Egypt (Official) Committee
further hinted at MI6's confidence:
There were good reasons to believe that, given 
the defeat of the Egyptian Army and the collapse 
of the Nasser regime, a successor Government 
could be formed which are able to maintain law 
and order....This prospect would be enhanced if 
the functioning headquarters, in or near Cairo, 
of such Nasser agencies as Army Intelligence, 
the Liberation Rally, and the National Guard 
could be eliminated at an early stage by Allied 
military action.33
The Foreign Office was told little, if anything, 
about MI6's plotting with the dissidents. In September 
1956, the British Embassy in Cairo was asked for 'names, 
addresses, telephone numbers, and background of any people 
who should be borne in mind' as successors to Nasser. The 
Oriental Counsellor, Trefor Evans, visited London to give 
an oral appreciation of the situation, but the only 
candidate to lead Egypt, as in 1955, was Ali Maher, the 
former 'independent' Prime Minister. According to J.B. 
Flux, expelled from Egypt after the round-up of the 
British spy ring, Ali Maher said he was ready to form a 
Government and had names of Cabinet members 'in his 
pocket./34
33 Author's interview with Julian Amery; PRO, W0288/38, 
Maguire to Phillips, 1 September 1956; PRO, CAB134/1225, 
E0C(56)1, 5 September 1956.
34 PRO, F0371/118897/JE11924/61G, Murray minute, 4
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REVISE'S flaw was that, without full knowledge of
MI6's operations, civil servants and military planners
could only assume, on the strength of MI6's assurances or
on blind faith, that an alternative to Nasser would emerge
after the launch of Anglo-French military operations. The
ad hoc committees established in July 1956 were no
solution, as their brief was administrative, defining
political control of Egypt after the landing of British
troops and i;he installation of a new Egyptian Government.
Technically, the Egypt Committee oversaw REVISE and MI6's
activities, but it had neither the time nor the expertise
to concentrate on operational details.
Only Kirkpatrick, Patrick Dean, the head of the
Permanent Undersecretary's Department, and Geoffrey
Macdermott, Dean's deputy and the Foreign Office Adviser
to MI6, received intelligence and information of British
plans against Egypt, and Macdermott was rarely informed
about operations. Kirkpatrick privately expressed concern
at Eden's wish to 'murder' Nasser, but he never tried to
check MI6's plans. Furthermore, from September, Eden
increasingly circumvented Kirkpatrick, as Dean, promoted
from Assistant Undersecretary (Grade 4) to Deputy
Undersecretary (Grade 2) became the Prime Minister's
channel for ad hoc action. According to Ross:
As things began to hot up, [Eden] did take Dean 
over as his Foreign Office man....As the crisis 
developed and decisions became more and more 
crucial, it wasn't so much the Foreign Office 
submitting advice as Eden using a member of the 
Foreign Office to do what he thought had to be 
done. 5
September 1956, and subsequent minutes; PRO, 
F0371/118832/JE1015/50, Flux minute, 29 September 1956.
35 Author's interview with Sir Archibald Ross.
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Meanwhile, the Egypt Committee's 'hawks' were 
determined to proceed with military action. They were 
supported by French Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister 
Pineau, who visited London on 10 September. To prevent the 
British straying too far towards accommodation with Egypt, 
Mollet revived Winston Churchill's 1940 proposal for 
Anglo-French union. Press Secretary Clark wrote that the 
proposal was 'impossible at present because of the 
Commonwealth.' With no alternative, Mollet and Pineau 
deferred to the new British position on SCUA and REVISE.36
The revised British strategy was presented to the 
Cabinet on 11 September. Lloyd contended that SCUA would 
'directly involve the U.S.' with Anglo-French planning and 
deprive Egypt of 80 percent of transit dues. Leading the 
'hawks,' Macmillan only accepted SCUA 'as a step towards 
the ultimate use of force.' Dismissed fears that the 
Treasury could not afford a military operation, he turned 
the economic argument against opponents of force: 'A quick 
solution to the crisis would restore confidence in the 
pound but delay would 'undermine our financial position.'
Minister of Defence Monckton again opposed the 
military option, but, as in the 28 August debate, Lords 
Kilmuir and Salisbury supported the use of force. Even 
Butler conceded that Tory MPs would support military 
action 'if they were satisfied that all practicable steps 
had been taken, without success, to secure a settlement by 
peaceful means.' Eden summarised, 'If [peaceful means] 
should fail, we should be justified in last resort in
36 PRO, PREM11/1101, 'Declaration d'Union,' undated, and 
Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 4159, 11 September 
1956? Clark, p. 185.
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using force to restore the situation.'37
It remained to be established publicly that SCUA
would be an economic instrument, possibly providing the
pretext for force against Nasser. Eden would tell the
special Parliamentary session on 12 September that SCUA
would exercise its rights under the 1888 Constantinople
Convention, that it would provide pilots for all ships
transitting the Canal, and...'
that all dues payable by the users' ships would 
forthwith be paid to the new organisation.... If 
the Egyptian Government sought to interfere with 
the operations of the organisation or refused to 
extend the necessary cooperation on land, then 
the Egyptian Government would be regarded as 
being in breach of the Convention of 1888, and 
users could take such stejps assumed fit to them 
to enforce their rights.'**8
Presented with Eden's draft announcement, Foster 
Dulles commented, significantly, that the U.S. could not 
commit itself to the provision, 'Users could take such 
steps as seemed fit to them to enforce their rights,' 
although users might individually exercise their rights. 
He repeated his assumption that Britain was prepared for 
the cost of sending ships around the Cape of Good Hope. 
The Foreign Office replied that Britain was prepared to 
face 'economic consequences,' but with the long-term 
approach, rather than a 'short, sharp struggle' against 
E9ypt/ Britain must rely upon American assistance for 
payments for oil.39
Foster Dulles was in a difficult position. Secretary
37 PRO, CAB128/30, CM64(56), 11 September 1956.
38 PRO, PREM11/1101, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
4136, 10 September 1956.
39 PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1865, 10 September 1956, and Foreign Office to 
Washington, Cable 4155, 11 September 1956? PRO, 
F0800/740, Kirkpatrick to Makins, 10 September 1956.
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of the Treasury Humphrey opposed 'hand-outs' to the 
British and any grant might require Congressional 
approval. On the other hand, Britain could not accept a 
plan which crippled its economy. Foster Dulles tried to 
escape by arguing that Nasser would not obstruct
navigation by SCUA's ships if he was aware of diversion 
around the Cape as an alternative, rather than an
obligatory step, for the users. However, 'the U.S. 
Government would only be able to ensure that U.S. 
flagships paid [dues] to the new organisation and...the 
application of this requirement to [U.S.-owned] ships 
under the Panamanian and Liberian flags would require 
further consultations.' Since 90 to 95 percent of U.S.- 
owned ships sailed under other countries' flags, Foster 
Dulles effectively allowed them to pay dues to Egypt.40
Despite Foster Dulles' provisos, Lloyd, reassured by 
Makins,41 thought SCUA could still provide a pretext for 
force. Ambassador Aldrich reported, 'Lloyd expects
if...Nasser should refuse the proposed plan, the U.K. and 
France would be on as firm ground as possible in taking 
whatever measures then seem to be desirable.'42
Eisenhower now made his first important intervention 
since July. While Foster Dulles apparently did not exclude 
the possibility of force if Nasser blocked Canal traffic, 
provided the U.S. did not have to join the action, the 
President believed, 'We are sitting on a keg of dynamite.'
40 PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to Foreign Office, Cables 
1869, 1873, 1875, and 1879, 11 September 1956.
41 See PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1896, 11 September 1956.
42 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 43, Suez 
Summaries, Number 7, 13 September 1956.
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Asked at a press conference if Britain and France would be
justified in the use of force if pilots walked out and
traffic through the Canal broke down, Eisenhower replied:
Justified, probably, in taking steps and 
conferring with Nasser....That doesn't mean that 
they are justified at that moment in using 
force....We established the United Nations to 
abolish aggression, and I am not going to be a 
party to aggression if it is humanly possible. 3
The Egypt Committee was undeterred, agreeing on the
morning of 12 September that Lloyd should arrange
consultations to establish SCUA. The Committee even saw
merit in Foster Dulles' proposal that SCUA compensate
Egypt from transit dues. Macmillan accepted that a loan
from the Export-Import Bank, the only aid that U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey would allow, would not
help Britain, since the loan would have to be repaid in
dollars, but 'with Congress not in session and the
Presidential election pending, the U.S. Government could
scarcely be expected to volunteer any wider
undertaking./44
By stating that Britain and France 'would be free to
take steps to assure their rights,' a concession
Eisenhower did not accept, while avoiding SCUA's use as an
economic instrument against Nasser, Foster Dulles made
promises he could not fulfill. The Egypt Committee
recognised the apparent contradiction in American policy
but believed withdrawal of pilots and the success of
Operation PILEUP would halt traffic through the Canal,
forcing the U.S. to support Anglo-French restoration of
43 PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1891, 11 September 1956.
44 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)27th meeting, 12 September 1956
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order.
Eden ruined the strategy in his Commons statement.
Neglecting to inform Labour leader Gaitskell about SCUA,
Eden failed to ensure Opposition agreement. He then
highlighted the threat of force:
THE PRIME MINISTER: I must make it clear that if 
the Egyptian Government should see to interfere
HAROLD DAVIES [Lab, Leek]: Deliberate
provocation.
THE PRIME MINISTER:-- with the operations of
the Association, or refuse to extend to it the 
essential minimum of cooperation, then that 
Government will once again be in breach of the 
1888 Convention. (Hon. Members: Resign!) I must 
remind the House that what I am saying (An Hon. 
Member: What a peacemaker!) is the result of
exchanges of views between three Governments. In 
that event HMG and others concerned will be free 
to take such further steps --
Mr. S.O. DAVIES: [Lab, Merthyr Tydfil]: What do
you mean by that?
THE PRIME MINISTER: ---  as seem to be required -
Mr. S.O. DAVIES: You are talking about war.
THE PRIME MINISTER:----  either through the
United Nations or by other means, for the 
assertion of their rights. (Hon. Members: Oh!)
Eden concluded his speech with a clear warning to Nasser:
In these last weeks I have had constantly in 
mind the closeness of the parallel of these 
events with those of the years before the war.
Once again we are faced with what is, in fact, 
an act of force which, if it is not resisted, if 
it not checked, will lead to others. 5
Foster Dulles was furious. He had approved a British
statement without the threat of force, but he now faced a
call to war. He told a colleague:
[I am] embarrassed because Eden kind of knocked
45 Hansard. 12 September 1956. See also Clark, p. 187? 
USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9-1356, London to State 
Department, Cable 1442, 13 September 1956.
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this whole plan down....Eden went a little out- 
of-bounds. . .He wants to show [the Canal] is a
lifeline and it can't be c u t  and so justify
war. That is where our policy splits. 6
Foster Dulles had agreed to a press conference on 13
September to support Eden's 'idea' of SCUA, but he
deviated from his prepared text. Asked if users' ships
would travel around the Cape rather than force their way
through the Canal, Foster Dulles replied:
It is not our purpose to try to bring about a 
concerted boycotting of the Canal. I think, 
under those conditions, each country would have 
to decide for itself what it wanted its vessels 
to do.
Foster Dulles was even more devastating when asked if
rerouting of ships was, in effect, a boycott. He answered:
It is not a boycott of the Canal as far as I 
know to refrain from using force to get through 
the Canal. If force is interposed by Egypt, then 
I do not call it a boycott to avoid using force 
to shoot your way through. We do not intend to 
shoot our way through.
Asked whether SCUA would guarantee the passage of Israeli
ships, Foster Dulles completed the demolition of his plan,
responding, 'Well, I am afraid that the Users Association
is not going to be in the position to guarantee anything
to anybody; we can't even guarantee anything to our own
ships./47
Technically, Foster Dulles did not retract his 
promise to allow other powers to protect their rights, 
since he only said that the U.S. would not use force. 
Journalists, however, knew that Foster Dulles, not Eden, 
had created SCUA and assumed that he was speaking for all
46 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Flemming to Foster Dulles, 12 September 1956.
47 PRO, PREM11/1101, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
1916, 13 September 1956.
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members. To them, Foster Dulles had publicly withdrawn the 
'last resort' of force as a bargaining lever against 
Egypt.
The effect was immediately felt in the Commons. 
Gaitskell asked, 'Is [the Prime Minister] prepared to say 
on behalf of HMG that they will not shoot their way 
through the Canal?' Eden, deprived of American support for 
force, Eden fell back upon recourse to the Security 
Council:
Would HMG give a pledge not to use force except 
after reference to the Security Council?...It 
would certainly be our intention, if 
circumstances allowed, or in other words, except 
in an emergency, to refer a matter of that kind 
to the Security Council. Beyond that, I do not 
think that any Government can possibly go. 8
Eden had intended, in response to public opinion and
the wishes of some Tory MPs, to announce Britain's appeal
to the U.N.,49 but Gaitskell's badgering forced him to
alter his speech and reveal his intentions prematurely.
The impression was given that recourse to the U.N. was a
desperate response to Foster Dulles' abandonment of SCUA.
Eden's previous commitment to the use of force seemed
hollow, and the press widely labelled his statement a
'climbdown./5°
The public outbursts of Eden and Foster Dulles ruined
six weeks' of Anglo-American negotiations. Foster Dulles
decided that SCUA's effectiveness as a sanction against
Nasser was no longer an issue. Only a peaceful settlement
mattered. He told Humphrey after his press conference of
48 Hansard. 13 September 1956.
49 See Clark, p. 188? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9-1756, 
London to State Department, Cable 1520, 17 September 
1956.
50 Clark, p. 188.
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13 September:
We are not at war yet. [I] feel better today
than for some time....We never expected the plan 
to work anyway.
He informed Eisenhower that he would attend the second
London Conference to establish SCUA: 'All [my] associates
feel very strongly the British and French will mess it up
and no one of less stature than [me] can handle Eden,
Lloyd and Pineau.'51
In contrast, Eden saw no possibility of a peaceful
settlement that would punish Egypt, as 'American
torpedoing of their own plan on the first day of launching
it left no alternative but to use force or acquiesce in
Nasser's triumph.' Pineau complained about the...
lack of definite policy in Washington....The 
U.S. inability to agree on sanctions is bringing 
about the very result it seeks to avoid, namely, 
the use of military force.
Anglo-French hopes hinged upon the walkout of the 165 
non-Egyptian pilots of the Egyptian Canal Authority. Only 
40 Egyptian pilots remained, and Lloyd's of London raised 
the cost of war-risk insurance by 250 percent to ships 
using the Canal. Operation PILEUP failed miserably, 
however. The Authority maintained the flow of traffic with 
the Egyptian pilots, supplemented by 30 Egyptian and 11 
Greek recruits, by organising convoys and allowing some 
captains to pilot their vessels through the Canal. On 16 
September, 40 ships, an above-average figure, passed
51 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Humphrey, 13 September 1956? DDE, John 
Foster Dulles Papers, White House, Box 10, Eisenhower to 
Foster Dulles, 13 September 1956. See also DDE, John 
Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, Foster 
Dulles to Smith, 14 September 1956.
52 Eden, p. 484? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, 
Box 43, Suez Summaries, Number 6, 11 September 1956.
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through the canal, 254 transitted during the next week, 
and a record 57 ships passed through the canal on 7 
October. Lloyd's reduced its premiums and shippers 
withdrew the 15 percent surcharge placed on cargoes. By 18 
September, Watkinson told the Egypt Committee and 
shipowners that PILEUP had failed.53
With the problems with SCUA and PILEUP, Eden returned 
to the plans of late August, proposing 'reference to the 
Security Council immediately.' Lloyd was cautious, asking 
for time to persuade the U.S. to adopt a stronger position 
on financial and military sanctions.54 Other Ministers 
embarked upon private initiatives, including the idea of 
collaboration with Israel. In early September, Colonel 
Robert Henriques MBE, writer, soldier, and member of a 
prominent Anglo-Jewish family, consulted Minister of 
Defence Monckton about a forthcoming trip to Israel. On 
Monckton's advice, Henriques spoke to General Oliver, the 
Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General 
Charles Haydon, chief of intelligence in the Middle East, 
before lunching with Minister of War Head, who served at 
Combined Headquarters with Henriques in World War II.
Head cautioned that Henriques' trip 'could do untold 
harm in Israel just at this moment,' but when Henriques 
asked if he could do any good, Head asked him to tell 
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:
53 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 774.00/9-2156, Port Said to State 
Department, Cable 39, 21 September 1956, and
774.00(W)/10-1156, SANA (Cairo) to State Department, 11 
October 1956? PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56) 29th meeting, 17 
September 1956? PRO, F0371/119140/JE14211/1757, Giles to 
Logan, 18 September 1956.
54 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)29th meeting, 17 September 
1956.
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At all costs, Israel must avoid war with Jordan, 
but if, when Britain went into Suez, Israel were 
to attack simultaneously, it would be very 
convenient for all concerned. Britain would 
denounce Israel's aggression in the strongest 
possible terms, but at the peace negotiations 
afterwards, Britain would help Israel to get the 
best possible treaty.
Henriques transmitted the message about 20 September. Ben-
Gurion smiled and said, 'We have heard such promises
before./55
Even Lloyd, who opposed cooperation with Israel,
asked Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson...
...whether, if things dragged on, Israel might 
not take advantage of the situation by some 
aggressive move against Egypt....This might help 
Britain out of some of her more immediate 
difficulties.
Lloyd eventually agreed with Pearson 'that the long-range 
results and, indeed, even the short-range results of such 
action would be deplorable and dangerous; that such action 
by Israel would certainly consolidate Arab opinion behind 
Egypt? that even Arab leaders who might now be worrying 
about Nasser's moves would have to rally behind him.'56
Foster Dulles had second thoughts about his burial of 
SCUA, saying, 'Despite the fact that the Users Association 
proposal had gotten off to a bad start through Eden's 
presentation, it was now being better understood 
and...might be widely acceptable,' but Eisenhower pursued
55 Robert Henriques, 'The Ultimatum: A Dissenting View,' 
The Spectator. 6 November 1959, p. 623, and 'The 
Ultimatum,' The Spectator. 4 December 1959, p. 823? 
Michael Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet: A Biography of 
Ben-Gurion (London: Arthur Barker, 1967), p. 222.
56 Lester Pearson, Memoirs. Volume II. 1948-1957. The 
International Years (London: Victor Gollancz, 1974) pp. 
231ff.? Canadian National Archives, DEA 50372-40, Vol.
4, London to Department of External Affairs, Cable 1200, 
3 September 1956. I am grateful to Brian Hearndon for 
bringing the Canadian document to my attention.
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Saudi mediation between Britain, France, and Egypt. Makins
again warned that the U.S. would not support force:
While the Administration has so far shown an 
unusual and commendable disposition to eschew 
domestic political consideration in their 
handling of the Suez problem, it remains true 
that the Great Republican trump card, which the 
Democrats do not yet know how to overtrump, is 
peace. So, although the President and Dulles 
have been careful not to exclude the possibility 
that force may have to be used, there is in my 
judgement no prospect that the U.S. will 
themselves participate in military action before 
November 6 [Election Day].57
57 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Chronological, Box 4, 
Meetings with the President, Foster Dulles memorandum,
17 September 1956; PRO, F0371/119136/JE14211/1613, Jedda 
to Foreign Office, Cable 292, 15 September 1956? PRO, 
PREM11/1102, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 1896,
11 September 1956.
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CHAPTER 12
19 SEPTEMBER-4 OCTOBER 1956: THE ILLUSION OF SCUA
On 19 September, representatives of the 18 nations 
who sanctioned the proposals of the first London
Conference reconvened at Lancaster House. The previous 
day, Foster Dulles met Lloyd and Pineau in the afternoon
and Macmillan and Salisbury in the evening. He reported to 
Eisenhower:
My general impression is that the British and 
the French have quite isolated themselves, even 
from what are naturally their closest 
friends....The United States is the only bridge 
between the British and the French and the rest 
of the countries here.
Yet 24 hours later, the British thought they had won over
Foster Dulles. In his opening speech to the Conference,
the Secretary simply introduced SCUA, but in the
afternoon, he became worried about 'a series of very weak
speeches which put all the emphasis upon the necessity for
peace and no emphasis at all upon the need for what the
United Nations Charter calls a settlement "in accordance
with the principle of justice and international law",' he
stated:
I do not care how many words are written into 
the Charter of the United Nations about not 
using force? if in fact there is not a 
substitute for force, and some way of getting 
just solutions of some of these problems, 
inevitably the world will fall back again into 
anarchy and chaos.
Foster Dulles had not sanctioned the use of force;
1 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, 
September 1956 (1), London to State Department, Cable 
DULTE 2, 19 September 1956.
2 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, 
September 1956 (1), Cable DULTE 6, 20 September 1956? 
USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9-1956, London to State 
Department, Cable SECTO 11, 19 September 1956.
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however, conscious of Anglo-French anger after his press 
conference of 13 September, he used a tone which implied 
that a 'just solution' would be imposed upon Nasser, if 
necessary. At the least, this indicated that the U.S. 
would use SCUA as an economic sanction. The British even 
inferred that Foster Dulles had reverted to the statement 
originally agreed on SCUA, allowing each power to take 
necessary action to preserve its rights.3
In the long run, the speech was disastrous. Having 
raised British expectations, Foster Dulles had no economic 
or military measures to satisfy them. He admitted to 
American journalists that there was 'no desire...to use 
the Users Association to establish a boycott of the Canal' 
and that 'the Users Association [was] not a device for 
denying Egypt any income at all with respect to the 
Canal.'4
On 20 September, Clark, Eden's Press Secretary, 
recorded 'a day of deepening depression.' When the 
conference concluded the next day, depression turned into 
near-panic. Foster Dulles' speech had raised other 
countries' fears that they might become involved in an 
economic or military war with Nasser, trapping the U.S. 
between Anglo-French determination and the caution of most 
of the 18 nations. Even the name for the Association was a 
cause for dispute. The American suggestion of CASU 
(Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users) was highly 
obscene in Portuguese, and as Lloyd recalled:
Various other combinations were tried. Almost
3 Lloyd, p. 144.
4 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9-2056, London to State 
Department, Cable SECTO 20, 20 September 1956.
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all of them meant something revolting, usually 
in Turkish.
Finally, it was discovered that SCUA offended no one.5
A more substantial problem was Pakistan's insistence 
that SCUA's sole purpose was negotiations with Nasser.' 
The Scandinavian countries were sceptical about the plan, 
and Spain was close to rejection. When Japanese delegates 
pressed Foster Dulles to clarify details, British hopes 
for the 'just solution' faded. The Secretary admitted that 
'de facto operating cooperation at the local level' would 
be necessary. If Egyptian law allowed only Egyptian pilots 
to transit the Canal, the provision of foreign pilots for 
SCUA would collapse. The final declaration of the 
Conference admitted SCUA would 'seek the cooperation of 
the competent Egyptian authorities pending a solution of 
the larger issues.' The section on dues gave no indication 
of pressure, saying only that 'any user of the Canal may 
pay to SCUA.'6
Clark wrote on 21 September:
A ghastly day with all the worst expectations 
turning up. Dulles pulled rug after rug from 
under us and watered down the Canal Users 
Association until it was meaningless....Pineau 
came in and seemed almost on the edge of 
dissolving the [Western] alliance.
The French were allegedly pacified by the announcement
that Eden and Lloyd would visit Paris the following week
and a private agreement that the Queen would tour France
in 1957.7 Eden, who had informed Winston Churchill on 10
5 Clark, p. 191; Lloyd, p. 145.
6 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301 Series, London to State 
Department, Cable SECTO 15, 20 September 1956, and 
Cables DULTE 8 and SECTO 25, 21 September 1956.
7 Clark, p. 191. See also AP, AP14/4, Jebb to Eden, 14
September 1956.
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September that 'the Americans seem very firmly lined up
with us on internationalism,' now wrote Churchill:
I am not very happy at the way things are 
developing here....Foster assures me that U.S. 
is as determined to deal with Nasser as we are - 
—  but I fear he has a mental caveat about 
November 6th [Presidential Election Day].8
Disillusioned with SCUA, the British reverted to U.N.
discussions as the pretext for military action. Eden,
Lloyd, and Foster Dulles discussed the topic on 20
September, Lloyd arguing for a meeting as early as
possible and Foster Dulles asking for a delayed approach.9
Eden then confirmed to Lloyd, 'I agree with you that it
[the Security Council] must be called together early next
week, even if only for a preliminary meeting.' Informed of
this by Lloyd after the Conference, Foster Dulles
requested ten days for the 18 powers to join SCUA.10
The British again had to decide between Anglo-
American cooperation and the military option. Because of
weather conditions and troop morale, REVISE could not be
implemented after the end of October. The decision to
launch the operation was required by 23 October. If
Britain heeded Foster Dulles' wishes, the Security
Council's endorsement of the British position and
Parliamentary sanction for military action might not be
arranged by then.
Eden decided to present the Americans with a fait
accompli. On 22 September, the Foreign Office informed the
8 Gilbert, p. 1210; Rhodes James, p. 514.
9 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/9-2156, Foster Dulles 
memorandum, 21 September 1956.
10 PRO, PREM11/1102, Eden to Lloyd and Foster Dulles-Lloyd 
meeting, 21 September 1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/ 
9-2156, Foster Dulles memorandum, 21 September 1956.
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British Embassy in Washington that the decision to appeal 
would be announced at 9 p.m. (4 p.m. in Washington) . 
Makins replied frantically that Foster Dulles could not be 
informed, as he was not landing in Washington before 4 
p.m. Fifteen minutes before the announcement, the British, 
'from courtesy,' postponed the press release until 3 p.m. 
on 23 September.11
At the airport, Foster Dulles told British Minister 
Coulson that the British action was 'sound' but said he 
thought Eden had agreed to wait for progress on SCUA. 
Fearing that hasty recourse to the Security Council might 
dissuade Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and perhaps Sweden and 
Denmark from joining the Association, he asked for a 
further 24-hour delay in the announcement. Eden refused, 
and on the 23rd, Britain proclaimed that it was going to 
the Security Council.12
Foster Dulles said on American television that he 
thought 'very well' of the British petition to the U.N. 
Privately, he was livid, telling the Australian
Ambassador:
[The British] moved awfully fast without quite 
knowing what they are doing... .There was no 
decision when he left [London] and he was told 
when he got off the plane.13
Disillusioned with the U.S., the British considered 
'going it alone' with the French, but resurrecting the old
11 PRO, PREM11/1102, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
4389, Washington to Foreign Office, Cables 1974 and 
1975, and Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 4403, 22 
September 1956.
12 PRO, PREM11/1102, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 
September 1956, and Brook minute, 23 September 1956.
13 PRO, F0371/119141/JE14211/1791, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1980, 23 September 1956; DDE, John Foster 
Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, Spender to Foster 
Dulles, 24 September 1956.
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problem: could Britain and France proceed without Tel
Aviv? During July and August, the French limited 
cooperation with Israel to general discussions and 
deliveries of equipment, but, frustrated by delays in the 
Anglo-French timetable, France approached the Israelis in 
early September about military planning against Egypt. The 
Israeli Chief of Staff, General Dayan, alerted his forces, 
'Our political circumstances obliged us to be capable of 
going into action and operating all our aircraft...and not 
to be caught in a position in which we would have to pass 
up favourable political opportunities to strike at Egypt.' 
Dayan's Chief of Operations, Major-General Meir Amit, was 
questioned by Admiral Pierre Barjot, MUSKETEER'S Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief, in Paris about Israeli intervention if 
appropriate political conditions arose in the immediate 
future.'14
When it became apparent that SCUA was not a vehicle 
for force, the French decided upon an Franco-Israeli 
attack against Egypt. The Director-General of the Israeli 
Ministry of Defence, Peres, discussed 'the objectives and 
methods of REVISE' with French Minister of Defence 
Bourges-Maunoury on 19 September. Dayan set three 
conditions for Israeli participation: first, France would 
treat Israel as 'an ally with equal rights'? second, 
Israel would not be brought into conflict with Britain? 
third, Israel would 'rectify its border with the Sinai' 
and acquire Sharm el-Sheikh and control of the Gulf of 
Aqaba. After the second London Conference, Bourges- 
Maunoury sent a birthday card to Ben-Gurion confirming
14 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, pp. 151ff.
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that France would meet Israel's conditions. On 25
September, the Israeli Cabinet instructed Dayan, Peres,
and Foreign Minister Meir to travel to Paris.15
About 23 September, Pineau broached the possibility
of Anglo-French cooperation with Israel to Lloyd and Eden.
Pineau allegedly claimed:
Eden showed a good deal of interest; Lloyd a 
great deal of reticence... .Nevertheless I was 
able to persuade them to give me a kind of carte 
blanche to undertake further negotiations with 
the Israelis.16
Pineau later disclaimed this account, but Bourges-Maunoury
confirmed to Peres:
When Pineau left London disappointed...he was 
able to throw this at Eden: 'It seems that we
have no choice but to work hand in hand with the 
Israelis....' The British Prime
Minister...reacted in a flaccid tone: 'On
condition that they do not hurt the 
Jordanians....' From this, [I conclude] the 
English will not attempt to interfere with the 
operation.
Dayan added that Pineau said, 'The feeling in French 
Ministry of Defence circles is that military operations 
against Egypt are essential and that France should launch
t h e m  even if she has to act alone. If she does, they
believe that Britain, in the end, will join in the
• 17campaign.'A'
A British Minister confirmed Lloyd's 'horrified' 
reaction to Pineau's proposals. The British Joint Planning 
Staff, unaware of the French approach, assessed:
15 Golan, p. 49? Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. pp. 230ff? Abel 
Thomas, p. 145? Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, pp. 152ff.? 
'Ben-Gurion's Diary,' 25 September 1956, in Troen and 
Shemesh, p. 299.
16 Terence Robertson, Inside Storv: The Storv of the Suez 
Conspiracy (London: Hutchinson, 1965), pp. 134ff.
17 Brecher, p. 265? Moshe Dayan, Diarv of the Sinai 
Campaign (London: Sphere, 1967), p. 30? 'Ben-Gurion's 
Diary,' 25 September 1956, in Troen and Shemesh, p. 299.
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Israeli action against Egypt would considerably 
help us. ...However, our apparent association 
with Israel could possibly lead to the 
disintegration of the Baghdad Pact, the loss of 
our position in Jordan and Iraq, and to a 
requirement to reinforce the Persian Gulf. It is 
therefore most important that we should avoid 
the appearance of any collusion with the 
Israelis. 8
In essence, Eden refrained from supporting a Franco- 
Israeli operation but indicated that London would not 
oppose the initiative. Macmillan was now in a strong 
position. Not only had he advocated cooperation with 
France and Israel, he was visiting the U.S. in late 
September. If the Chancellor could persuade Eisenhower, 
with whom he had served in World War II, to accept British 
military action against Nasser, an Anglo-French or even an 
Anglo-French-Israeli attack upon Egypt could be 
contemplated.
Furthermore, Macmillan's political future apparently 
depended upon American financial assistance. By 8 August, 
Sir Edward Bridges, the Permanent Secretary at the 
Treasury, warned that the Suez crisis placed Britain's 
balance of payments and foreign reserves under 
considerable pressure, and he reiterated on 7 September 
'the vital necessity from the point of view of our 
currency and our economy of ensuring that we do not go it 
alone and that we have the maximum U.S. support.' Treasury 
official Leslie Rowan warned Macmillan on 21 September 
that £250-300 million of foreign reserves had been lost in 
the last two months, bringing Britain near the Treasury
18 Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London; Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1966), p. 91? PRO, DEFE6/37, JP(56)149(Final), 
'Implications of Independent Israeli Aggression 
Concurrent with Operation MUSKETEER,' 27 September 1956.
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'floor' of $2 billion in dollar balances. Confidence in 
sterling...
...would not survive a war followed by 
protracted negotiations, resulting even in the 
fall of Nasser and the corresponding restoration 
of our prestige in the Middle East. It is 
unlikely that...the U.S. would be ready to join i 
n any far-reaching actions in the Middle East 
prior to the Elections.
Macmillan minuted, 'This is gloomy, but very likely
correct.' On the same day, a Treasury paper estimated that
Britain would lose £164 million ($466 million) in foreign
reserves if supplies of Middle Eastern oil were halted.19
The first significant event of Macmillan's mission
was a 35-minute meeting with Eisenhower on 25 September.
Macmillan cabled Eden that 'nothing very specific had
emerged.' He added, 'The President understands our
problems about Nasser, but he is, of course, in the same
position now as we were in May 1955, with an impending
general election.' Macmillan alleged in his memoirs:
On Suez, [Eisenhower] was sure that we must get 
Nasser down. The only thing was how to do it. I 
made it quite clear that we could not play it
long, without aid on a very large scale --- that
is, if playing it long involved buying dollar 
oil.20
In contrast, Eisenhower's version of events never referred 
to Nasser's overthrow. He merely told Foster Dulles of a 
'nice chat' about the British appeal to the Security 
Council and Macmillan's opinion that 'the Users 
Association [was] a good thing. Subsequently he recalled
19 PRO, T236/4188, Bridges to Macmillan, 8 August 1956, 
and Rowan to Macmillan, 21 September 1956, and 
subsequent minutes? PRO, T234/78, 'Suez: The Economic 
Effects of the Long Haul,' 21 September 1956.
20 PRO, PREM11/1102, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2004, 25 September 1956? Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 
139.
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that 'Harold said that, if it came to the worst, they'd go
down with the bands playing, the guns firing, and the
flags flying,' but he could not understand what Macmillan
was implying.' Ambassador Makins, the only witness to the
meeting, recalled:
I was expecting Harold to make a statement, say
something important on S u e z  but in fact he
said nothing....Nor did Eisenhower say anything.
I was amazed.21
Macmillan then attended a meeting of the
International Monetary Fund. Macmillan later claimed that,
to bolster foreign reserves, he requested a drawing from
Britain's contribution to the Fund. In fact, the Treasury
had not approved the step. *
Macmillan's day ended with a tense meeting with
Foster Dulles. After castigating the manner of Britain's
appeal to the U.N., Foster Dulles indicated he would order
U.S.-flagged ships to avoid paying dues to Egypt if
Britain and France faced the consequences, including
blockage of the Canal, but he still insisted that he had
no authority over U.S.-owned ships under other countries'
flags. Moreover, Britain would have to pay, in dollars,
for the diversion of oil from the Western Hemisphere if
the Canal were blocked, a cost estimated at $500,000-
$700,000 per year. Cornered, Macmillan admitted:
The detour [of ships around the Cape of Good 
Hope] was really not a practicable possibility 
for any length of time. The U.K. could not 
afford to borrow more dollars.
21 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 18, September 
1956 Phone Calls, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 25 
September 1956; AP, AP23/52/65, Middleton manuscript, 
'Where Has Last July Gone?'; Horne, p. 421; Author's 
interview with Lord Sherfield.
22 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 135; PRO, T236/4188, 
Ricketts memorandum, 29 September 1956.
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As the Foreign Office predicted, Foster Dulles asked for a 
return to OMEGA: 'The U.S. Government was prepared to do
everything it could to bring Nasser down, but...the most 
effective way of doing so was to let the present situation 
in the Canal continue and use other means of pressure 
which would shortly be discussed between us.'23
Foster Dulles had clearly warned Macmillan of the 
limits of American action, but the Chancellor put events 
in a positive light to the Foreign Office. Noting Foster 
Dulles' readiness to force U.S.-flagged ships to pay dues 
to SCUA, Macmillan thought, inexplicably, that the 
Americans would press U.S.-owned ships, short of 
legislation, to withhold dues. As for Foster Dulles' 
warning that Britain must finance diversion of oil, 
Macmillan only said that Foster Dulles believed the 
economic dangers of Nasser's reaction to withdrawal of 
dues 'might be very serious.'24
Macmillan went even further in 'unofficial' reports 
to Eden, hinting at a U.S. 'blind eye' toward, if not 
support for, force. He noted Eisenhower's anxiety about 
the election but informed Eden that the President was 
'really determined, somehow or another, to bring Nasser 
down' and understood that Britain 'must win or the whole
o e
structure of our economy would collapse.
Macmillan also alleged that, after he said that he 
did 'not think [Britain] could stand for six months' 
waiting for OMEGA'S success, Foster Dulles conceded:
23 PRO, PREM11/1102, Washington to Foreign Office, Cables 
2000 and 2001, 25 September 1956.
24 PRO, PREM11/1102, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2002, 25 September 1956.
25 PRO, PREM11/1102, Macmillan to Eden, 25 September 1956.
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[He] quite realised that we might have to act by 
force....Our threat of force was vital, whether 
we used it or not, to keep Nasser worried.
The Secretary asked, as he and Eisenhower had helped Eden
during the May 1955 British general election by agreeing
to the Geneva summit with the Soviets, if Britain 'could
not do something in return and hold things off until after
November 6th?' Macmillan's implication was clear: because
of the Presidential election, the Americans could not
intervene against military action. In fact, Foster Dulles,
indicating that the U.S. would proceed with OMEGA after 6
November, was warning Macmillan that the Americans could
not condone a showdown with Nasser before then.27
On 29 September, Deputy Undersecretary Robert Murphy,
reiterated Foster Dulles' message to Macmillan.
Significantly, Makins recorded that nothing Murphy said
was inconsistent with the views of Eisenhower or Foster
Dulles. Murphy again asked that Britain refrain from
acting before Election Day. OMEGA could then be
implemented:
The position would be quite different....Between 
us, we should be able to encompass [Nasser's] 
downfall within a few months. It was high time 
that Nasser's pretensions and those of the other 
Arab states were deflated.27
Makins later assessed that there was 'no basis at all 
for Harold's optimism.' Given Macmillan's political 
experience, it is unlikely that he misinterpreted the 
American sentiment against force. Instead, the Chancellor 
was trying to bolster Eden with the impression that 
Eisenhower and Foster Dulles would not risk public
26 PRO, PREM11/1102, Macmillan to Eden, 26 September 1956.
27 PRO, F0371/120342/AU1057/1, Makins memorandum, 29 
September 1956.
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division with two NATO allies and oppose Anglo-French 
action.28 On the other hand, if nothing was done, Britain 
would drift into negotiations with Egypt, with disastrous 
political and economic consequences. As Kirkpatrick, the 
Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, 
complained:
In two years' time, Nasser will have deprived us 
of our oil, the sterling area fallen apart, no 
European defence possibly, unemployment and 
unrest in the United Kingdom, and our standard 
of living reduced to that of the Yugoslavs or 
Egyptians.29
Ironically, Macmillan's influence had been eclipsed 
by events, and he returned from Washington to find the 
Egypt Committee considering genuine negotiations. Foreign 
Office officials, almost all of whom except Kirkpatrick 
were wary of force, turned the decision to approach the 
U.N. to their advantage, and Lloyd, concerned with the 
American attitude and world opinion, was ready to support 
them. He told the Egypt Committee on 25 September that it 
was impossible to reject all proposals for negotiations 
and introduced a plan, drafted by Indian Foreign Minister 
Krishna Menon, for a 'system of guarantee, controlled by 
arbitrators,' between the Egyptian Canal Authority and 
Canal users for development of the Canal and transit dues. 
Ministers noted that arrangements for international 
consultation were 'probably more satisfactory than any 
proposal that could be agreed with Egypt after the 
expiration of the original concession [to the Suez Canal 
Company] in 1968.' Although 'such a scheme would...need 
some effective sanctions,' Lloyd was authorised to speak
28 See Horne, p. 422.
29 Shuckburgh, p. 360.
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with Menon.30 Even Eden was considering negotiations,
telling the Cabinet that he hoped to persuade the French
'that it would not be possible to reject at the Security
Council all suggestions for further negotiations between
the parties to the dispute.'31
British moderation led to a 'very difficult' meeting
of more than two hours with Mollet and Pineau on 26
September in Paris. Eden recorded that the French 'did not
like [U.N. negotiations] at all....They [stood] by the 18-
Power proposals and [were] not prepared for any
modification of them.' Eden concluded:
My own feeling is that the French, particularly 
M. Pineau, are in the mood to blame everyone, 
including us, if military action is not taken 
before the end of October. M. Mollet...would 
like to get a settlement on reasonable terms if 
he could. I doubt whether M. Pineau wants a 
settlement at all.32
Privately, Eden was impressed with French 
determination,33 but without a pretext for military 
action, he saw no way to reverse British acceptance of 
negotiations. Lloyd told the Egypt Committee that, 
although he would stand by the 18-Power proposals, 'This 
need not mean that the Western Powers should refuse to 
consider any counterproposals put forward by Egypt.' The 
Committee noted that the Menon plan 'would at least 
provide for international supervision' and could be
30 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)31st meeting, 25 September 
1956.
31 PRO, PREM11/1102, Bishop minute and Eden revisions, 25 
September 1956; PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.(56)67, 26 September 
1956.
32 PRO, PREM11/1102, Paris to Foreign Office, Cable 337,
26 September 1956.
33 See DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 43, 
Suez Summaries, Number 19, 28 September 1956; Gilbert, 
p. 1214.
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developed to allow international control of the Canal.34
On 3 October, the Cabinet reached the same
conclusion, although the 'hawks,' possibly using the idea
of cooperation with Israel,35 protested:
Our objectives would not be fully attained if we 
accepted a settlement of the Suez Canal dispute 
which left Colonel Nasser's influence 
undiminished throughout the Middle East....There 
was evidence that he was already seeking to 
foment discontent with the existing regimes in 
other Arab countries. Disturbing reports had 
been received of dissident movements in Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
Eden rationalised, 'If [the Egyptians] continued to be
obdurate, world opinion might be ready to support a
recourse to forceful measures.
MI6's continued pressure upon the Prime Minister had
been eclipsed,37 although Eden decided, before embarking
upon negotiations, to test Eisenhower with another
personal appeal:
You can be sure that we are fully alive to the 
wider dangers of the Middle Eastern situation.
They can be summed up in one word --- Russia....
There is no doubt in our minds that Nasser, 
whether he likes it or not, is now effectively 
in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in 
Hitler's. It would be as ineffective to show 
weakness to Nasser now in order to placate him 
as it was to show weakness to Mussolini....
Eden pleaded for U.S.-owned ships to pay transit dues to
• . . .  T OSCUA as a sign of American intentions. °
'Abandoned' by Britain, France sought final agreement 
on action with Israel. On 30 September, Meir, Peres, and 
Dayan met Pineau, Bourges-Maunoury, and General Maurice
34 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)32nd meeting, 1 October 1956.
35 See Hugh Thomas, p. 96.
36 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.68(56), 3 October 1956.
37 See DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, 
October 1956 (2), London to State Department, Cable 
1932, 9 October 1956.
38 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eden to Eisenhower, 1 October 1956.
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Challe, the Chief of the Air Staff, in Paris. Pineau
suggested that, if Israel attacked Egypt, Britain and
France could 'intervene' as peacekeepers and control the
Suez Canal. He insisted that the invasion of Egypt must
occur before 6 November:
[The Americans] would not take the
responsibility of deliberately breaking the 
Atlantic alliance before the elections....They
could not alienate...the great number of 
pro-Israeli voters in the U.S. by taking a 
position against Israel.
On the other hand, if Eisenhower is elected, 
Dulles will no longer hesitate to make an
agreement with the Russians, at our expence, to 
protect the interests of the oil lobby in the 
U.S. He will no longer hesitate to impose 
sanctions against Israel in the event of her 
intervention [in Egypt].
Meir wanted to consult the U.S., but Pineau refused 
and asked for Franco-Israeli planning, with or without
British participation. Dayan and Meir agreed, although the 
latter requested a guarantee that Britain would not attack 
Israel if Israeli-Jordanian fighting followed action
against Egypt.39 French Chief of Staff Ely, in discussions 
with Dayan, agreed to the supply of additional equipment, 
notably 100 Sherman tanks and 300 half-tracks, to Israel, 
although he declined to commit French forces in a 
simultaneous attack upon Egypt. A date of 20 October was 
set for the military operation.40
The Americans were excluded from the discussions in 
London, Paris, and Tel Aviv, the Americans lost the 
diplomatic initiative. Foster Dulles complained to Lodge, 
the U.S. Ambassador at the U.N.:
39 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, pp. 157ff.; Bar-Zohar, Ben- 
Gurion. pp. 231ff.? Golan, pp. 50ff; Abel Thomas, pp. 
145ff.
40 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, pp. 161ff.
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We don't know what they are after. The French 
are eager to get into a fighting war.... The 
British Cabinet is divided; I don't know where 
the balance of power lies. 1
Foster Dulles responded hastily at a press conference on 2
October. First, he rejected economic pressure upon Egypt,
within or without the Users Association. Asked about
collapsing the price for Egyptian cotton through the
'dumping' of American cotton surpluses, he replied:
It may be that ways can be found if they are 
sought... which would be somewhat disturbing to 
Egypt's cotton market, but we are not now 
engaging in any economic war against Egypt.
Second, he repeated that 'there were never "teeth" in
[SCUA], if that means the use of force.' Finally, he
attacked upon Britain and France:
The U.S. cannot be expected to identify itself 
100 percent either with the colonial powers or 
the powers uniquely concerned with the problem 
of getting independence as rapidly and as fully 
as possible....I hope that we shall always stand 
together in treaty relations covering the North 
Atlantic, [but] any areas encroaching in some 
form or manner on the problem of so-called 
colonialism find the U.S. playing a somewhat 
independent role. 2
Foster Dulles' outburst resulted from pique rather 
than policy, but it was a catastrophic failure of 
judgement. As Nasser asserted that his struggle against 
Britain was a fight against colonialism, Foster Dulles' 
remark implied American support for Cairo. The following 
day, Foster Dulles told Makins that 'he had been drawn 
into a line of discussion which was in itself undesirable' 
and 'his remarks had been given a connexion which he did 
not intend.' Moreover, the typescript of his answers was
41 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Lodge, 2 October 1956.
42 PRO, PREM11/1174, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2046, 2 October 1956.
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released to the press before he saw it.43
Despite Foster Dulles' repentance, American and
British journalists speculated that he was privately
pursuing an American 'middle course' between Egypt and the
Anglo-French position. The Times commented, after a
private briefing by Press Secretary Clark:
Mr. Dulles' wavering course over the Suez issue 
has been watched in Britain with patient 
understanding because of the realisation that 
the U.S. is on the eve of a presidential 
election and whatever he does or says has to 
pass the test of that scrutiny, but some of his 
words at yesterday's press conference can hardly 
claim the indulgence of that understanding any 
longer.44
Eden protested to Washington:
It would be...dishonest to pretend that the 
press conference did not give a severe shock to 
public opinion here.... Anything which could be 
said by Mr. Dulles to redress that balance will 
buttress peace.45
It was too late to 'redress the balance.' At the NSC,
Foster Dulles complained that 'never before in recent
years' had the U.S. been in an international crisis with
no idea of British and French intentions. Eisenhower, who
was receiving reports of top-secret talks between CIA
officials and Wing Commander Ali Sabri, a member of
Nasser's ruling council, reaffirmed:
The U.S. would be dead wrong to join in any 
resort to force. We should instead hold out for 
honest negotiations with the Egyptians.46
43 PRO, PREM11/1174, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2052, 3 October 1956, and Makins to Eden, 4 October 
1956.
44 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 2 October 
1956; PRO, PREM11/1174, The Times. 3 October 1956.
45 PRO, PREM11/1174, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
4592, 4 October 1956.
46 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
7, 299th NSC meeting, 4 October 1956; DDE, Ann Whitman
Series, International, Box 43, Suez Summaries, Number 
20, 1 October 1956, and Number 21, 2 October 1956.
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Renewed Anglo-American cooperation depended upon 
British adherence to OMEGA. On 20 September, Eden and 
Foster Dulles discussed 'setting up a very secret working 
party...in London to consider continued economic and 
political means of weakening and lessening the prestige of 
the regime of Colonel Nasser.' Two weeks later, Foreign 
Office and MI6 personnel, including Patrick Dean, the head 
of the Permanent Undersecretary's Department, met State 
Department and CIA personnel, including the Roosevelts, in 
Washington to discuss OMEGA. It was agreed that the coup 
against the Syrian Government through Operation STRAGGLE 
would be implemented by the end of October.47
Even this cooperation was undermined by MI6's 
independent activities. During the summer of 1956, the 
intelligence service worked with the Iraqis, the banned 
Syrian group Parti Populaire Syrienne (PPS), and Syrian 
military conspirators. While the Americans cleared their 
operation with British officials, MI6 withheld information 
from the Americans. MI6 probably consulted the Iraqis in 
summer 1956 about the return to power of the former 
dictator Adib Shishakli before the Americans, who doubted 
Shishakli had widespread support within Syria, forced his
A Q
departure from the Lebanon. °
By October, the British Military Attache in Beirut 
and General Daghestani, the Iraqi Deputy Chief of Staff, 
were discussing the details of a new plan. A PPS para-
47 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject, Alphabetical, 
Box 11, Miscellaneous Paper - U.K. (4), Foster Dulles 
memorandum, 21 September 1956; AP, AP20/34/4, Eden memorandum, undated.
48 PRO, FO371/121858-121859/VY1015/File; PRO, F0371/12 8220/VY1015/File. W
302
military force would seize Horns, and Salah Shishakli, the 
former dictator's brother, led his men against Hama. Other 
PPS troops would occupy key positions in Damascus and 
assassinate left-wing Army officers. Tribes, such as the 
Druze in the south and the Alawites in the west, supplied 
with Iraqi arms, would simultaneously rebel. Politicians 
involved in the plot included Adnan Atassi, former 
Ambassador to France; his cousin Faydi Atassi, a former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs; former Minister of Justice 
Mounir Ajlani; and former Minister of State Hassan Atrash, 
a Druze leader. It is not clear if Ilyan, the chief
American contact for STRAGGLE and well-known to the Iraqis
and the British, played a role in the Anglo-Iraqi 
planning.49
The Anglo-American 'alliance' in the Middle East was 
not dormant by early October. At working level, the State 
Department, CIA, and Foreign Office collaborated over
OMEGA and relations between the military staffs were 
close. However, American influence with the Egypt
Committee had effectively been replaced by the influence 
of France and, through the French, Israel. Yet, the 
Committee, struggling for independence from the U.S., 
played into the hands of British officials who sought a 
negotiated settlement. The appeal to the Security Council 
was not overseen by ad hoc committees but by the regular 
Foreign Office machinery. Lloyd, accused by some of being 
'Eden's poodle,' now became the most important figure in 
British policymaking.
49 PRO/F0371/128220/VY1015/File.
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CHAPTER 13 
5 OCTOBER - 14 OCTOBER: FORCE DISMISSED
Foster Dulles, upset with Eden, misinterpreted by 
Macmillan, and ignored by the Egypt Committee, had one 
last card to play. If he could personally influence Lloyd, 
he could tilt the balance in London against force. Before 
the Security Council considered Suez, he warned Lloyd and 
Pineau:
There must be some international participation 
in the operation of the Canal. [The U.S.] also 
believed, however, that every possible effort 
must be made to secure this objective by 
peaceful means and that the use of force would 
be a desperate remedy.
Lloyd stood firm, using words reminiscent of Kirkpatrick
and Eden:
We knew the Egyptians were planning a coup in 
Libya? they had arms ready there for use and 
there was a plot to kill the King. King Saud was 
also threatened. In Iraq Nuri was now in control 
but there was dissatisfaction amongst some of 
the younger officers and this was likely to grow 
if we continue to do nothing. Jordan was already 
penetrated and Syria was virtually under 
Egyptian control.
Pineau added, 'Nothing less than the existence of NATO was
at stake.'
Foster Dulles insisted, 'If force were used, we could 
write off Pakistan, Iran, and Ethiopia. The position in 
Africa would be worse and not better,' but again he made 
his position palatable by allowing force in the last 
resort:
The potential use of force must be kept in 
existence... .We must make it clear in the 
Security Council that if a real effort to get a 
peaceful settlement were made failed, it would 
then be permissible to consider force as an
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alternative.1
Eden was temporarily absent from British
policymaking. Visiting his wife Clarissa in University
College Hospital, he was struck by a high fever, a
recurrent effect of his 1953 gall bladder operation, and
admitted to the hospital. By 7 October, his temperature
returned to normal, he cabled Lloyd with renewed vigor:
In the last resort, action will be necessary. It 
is therefore very important that, while 
appearing reasonable, we shall not be inveigled 
away in negotiation from the fundamentals to 
which we have held all along and that we should 
not be parted from the French.
Eden's absence, however, revealed the split within
Britain's 'official' policy. Lloyd, supported by the
Foreign Office and confronted by Foster Dulles' refusal to
support significant economic measures, was ready for
negotiations, but in London, Macmillan, regaining his
former influence, steered the Egypt Committee towards a
firmer position.
Lloyd urged Foster Dulles to 'give [SCUA] a few
vitamins.' Foster Dulles indicated that the Administration
would demand withholding of dues from Egypt by U.S. ships
after British and French ships began payments to SCUA. If
the U.S. acted first, American ships might be denied
passage through the Canal while the vessels of Britain,
France, and other countries freely transitted. Lloyd
realised Foster Dulles was playing for time, since no dues
could be paid to SCUA until it was organised and
1 PRO, PREM11/1102, Foster Dulles-Lloyd-Pineau meeting, 5 
October 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/10-556, Lodge 
memorandum, 5 October 1956.
2 PRO, PREM11/1102, Foreign Office to New York, Cable 
1070, 7 October 1956.
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compensation arranged for the old Suez Canal Company.3
Foster Dulles insisted that he 'was in full agreement 
with [Britain] on every point except the wisdom of the 
ultimate use of force,' but the Egypt Committee instructed 
Lloyd to insist that the U.S. pay dues to the Association. 
Lloyd was also told to stand firmly upon the 18-Power Plan 
in the Security Council.4 The position of Macmillan, who 
allegedly threatened to resign if a compromise was struck 
with Egypt, was expected. More intriguing was the 
emergence of Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office as a 'hawk.'
On 8 October, Nutting met Indian Foreign Minister 
Menon, who was promoting his plan for international 
cooperation in the Canal's administration. Although India 
would not propose military sanctions, Menon proposed 
binding arbitration and possible economic sanctions in a 
dispute between Egypt and the Canal users. Nutting 
minuted, 'There might even be some slight improvement for 
us' in the package but warned, 'At present... [it is] 
unwise to treat the plan as other than a piece of Indian 
private enterprise.'5 The next morning, Nutting persuaded 
Eden to reject the Menon proposals. He argued that 
cooperation between SCUA and the Egyptian Canal Authority 
should not extend beyond advice proffered at joint 
sessions and rejected any reference of disputes to the 
International Court of Justice or the U.N.6
3 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 
798, 7 October 1956, and Cable 801, 8 October 1956.
4 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)33rd meeting, 8 October 1956.
5 PRO, PREM11/1102, Foreign Office to New York, Cable 
1075, 8 October 1956.
6 PRO, PREM11/1102, Foreign Office to New York, Cable 
1086, 9 October 1956, and Cable 1106, 10 October 1956.
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Lloyd, however, was already discussing variants of 
the Menon plan with Pineau and Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Mahmoud Fawzi. The Security Council adjourned on 9 October 
to allow the three to confer under the auspices of U.N. 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. Fawzi said the 
Egyptians would accept the 1888 Convention or a new 
agreement concerning the Canal. They would designate a 
percentage of revenues for the Canal's development and fix 
the level of tolls through negotiation. They would endorse 
an arbitration tribunal, with one Egyptian member, one 
member from SCUA, and an impartial chairman. Finally, they 
would welcome Britain's ideas on enforcement of the 
tribunal's decisions.7
Eden had forced to accept the negotiations, since 
halting the talks would put Britain in the wrong before 
world opinion and ruin any pretext for force. Instead, he 
suggested to the Egypt Committee that Lloyd ask Fawzi for 
details of Egyptian proposals. Meanwhile, Foster Dulles 
would be pressed to agree that dues could be withheld from 
Egypt if the Egyptians violated any agreement reached with 
SCUA. Just in case the Egyptians were conciliatory, Eden 
added the proviso that Egypt should abandon her blockade
of Israeli shipping through the Canal, an almost
. . . 8 impossible condition for Cairo to accept.
Unfortunately for Eden, Lloyd continued to obtain 
concessions, as Fawzi agreed, without qualification, that 
the Canal should be insulated from Egyptian politics. 
Lloyd warned the French that negotiations with Egypt meant
7 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 
814, 9 October 1956.
8 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)34th meeting, 10 October 1956.
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'any resort to force would be ruled out in the immediate
future' and cabled Eden, 'I doubt whether Pineau really
believes that a peaceful settlement is possible and I am
not entirely convinced that he wants one.'9
Considering the reply to Lloyd, Eden met Minister of
Defence Monckton, Minister of Transport Watkinson, Cabinet
Secretary Brook, and Kirkpatrick and A.D.M. Ross of the
Foreign Office. Finally, the 'hawks' were defeated.
Macmillan was absent, Watkinson was disillusioned by the
failure of Operation PILEUP, and Monckton's aversion to
force was unabated. The meeting conceded:
The present proposals would at least provide a 
system of international cooperation with a 
considerable measure of financial control. 
Moreover, the consortium of the Users 
Association and the Egyptian Board to some 
extent satisfied the requirements for an 
international authority postulated in the 18- 
Power proposals.
Participants suggested a clause, linked to the U.N.
Charter, that any Egyptian breach of the principle of free
navigation would 'constitute an act of aggression which
justified the injured country in taking action to protect
its interests.'
The Egypt Committee intended to end the U.N. talks by
12 October to allow the 'consultation' of Parliament about
the launching of REVISE. The Committee now accepted Eden's
recommendation:
Provided the present pressure was maintained on 
Egyptian representatives in these negotiations,
[the Foreign Secretary] should not feel himself 
bound to terminate the discussions by the end of 
this week [12 October] if at the time it 
appeared that a satisfactory agreement would 
shortly be obtained.
9 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 
819, 10 October 1956, and Cable 821, 11 October 1956.
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Eden cabled Lloyd that he was 'delighted to see that [you]
fought so hard' in the negotiations and concluded, 'I know
you will do your best to keep the French in line.'10
Lloyd's antagonist was no longer Fawzi but Pineau.
He cabled Eden on 11 October:
Pineau's heavy cold has now translated itself 
into a fever and his influence upon our 
discussions is almost entirely negative....I am 
doing my best to keep him in line, but he seems 
determined (a) to prevent any agreement, (b) to 
present our negotiations in the worst possible 
light, (c) to end up with an expression of 
opinion by the Security Council which would tie 
our hands.
Late in the evening, however, the talks produced 'Fawzi's 
quite definite statement that Egypt would leave the Users 
to organise themselves as they wished. Egypt would 
recognise the association and would accept the dues paid 
through it.'11
On 12 October, Lloyd and Fawzi accepted 'Six 
Principles' for operation of the Canal:
1. There should be free and open transit through 
the Canal without discrimination, overt or 
covert;
2. There should be respect for Egyptian
sovereignty;
3. The operation of the Canal should be
insulated from the politics of any country;
4. The level of dues should be fixed by
agreement between users and owners;
5. A fair proportion of the dues should be 
allotted to development [of the Canal];
6. Affairs between the Suez Canal Company 
and the Egyptian Government should be settled 
by arbitration, with suitable terms of 
reference and suitable provision for the 
payment of the sums found to be due.12
10 PRO, PREM11/1102, Ministerial meeting, 11 October 1956, 
and Foreign Office to New York, Cable 1125, 11 October 
1956.
11 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cable
829, 11 October 1956.
12 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cable
830, 11 October 1956, and Cable 835, 12 October 1956.
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All eleven members of the Security Council, including the 
Soviet Union, supported the Principles. The issue, Lloyd 
wrote, was 'how were these principles to be 
implemented?'13 Pineau insisted that he could not stay in 
New York beyond 14 October, and Lloyd realised that a 
detailed agreement could not be reached in 48 hours. 
Therefore, he and Pineau introduced the 18-Power Plan as 
the 'most appropriate' means to implement the Six 
Principles. Lloyd recognised the Soviet Union would veto 
this but hoped that a substantial majority for the plan 
bolster Britain's negotiating position.14
The Americans were now optimistic about the prospect 
of a peaceful settlement. Foster Dulles told the NSC that 
Britain appeared 'to favor a compromise settlement but are 
deeply concerned on how they can square such a compromise 
with the strong positions which they have taken publicly.' 
To reinforce British 'moderates,' Foster Dulles finally 
suggested that, once SCUA was established, U.S.-flagged 
ships would be mandated to pay Canal dues to the 
Association and U.S.-owned ships would be encouraged to do 
likewise.15
In his relief, Eisenhower spoke too freely, telling a
press conference:
It looks like here is a very great crisis that 
is behind us. I do not mean to say that we are 
completely out of the woods, but...in both 
[Foster Dulles'] heart and miAp there is a very 
great prayer of thanksgiving.16
13 Lloyd, p. 159.
14 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cables 
835 and 845, 12 October 1956.
15 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
8, 300th NSC meeting, 12 October 1956.
16 Lloyd, p. 160.
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Lloyd, incensed that the President spoke before the 
Security Council vote on the 18-Power Plan, told Foster 
Dulles that he 'was disgusted by the way in which our hand 
is weakened at every stage of this business by what is 
said over here.'17
Despite Lloyd's pessimism, nine countries supported 
the 18-Power Plan in the Council, with only Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union, using the veto, opposed. Lloyd informed 
Eden, 'The suspicion that we were treating the United 
Nations simply as formality has been dissipated.' The 
option of military action was still open, since Britain 
emerged...
...without any result enjoining us against force 
or to set up a negotiating committee....With the 
changed atmosphere here, we can count on a more 
understanding reaction if we have to take 
extreme measures.
This could only be undertaken, however, if Egypt refused
to continue discussions. Lloyd concluded, 'We are now
committed to further interchanges with Egypt without a
time limit.'18
On the morning of 14 October, Eden and Nutting read
Lloyd's final report. The Prime Minister could have
overruled Lloyd's call for genuine negotiations. He told
the Conservative Party Conference the previous day, 'We
have refused to say that in no circumstances would we ever
use force.' To rapturous applause, Eden repeated that
Britain would not accept Egyptian control of the Canal.
Two days earlier, Nutting delivered a similar statement
17 PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 
852, 13 October 1956.
18 Lloyd, p. 160? PRO, PREM11/1102, New York to Foreign 
Office, Cable 854, 14 October 1956.
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with the same results.19
Privately, however, Eden's resolve for military
action had disappeared. A cable to Lloyd, drafted by
Nutting and approved by Eden, suggested further
negotiations:
Should not we and the French now approach the 
Egyptians and ask them whether they are prepared 
to meet and discuss in confidence with us on the 
basis of the second half of the resolution which 
the Russians vetoed? If they say yes, then it is 
for consideration whether we and the French meet 
them somewhere, e.g. Geneva. If they say no, 
then they will be in defiance of the view of 
nine members of the Security Council and a new 
situation will arise.20
Why did Eden change his mind between 10 October, when 
he rejected Menon's ideas, and 14 October, when he 
accepted negotiations on similar proposals? One could 
speculate that Eden expected the Egyptians to reject the 
talks in Geneva 'on the basis' of the 18-Power proposals, 
but the Prime Minister knew that discussions with Egypt 
had progressed beyond international 'control' of the Canal 
to international 'cooperation' with the Egyptian Canal 
Authority.21
Eden and Nutting's decision was forced by a lack of 
options. British and French commanders, with the declining 
morale of their forces22 and the approach of winter 
weather, could no longer maintain REVISE. On 12 October, 
the British Chiefs of Staff approved the 'Winter Plan,' to
19 Eden, p. 507? Rhodes James, pp. 526ff.? USNA, RG 59, 
CDF, 741.00/10-1856, London to State Department, Cable 
2134, 18 October 1956.
20 PRO, PREM11/1102, Foreign Office to New York, Cable 
1198, 14 October 1956.
21 See Lamb, p. 227.
22 See PRO, W032/16709, Middle East Rear Command to War 
Office, Cable 78719/PSZ, 3 October 1956, and Troopers to 
Forces, Cable 06161/AG, 10 October 1956.
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take effect in a week. While the Plan, like REVISE, used 
an aerial assault and psychological warfare in Phases I 
and II, the bombing of Egypt 'might occupy 10 to 14 days 
or even longer' because of adverse weather conditions, 
shorter daylight hours, and selective targeting to ensure 
few civilian casualties. More importantly, because of the 
release of reservists and shipping from duty, no landing 
of troops on open beaches could be attempted until Spring 
1957.23
As long as Fawzi negotiated and Nasser allowed 
traffic to transit the Canal, Lloyd and Pineau could not 
end discussions. American expectations of a peaceful 
settlement were confirmed by Eisenhower's statement of 12 
October. Finally, Nutting was a significant influence, 
acting as Eden's closest adviser while the Prime Minister 
rested at Chequers and attended the Conservative Party 
Conference between 8 and 14 October. As in March, when he 
advised against punishment of Jordan for Glubb's 
dismissal, Nutting, belatedly accepting Lloyd's efforts in 
New York, presented retreat from military action as a 
diplomatic alternative which would eventually pay 
dividends.
23 PRO, PREM11/1104, COS(56)380, 'Operation MUSKETEER: 
Winter Plan,' 12 October 1956.
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CHAPTER 14
14 OCTOBER-29 OCTOBER 1956: FORCE RESURRECTED
Eden's telegram proposing negotiations with the 
Egyptians in Geneva was despatched to Lloyd at 1:30 p.m. 
on 14 October. At 3 p.m., Eden intended to inform two 
French envoys of the change of policy, but Acting Foreign 
Minister Albert Gazier and General Maurice Challe, the 
Chief of Air Staff, had their own surprise for the Prime 
Minister. By 4 p.m., the Anglo-French military option was 
revived.
Gazier opened the discussion by unexpectedly asking 
about British policy if Israel attacked Egypt. Puzzled, 
Eden noted that Britain, France, and the U.S. agreed in 
the Tripartite Declaration to oppose any aggression across 
Arab-Israeli frontiers, but Gazier persisted, inquiring if 
Britain would act under the Declaration when Israel 
invaded Egypt. The Prime Minister, finally recognising the 
French plan, asked Nutting, 'Didn't your agreement [the 
1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty] say something about our not 
being obliged to send troops if Egypt was attacked by 
Israel?' Nutting correctly answered that the treaty had 
nothing to do with the Egyptian-Israeli question and did 
not nullify British obligations under the Tripartite 
Declaration. Eden was crestfallen but 'could scarcely 
contain his glee' when Gazier noted that Nasser recently 
stated that the Declaration did not apply to Egypt.
Challe then revealed the French plan. Hours after 
Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, Britain and France 
would order the Egyptians and Israelis to withdraw their
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forces either side of the Suez Canal, and an Anglo-French 
force would occupy the Canal Zone. Eden said he would 
answer the proposal by 16 October, but revealed his 
thoughts when he dismissed Nutting's request to question 
the French about the secret delivery of more than 60 
Mystere IV fighters to Israel.1
To prompt the British into an operation including 
Israel against Egypt, some cause had to be found, and the 
French discovered it in the Israeli-Jordanian conflict and 
British sponsorship of the Iraqi-Jordanian axis. Gazier 
and Challe only had to convince Eden that, if he rejected 
their approach, Israeli-Jordanian troubles would lead to 
Anglo-Israeli war.
On 10 September, seven Israeli soldiers were slain in 
Jerusalem, allegedly by Jordanian attackers. Israel's 
Force 101, the specialist commando unit, demolished a 
police post near Hebron the next evening, killing 19. 
After three Israeli watchmen were killed on 12 September, 
10 Jordanians died in an Israeli attack upon the police 
post at Gharandal.2
Jordan's King Hussein was desperate. Hoping for 
Egyptian assistance, he supported Nasser's nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal Company, but Egypt was preoccupied with 
Anglo-French military preparations. General Nuwar, the 
Jordanian Chief of Staff, asked Saudi Arabia for £12 
million in military equipment, but King Saud only agreed 
to £2-3 million, spread among Arab states, 'mostly in 
ships and dates.' Syrian forces were inadequate and its
1 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 90ff.
2 PRO, FO371/121780/VR1091/278, Laurence minute, 26 
September 1956.
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government unstable. So Hussein, despite dissatisfaction 
at earlier Iraqi-Jordanian staff talks and lack of Iraqi 
aid, met King Feisal II, Crown Prince Abdul-Illah, Prime 
Minister Nuri Sa'id, and the Iraqi Chief of Staff on 14 
September to request that the Iraqis immediately send a 
division to Jordan. Unwilling to put troops under Nuwar's 
command, the Iraqis refused, but they offered to send two 
or three brigades if Jordan accepted a 'proper plan with 
command structure and defined roles.
Hussein's approach gave Britain a new opportunity to 
forge an Iraqi-Jordanian defence system. Lloyd wrote that 
the despatch of an Iraqi division into Jordan 'would have 
the advantage that were Jordan to disintegrate, a 
substantial portion of Jordan would remain under Iraqi 
control.' The Chiefs of Staff suggested 'approaching the 
Iraqis with a view to informing the Jordanian Government 
that, in the event that [Iraq] put forces into Jordan, 
[Jordan] could expect to have air support from the RAF 
stationed there.'4
Tension rose as the Iraqi-Jordanian staff talks 
stalled over the question of command and the Israelis 
stepped up reprisals. After an attack upon Israeli 
archaeologists by a deranged Jordanian soldier, Israeli 
troops overwhelmed another police post near Jerusalem in 
the 'biggest actual military operation since the 1948 
armistice,' killing more than 30. On 27 September, Nuri
3 PRO, F0371/121486/VJ10393/60, Baghdad to Foreign 
Office, Cable 1048, 15 September 1956.
4 PRO, FO371/121587/VJ10393/106G, Extract from Lloyd 
minute, 17 September 1956; PRO, DEFE4/90, COS(56)94th 
meeting, 18 September 1956; PRO, F0371/121486/VJ10393/ 
60, Foreign Office to Baghdad, Cable 1872, 20 September 
1956.
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invited British Ambassador Wright to join discussions with 
the Jordanian Foreign Minister.5
The Foreign Office had a difficult decision. Wright's 
attendance would indicate British approval of the Iraqi 
deployment, but Teddy Kollek, Israeli Prime Minister Ben- 
Gurion's chief aide, told U.S. Ambassador Edward Lawson 
that Israel would occupy Jordanian territory if 'a single 
Iraqi soldier moved into Jordan.' On the other hand, Iraq 
and Jordan would interpret refusal to uphold the Anglo- 
Jordanian Treaty as British abandonment of her Arab 
allies. The Baghdad Pact would be undermined and Jordan 
might join the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian bloc.6
The Foreign Office stood by the Iraqi-Jordanian axis. 
If Israel attacked Jordan, Britain would provide air and 
naval support to Amman, and Nuwar's forces could draw upon 
£7 million of British stocks. Israel would be told that 
Britain would honour the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and U.S. 
support would be sought for the Iraqi deployment. Wright 
presented the decision to Nuri and the Jordanian Foreign 
Minister on 29 September.7
On 1 October, the Egypt Committee endorsed the 
measures, although the Defence Committee, unwilling to 
risk Israeli opposition without American backing, modified 
the instructions from 'all available air and naval
5 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/278, Laurence minute, 26 
September 1956; PRO, FO371/121486/VJ10393/69G, Baghdad 
to Foreign Office, Cable 1097, 27 September 1956.
6 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 685.87/9-2756, Tel Aviv to State 
Department, Cable 295, 27 September 1956? PRO, 
F0371/121486/VJ10393/69G, Foreign Office to Baghdad, 
Cable 1947, 28 September 1956.
7 PRO, F0371/121486/VJ10393/69G, Foreign Office to 
Baghdad, Cables 1947-1949, 28 September 1956, and 
VJ10393/72G, Baghdad to Foreign Office, Cable 1110, 29 
September 1956.
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support' to 'air and naval support.... to the greatest 
extent possible in the circumstances obtaining at the 
time.' The Foreign Office's hand was strengthened, 
however, when the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Abba 
Eban, told Foster Dulles that Israel would not object to 
the Iraqi deployment if it had advance notice, no heavy 
equipment was moved into Jordan, no 'unreasonably large 
number' of Iraqi troops was moved, and no Iraqi troops 
were put on the West Bank. Reassured, Foster Dulles urged 
Britain to 'clinch the matter immediately.'8
On 6 October, Ben-Gurion asked Ambassador Lawson for 
further information on the size of the Iraqi force and an 
assurance that it would be far from the Israeli-Jordanian 
border. Lawson warned the State Department that Israeli 
assurances were based on information that the Iraqi 
deployment was a token force of several hundred troops. 
The Foreign Office dismissed Lawson's concern, however, 
since Iraq now planned to deploy only one battalion, far 
from the Israeli border.9
Diplomatic confusion now caused an important delay. 
The State Department, believing the Iraqi deployment was 
imminent, told Lawson to wait before approaching Israeli 
officials, but the despatch of the battalion was delayed 
by the Iraqi-Jordanian dispute over command. The British
8 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)32nd meeting, 1 October 1956; 
PRO, CAB131/17, DC(56)7th meeting, 2 October 1956; PRO, 
F0371/121487/ VJ10393/82, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2053, 3 October 1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.85/ 
10-356, Tel Aviv to State Department, Cable 310, 3 
October 1956; Israeli State Archives, 2409/18, Eytan to 
Eban, 3 October 1956.
9 PRO, F0371/121487/VJ10393/102, Tel Aviv to Foreign 
Office, Cable 467, 6 October 1956, and Holmer minute, 8 
October 1956.
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charge d'affaires in Tel Aviv, Peter Westlake, finally
asked the Foreign Office on 9 October if Lawson could give
Ben-Gurion details of the deployment.10
Meanwhile, Israel seized the diplomatic and military
initiative. Foreign Minister Meir told Ambassador Lawson
that conditional agreement to the Iraqi deployment was
withdrawn because of Nuri's statement, printed in The
Times of 7 October, that Israel should accept a frontier
settlement based on the 1947 borders, ceding territory to
the Arabs. She warned:
Israel will not sit by while these events 
develop. We will not make it so comfortable for 
them. We are not going to be destroyed without a 
struggle. 1
At 11:55 p.m. on 10 October, 'very heavy Israeli 
artillery and mortar fire' began on a 12-mile front from 
Qalqilya to Tul Karra in Jordan. An Israeli division was 
involved, one brigade crossing the border and two waiting 
in reserve. Tanks shelled the Jordanians across the 
border, and light aircraft carried out reconnaissance. The 
police station in Qalqilya was destroyed by mortar fire, 
and by 1:47 a.m., some Israeli troops were five miles 
inside Jordan. More than 70 Jordanians were killed and 
more than 40 wounded before the attack ended, and the IDF 
lost 18 men, an unusually high total for a 'reprisal' 
operation.12
10 PRO, FO371/121487/VJ10393/109, Tel Aviv to Foreign 
Office, Cable 471, 9 October 1956, and Foreign Office to 
Baghdad, Cable 2077, 10 October 1956.
11 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/297, Makins to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2096, 10 October 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.85 
Series, Tel Aviv to State Department, Cable 340, 9 
October 1956, and Cable 346, 10 October 1956.
12 USNA, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Geographical File, 1954-56, Box 14, S. 42, Collins to 
Radford, 11 October 1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.85/10-
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The Israelis claimed the raid was a 'hastily planned,
organised, and carried out' reprisal for the murder of two
Israeli farm labourers on 9 October. Dayan also asserted
that four fedayeen who killed three Israeli Druze on 12
September, released by Hussein, subsequently murdered five
Israelis. On 8 October, the Israelis allegedly transmitted
the names of the fedayeen to Jordan but received no 
13response.A
Dayan's argument is belied by the nature of the raid. 
An entire Israeli division had never been used for a 
'reprisal,' and the operation required days of advance 
preparation. As Duke, the British Ambassador to Jordan, 
noted, 'The types and numbers of weapons employed in 
the...incident were not justified by the opposition to be 
expected.' Abel Thomas, the chief aide of French Minister 
of Defence Bourges-Maunoury and a participant in secret 
Franco-Israeli discussions, summarised, 'Under the pretext 
that Iraqi troops had expressed their intention to invade 
Jordan and had made some incursions there,...Israel had 
created the casus belli' for an Israeli-Jordanian war.14
In one sense, Qalqilya warned Britain and Jordan to 
halt the Iraqi deployment. The day after the raid, the 
Israeli Government publicly stated, '[Iraqi] action would
1856, Tel Aviv to State Department, Cable 220, 18 
October 1956.
13 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, p. 172; PRO, F0371/121782/ 
VR1091/359, Chancery (Tel Aviv) to Levant Department, 18 
October 1956. See also PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/301, Tel 
Aviv to Foreign Office, Cable 480, 11 October 1956; PRO, 
FO371/121781/VR1091/319, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 
1462, 15 October 1956.
14 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/334A, Higgins to Levant 
Department, 25 October 1956; PRO, F0371/121781/VR1091/ 
316G, Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 1459, 13 October 
1956; Abel Thomas, p. 164.
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be a direct threat to the security of Israel and to the 
validity of the Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement.'15 
On 12 October, an 'anxious and indecisive' Meir requested 
that British Charge Westlake provide information within 
48 hours on the size of the Iraqi deployment, its 
destination, and the type of equipment involved. When 
Westlake repeated that Britain would honour her obligation 
to defend Jordan, Meir replied that this 'amounted to an 
ultimatum...creating a radical change in the situation.'16
Two days later, a public statement by Meir claimed, 
'The movement into Jordan of Iraqi troops would be part of 
a scheme designed to serve the territorial ambitions of 
Iraq and to bring about a radical change in the status quo 
in the area.' A further Cabinet statement expressed 
'concern and astonishment' at 'the threat of the British 
Foreign Office that Britain will implement the Anglo- 
Jordanian Treaty against Israel.' The Director-General 
of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Peres, told his senior 
officials:
I don't know whether we'll be able to wait until 
the Iraqi thing begins and reaches us before we 
fight....I am convinced that the French 
sincerely wanted, and still want, to fight 
Nasser, [but] I am very suspicious of British 
machinations.17
The Israelis threatened to seize the West Bank of the 
Jordan River if the Iraqi deployment was completed. On 7
15 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/310, Tel Aviv to Foreign 
Office, Cable 491, 12 October 1956.
16 PRO, FO371/121488/VJ10393/126G, Westlake to Foreign 
Office, Cable 488, 12 October 1956. See also USNA, RG 
59, CDF, 684A.85/10-1256, Tel Aviv to State Department, 
Cable 365, 12 October 1956.
17 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/311, Tel Aviv to Foreign 
Office, Cable 494, 14 October 1956, and VR1091/323, Tel 
Aviv to Foreign Office, Cable 506, 15 October 1956.
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October, the Jerusalem Post, recognised as the voice of 
the Israeli Government, had hinted, 'If Jordan crumbles, 
Israel could not sit with folded hands and Egypt would not 
inherit [her].' 'Reliable' informants told the British 
Consulate in Jerusalem and Embassy in Tel Aviv that the 
Israeli Cabinet, upset by the information from Westlake 
'about the number of Iraqi troops and their length of stay 
in Jordan,... intended to take part of the West Bank from 
Ramallah to Nablus and the North,' as it thought both the 
U.S. and France would remain neutral. On 15 October, 
Israeli Ambassador Eban, told Foster Dulles, '[We] think 
Jordan is breaking up and it is a question of grabbing the 
pieces.' Although Foster Dulles discouraged Israeli 
action, a high-level meeting, with Eisenhower present, 
assumed that Jordan would be partitioned between Israel 
and Iraq. This was unwelcome, but a British or American 
war against Israel was worse.18
Yet Israel had assumed a great risk with Qalqilya. 
CORDAGE, the British military plan to punish Israeli 
aggression against Jordan, was operational despite the 
Suez Crisis. On 9 October, the Chiefs of Staff reinforced 
the air defences of Cyprus, not only against Egypt, but 
also Israel. The next day, the Chiefs concluded, '[We] 
should bring home very forcibly to Ministers that we could
18 PRO, F0371/121488/VJ10393/113, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2085, 9 October 1956? PRO, F0371/121781/ 
VR1091/321, Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, Cable 497, 14 
October 1956, and VR1091/320, Jerusalem to Foreign 
Office, Cable 385, 15 October 1956? PRO, F0371/121781/ 
VR1091/332, Jerusalem to Foreign Office, Cable 390, 16 
October 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone 
Calls, Box 5, Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 15 October 
1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 6, 
'U.S. Opportunities in the Middle East,' undated 
memorandum•
322
either go to the aid of Jordan against Israel with sea and 
air power, or we could launch MUSKETEER [REVISE]; we could 
not do both.'19
Ben-Gurion had recognised the risk, telling the 
Knesset on 19 June, '[War with Jordan] would bring Israel 
into conflict with the British army and...he would never 
send Israeli defence forces to fight any European, 
American, British, Russian, or French army.' He knew that 
a large-scale Israeli attack upon Jordan might prevent 
Britain joining a Franco-Israeli attack upon Egypt, 
writing on 6 October, 'In my opinion, France will not act 
without Britain, so we must not give the British any 
pretext just now to slip out of the affair.' Meir, 
however, was willing to brave British retaliation to stop 
the Iraqi deployment, and Ben-Gurion accepted the Foreign 
Minister's argument at a 7 1/2-hour Cabinet meeting on 7 
October. Dayan also agreed, but his motive may have 
involved a conspiracy with French planners to draw Britain 
into a tripartite attack upon Nasser.20
Dayan believed a Franco-Israeli operation could 
overwhelm Egypt, but his hopes were blocked by Ben- 
Gurion 's insistence upon British participation. Salvation 
came from an idea of Pineau's, broached at the Franco- 
Israeli discussions in Paris on 30 September. A week 
earlier, Eden, referring to the Israeli-Jordanian tension, 
allegedly exclaimed to Pineau, 'What a pity that these
19 PRO, DEFE4/90, COS(56)97th meeting, 9 October 1956?
PRO, DEFE4/91, COS(56)98th meeting, 10 October 1956;
20 PRO, F0371/121728/VR1073/185, Chancery (Tel Aviv) to 
Levant Department, 21 June 1956? Bar-Zohar, The Armed 
Prophet, p. 222? Ben-Gurion Archive, Sde Boker, Israel, 
Ben-Gurion diary entry, 6 October 1956..
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incidents were not taking place on the Egyptian border!' 
Pineau assumed that, if the British Cabinet faced a 
possible Israeli-Jordanian war, they would choose the 
lesser evil of cooperating with Israel against Egypt. At 
Ben-Gurion's discussion of 3 October with the French 
military planners, General Challe and Colonel Mangin, 
Dayan noted cryptically, 'If the thing [the Franco-Israeli 
operation] is postponed at present, it might be that 
something will be cooked up in France and Jordan.'21
While the raid on Qalqilya was planned, Dayan and the 
French assumed that operations against Cairo would 
proceed. Admiral Barjot, the Deputy Commander of REVISE, 
issued a 'Secret and Personal Instruction' with 'Hypothese 
I [for Israel],' which assumed 'benevolent neutrality on 
the part of Great Britain,' including permission for 
France to use airfields in Cyprus. On 10 October, Peres 
and Abel Thomas signed a politico-military agreement, and 
Franco-Israeli staff conferences in Tel Aviv established 
the invasion's details. Teddy Kollek, the director of Ben- 
Gurion' s office, told American officials on 13 October, 
before the Gazier-Challe mission to London, that Israeli 
activity might shift towards Egypt.22
It is possible that not even Challe or Mangin knew 
the operational details of Qalqilya in advance, but they 
probably knew of its general aim. General Andre Beaufre, 
the commander of French land forces for MUSKETEER, later 
wrote, 'It seems that the [French] Colonial Office tried
21 Abel Thomas, p. 150? Ben-Gurion Archives, Ben-Gurion 
diary entry, 3 October 1956.
22 Beaufre, p. 69 and p. 77? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 674.84A/10- 
2456, Tel Aviv to State Department, Despatch 229, 24 
October 1956.
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some complicated manoeuvre in Jordan to incite Nasser to 
attack Israel and so provide justification for our 
operations.' On 13 October, Eden asked Nutting if France 
had put the Israelis up to attack Jordan. Nutting replied 
that Foreign Office experts thought this was possible. The 
French Ambassador to Israel, Pierre-Eugene Gilbert, who 
knew of the talks between Dayan and the French planners, 
told his British counterpart, John Nicholls, that France 
had not encouraged recent Israeli reprisals but 'some 
Ministers might well have taken the line that a good 
display of aggressiveness on any of Israel's frontiers 
would be helpful to the West in the context of the Suez 
situation./23
The secretive nature of Franco-Israeli consultations 
produced the seemingly erratic behaviour of French 
officials in early October. Pineau knew of Ben-Gurion's 
initial agreement to the Iraqi deployment into Jordan but 
never informed officials of the French Foreign Ministry.24 
The Foreign Ministry, citing Israeli opposition, 
repeatedly warned Britain against the Iraqi deployment and 
French officials in Tel Aviv told the Israelis that 'they 
fear[ed] that the English want to conquer Jordan [and] 
Syria with the help of the Iraqis.' However, the French 
Embassy in Washington told the State Department that 
Pineau did not object to the plan. A British Foreign 
Office official noted the conflict in French thought and 
came close to the truth: 'One cannot help suspecting that
23 Beaufre, p. 77? Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 88ff.; 
PRO, F0371/121782/VR1091/363, Nicholls to Rose, 17 
October 1956.
24 See Israeli State Archives, Elath to Israeli Foreign 
Ministry, 10 October 1956.
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the French and Israel are in collusion over all this.'25
Pineau, who had obstructed negotiations with Fawzi
and Lloyd, suddenly embraced the talks after the raid on
Qalqilya and a visit by General Challe, who informed him 
of Franco-Israeli military planning. Challe's probable
task, given Ben-Gurion's insistence that the British 
consent to Franco-Israeli military operations, was to 
ensure that Pineau spun out negotiations while Ben-
• • 0 ftGunon's wishes were met. °
Eden's immediate priority after the Gazier-Challe
visit was blocking British intervention for Jordan against 
Israel. When Nutting, supporting Ambassador Duke in Amman, 
suggested that Britain defend Jordan, Eden allegedly 
replied, 'I will not allow you to plunge this country into 
war merely to satisfy the anti-Jewish spleen of you people 
in the Foreign Office.' He directed Nutting to instruct 
Duke:
It is manifestly not in our interest nor in 
Jordan's interest to treat raids as an act of 
war and intervene....[The Jordanians] seem to be 
nurturing the idea that they can safely destroy 
the military value of the Arab Legion, dispense 
with British land assistance, and rely on the 
RAF to win the land battle, but that is a lethal 
illusion.2
Eden suspended the Iraqi deployment, the Foreign Office
25 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/297, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2096, 10 October 1956, and Laurence 
minute, 11 October 1956; 'Ben-Gurion's Diary,' 9 October 
1956, in Troen and Shemesh, p. 301.
26 PRO, F0800/725, Lloyd minute, 'M. Pineau and Mr. Dulles 
in New York,' 18 October 1956; Abel Thomas, p. 162; 
'Ben-Gurion's Diary,' 15 October 1956, in Troen and 
Shemesh, p. 302.
27 PRO, F0371/121781/VR1091/316G, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Amman to Foreign Office, Cable 1459, 13 October 1956, 
and subsequent minutes and VR1091/315G, Foreign Office 
to Amman, Cable 2008, 14 October 1956; Nutting, No End 
of a Lesson, p. 89.
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instructing Ambassador Wright on 15 October:
There are reasons which cannot be divulged but 
which make it essential that [the] move should 
not take place for 48 hours....You may tell Nuri 
for his own information that the Prime Minister 
personally attaches great importance to this.
Four days later, Eden instructed Kirkpatrick, 'No Iraqi
troops or stores into Jordan at present.'28
Eden's sudden decision to work with France and Israel
threw British policy into disarray. Although the Foreign
Office and Air Ministry tried to defuse Israeli-Jordanian
tension, agreeing only to 'demonstration' flights of
Hunter fighters from Cyprus to Jordan and supply of 25-
pound ammunition to the Arab Legion, but CORDAGE was still
in effect. After Qalqilya, half of Britain's Middle
Eastern air force was placed on six-hour readiness, with
the remainder on 12-hour alert. General Sir Charles
Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief of REVISE, assured the
Chiefs of Staff, 'With forces now available, [we] were in
a strong position to overcome any Israeli opposition in a
few days.'29
The British Defence Coordinating Committee for the 
Middle East, was not as confident and suggested immediate 
readiness for CORDAGE of the RAF squadrons earmarked for 
REVISE, transfer of Venom fighters from Germany to Cyprus, 
and assignment of bombers at Malta 'for offensive action 
against Israel as well as Egypt.' The Carrier Task Group
28 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 95? PRO, F0371/121488/ 
VJ10393/131G, Foreign Office to Baghdad, Cable 2164, 15 
October 1956; PRO, FO371/121489/VJ10393/166, Cairncross 
to Cloake, 19 October 1956.
29 PRO, F0371/121780/VR1091/303, Amman to Foreign Office, 
Cables 1948-1950, and subsequent minutes and cables;
PRO, AIR8/2093, ACAS (Ops) to SASO (MEAF), Cable 
2147/ACAS, 12 October 1956; PRO, DEFE4/91, COS(56)101st 
meeting, 15 October 1956.
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in the Eastern Mediterranean would be placed on 24-hour
alert, while the British land force at Aqaba in southern
Jordan prepared to seize the Israeli port of Elath.30
The situation neared the level of farce. Eden allowed
Nutting to inform two Foreign Office colleagues of events
but objected to the briefing of the Foreign Office Legal
Advisor, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:
That's the last person I want consulted. The 
lawyers are always against our doing anything.
For God's sake, keep them out of it. This is a 
political affair.
Nutting consulted Kirkpatrick and Assistant Undersecretary
Ross. Despite Kirkpatrick's advocacy of force against
Egypt, he and Ross objected vehemently to the French plan.
Lloyd's work in New York would be undone, the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950 would be ignored, the U.S. would
oppose the plan and the U.N. would condemn it, the
Commonwealth would be divided, the stability of pro-
Western regimes in the Middle East would be jeopardised,
and the security of British and French oil installations
would be endangered.31
Eden rejected the brief out of hand and presented the
Challe-Gazier plan at an 'informal' meeting on 16 October
with Secretary of State for War Head, Minister of Defence
Monckton, the President of the Board of Trade, Peter
Thorneycroft, and Lord Chancellor Kilmuir. Nutting
summarised his objections and Monckton mildly protested,
but the other Ministers agreed with Eden.32
30 PRO, DEFE4/91, COS(56)102nd meeting, 16 October 1956? 
PRO, F0371/121535/VJ1192/116G, BDCC (ME) to COS, Cable 
MECOS 186, 16 October 1956.
31 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 95ff.
32 Lamb, pp. 231ff.
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Lloyd, ordered by Eden to return from New York, 
arrived at 10 Downing Street as the meeting was in 
progress. Nutting greeted him with the news that 
negotiations with Egypt were suspended. Lloyd allegedly 
said, 'We must have nothing to do with the French plan.' 
In the meeting, however, Lloyd held his objections. 
Afterwards, Nutting tried to change his Minister's mind, 
but Lloyd, resigned to following Eden's wishes, 
rationalised that negotiations with Egypt were useless 
because Nasser would not honour any commitment.33
Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris that afternoon to meet 
Mollet and Pineau in discussions that lasted until 1:30 
a.m. At the meeting with Mollet and Pineau, Lloyd made a 
final attempt to save negotiations with Egypt, arguing 
that, while Britain and France could not obtain the 18- 
Power Plan, they might arrange 'international control,' 
with strict regulations on the level of tolls and 
percentage of revenues devoted to the Canal's development. 
Differences would be referred to an independent body, 
whose decisions would be enforced through appropriate 
sanctions. Mollet, supported by Pineau, said this was 
'quite unsatisfactory.'
Pineau then indicated that Israel would act before 
the Arabs received more Soviet arms. Eden repeated, 'If 
Israel attacked Jordan, we were bound to go to Jordan's 
help,' but added, 'We did not regard ourselves as under 
any obligation towards Egypt under the Tripartite 
Declaration.' Eden and the French agreed that the United 
Nations was not a serious impediment, as 'it was not
33 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 97ff.
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thought likely that the Security Council would reach 
agreement on any action to be taken.' More significantly, 
Eden argued, 'The U.S. Government would be no more anxious 
than the French or British Government to take action under 
the Tripartite Declaration' to punish Israel for her 
aggression.' It was agreed 'that if Israel were to act 
before the end of the American election campaign, it was 
most improbable that Congress could be resummoned or, if 
resummoned, would give this authority [for the 
intervention of U.S. forces].' Non-military action by the 
U.S., notably economic sanctions against an aggressor, was 
not discussed.
Finally, Mollet established Eden's position: 'If
Israel attacked Egypt, would U.K. feel bound to intervene 
under the Tripartite Declaration?' Eden 'thought the 
answer to that would be "no” but he would confirm that to 
M. Mollet after he got back to London.' Mollet asked, 'In 
the event of the likelihood of hostilities in the vicinity 
of the Canal, would the U.K. Government intervene to stop 
them?' Eden 'thought the answer to that question would be 
"yes".'34
A disheartened Lloyd told Nutting the next morning 
that 'he hoped that [Britain] would not have to be 
directly associated with these [Franco-Israeli] talks, at 
any rate at the political level.'35 A more enthusiastic 
Eden told Iveragh MacDonald of the Times of the Gazier- 
Challe approach and the meeting in Paris,36 but he
34 PRO, F0800/725, Lloyd minute, 18 October 1956.
35 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 98ff.
36 See Iveragh MacDonald, The History of the Times: Volume 
V. Struggles in War and Peace. 1939-1966 (London: Times 
Books, 1984).
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withheld the details from the Egypt Committee, merely 
telling them that Iraqi troops were to be held at the 
Jordanian frontier 'at the suggestion of
Jordan....Meanwhile, the French Government were urging the 
Israelis to refrain from any precipitate action.' 
Regarding Suez, Lloyd reported that Egypt had proposed 
further negotiations and 'it would be inexpedient to
. . ^ 7reject such a suggestion.'
Only at the Cabinet on 18 October, after Lloyd had
spoken to Butler, the Lord Privy Seal and potentially
Eden's most powerful opponent, did the Prime Minister and
Lloyd refer to the talks with the French. Like Gazier,
they cited Jordan as the reason for a new policy:
The political situation in Jordan was unstable, 
and there were signs that Israel might be 
preparing to make some military move....[We] had 
our obligations under the Anglo-Jordanian 
Treaty, but it would be contrary to our 
interests to act, at this time and alone, in 
support of Jordan against Israel.
Eden then presented the Gazier-Challe formula:
If [Israel] contemplated any military operations 
against the Arabs, it would be far better from 
our point of view that they should attack 
Egypt....He had therefore thought it right to 
make it known to the Israelis, through the 
French, that in the event of hostilities between 
Egypt and Israel, the U.K. Government would not 
come to the assistance of Egypt.
According to Lloyd and Butler, the Prime Minister also
asked that 'Britain and France should go in to safeguard
the Canal and the shipping in it' when Israel attacked
Egypt. Butler vaguely suggested 'an agreement with the
French and the Israelis designed to free the Canal and
eventually to internationalise it,' and Lloyd expressed
37 PRO, CAB134/1216, E.C.(56)35th meeting, 17 October 
1956.
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his anxiety over the effect upon Arab opinion of Anglo-
French operations with Israel. Neither was willing,
however, to oppose Eden.38
The Cabinet endorsement of Eden's action confirmed
Britain's estrangement from the U.S. On 13 October, Foster
Dulles, trying to further negotiations with Egypt,
indicated that SCUA would transfer up to 90 percent of the
revenues it received to the Egyptian Government. Anxious
that any agreement with Egypt should contain effective
sanctions, Lloyd appealed to Foster Dulles to modify his
position, but the U.S. Secretary had already informed the
Foreign Office:
I gather that it is now your view that SCUA 
should serve as a means of exerting pressure on 
the Egyptian Government by withholding dues. Our 
idea, made clear from the beginning, is that it 
was to be a means of practical working 
cooperation with the Egyptian authorities which 
would seek to establish de facto international 
participation in the operation of the Canal.39
The Americans knew from U-2 reconnaissance flights
about Israel's acquisition of 72 Mysteres, but they
expected the Israelis to attack Jordan. When Foster Dulles
complained to Allen Dulles, 'I do not think that we have
really any clear picture as to what the British and French
are up to there,' he was reassured that the CIA was
'fairly well' aware of developments in Egypt.40 In fact,
38 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.71(56), 18 October 1956? Lloyd, p. 
177? Butler, The Art of the Possible (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1971), p. 192.
39 PRO, PREM11/1102, Dixon to Foreign Office, Cables 846 
and 847, 13 October 1956? PRO, PREM11/1103, Lloyd to 
Foster Dulles and Foster Dulles to Lloyd, 15 October 
1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, 
Box 5, Foster Dulles to Rountree, 15 October 1956.
40 DDE, John Foster Dulles Series, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Lodge to Dulles, 17 October 1956, and Foster Dulles to 
Allen Dulles, 18 October 1956.
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the CIA missed the first public hint of Israeli
cooperation with Britain and France. Addressing the
Knesset on 15 October, Ben-Gurion read a poem about 
Israel's strength, a disguised reference to arms shipments 
from France, and commented, 'I am as confident, as every 
one of our commanders, that any conflict with the 
Egyptians or the rest of the Arab armies will end in
victory.'41
Privately, Ben-Gurion maintained pessimistic
resistance to the Israeli military and Ministry of
Defence. On 15 October, Joseph Nachmias, the Israeli
Military Attache in Paris, transmitted the Challe-Gazier
plan but, to persuade Ben-Gurion of Britain's desire to
work with Israel, implied that the proposal came from
Eden. Ben-Gurion saw 'the height of British hypocrisy' in
the plan and wrote, 'The British plot, I imagine, is to
get us involved with Nasser and bring about the occupation
of Jordan by Iraq.' However, Ben-Gurion accepted Mollet's
invitation to tripartite discussions in Paris.42
Meanwhile, Eden prepared for implementation of the
Gazier-Challe plan. When the British representative to the
U.N., Pierson Dixon, suggested that Jordan was entitled to
defend herself against Israeli attacks, Eden wrote Lloyd:
I am much concerned by the line taken by Sir 
Pierson Dixon over the Jordan complaint. The 
blame is not entirely on one side, but he makes 
it appear that it is, and aligns himself with 
the Russians....1 am really concerned about the 
effect of this on Israel. The French warned us
41 PRO, F0371/121781/VR1091/327, Tel Aviv to Foreign 
Office, Cable 511, 15 October 1956; Brecher, p.248.
42 Golan, p. 53? Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion» p. 234; Mordechai 
Bar-On, 'David Ben-Gurion and the Sevres Collusion,' in 
Louis and Owen, pp. 149ff.
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how suspicious of us the Israelis are.43
Eden told his military enough to halt REVISE'S 
replacement with the Winter Plan but not enough to stand 
down the British alert against Israel. The Chiefs of Staff 
vetoed the British Defence Coordinating Committee's plan 
to capture Eilat, but they agreed to 'A) air operations at 
maximum intensity to neutralise the Israeli Air Force, B) 
blockade and naval bombardment as soon as the air 
situation permits, and C) such operations as are necessary 
to secure Aqaba [in Jordan].' Six squadrons of bombers 
were sent to Cyprus and 1 1/2 to Malta. Hunter fighters 
were reinforced on Cyprus by Venoms from Germany. The 
operational headquarters for CORDAGE moved from Malta to 
Cyprus on 21 October and took precedence over REVISE'S 
command structure.44
The Foreign Office's Levant Department knew of the 
measures on 16 October, but the Permanent Undersecretary's 
Department, the liaison with Eden for covert action and 
planning, was not informed of CORDAGE'S development until 
the 18th.45 Eden only acted to halt CORDAGE on 22 October 
when he received a request to retain the New Zealand 
cruiser Royalist for the operation. He wrote Lord
43 PRO, FO371/121745/VR1074/412, Dixon to Foreign Office, 
Cable 876, 17 October 1956, and DeZulueta to Graham, 19 
October 1956? PRO, F0371/121746/VR1074/436, Eden to 
Lloyd, 20 October 1956.
44 PRO, DEFE4/91, C0S(56)103rd meeting, 18 October 1956; 
PRO, AIR20/9965/File.
45 PRO, F0371/121535/VJ1192/118G, COS to BDCC (ME), COSME 
150, and Rose to Ross, 18 October 1956.
The Permanent Undersecretary's Department discussed 
the military preparations, but its action, including the 
vital question of when it informed Ministers of the 
alert against Israel, is in a file that is missing from 
the Public Record Office. (PRO, F0371/121536/VJ1192/122 
(missing from PRO))
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Hailsham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 'I trust that
there is no likelihood of our fighting Israel on behalf of
Jordan and we have done all we can to discourage Israel
from follies in this direction.'46
By the time Eden wrote Hailsham, British, French, and
Israeli representatives had met at Sevres outside Paris.
On 21 October, Challe and Mangin arrived in Jerusalem to
'escort' the Israeli delegation. Ben-Gurion threatened to
turn back if the French still favoured a unilateral
Israeli invasion followed by Anglo-French intervention and
warned the envoys, 'If you intend to present the British
proposal to us, the only benefit of my journey to France
[will be] that I will make the acquaintance of your 
, 47p r e m i e r . '
The first formal Franco-Israeli meeting occurred over 
lunch on 22 October, with Mollet, Pineau, and Bourges- 
Maunoury leading the French delegation. Ben-Gurion tested 
support for a 'master plan' for the Middle East, 
involving, 'before all else, naturally, the elimination of 
Nasser,' the partition of Jordan between Iraq and Israel, 
the division of Lebanon, with portions to Israel and Syria 
and the remainder as a Christian state, the installation 
of a pro-Western government in Syria, and international 
status for the Suez Canal.48 When the French offered no 
reaction, Ben-Gurion challenged them by arguing that 
operations against Egypt should not be undertaken
46 PRO, PREM11/1508, Hailsham to Eden, 22 October 1956, 
and Eden to Hailsham, 23 October 1956.
47 Dayan, Story of My Life, pp. 175ff.? Bar-Zohar, Ben- 
Gurion. pp. 234ff.
48 See also Israeli State Archives, Ben-Gurion-Gilbert 
meeting, 19 October 1956.
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immediately. The Soviets might intervene, and Eisenhower
would 'feel freer after the elections' to adopt a position
of benevolent neutrality towards the invasion and to warn
off Moscow. Mollet protested:
Perhaps, in the end, we would convince the U.S. 
in favour of a common programme... but we would 
lose valuable time, and possibly even the chance 
to act....As for British participation, any 
delay is likely to be fatal. I know Eden 
personally, and I am absolutely convinced that 
he is an enthusiastic supporter of common 
action...but his domestic situation is 
deteriorating.
Pineau added that the Soviets were busy with uprisings in 
Hungary and that the U.S. was preoccupied with the 
Presidential elections. Bourges-Maunoury argued that, if 
the operation was not launched within a few days, 'France 
would have to withdraw....The beginning of November is the 
final date.' He then offered French planes and pilots to 
operate from Israeli bases and support the Israeli land 
advance while French ships patrolled the Israeli coast and 
bombarded Egyptian ports. Ben-Gurion's 'objections' to an 
operation led by an Israeli advance suddenly disappeared. 
Dayan proposed an Israeli paratroop drop in the Sinai, 
followed by a French ultimatum to Egypt to cease 
resistance and the bombing of Egyptian airfields. Ben- 
Gurion concluded that the invasion could start 'tomorrow'
. . t AQif Britain cooperated. *
On 21 October at Chequers, Eden consulted an inner 
circle of Ministers, including Lloyd, Macmillan, Butler, 
Head, Kilmuir, and Home about the invitation to meet with 
the Israelis. Cabinet Secretary Brook, and the Permanent
49 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. pp. 236ff.? Dayan, Storv of Mv 
Life, pp. 177ff.; Brecher, p. 271.
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Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defence, Richard Powell, 
were also present. Powell declined Eden's invitation to go 
to Sevres. Eden then suggested Dean, the head of the 
Permanent Undersecretary's Department, but Ministers 
finally decided that Lloyd, using the excuse of a cold, 
should cancel his appointments and travel to France.50
Lloyd, still unhappy about cooperation with Israel, 
was further shaken when his automobile, en route from 
Villacoublay airfield to Sevres, was nearly hit by a 
speeding car. Ben-Gurion's secretary, Mordechai Bar-On 
wrote:
[Lloyd's] voice was shrill and started with an 
unpleasant tone of cynicism and a humour dry as 
a clay shard. His face gave the impression of 
something stinking hanging permanently under his 
nose.51
Ben-Gurion again tried the gambit of a Middle Eastern 
'master plan.' Lloyd ignored the scheme but, unlike the 
French, seized the initiative, arguing that 'it was 
possible to reach agreement with Egypt over the Suez Canal 
within seven days.' Lloyd restated the 'British' plan: if 
Israel would attack Egypt alone, Britain and France would 
subsequently intervene to safeguard the Suez Canal and 
stop the fighting. He refused the proposal of Ben-Gurion 
and Dayan for a limited Israeli paratroop drop since 
Britain needed a 'real act of war' to justify Anglo-French 
intervention as 'peacekeepers.' Bourges-Maunoury unveiled 
his idea of French air cover for Israeli operations, but 
Lloyd objected that this would prove Anglo-French
50 Author's interview with Sir Richard Powell? Thorpe, p. 
236? AP, AP20/30/2, Chequers Book, 21 October 1956, and 
AP23/44/83A-B, Hill to Lloyd, 26 April 1967.
51 The Times. 2 January 1987? Bar-On, in Louis and Owen, 
p. 157.
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'collusion' with Israel.52
The Anglo-Israeli dispute centred upon the interval 
between a large-scale Israeli invasion of Sinai and Anglo- 
French bombing of Egypt. Ben-Gurion wanted 12 hours? Lloyd 
offered no less than 48. A compromise suggestion that 
France intervene 12 hours and Britain 48 hours after the 
Israeli attack was unacceptable because the French did not 
have the bombers to neutralise the Egyptian Air Force. 
Ben-Gurion proposed a loan of British bombers to the 
French on the lines of the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal 
between the U.S. and Britain in World War II, but Lloyd 
snapped that the American destroyers had not been worth 
anything.53
Discussions continued past midnight without 
compromise, and Lloyd returned to Britain, thinking that 
the 'collusion' had been aborted. Eden told the Cabinet on 
23 October:
From secret conversations which had been held in 
Paris with representatives of the Israeli 
Government, it now seemed unlikely that the 
Israelis would launch a full-scale attack 
against Egypt. The U.K. and French Governments 
were thus confronted with the choice between an 
early military operation or a relatively 
prolonged negotiation [with Egypt].
However, Eden still thought a British concession, such as
French use of facilities on Cyprus, be made. Lloyd loyally
supported the Prime Minister and insisted that there would
be no settlement with Egypt.54
In effect, Lloyd gave up the Foreign Office's effort
to control policy. He told Nutting, 'You, my dear Anthony,
52 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, pp. 179ff.; Bar-Zohar, Ben- 
Gurion . pp. 238ff.
53 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, p. 182.
54 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.72(56), 23 October 1956.
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will no doubt be delighted to hear that it doesn't look as
if the French plan will come off,' but, asked what he
would do, said:
I am so confused and exhausted that I honestly 
have no advice to offer any more. It would 
really be better to leave it to a group of the 
colleagues, such as [Minister of Agriculture]
Derry Heathcoat-Amory or [Minister of Works]
Patrick Buchan-Hepburn to decide.55
At Sevres, the French and Israelis searched for 
compromise. Ben-Gurion rejected Challe's idea that Israel 
bomb one of her cities, Beersheba, and blame it on Egypt 
to justify Anglo-French intervention. Peres proposed that 
the Israelis send a ship through the Suez Canal, forcing 
an Egyptian response that would justify war. Most 
importantly, Dayan modified his original plan. Israeli 
paratroopers would launch a surprise attack on the Mitla 
Pass, 70 miles inside Egypt and 30 miles from the Suez 
Canal, while armoured columns crossed into Sinai. Britain 
and France would intervene 36 hours later.56
Pineau took Dayan's plan to London that evening. 
Lloyd, with Eden absent, refused to abandon hope of a 
peaceful settlement and described the advantages of the 
solution sought at the U.N., but he gave way when the 
Prime Minister joined the meeting. Eden and Pineau decided 
that they 'might serve notice on the parties to stop and 
withdraw a certain distance from the Canal and threaten 
them with military intervention by France and Britain if 
that was not done.' Consultation with the U.S. was 
rejected 'owing to their preoccupation with the election
55 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 102.
56 Bar-Zohar, p. 240? Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, p. 184; 
'Ben-Gurion's Diary,' 22-25 October 1956, in Troen and 
Shemesh, pp. 305ff.
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campaign and the generally unsatisfactory nature of our 
exchanges with Mr. Dulles about U.S. action of any 
character./57
The British Cabinet were informed the following 
morning that France had just captured the Athos, a ship 
allegedly loaded with Egyptian arms for Algerian rebels? 
however, 'they were unwilling to use the gun-running 
incident as a ground for taking military action against 
Egypt? they preferred that such action should be based on 
grounds which concerned the U.K. as well as France.' It 
was hinted:
It could...be assumed that if [REVISE] were 
launched, Israel would make a full-scale attack 
against Egypt, and this might have the effect of 
reducing the period of preliminary [aerial] 
bombardment. The second objective of the 
operation would be to secure the downfall of 
Colonel Nasser's regime in Egypt.58
With Lloyd scheduled to make a speech in the Commons that
afternoon, Eden instructed Dean to return to Sevres with
Donald Logan, Lloyd's Private Secretary.59
At the same time, Ben-Gurion finally accepted Dayan's
plans. While paratroopers dropped into Mitla Pass,
armoured columns would attack toward Rafah on the northern
coast of the Sinai, Abu al-Agheila in the centre, and
Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip. The assault would
begin on the afternoon of 29 October with Anglo-French
bombing of Egypt at first light on the 31st and the
airdrop of two French paratroop brigades into the Canal
Zone two days later. To disguise the Mitla Pass operation
57 PRO, F0800/725, Lloyd minute, 24 October 1956.
58 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.73(56), 24 October 1956.
59 Lloyd, pp. 186ff•? Author's interview with Donald 
Logan.
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as a 'raid,' decreasing the chance of Egyptian aerial 
counter-attack, Israeli armoured columns would not seize 
the towns of Rafah and Gaza until the Egyptians realised 
that the paratroop drop was part of a coordinated 
invasion.60
The ensuing tripartite talks in Sevres were an anti­
climax. Dean's duty was simply ensure that Israeli action 
against Egypt was significant enough to justify Anglo- 
French intervention, as Pineau had indicated the previous 
evening. Indeed, Pineau told the Israelis 30 minutes 
before Logan and Dean arrived that Eden had agreed to 
strike Egypt 36 hours after Israel crossed into the Sinai.
After 'a somewhat desultory recapitulation' of issues 
with Dean and Logan, the French and Israeli delegations 
surmised that, while the British officials were not 
empowered to take further decisions, enough had been done 
to secure an agreement. Soon after the meeting adjourned, 
Dean and Logan overheard a typewriter in the next room 
producing the Sevres Protocol. The Protocol, a three-page 
document in French on plain paper, confirmed that Israel 
would launch 'a full-scale attack' on the afternoon of 29 
October. The next day, the British and French Governments 
would demand that Egypt and Israel cease fire and withdraw 
10 miles either side of the Suez Canal while Anglo-French 
forces established a 'temporary occupation of the key 
positions on the Canal.' The inevitable Egyptian refusal 
of the ultimatum would bring an Anglo-French attack 'early 
on October 31st.' An annex, signed by France and Israel
60 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. p. 241; Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, 
pp. 189ff.
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and withheld from the British, stated that French fighters
and pilots would be based on Israeli airfields and French
ships would protect the Israeli coast.61
Dean reported to Eden, Butler, Macmillan, Head, and
Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, at 10 Downing Street at
11 p.m. The Ministers were satisfied with the Protocol,
but Eden, dismayed that the collusion had been recorded,
ordered Dean and Logan to return to Paris in the morning
to destroy all copies of the agreement. The French left
the two in a locked room for hours, without food or drink,
while Pineau phoned the Israelis. Ben-Gurion, still
sceptical that Britain would abide by the Protocol,
refused Eden's request.62
Eden told the Cabinet on 25 October:
The Israelis were, after all, advancing their 
military preparations with a view to making an 
attack on Egypt....The French Government were 
strongly of the view that intervention would be 
justified in order to limit the hostilities and 
that for this purpose it would be right to 
launch the military operation against Egypt 
which had already been mounted.
If Israel attacked Egypt, Britain and France would issue
their ultimata, and the Anglo-French force would act
against any country refusing the terms. Eden admitted 'the
risk that we should be accused of collusion with Israel'
but gave a confused justification:
If an Anglo-French operation were undertaken 
against Egypt, we should be unable to prevent 
the Israelis from launching a parallel attack 
themselves; and it was preferable that we should 
seen to be holding the balance between Israel 
and Egypt rather than appear to be accepting 
Israeli cooperation in an attack on Egypt alone.
61 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion. pp. 242ff.; Dayan, Storv of Mv 
Life, pp. 191ff.? Author's interview with Donald Logan.
62 Lloyd, p. 188; The Times, 2 January 1987; Author's 
interview with Donald Logan.
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Ministers supporting Eden alleged that the British action
was 'defensible in international law, for we should be
intervening to prevent interference with the free flow of
traffic through the Canal,' a flimsy excuse since the
Egyptians, despite British and French efforts, had ensured
passage through the Canal. Others rationalised:
A crisis in the Middle East could not now be 
long delayed. If...force might ultimately have 
to be used, would it not be used more 
effectively and with more limited damage if we 
acted promptly now when an Anglo-French 
operation was already mounted?
The Cabinet was not unanimous, however, and 
dissenters produced a range of arguments. An ultimatum to 
Egypt and Israel to hold their forces at least 10 miles 
from the Suez Canal would 'not appear to be holding the 
balance between Israel and Egypt,' since it would allow 
Israel to establish a line 90 miles inside Egypt. The U.N. 
might object to Britain and France usurping its peace­
keeping function. Most significantly, the dissenters 
foresaw:
Our action would cause offence to the U.S. 
Government and might do lasting damage to Anglo- 
American relations. There was no prospect of 
securing the support or approval of the U.S. 
Government.
Despite these objections, the Cabinet accepted Eden's 
statement.63
While Eden indicated that Britain knew of an 
impending Israeli attack, that is different from revealing 
British collusion in an Israeli invasion. The Prime 
Minister, to maintain security and minimise the 
possibility of a Cabinet split, probably limited the
63 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.74(56), 25 October 1956.
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details of Sevres to an inner circle of Ministers. Eden's 
'official' biographer criticised dissidents, especially 
Monckton and Heathcoat-Amory for not pressing their 
objections, but the Minister of Defence continually 
reminded Eden of his opposition to the use of force except 
as a last resort. Given the agreement between senior 
Ministers to proceed, Monckton and junior Ministers could 
not upset Eden's strategy. A dissenter could have 
resigned, at the cost of his career, but as of 25 October,
he had no cause to present to Commons or to the public. An
Israeli attack was anticipated but it had not yet
occurred.64
Those who knew of Sevres never challenged Eden.
Macmillan remained a fervent 'hawk,' and Commonwealth
Secretary Home and the new Minister of Defence, Head,
fully supported the decision to act with Israel against
Nasser. Butler had doubts but would not vote against the
Prime Minister. Instead, he told Hugh Massingham, the
political editor of the Observer, that his fellow
Ministers were 'mad' without elaborating further.65
Moreover, no senior Minister heeded possible U.N. and
U.S. opposition to Anglo-French intervention. Eden himself
later wrote that he...
...thought that [the U.S.] would be indignant 
with us and lecture us and the Israeli 
Government and Egyptian Government for having 
seized the Canal and that they would then 'watch 
the Bear [the Soviet Union].' Convinced as I was 
that the Soviet Government would take no action,
I thought that the U.S. Government would then
64 Rhodes James, p. 535; Walter Monckton Papers, File 7, 
Monckton to Eden drafts, September 1956; David Astor, 
'The Observer and Suez,' paper at ICBH/LSE Summer 
School, 15 July 1989.
65 Astor, op. cit.
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seize this unique opportunity and put forward 
their own proposals for the future of the Suez 
Canal...and also put foryard proposals for an 
Arab-Israeli settlement. 6
Macmillan admitted that, while it was ' absolutely
vital to humiliate Nasser..., we must (if we possibly can)
keep the Americans with us, or we shall have no chance of
getting out of our financial ruin.' Unlike France, Britain
had not withdrawn reserves from the International Monetary
Fund, for fear of triggering a run against the pound. Yet
the Chancellor took no action to ensure that military
operations were not upset by economic weakness and refused
to inform his Treasury staff informed of developments.
Makins, the former British Ambassador to the U.S., arrived
on 15 October to take up his duties as Permanent Secretary
to the Treasury. He discovered:
Selwyn didn't want to see m e  Anthony didn't
want to see me --  even Harold.... I knew
absolutely nothing, was told absolutely nothing, 
but I knew enough to realise that something very 
big was in the wind. 7
Makins discovered the plans, but he was not informed 
by Macmillan of the imminent Israeli attack upon Egypt 
until 28 October. Makins responded, 'We've got to make 
preparations,' but Macmillan insisted, 'You can't tell 
anyone about this.' It was finally agreed that Makins 
could speak to Cabinet Secretary Brook. °
Macmillan may have expected the U.S. to take no 
action against the British even if the Americans were not 
supportive. In his memoirs, he admitted 'a heavy 
responsibility' for the mistake and said in 1971:
66 AP, AP33/7, Eden record, October 1972.
67 Horne, p. 402 and p. 417? Author's interview with Lord 
Sherfield.
68 Author's interview with Lord Sherfield; Horne, p. 434.
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My judgement was wrong....[My] instinct [was] 
that the Americans didn't wish to be informed 
when we took the final action.. .because that 
would embarrass them...but would support us when 
action was taken.
This explanation rests upon Macmillan's claims after 
Suez. The Chancellor, a prolific diarist, left no entries 
between October 1956 and February 1957. Instead, he later 
maintained that Anglo-American division would not have 
occurred if he had been Foreign Secretary: 'I would have
persuaded Eisenhower, or Foster, to back us - or say to 
the Cabinet, "we can't move".' Since Macmillan, as
Chancellor, had that opportunity after his visit to 
Washington, his claim was whimsical, if not outright 
deception.
Likewise, Macmillan tried to absolve himself of blame
for the collusion by insisting:
I can't honestly say I liked it....I was in a 
difficult position? I took no part in the 
details (looking back on it, they weren't very 
clever) and therefore didn't wish to 
criticise....I think if I'd perhaps had more
experience, I would have taken a stronger
position in insisting on knowing just exactly 
how they were going to bring it about? and what 
were the chances of its success and what were 
the dangers.
Since Macmillan was the foremost proponent of British 
cooperation with Israel and approved the collusion when he 
was informed of it by Eden, the excuse is somewhat 
misleading.70
Still, it is puzzling that Macmillan misinterpreted 
Eisenhower's and Foster Dulles' emphasis on OMEGA and
aversion to the use of force. Eden's private secretaries 
allegedly speculated that Macmillan 'was planning to
69 Horne, p. 444.
70 Horne, p. 430 and p. 447.
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overthrow Eden,' but it is more likely that the Chancellor 
decided that Britain had to risk attacking Egypt, even 
without assurances of American support. In his last 
surviving diary entry for 1956, dated 4 October, Macmillan 
wrote:
We must, by one means or another, win this 
struggle. Nasser may well try to preach Holy War 
in the Middle East and (even to their own loss) 
the mob and the demagogues may create a ruinous 
position for us. Without oil, and without the 
profits from oil, neither U.K. nor Western 
Europe can survive.71
Whatever Britain's economic situation, Macmillan wanted
war. On 26 October, he told the Cabinet that Britain would
lose up to £300 million in foreign reserves in November.
Sterling's role as an international currency could only be
saved if the pound was devalued and all of Britain's
financial resources were mobilised. Despite this grim
picture, the Chancellor never mentioned the impending
attack upon Egypt.72
British commanders of REVISE were unable to object to
Sevres, as they were given misleading information about
collusion. After the signature of the Protocol, Keightley
and General Hugh Stockwell, the commander of REVISE'S land
forces, were informed that REVISE might be implemented at
less than the 10 days' notice required in the plan, but
they were not told that the operation was authorised until
26 October. An unsigned memorandum for Eden argued that
Keightley 'should...be directed to go ahead' with
preparations for an assault against Egypt under the cover
of Operation B0ATH00K, a communications exercise between
71 Horne, p. 429.
72 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.85(56), 26 October 1956.
347
Cyprus and warships in the Mediterranean.73
Keightley was not told that plans had been
coordinated with Israel. When he expressed his anxiety
about military operations, 'Eden gave him a severe
dressing down and told him that these were questions with
which military commanders should not concern themselves.'
Keightley was probably informed that British intelligence
knew of an imminent Israeli attack which would provide the
excuse for Anglo-French seizure of the Suez Canal. For
unknown reasons, Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, did not
give details of Sevres to Keightley. He simply informed
Admiral Guy Grantham, the Commander-in-Chief of Britain's
naval forces in the Mediterranean:
We have definite reports that Israel is 
mobilising and requisitioning civilian 
transports. Our estimate is that they are likely 
to be ready for war about Monday [29 October] or 
possibly Tuesday, but no overt step may be taken 
by us at present. 4
Stockwell, who left London for Malta on 26 October, 
was the first British commander to learn of the new plans. 
During a stopover outside Paris, he was informed by his 
French subordinate, General Andre Beaufre, of the 'Israeli 
plan and timings,' although Beaufre probably did not tell 
Stockwell that this was coordinated between British,
J
French, and Israeli politicians.75 Upon arrival in Malta,
73 Stockwell Papers, Liddell-Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College London, 8/2/2, Stockwell report 
on MUSKETEER, p. 38; PRO, ADM205/118, unsigned note to 
Prime Minister, 26 October 1956. See also PRO, PREM11/ 
1103, EC(56) 63, 'Military Implications of Mounting 
Operation MUSKETEER,' 25 October 1956.
74 Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on MUSKETEER, 
p. 33; Ziegler, p. 544.
75 Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on MUSKETEER, 
p. 39; British Broadcasting Corporation Radio Four, A 
Canal Too Far (1987), interview with Kenneth Darling.
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Stockwell passed the news to Grantham and Vice-Admiral 
L.F. Dunford-Slater, REVISE'S naval commander. The trio 
acted without instructions from London, re-deploying 
carrier groups from Malta to Cyprus, loading the 
amphibious assault force, and sailing H.M.S. TYNE, the 
headquarters ship for the British commanders, to Cyprus 
under the cover of Operation BOATHOOK.76
REVISE'S air commander, Air Vice-Marshal Denis 
Barnett was told nothing of developments. On 25 October he 
asked that his forces be stood down from the six-hour 
alert for CORDAGE and that, with the reduction in tension, 
formal responsibility for REVISE and CORDAGE be given to 
the Air Officer Commanding Levant, the peacetime British 
commander. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans flew 
to Cyprus to 'clarify the situation,' but Barnett only 
learned of plans for Anglo-French intervention when 
Keightley arrived in Cyprus. As Barnett entered 
Keightley's office, a paper blew onto the floor: 
'Hooknoses D-Day 29 Oct.'77
There was now little coordination between British 
political and military planning. Stockwell noted the 
unsolvable problem. To make the Anglo-French ultimatum 
appear genuine, Eden insisted that there should be no 
alert before 30 October. Yet the landing in Egypt in Phase 
III of REVISE, planned for 20 days after the announcement 
of an alert, was now scheduled for 8 November. Only ad hoc
76 Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on MUSKETEER, 
pp. 39ff.
77 PRO, AIR20/9965, CINCMEAF to CAS, Cable CINC190, 25 
October 1956, and CAS to CINCMEAF, Cable A2988/CAS, 27 
October 1956; A Canal Too Far, interview with Denis 
Barnett.
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preparations by Stockwell, Grantham, and Dunford-Slater 
could narrow the gap between the plans in REVISE and the 
Cabinet's demand for a quick occupation of the Canal 
Zone.78
In contrast, the mobilisation of Israeli troops began 
on 25 October, and French assault troops left Toulon and 
Marseilles on the 27th. Three French fighters supplied 
high-octane jet fuel to Lydda airfield in Israel, and 
large deliveries of French arms were off-loaded on the 
Israeli coast. To deceive Egypt, the U.S., and the Soviet 
Union, Dayan ordered a 'deception to produce an impression 
that mobilisation [was] aimed against Jordan because of 
entry of Iraqi forces.'7  ^ 'Extremist' parties, notably the 
anti-Western National Socialists, had gained seats in 
Jordanian elections on 21 October. Three days later, 
Jordan joined the Egyptian-Syrian military command. 
Dayan's mobilisation no longer appeared to be directed 
against an Iraqi-Jordanian axis but an Egyptian-Jordanian-
. , onSyrian grouping.ou
For the Americans, the first indication that 
something was amiss came when the U.S. Embassy in London 
could not provide an account of the Anglo-French meeting 
of 16 October to the State Department. Concern increased 
when French Cabinet Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas told 
U.S. Ambassador Dillon that Britain and France were
78 Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on MUSKETEER, 
p. 39.
79 Dayan, Storv of Mv Life, p. 193? Bar-Zohar, The Armed 
Prophet, p. 234? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/12-1056, Tel 
Aviv to State Department, Cable 317, 10 December 1956.
80 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 103? PRO, F0371/121469, 
V1015/ 274, Duke to Foreign Office, CAble 1522, 23 
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collaborating with Israel to attack Egypt on or about 10 
November. Foster Dulles told Eisenhower on 21 October that 
he was 'baffled to know the real purposes of the British 
and the French.' Although Britain and the U.S. were 
working on 'long-term economic projects,' i.e. OMEGA, the 
British were considering 'alternatives.' Foster Dulles, 
drawing upon his conversation with Macmillan, could only 
be...
...confident that the British and the French 
would not resort to any of these measures before 
[the Presidential] election....[He] was more 
fearful as to what might happen after the 
election.81
The signs were increasingly ominous. U-2 flights 
photographed the Israeli mobilisation and the sailing of 
British and French ships to the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
French, after the capture of the Athos, hijacked a plane 
carrying five leaders of the Algerian nationalists. 
Monckton told Ambassador Aldrich that he had resigned as 
Minister of Defence because he believed the use of force 
against Egypt would be a 'great blunder.'82
The 'Watch Tower' committee of representatives from 
the State Department, CIA, and the military was convened 
after the U.S. Military Attache in Israel reported that 
his driver, a reservist with one arm and one leg and blind 
in one eye, was called up for service. The Committee noted 
that British intelligence had 'crawled into a shell' and
81 PRO, F0371/119156/JE14211/2180, Coulson to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2136, 18 October 1956, and Foreign Office 
to Washington, Cable 5875, 21 October 1956? USNA, RG 59, 
CDF, 974.7301/10-1956, Paris to State Department, Cable 
1839, 19 October 1956? US DDRS, US85 000227.
82 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 6, October 
1956 (1), London to State Department, Cable 2215 
(Classified).
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that Dayan was reportedly in France. Robert Amory, the
CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, reported that Eden 
was so mad at Nasser that he would 'team up with anyone' 
to overthrow the Egyptian leader. Only James Angleton, the 
head of the CIA's counter-espionage, with close contacts 
with the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, dismissed the 
chances of an Israeli attack.83
On 27 October, a White House meeting drafted a 
message from Eisenhower to Ben-Gurion requesting 'no 
forceful initiative on the part of your Government which 
would endanger the peace and the growing friendship
between our two countries.' However, the Americans saw 
'Jordan as the most probable direction' for an Israeli
attack. Eden and Lloyd had told General A1 Gruenther, the 
outgoing Supreme Commander of NATO forces, that the 
Israeli-Jordanian situation and Egyptian involvement in 
Jordan was 'of more fundamental importance' than the Suez 
Crisis. Ambassador Eban, summoned by Foster Dulles, found 
the Secretary studying an 'enormous map of Israel and
Jordan.' Foster Dulles 'strongly expressed concern and the 
difficulty [the U.S.] had in interpreting Israeli 
mobilization as purely defensive.' Eban maintained that 
Israel had no aggressive intentions. *
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Meanwhile, Ambassador Aldrich saw Lloyd, who
blatantly lied to cover up the collusion. Aldrich reported
to Washington:
[Lloyd] said with feeling and...evident 
conviction that a major Israeli attack either on 
Jordan or Egypt at this time would put Britain 
in an impossible situation....He was unwilling 
to believe the Israelis would launch a full- 
scale attack upon Egypt despite the temptation 
to do so in the present circumstances. He also 
said categorically that his recent conversations 
with the French gave him no reason to think the 
French were stimulating such an Israeli venture.
Lloyd predicted that negotiations with Egypt would resume
within a few days and assured Aldrich that the Cabinet was
'prepared to give him a reasonable period in which to seek
a negotiated solution.' He even carried out the charade of
agreeing 'a five-step program' with Aldrich for SCUA and
collection of Canal dues.85
Eisenhower sent a second message to Ben-Gurion,
requesting that Middle Eastern countries 'refrain from any
action which can lead to hostilities.' Foster Dulles was
informed by John McCloy, a director of Chase Manhattan
Bank, that there had not been 'a significant transfer of
funds from Israeli bank accounts.' McCloy did not realise
that Israel had withdrawn most of its balances weeks
earlier.86 Only on the late evening of 28 October did the
Watch Tower Committee conclude that Egypt was the Israeli
target, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed U.S.
85 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/10-2956, London to State 
Department, Cable 2322, 29 October 1956; Winthrop 
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military posts:
Past Egyptian provocations, the key role of 
Egypt in the Arab threat [to Israel], and U.K. 
involvement with Jordan indicate the attack will 
be launched against Egypt in the near-future, 
under the pretext of retaliation and exceeding 
past raids in strength.87
At 5 p.m., local time, on 29 October, four low-flying 
Israeli Mustangs cut Egyptian telephone lines in the 
Sinai, and 395 Israeli paratroopers dropped into the Mitla 
Pass. Eban was explaining to Rountree that Israeli 
mobilisation was a 'security measure,' unconnected to 
Anglo-French conflict with Egypt, when news of the attack 
reached the State Department. Rountree commented drily, 'I 
am certain, Mr. Ambassador, that you will wish to get back, 
to your embassy to find out exactly what is happening in
Q O
your country.'00
Foster Dulles did not react until 3:40 p.m. (10:40
p.m. in Egypt), as an advance Israeli land force linked up
with paratroopers at the Mitla Pass. He phoned Lodge, the
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.:
The Israelis have moved into Egyptian territory.
We don't know yet in what force or whether it is 
[a position] from which they will retire....The 
British and French are coming in and we will see 
if they will act in the U.N. calling upon the 
Israelis to withdraw. Partly it is to smoke them 
out to see where they stand.89
The Anglo-American 'alliance' in the Middle East,
reconstructed in the previous two years, was about to
undergo its sternest test.
87 USNA, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Geographical File, 1954-56, Box 14, S. 42, JCS to 
Commands, Cable 912389, 29 October 1956.
88 Neff, p. 362.
89 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Lodge, 29 October 1956.
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CHAPTER 15 
29 OCTOBER-6 NOVEMBER 1956: WAR
The 'hawks' finally had a war with Nasser, but 
Britain's diplomatic, economic, and military forces were 
unprepared for the conflict. On 28 October, Coulson, the 
British Charge d'Affaires in Washington,1 reassured Deputy 
Undersecretary Murphy that John Nicholls, the British 
Ambassador to Israel, was approaching Foreign Minister Meir 
about the Israeli mobilisation. Coulson told the truth, but 
only because Levant Department officials, ignorant of 
collusion with Israel, had instructed Nicholls to express 
'grave concern at recent moves and [the] hope that no action
will be taken to endanger the peace.' Eden halted the
. . ?despatch of the instructions.
Nicholls, on earlier instructions, had approached 
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to say Britain 'hoped no 
further action is contemplated against Jordan.' Ben-Gurion 
replied, 'I think you will find your government knows more 
about this than you do.' Nicholls took the initiative and 
asked Meir on the morning of 29 October for an assurance 
that Israel would not attack Jordan. Meir said drily, 'I 
think I can give you that assurance.'3
Eden and Lloyd waited until 6:10 p.m., more than two 
hours after the Israeli attack, to advise Coulson. Britain
1 The new British Ambassador, Harold Caccia, did not even 
leave for the U.S. until 1 November.
2 PRO, F0371/121763/VR1076/122, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2190, 28 October 1956, and subsequent 
minutes.
3 Author's interview with Sir Harold Beeley? PRO, 
F0371/121782/VR1091/368, Foreign Office to Tel Aviv, Cable 
1025, 27 October 1956, and VR1091/377, Tel Aviv to Foreign 
Office, Cable 575, 29 October 1956.
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welcomed tripartite consultations, but the Tripartite 
Declaration was not applicable, since Nasser had stated that 
the Declaration did not give Britain and the U.S. the right 
to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs. Eden and Lloyd 
speculated that Israel had acted because of Egyptian 
mobilisation, Nasser's public assertion that Israel should 
be liquidated, and Jordan's accession to the Egyptian-Syrian 
military command.4
Foster Dulles told Coulson and French Ambassador Herve 
Alphand that the U.S. was ready to request in the Security 
Council that Israel withdraw while U.N. members suspended 
aid to Tel Aviv. Foster Dulles agreed with Coulson that 
military intervention under the Tripartite Declaration was 
inappropriate but suggested financial and economic 
sanctions. Coulson innocently replied that he thought London 
would favour this procedure.5
Foster Dulles was not so trusting, telling William 
Knowland, the Republican leader in the Senate, '[Our] guess 
is it [the Israeli attack] has been worked out with the 
French at least and possibly with the British.'6 He arranged 
a meeting at the White House with Eisenhower, Undersecretary 
of State Hoover, Secretary of Defence Wilson, Admiral 
Radford, Allen Dulles, and Eisenhower's staff. Allen Dulles 
still thought the Israeli attack was a 'probing action,' but 
Foster Dulles noted the French supply of Mysteres to Israel 
and 'a very large number of messages between Paris and
4 PRO, F0371/121763/VR1076/122, Millard and Ross minutes 
and Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 4987, 29 October 
1956.
5 PRO, F0371/121476/VR1074/429, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2197, 29 October 1956.
6 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Knowland, 29 October 1956.
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Israel,' which the CIA had not been able to decode, on 28 
October. He speculated, 'The French and British may think
that --- whatever we may think of what they have done --- we
have to go along with them.'
The French assumption that Eisenhower would not 
intervene because of the election was immediately shattered. 
The President 'did not really think the American people 
would throw him out in the midst of a situation like this, 
but if they did, so be it.' He favoured an immediate 
approach to the U.N. while notifying Britain, 'We recognise 
that much is on their side in the dispute with the Egyptians 
but... nothing justifies double-crossing us.' Wilson held out 
against support of Egypt, but Hoover, worried that Arab 
States would ally with the Soviets if the U.S. backed 
Britain and France, and Radford agreed with the President. 
Foster Dulles also favoured pressure on the British, 
although he thought there was 'still a bare chance to 
"unhook” the British from the French.'7
After the meeting, Eisenhower told Coulson that the 
U.S. 'planned to get [to the Security Council] first thing 
in the morning - when the doors open - before the U.S.S.R. 
gets there' and asked the British to do likewise. Coulson, 
still without instructions from London, reasserted that 
Britain would approach the Council 'if only because, 
otherwise, the belief would spread throughout the Arab world 
that we were behind the Israeli move.'8
7 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, October 
1956, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 29 October 
1956.
8 PRO, F0800/741, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2200, 
29 October 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 
19, October 1956, Staff Memoranda, Foster Dulles- 
Eisenhower-Coulson meeting, 29 October 1956.
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The first sign of trouble came when U.N. Secretary- 
General Hammarskjold asked for an immediate Council session. 
British representative Dixon agreed that the Council should 
'at least call on Israel to withdraw her forces' but said he 
had no instructions from London. U.S. delegate Lodge, 
normally on good terms with Dixon, reported, 'It was as 
though a mask had fallen off, [Dixon] was ugly and not 
smiling.' Dixon allegedly chastised Lodge, 'Don't be so damn 
high-minded,' and described the Tripartite Declaration as 
'ancient history and without current validity.'9
While the British Cabinet approved the draft ultimatum 
to Egypt and Israel, to be issued by Eden in the Commons on 
the afternoon of 30 October, Ministers realised that the 
American attitude could not be ignored. Before the meeting, 
Lloyd protested to Aldrich about the American resolution 
condemning Israel, since the Israeli action was 'a clear 
case of self-defence.' Aldrich warned that, if the U.S. and 
Britain took opposing positions in the Security Council, the 
impression would be given that 'the Israeli action had been 
contrived with the United Kingdom and France as a move to 
get rid of Nasser.'10
Lloyd asked the Cabinet, in light of Aldrich's 
position, to consider whether Britain 'should attempt to 
persuade [the U.S.] to support the action which we and the 
French were proposing.' The bombing of Egypt could be
9 PRO, PREM11/1103, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 967, 
30 October 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone 
Calls, Box 5, Foster Dulles to Lodge, 29 October 1956?
DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 18, October 1956 
Phone Calls, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 30 October 1956? 
USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/10-3056, New York to State 
Department, Cable 443, 30 October 1956.
10 Aldrich, Foreign Affairs, o p . cit.? PRO, F0371/121783/ 
VR1091/418, Lloyd minute, 30 October 1956.
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deferred for 24 hours while an approach was made to
Washington. Supporting Lloyd, Macmillan belatedly admitted
that, in a protracted war, American financial help might be
needed. Ministers concluded:
Even though it was unlikely that the U.S. 
Government would respond to such an appeal, we 
should do our utmost to reduce the offence to 
American public opinion which was liable to be 
caused by our notes to Egypt and Israel. Our 
reserves of gold and dollars were still in need of 
assistance, and we could not afford to alienate 
the U.S. Government more than was absolutely 
necessary. 1
Eden cabled Eisenhower that 'Egypt has to a large
extent brought this attack on herself by insisting that the
state of war [with Israel] persists, by defying the Security
Council [over Egypt's ban on Israeli shipping through the
Suez Canal], and by declaring her intention to marshal the
Arab States for the destruction of Israel.' The last line of
the letter, however, held out the possibility of Anglo-
American cooperation:
We feel that decisive action should be taken at 
once to stop hostilities. We have agreed to go 
with you to the Security Council and instructions 
are being sent this moment [to Dixon]. 2
Eden's cable crossed Eisenhower's request for 'help in
clearing up my understanding as to what exactly what is
happening between us and our European allies - especially
between us, the French, and yourselves.' Citing the French
sale of weapons to Israel, increased radio traffic between
Paris and Tel Aviv, and Dixon's 'completely unsympathetic'
behaviour, Eisenhower concluded:
It seems to me of first importance that the U.K. 
and the U.S. quickly and clearly lay out their
11 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.75(56), 30 October 1956.
12 PRO, PREM11/1177, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
5010, 30 October 1956.
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present views and intentions before each 
other...so that we may not, in any real crisis, be 
powerless, to act in concert because of 
misunderstanding of each other.13
The letter concealed the fury of Eisenhower, who was
being restrained by Foster Dulles. At a White House meeting
on the morning of 30 October, the President complained:
He wondered if the hand of Churchill might not be 
behind this, inasmuch as this action is in the 
mid-Victorian style....He did not see much value 
in an unworthy and unreliable ally and...the 
necessity to support them might not be as great as 
they believed.
Eisenhower only sought Anglo-American agreement because of 
Foster Dulles' assessment that 'the U.S. could not sit by 
and let [Britain] go under economically.' The Secretary told 
Lodge, 'We are anxious to carry the Br[itish] - it is basic 
and goes to the heart of our relations all over the world 
and we have to give them a reasonable time.'14
Any possibility of Anglo-American reconciliation was 
soon dispelled. Because of the collusion, Britain could not 
allow a Security Council resolution which condemned the 
Israeli invasion. Dixon refused to endorse an American 
letter to the Security Council that stated Israel had 
'penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory' and spoke of 
'steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of 
Israel against Egypt.' Lodge, again 'shocked by [Dixon's] 
attitude and tone,' told Foster Dulles that Britain would 
only support the U.S. resolution if references to Israeli 
action were removed. Foster Dulles, after speaking with
13 DDE, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, 
Subject, State Department, Box 1, State Department to 
London, Cable 3080, 30 October 1956.
14 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, October 
1956 Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 30 
October 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone 
Calls, Box 5, Foster Dulles to Lodge, 30 October 1956.
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Eisenhower, told Lodge to proceed, simply modifying the
reference to 'the military action of Israel against Egypt'
to 'the military action of Israel in Egypt.'15
Eisenhower and Foster Dulles now knew that Britain, to
some degree, had accepted or encouraged the Israeli attack.
The President was especially bitter:
We will not help [Britain and France]. [I do] not
think we should call a special session of our
people to get dollars to help them out....They are 
our friends and allies and suddenly they put us in 
a hole and expect us to rescue them.
He concluded, '[I] want [Eden] to know that we are a
Government of honor and stick by what we say.'16
Meanwhile, Eden informed the Commons at 4:30 p.m. on 30
October of the Anglo-French demand that Egypt and Israel
cease fire, withdraw their forces 10 miles from the Suez
Canal within 12 hours, and allow an Anglo-French force to
occupy the Canal Zone. Refusal by either side would subject
it to Anglo-French military action. The 'impartial'
ultimatum was blatantly transparent. At the time of Eden's
announcement, the main Israeli force was between 50 and 100
miles from the Canal, so Israel could advance 40 to 90 miles
and still comply with British demands.17 Labour leader
Gaitskell, given only 15 minutes' notice of the ultimatum,
criticised Eden's refusal to ask the Security Council for
prompt Israeli withdrawal from Egypt and stressed the
Government's failure to consult the U.S. and the
15 PRO, PREM11/1105, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 989, 
30 October 1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/10-3056, New 
York to State Department, Cables 443, 445, and 452, 30 
October 1956.
16 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 30 October 
1956.
17 Hansard. 30 October 1956.
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Commonwealth.18
The damage of Eden's announcement was compounded by a 
lack of diplomacy. Aldrich called at the Foreign Office at 
1:30 p.m. for Lloyd's answer about an approach to the 
Security Council, but Lloyd's Private Secretary asked 
Aldrich to return later in the afternoon. Aldrich did so and 
was told that Lloyd was in the Commons. Only when Eden was 
speaking that Kirkpatrick present Aldrich with the 
ultimatum.19
Eden's telegram to Eisenhower justifying the ultimatum
was not despatched to Washington until 5:45 p.m. He
disingenuously stated that his 'first instinct would have
been to ask you to associate yourself and your country with
the declaration, but I know the constitutional and other
difficulties in which you are placed.' The message did not
reach Eisenhower's desk until 8:30 p.m., London time.20 Eden
claimed that 'cyphering delays' had occurred, but the
Americans suspected that he presented them with a fait
accompli. Foster Dulles complained to Senator Knowland:
The evidence is that the Israelis were used as a 
decoy [for Britain and France]....He had solemn 
assurances they would not - though they were 
private.
An hour later, he told Eisenhower that the ultimatum was 
'about as crude and brutal as anything he has ever seen.' 
The President agreed.21
18 Hansard. 30 October 1956; Rhodes James, p. 544.
19 Aldrich, Foreign Affairs, op. cit. See also PRO,
F0371/118902/ JE1094/4, Kirkpatrick minute, 30 October 
1956.
20 PRO, PREM11/1177, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
5025, 30 October 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, 
Telephone Calls, White House, Box 10, Eisenhower to Foster 
Dulles, 30 October 1956.
21 PRO, PREM11/1177, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
5180, 5 November 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers,
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Adding insult to injury, Britain and France requested 
suspension of the Security Council session, scheduled for 3 
p.m. in New York, so Eden's speech could be studied. Foster 
Dulles was in no mood to consent. Nor was Eisenhower: 'All
right with him that [the U.S. delegation] go ahead - after 
all [Britain and France] haven't consulted with us on 
anything.' Another message to Eden and Mollet, intended for 
publication, emphasized Eisenhower's 'deep concern at the 
prospect of this drastic action.'22
Dixon's position was sabotaged. The British delegate 
obtained an adjournment of the Security Council's morning 
session of 30 October but, 'obviously shaken,' had to read
the ultimatum at the afternoon meeting. Lodge refused
*
Dixon's plea for another delay and tabled the U.S. 
resolution, which not only called for Israeli withdrawal 
but, in a clause directed at Britain and France, for all 
U.N. members to refrain from the threat or use of force. 
Dixon publicly asked Lodge not to press for a vote, but the 
U.S. delegate demanded an immediate decision. Dixon and the 
French representative, Henri Cornut-Gentille, vetoed the 
measure. The Soviet representative cleverly resubmitted the 
American resolution without the requirement that U.N. 
members refrain from force. Britain and France again cast 
vetoes, indicating support of the Israeli invasion.23 Dixon
Telephone Calls, Box 5, Knowland to Foster Dulles, 30 
October 1956? DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone 
Calls, White House, Box 10, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower,
30 October 1956.
22 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 30 October 
1956? DDE, White House Office, Office of the Staff 
Secretary, Subject, State Department, Box 1, State 
Department to London, Cable 3083, 30 October 1956.
23 PRO, PREM11/1105, New York to Foreign Office, Cables 975- 
977 and 989, 30 October 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/
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reported to London that 'the Anglo-French action [has] been 
greeted by our friends with shocked surprise' and 
desperately hoped for Anglo-American reconciliation: 'Mr.
Lodge did his best, but was clearly under firm instructions 
to oppose us at every point.'24
Dixon received no assistance. Nasser, 'completely
relaxed and at his ease,' told British Ambassador Trevelyan
that Egypt would defend her rights against aggression.
British commanders, fearing effective Egyptian use of anti­
aircraft fire and fighter aircraft at dawn on 31 October, 
delayed the bombing of Egyptian airfields for 12 hours, but 
Eden told the Cabinet that air operations would begin at 
dusk.25
Foster Dulles' was to safeguard American 'moral'
leadership of the world, condemning British and French
'colonialism,' if necessary:
Two things are important from the standpoint of 
history. It is the beginning of the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire [because of the Hungarian 
uprising]. The second is the idea is out that we 
can be dragged along at the heels of British and 
French policies that are obsolete. This is a 
declaration of independence for the first time 
that they cannot count upon us to engage in 
policies of this sort.
Vice-President Richard Nixon noted, 'We will lose some
Israeli votes [in the election]' but agreed with Foster
Dulles that the great majority of Jewish voters already
• • • o csupported the opposition Democratic Party. °
10-3056, New York to State Department, Cable 452, 30 
October 1956.
24 PRO, PREM11/1105, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 989,
30 October 1956.
25 PRO, FO371/121783/VR1091/406, Cairo to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2590, 30 October 1956? PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.76(56),
31 October 1956.
26 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5,
Nixon to Foster Dulles, 31 October 1956.
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The immediate question was whether Foster Dulles would
invoke the United for Peace Resolution in the Security
Council. Under the Resolution, established during the Korean
War, an issue before the Council could be referred to the
General Assembly if at least seven of the Council's 11
members agreed. When Senator Knowland asked on 31 October if
an Assembly meeting was scheduled, Foster Dulles hesitated
and 'doubted we can have one before the regular one in two
weeks.' However, the Secretary soon had news of Anglo-French
bombing of Egypt, and an American journalist told him that
collusion with Israel...
... started with the French and the British were 
not in on it until a few days ago and.. .wanted to 
be sure there was no danger of war between Israel 
and Jordan.... When they got the assurance that 
would not be the case, they got in.27
Britain's only hope was delaying the passage of an
Assembly resolution long enough to take control of the Suez
Canal. Even Eisenhower might accept a fait accompli if
intervention was quick and successful. After reading the
ultimatum, he drafted a message for Eden:
It is hard for me to see any good final result 
emerging from a scheme that seems certain to 
antagonise the entire Moslem world....I assume, 
however, that you have gone too far to reconsider 
so I must further assume that your plan is so 
worked out that you foresee no dreary and unending 
prospect stretching out ahead.
I think I faintly understand and certainly I 
deeply sympathise with you in the problem you have 
to solve. Now we must pray that everything comes 
out both justly and reasonably peacefully.
Foster Dulles thought 'the last part is a bit too much,
assuming it is all going to happen.' Eisenhower agreed to
27 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Knowland to Foster Dulles and Lawrence to Foster Dulles,
31 October 1956.
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hold the letter until the next morning.28
Dixon tried to save the British position, asking Lodge 
on 31 October for 'a cooling-off period of only 24 hours.' 
Lodge informed Foster Dulles that an issue could be referred 
to the Assembly through a petition by a majority of the 
Assembly's members. Britain and France favoured this because 
'it takes longer and both have hope of being able to work 
something out.' The Secretary gave way: 'Get it [the Council 
session for 3 p.m.] called off and say we would sign and do
. . . jo , , ,it by p e t i t i o n . D i x o n  was finally undone by the Soviets. 
At 5:13 p.m., Lodge told Foster Dulles that the Soviet Union 
would only refrain from introducing a Council resolution 
condemning Britain, France, and Israel if the matter was 
referred to the Assembly. Foster Dulles instructed Lodge, 
'Go ahead and vote for [reference to the Assembly]' but 
added, '[I] would not have the [Assembly] meeting before 
Friday [2 November].'30
Foster Dulles' ambivalence was apparent throughout the 
U.S. Government. When the Royal Air Force first bombed 
Egypt, U-2 reconnaissance flights from the American base at 
Adana, Turkey, were passing over the area. The Americans 
passed the photographs to the British, who replied, 'Warm 
thanks for pictures. It's the quickest bomb damage
i
assessment we've ever had.'JA
28 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, October 
1956 (1), Eisenhower to Eden draft, 30 October 1956? DDE, 
John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, Lodge 
to Foster Dulles, 31 October 1956.
29 PRO, F0371/121746/VR1074/451, New York to Foreign Office, 
Cable 993, 31 October 1956; DDE, John Foster Dulles 
Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, Lodge to Foster Dulles, 31 
October 1956.
30 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Lodge to Foster Dulles, 31 October 1956.
31 Mosley, pp. 417ff.
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Other U.S. commanders prepared for confrontation. Asked
by Foster Dulles if the Sixth Fleet could prevent the Anglo-
French carrier force from reaching Egypt, Admiral Arleigh
Burke, the Chief Naval Officer, answered:
We can stop them, but we will have to blast hell 
out of them....The British, the French, and the 
Egyptians and the Israelis, the whole Goddamn 
works of them we can knock off, if you want, but 
that's the only way we can do it.
Burke ordered the Commander of the Sixth Fleet 'to have his
bomb[er]s up, to be checked out, so as to be able to fight
either another naval force or against land targets, and to
make sure of all his targeting data.' When the Commander
asked, 'Who's the enemy?', Burke instructed, 'Don't take any
guff from anybody.'32
Eisenhower, uninvolved in discussions of U.N. strategy,
was a catalyst for American public opinion rather than an
actor in policymaking. Although moderate in tone, his
national broadcast of 31 October concentrated on the faults
of the invasion of Egypt. The U.S., 'not consulted in any
way' by Britain, France, or Israel, retained its right to
oppose the attack, and the matter would be pressed in the
U.N. The President concluded with a subtle warning to
Britain and France: 'The peace we seek...means the
acceptance of law, and the fostering of justice, in all the
world.'33
American criticism was not the only source of pressure 
upon the Eden Government. On 31 October, Nutting decided to 
resign as Minister of State in the Foreign Office.34 
Assistant Undersecretary Ross, who also knew about
32 Ibid.
33 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 81.
34 See Nutting, No End of A Lesson, pp. 122ff.
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collusion, recommended adoption of the U.N. resolution for
Israeli withdrawal:
We appear to be pitching into the Egyptians but do 
nothing about the Israelis. We can and should say 
that we would deal with the Israelis as soon as 
our hands are free but it would be better if the 
Assembly would make this their business. 5
The First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten, who had worried
throughout the crisis about British relations with Arab
countries and had asked Eden to sign a statement that the
military carried no political responsibility for its
actions, also submitted his resignation to the Prime
Minister, but it was not accepted.36
In the Commons, Gaitskell queried if the U.S. was
consulted about the ultimatum and accused the Government of
'violating' its relations with Washington, the Commonwealth,
and the U.N. Eden did not deny his 'blackout' of the U.S.
but argued that, while the Canal was necessary to British
survival, it was only a secondary concern for the Americans:
'I do not think that we must in all circumstances secure
agreement from our American ally before we can act ourselves
in what we know to be our vital interests.'37 That evening,
Lloyd tried to avoid the charge of collusion:
It is quite wrong to state that Israel was incited 
to this action by Her Majesty's Government. There 
was no prior agreement between us about it. It is, 
of course, true that the Israeli mobilisation gave 
some advance warning, and we urged restraint upon 
the Israeli Government and, in particular, drew 
attention to the serious consequences of any 
attack upon Jordan.
35 PRO, F0371/121748/VR1074/527, Ross minute, 30 October 
1956.
36 AP, AP33/7, Eden record, 21 May 1976; PRO, PREM11/1090/ 
File.
37 Hansard. 31 October 1956. See also USNA, RG 59, CDF, 
641.74/10-3156, London to State Department, Cable 2402, 31 
October 1956.
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In his memoirs, Lloyd claimed the Sevres talks did not 
meet the Oxford English Dictionary definition of 'collusion' 
as a 'fraudulent secret understanding,' but this argument 
avoided the relevant points. The Sevres Protocol constituted 
a prior agreement, withheld from Parliament, between Britain 
and Israel to invade and bomb Egypt. Protecting the facade 
of the Anglo-French ultimatum, Lloyd lied, not only to the
O  Q  ,
Commons but to the world. ° He later admitted:
If I thought it would save British lives, protect 
British property, and serve British interests to 
conceal part of the facts from Parliament, I would 
not hesitate for a moment to do so, particularly 
when active hostilities were taking place or there 
was an inflammatory situation. 9
The Conservative majority in the Commons allowed the
Government to maintain the ruse, but Britain's Arab friends
could not be as accommodating. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri
Sa'id warned:
If immediately, or within a day or two at most, 
action by HMG to compel Israel [sic] forces to 
withdraw from Egyptian territory could be 
achieved, position would be altered very much and 
perhaps decisively for the better. But, failing 
this, he doubted whether Iraqi regime and 
government could hold the position much longer. A 
week was the very outside.
Kirkpatrick weakly replied to Ambassador Wright that
Britain's action was 'merely an emergency and temporary fire
brigade operation to prevent Israel inflicting a crushing
defeat on Egypt.' Wright responded:
My own appreciation is that, unless very early 
action is taken..., the Government and public 
security may be in danger....It is now literally 
imperative that something should be said or done 
to correct the false impression, which events are 
creating, that HMG .nare attacking Egypt in 
collusion with Israel.40
38 Hansard. 31 October 1956? Lloyd, pp. 246ff.
39 Thorpe, p. 249.
40 PRO, F0371/121783/VR1091/4071, Baghdad to Foreign Office,
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Even the Commonwealth offered little support for
British action. The Indians were bitterly opposed, and the 
Government of Ceylon expressed 'shock and perturbation.' The 
Pakistani Government was under public pressure to leave the 
Commonwealth and evict Britain from the Baghdad Pact. The 
Canadians, who consistently refused to endorse military
action, were infuriated that they learned of the ultimatum 
from the press. New Zealand's Prime Minister, Stuart 
Holland, publicly defended Britain but wrote Eden of his 
concern at Anglo-American conflict and the lack of British 
consultation with the Commonwealth. Australian Prime 
Minister Menzies remained Eden's firmest supporter, but the 
Opposition and members of Menzies' Cabinet were unhappy with 
British bombing of Egypt.41
If military operations had quickly brought the collapse
of the Egyptian Government or control of the Suez Canal,
Britain might have overcome these difficulties. In a draft 
letter of 1 November, written after the Security Council 
referred Suez to the General Assembly, Eisenhower advised 
Eden:
The very second you attain your minimum 
objectives....I think you could probably ease 
tension greatly by doing the following. One - 
instantly call for a cease-fire in the area; two, 
clearly state your reasons for entering the Canal 
Zone? three, announce your intention to resume
Cable 1230, and Foreign Office to Baghdad, Cable 2343, 31 
October 1956, and VR1091/416, Baghdad to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1234; and Foreign Office to Baghdad, Cable 2353, 31 
October 1956? PRO, F0371/121489/ VJ10393/176, Baghdad to 
Foreign Office, Cable 1238, 1 November 1956, and Foreign 
Office to Baghdad, Cable 2361, 1 November 1956.
41 Rhodes James, pp. 550ff.? PRO, FO371/121748/VR1074/550, 
Karachi to Commonwealth Relations Office, Cable 1777, 1 
November 1956? Pearson, p. 244? AP, AP20/25, Canberra to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, Cable 2545, 1 November 
1956, Ottawa to Commonwealth Relations Office, Cable 1040, 
1 November 1956, and Suhrawardy to Eden, 4 November 1956..
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negotiations on the basis of the Six Principles 
agreed by the U.N.? four, state your intention to 
evacuate as quickly as the Israelis return to
their own national territory and Egypt had 
announced her readiness to negotiate in good faith 
on the basis of the Six Principles. 2
Eisenhower confirmed in a 1964 interview:
We assumed that, if the three nations did attack, 
they would all move at one time, and it would be 
over in almost 24 hours....Had they done it
quickly, we would have accepted it...They could 
have taken over and then got out of there. There'd 
have been no great crisis in the world. 3
When Foster Dulles told Eisenhower of the ultimatum,
the Secretary estimated that British and French troops would
be in Egypt by 1 November. The President replied, 'Aren't
they partially in now?' That evening, with no landing
imminent, Eisenhower allegedly commented, 'I've just never
seen Great Powers make such a complete mess and botch of
things.'44 An American military intelligence summary on 1
November concluded:
Landing of French and U.K. troops in Canal Zone 
expected any moment. U.K. and France, with forces 
currently available, have capability of seizing 
key points Canal Area, including Port Said, 
Ismailia, and Suez, within 36 hours. They have 
capability securing control Canal Area, including 
establishing strong points east and west of Canal, 
within seven to ten days.45
In fact, under REVISE, no troops were to be landed 
until Egyptian resistance was ended through bombing and
42 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 19, Eden, 
Eisenhower to Eden draft, 1 November 1956.
43 DDE, Oral History Collection, OH-14, Eisenhower oral 
history, 28 July 1964.
44 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, White 
House, Box 10, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 30 October 
1956; Hughes, p. 216.
45 USNA, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Geographical File, 1954-1956, EMMEA (11-19-47), Box 14, S. 
46, CINCLANT to Commanders, Cable 5959, 1 November 1956. 
See also USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/10-3056, U.S. Army 
Attache (Paris) to State Department, Cable CX 195, 30 
October 1956.
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psychological warfare, a process estimated to require 10 
days. The prerequisite for this, the neutralisation of the 
Egyptian Air Force, was quickly achieved. Within hours of 
the bombing on 31 October, most Egyptian planes on the 
ground were destroyed or forced to distant bases. REVISE'S 
Air Force Headquarters reported: 'It appears likely that
Phase II [air offensive against static military targets and 
psychological warfare]...can start sometime tomorrow [2 
November].'46
Even Phase I was beset with political problems, 
however. Bombers despatched to attack Cairo West airfield 
were diverted, as American civilians were being evacuated 
along roads adjacent to the airfield. The attack against 
Cairo Radio was postponed because of fear of civilian 
casualties - the military thought the main transmitter, Abu 
Zabal, located 15 miles from Cairo, was in the centre of the 
city.47 Most importantly, the military did not keep the Suez 
Canal open. The Egyptian blockship Akka, bombed by British 
aircraft, conveniently sank in the middle of the waterway. 
Within days, the Egyptians sank 48 more blockships, and 
Britain faced drastic fuel rationing and the heavy cost of 
oil purchases from the Western Hemisphere. The problem was 
compounded on 3 November when Syrian Army troops, probably 
on Nasser's orders, demolished an Iraqi Petroleum Company 
pumping station.48
46 PRO, AIR24/2426, Air Task Force Directive, Cable AO 476,
1 November 1956.
47 PRO, AIR24/2426, General Summary of Events, 31 October 
1956, and AFHQ to SASO, ATF, 31 October 1956.
48 PRO, ADM205/150, 'A Short Account of Operation MUSKETEER 
and Its Aftermath, 31 Oct. 1956-Nov. 1956,' undated? PRO, 
AIR24/2426, Summary of FOA Carriers, 20 November 1956?
PRO, W0288/99, Mideast Intelligence Summary No. 201, 28 
October-10 November 1956.
372
Meanwhile, the U.S. Sixth Fleet hindered the Anglo- 
French carrier group. Aircraft repeatedly buzzed the ships, 
twice almost battling with British planes, and submarines 
shadowed the convoy. On 3 November, the Sixth Fleet's 
Commander assured the British that American submarines would 
remain on the surface and 'his aircraft [would] be more 
careful,' but as late as the 5th, the British Chiefs of 
Staff feared that the Sixth Fleet would block access to Port 
Said.49
Finally, British commanders were plagued by Eden's 
failure to tell them of collusion. On 31 October, the French 
asked Admiral Grantham, the British Commander-in-Chief in 
the Mediterranean, to allow the French destroyer Gazelle to 
resupply Israeli troops and to transport Israeli wounded to 
hospitals in Israel. Curiously, Grantham, who had no 
executive responsibility in REVISE, approved the proposal 
without referring it to Keightley.50 In Tel Aviv, REVISE'S 
deputy air commander, General Brohon, supervised French 
collaboration with Israel, as French planes dropped jeeps, 
guns and ammunition, cigarettes, and jerricans of water to 
Israeli paratroopers. Mystere and F-84 fighters with French 
pilots operated from Israel with the markings of the Anglo- 
French force.51 The cruiser Georges Leygues supported the 
Israeli advance by shelling Rafah on Sinai's northern coast. 
Another warship, Kersaint, damaged the Egyptian ship Ibrahim
49 PRO, ADM205/139-140/File? PRO, AIR8/2097, MUSKETEER Naval 
Situation Report #3, 3 November 1956? PRO, DEFE4/91, 
COS(56)111th meeting, 5 November 1956.
50 Abel Thomas, p. 110? Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet, p.
240? PRO, ADM205/139, CINCMED to HMS Newfoundland. 31 
October 1956.
51 See PRO, AIR8/2097, HQATF to HQ Bomber Malta, Cable 
AG611, 1 November 1956.
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el-Awal, later captured by Israeli forces.52
Keightley belatedly discovered on 31 October that 'the
French have established an effective liaison with the
Israelis.' He informed the Chiefs of Staff, 'I would welcome
direction at what stage or in what degree it is visualised
we fight as the Allies of the Israelis.' Instructed by the
Chiefs to warn the French against open cooperation with
Israel, Keightley was surprised to learn from a French
liaison officer 'that an agreement was made for certain help
between governments and, if it is not honoured, the Israelis
will publicise and exaggerate the agreement made.'53
Eden cabled French Premier Mollet on 1 November that
the French actions were...
...extremely embarrassing....Nothing could do more 
harm to our role as peacemakers than to be 
identified in this way with one of the two 
parties.
Mollet told Ambassador Jebb that he would end the open 
Franco-Israeli cooperation? however, French F-84s, operating 
from Israel on 4 November, destroyed 18 IL-28 bombers, which 
had been moved to Luxor in central Egypt. On 8 November, two 
French squadrons were still with the Israeli Air Force.54
By the end of 1 November, REVISE was collapsing under 
the strain of political considerations.55 Phase II, the
52 PRO, ADM205/150, 'A Short Account of Operation 
MUSKETEER,' undated.
53 PRO, AIR8/1940, Keightley to COS, KEYCOS 2, 31 October 
1956, and KEYCOS 16, 2 November 1956? PRO, DEFE4/91,
COS(56)108th meeting, 1 November 1956.
54 PRO, PREM11/1132, Foreign Office to Paris, Cable 2863, 1 
November 1956, and Paris to Foreign Office, Cable 397, 2 
November 1956? Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez: The 
Double War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979), p. 119? PRO, 
AIR20/10127, Keightley to Chiefs of Staff, KEYCOS 60, 8 
November 1956.
55 See PRO, AIR8/2097, AFHQ to Air Ministry, Cable COSAIR/1, 
1 November 1956,
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bombing of economic and military installations and 
psychological warfare, which was supposed 'to bring the 
Egyptians to the verge of surrender in a further six days,' 
was never implemented. The BBC Arabic Service station at 
Sharq el-Adna in Cyprus, requisitioned for Government use on 
30 October and renamed Voice of Britain, was rendered 
ineffective when its Arab Staff left.56 Bombing of oil 
tanks, telephone and telegraph systems, and railway lines 
was suspended by the Egypt Committee on 1 November. 
Ministers feared Arab retaliation against oil pipelines and 
long-term damage to the Egyptian economy as well as the 
effect on world opinion of heavy casualties. Cairo Radio was 
belatedly reclassified a 'military' target, but it was not 
attacked until 2 November and was able to resume 
broadcasting on the 5th. Canberra aircraft proved 
technically unable to drop leaflets and Air Force 
Headquarters would not risk 'losing valuable transport 
aircraft which were needed to mount the airborne assault.' 
Only one load of 500,000 leaflets was released, and two 
'voice' aircraft were never used.57
Nasser's position was never threatened. Colonel Hassan 
Siyam, one of the dissident officers supported by MI6, 
allegedly asked his civilian conspirators to demand a 
meeting with Nasser, but they would not act until the 
military deposed Nasser. On 2 November, Nasser drove in an
56 PRO, ADM205/150, 'A Short Account of Operation 
MUSKETEER,' undated; PRO, AIR20/10369/File. See also PRO, 
AIR20/10369, Keightley to Ministry of Defence, Cable CIC/ 
560, 16 November 1956, and Murray to Rennie, 1 December 
1956.
57 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)36th meeting, 1 November 1956? 
PRO, AIR8/ 2097, 3rd Summary of Operations, 2 November 
1956; PRO, F0953/1786/ PB1045/13, James minute, 13 June 
1957? PRO, AIR20/10369/File.
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open-topped car to Friday prayers at Al-Azhar Mosque in
Cairo and told the crowd:
In Cairo I shall fight with you against any 
invasion. We shall fight to the last drop of our 
blood. We shall never surrender.
Suleiman Hafez, a civilian leader who was not involved in
the British-backed plots, saw General Abdel Hakim Amer, the
Egyptian Chief of Staff, and Wing Commander Hassan Latim
Boghdadi to ask that Nasser be replaced by his predecessor,
General Mohammed Neguib. Supported by Boghdadi, Nasser
resolved, over Amer's objections, to fight for Cairo until
open resistance was useless and then to carry out a
guerrilla war.58
Press Secretary Clark reported a 'curious peace' at 10
Downing Street, but others were not as complacent. At an
informal meeting on 1 November, Kirkpatrick bleakly
projected that Britain would have to leave the U.N. unless a
quick remedy was found. Clark suggested that Britain accept
a U.N. commander, and Lloyd agreed that U.N. troops might
join the Anglo-French force. The meeting decided, however,
that the U.N. could not act immediately, and Minister of
Defence Head reminded Ministers that the organisation was
unlikely to adopt Britain's objective of overthrowing
C Q
Nasser. *
Minister of Fuel and Power Aubrey Jones told the Egypt 
Committee that oil consumption would have to be reduced by 
10 percent in the next week to prepare for rationing. The 
Attorney-General, Reginald Manningham-Buller, reopened the
58 PRO, F0371/125423/JE1019/1, Brenchley minute, 26 July 
1957? 'Abd Al-Latif Al-Bughdadi's Memoirs,' in Troen and 
Shemesh, pp. 336ff. See also Heikal, Nasser, op. cit.
59 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 12 November 
1956.
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issue of the invasion's legality, writing Lloyds
On what is known to me, I am unable to devise any 
argument which could purport to justify in 
international law either our demand that [Egypt], 
who had in no way threatened our nationals, should 
withdraw her forces from a part of her own 
territory which she is engaged in defending or the 
threat to occupy her territory by armed forces 
should she fail to accede to that demand.60
In the Foreign Office, junior officials considered mass
resignation, as Assistant Undersecretary Beeley told his
predecessor Shuckburgh that everyone except Kirkpatrick was
'equally depressed and astonished' by Anglo-French
operations. Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, said that 'he
had spoken out against [the operations] up to the limit of
what is possible and [he] was surprised that he was still in
the job.'61
Most ominous was Macmillan's changing attitude. On 29 
October, he told Treasury officials and the Bank of England 
that he was 'to remain firm and see the affair through,' but 
$50 million in reserves was lost in the next 48 hours and 
the Suez Canal was blocked. The Chancellor fretted about 
domestic support, complaining that people thought oil came 
out of taps and worried that U.S. reaction 'was much worse 
than he had expected.
In the Commons, tension rose to breaking point when 
Eden balked at answering Labour's question if Britain was at 
war. Tempers flared, and the sitting was suspended for the 
first time in 30 years. Eden finally said that Britain was 
'neither at war nor at peace,' but he made a notable
60 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)36th meeting, 1 November 1956? 
PRO, PREM11/ 1129, Manningham-Buller to Lloyd, 1 November 
1956.
61 Shuckburgh, pp. 363ff.
62 PRO, T236/4188, Rowan memorandum, 31 October 1956, and 
Ricketts memorandum, 2 November 1956? Clark, p. 203.
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concession. Despite the doubts of the informal meeting that 
morning, Eden invited the U.N. to send a peacekeeping force 
to Egypt:
The first and urgent task is to separate [Egyptian 
and Israeli troops] and to stabilise the 
position... .If the U.N. were then willing to take 
over the physical task of maintaining peace in 
that area, no one would be better pleased than we.
Eden gambled that it would take days, if not weeks, to
organise a force. Britain and France could proceed with the
invasion in the interim. The Opposition, awaiting U.N.
developments, did not press its challenge, and the
Government defeated a censure motion with a comfortable
majority.63
The Eisenhower Administration now concluded that 
Britain and France, failing to occupy the Canal Zone 
immediately, would continue to antagonise world opinion. 
Moreover, Anglo-French operations were undermining American 
objectives in the Middle East, notably Syria, and in Eastern 
Europe.
The critical NSC meeting occurred on 1 November. When 
the Council previously met on 26 October, members thought 
they were witnessing the long-awaited dissolution of the 
Soviet Empire and 'liberation' of Eastern European peoples. 
Polish leaders, despite Soviet opposition, had embarked upon 
a program of political and economic reforms, and street 
demonstrations in Hungary forced the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Hungary.64 However, when the protesters,
63 Hansard. 1 November 1956; PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)37th 
meeting, 1 November 1956.
64 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
8, 301st NSC meeting, 26 October 1956? John Ranelagh, The 
Rise and Fall of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1987), pp. 287ff.
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encouraged by broadcasts from the CIA's Radio Free Europe, 
made new demands, including Hungary's withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev ordered Soviet tanks to to crush the 
uprising in Budapest. In the face of Anglo-French 
'intervention' in Egypt, Allen Dulles vetoed action against 
the Soviet 'intervention.' American allies had dashed hopes 
of 'liberation.'65
Anglo-French action also doomed implementation of OMEGA 
against Nasser. After months of planning, the CIA-backed 
coup in Syria, scheduled for 29 October, was foiled by the 
Israeli invasion of Egypt. Some American officials even 
suspected that Mikhail Ilyan, the chief CIA contact, 
postponed the coup from 25 to 29 October at the instigation 
of the British and the Iraqis.66 The next day, Foster Dulles 
told his brother, 'The conditions are such [that] it would 
be a mistake to try to pull [the coup] off.' Allen Dulles 
was not as conclusive: 'If the assets can be held together
for a few days more without taking action, [the CIA] would 
much prefer it.'67
Worse followed. While the American-backed conspiracy 
was not detected, the Anglo-Iraqi plot was discovered when 
the Syrian internal police intercepted two Druze leaders 
with hundreds of rifles and machine guns, allegedly given to 
them by Iraq. Conspirators and leaders of the Parti 
Populaire Syrienne were arrested. Ilyan, taking no chances, 
fled to Lebanon with conspirators connected with Anglo-Iraqi 
planning. Eventually five defendants were sentenced to
65 Mosley, p. 420.
66 Private information.
67 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 30 October 1956.
379
death. Eight were condemned in absentia, including Ilyan,
PPS leader Ghassan Jedid, and the Iraqi Military Attache in
Damascus. The former dictator Adib Shishakli received a life
sentence in absentia. °
However, the most important consideration for the NSC
was the General Assembly debate, scheduled for 5 p.m..
Foster Dulles had to seize the initiative. He summarised:
For many years now, the U.S. has been walking a 
tightrope between the effort to maintain our old 
and valued relations with our British and French - 
allies on the one hand, and on the other try to 
assure ourselves of the friendship and 
understanding of the newly independent countries 
who have escaped from colonialism....Unless we now 
assert and maintain this leadership, all of these 
newly independent countries will turn from us to 
the U.S.S.R....In short, the U.S. would survive or 
go down on the basis of the fate of colonialism if 
the U.S. supports the French and British on the 
colonial issue....
It is nothing less than tragic, at this very 
time, when we are on the point of winning an 
immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet 
colonialism in the Eastern Europe, we should be 
forced to choose between following in the 
footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and 
Africa or split our course away from theirs.
The NSC divided on the methods to implement this
policy. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, concerned at the
cost and inconvenience of financial and trade sanctions,
preferred no action until the U.N. formally identified
aggressors. Secretary of Defence Wilson echoed the sympathy
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the use of force against
Egypt. Harold Stassen, the President's special
representative for mutual aid, accepted Anglo-French action,
since 'the Suez Canal [was] an absolutely vital lifeline for
the British.' Desperate to preserve the American position in
the U.N., Foster Dulles reminded Stassen 'with great warmth'
68 Seale, pp. 268ff.? PRO, F0371/128220/File. See also PRO, 
F0371/ 128236/VY1022/9, Bowker to Ross, 23 May 1957.
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that Britain and France would agree to a cease-fire only 
'when they were thoroughly lodged in Egypt.' Unruffled, 
Stassen asked whether this type of cease-fire was not in the 
best interests of the U.S. Foster Dulles gave an 'emphatic 
negative,' alleging, 'What the British and French had done 
was nothing but the straightforward old-fashioned variety of 
colonialism of the most obvious sort.'
Eisenhower appeared indecisive, expressing at one 
moment his 'emphatic belief that these powers were going 
downhill with the kind of policy that they were...carrying 
out,' then wondering what the argument was all about and 
asking Foster Dulles if the U.S. needed 'to do anything 
beyond' a mild U.N. resolution. He even suggested that the 
U.S. should 'continue to assist Britain [with military 
supplies] in order that she meet her NATO requirements,' 
although he quickly added, 'If the British actually diverted 
these supplies to other purposes, we would have to consider 
such an action to represent another case of perfidious 
Albion.' Finally, the President proposed a draft 'of the 
mildest things we could do in an effort to block the 
introduction of a really mean and arbitrary resolution.'
Eisenhower's intervention did not resolve the issue. 
Foster Dulles argued, 'It is important that we suspend our 
economic assistance program to Israel,' but Humphrey and 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell advocated an arms embargo 
for the entire Middle East, rather than economic sanctions 
against Tel Aviv. When Stassen insisted upon a resolution 
with no punitive measures, Foster Dulles, 'in some 
irritation,' asked if Stassen meant to leave aggressors in 
possession of their gains. Stassen bluntly affirmed this
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view, 'for which there seemed to be some support among other
members of the NSC.' Frustrated, Foster Dulles left to draft
the American resolution. Eisenhower concluded ambiguously:
Of course, no one in the whole world really 
expected us to break off our long alliance with 
Great Britain and France. We must not permit 
ourselves to be blinded by the thought that 
anything we are going to do will result in our 
fighting with Great Britain and France. 9
Ultimately, the Council's failure to agree strengthened
Foster Dulles' hand, as he had already obtained Eisenhower's
consent to suspend military supplies and aid 'to the
countries of the area of hostilities.' Realising that State
Department officials 'would like to go stronger,' Foster
Dulles told Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, 'We have
other pressures for [Britain and France] but we don't want
it publicly announced at the moment.70
More than seven hours into the Assembly debate, Foster
Dulles took the podium. He began, 'No delegate could have
spoken with a heavier heart than I speak with tonight,' for
the U.S. had to act against 'three nations with whom it has
ties, deep friendship, admiration, and respect.' However,
failure 'to stop the fighting as rapidly as possible' would
condemn the U.N. to 'apparent impotence.' He concluded, 'If,
whenever a nation feels that it has been subjected to
injustice, it should have the right to resort to
force,...then I fear we should be tearing the Charter into
shreds.'71
Sixty-four countries voted for the U.S. resolution for
69 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
8, 302nd NSC meeting, 1 November 1956.
70 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 5, 
Foster Dulles to Weeks, 1 November 1956.
71 Hoopes, p. 379? Carlton, Anthony Eden, p. 447.
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an immediate cease-fire, and only five (Britain, France, 
Israel, Australia, and New Zealand) voted against. Britain's 
only hope came from Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson. 
Seizing upon Eden's statement of 1 November in the Commons 
that 'if the U.N. were.. .willing to take over the physical 
task of maintaining peace in the area, no one would be 
better pleased than we,' Pearson arranged with Foster Dulles
, , 70
to propose an United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).'*
The French, realising U.S. and U.N. pressure would soon 
halt REVISE, sought an immediate landing. On 31 October, 
Anglo-French planners had drafted Operation OMELETTE for the 
occupation of Port Said by paratroopers as early as 3 
November. REVISE'S commanders argued about the plan for two 
days until French pressure prevailed, and Pineau, supported 
by Generals Ely and Challe, obtained the British Cabinet's 
agreement. At the same time, the Cabinet agreed to notify 
the U.N. that Britain and France would transfer 'police 
responsibility' to the UNEF when it arrived in Egypt. Butler 
cited domestic political reasons, while Lloyd warned of 
American oil sanctions which might force Britain 'to occupy 
Kuwait and Qatar, the only suppliers of oil who were not 
members of the U.N.' He concluded, 'We could not hope to 
avoid serious difficulties with the Arab states for more 
than a very short time longer, certainly not for as long as 
it would take us to complete an opposed occupation of 
Egypt.'73
72 PRO, PREM11/1105, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1009, 
2 November 1956? Pearson, pp. 243ff.
73 PRO, AIR24/2426, 'Operation OMELETTE,' 31 October 1956? 
Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on MUSKETEER, p. 
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Pineau, distressed with the facade of co-operation with 
the U.N., proposed that, simultaneously with OMELETTE, 
Israeli troops advance to the Suez Canal's east bank. The 
British responded, with 'outraged indignation.' Pineau 
complained:
The Prime Minister is no Churchill. He has neither 
the tenacity nor the steel nerves. The test, 
instead of strengthening him, exhausts him. It is 
not yet a 'breakdown,' but we are not far from 
it.7*
The Cabinet, in a later meeting on 2 November, not only 
rejected overt cooperation with Israel but snubbed Pineau by 
suspending British arms exports to Israel? however, they 
agreed that formation of UNEF should not halt an Anglo- 
French landing. Britain would stop military action 'as soon 
as...it was agreed that, until the U.N. force was 
constituted, detachments of Anglo-French troops should be 
stationed on Egyptian territory between the two combatants.' 
The Chiefs of Staff cabled Keightley, '[It] has become of 
great political importance in relation to activities in the 
U.N. Assembly to carry out such a drop before midday 
November 4.'75
OMELETTE collapsed almost immediately. British photo­
reconnaissance on 2 November confirmed the withdrawal of 
Egyptian armour from Sinai to the Canal Zone and the 
reinforcement of Port Said's defences. Keightley sent no 
four cables to London, concluding:
Any chances of an easy entry into Port Said are 
removed.... The probing operation will be 
pointless and impossible to carry out and we shall 
have to stick to our full assault operation on 6th
74 Neff, p. 397.
75 PRO, CAB134/1216, C.M.78(56), 2 November 1956? PRO, 
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November.76
After extended debate among the Chiefs of Staff, Keightley's 
anxiety prevailed, and OMELETTE was replaced by Operation 
SIMPLEX, in which paratroopers would drop on Gamil airfield 
outside Port Said and then advance upon the town. If there 
was strong Egyptian opposition, the paratroopers would hold 
Gamil and wait for relief by the amphibious landing. The 
operation was put at 9 hours' notice from 0500 on 4
77November.
Tired of waiting, Eisenhower complained to close
friends about Anglo-French folly, writing:
If one has to have a fight, then that is that, but 
I don't see the point in getting into a fight to 
which there can be no satisfactory end and in 
which the whole world believes you are playing the 
part of the bully, and you do not even have the 
firm backing of your entire people.78
Pineau, seeking American support, told the story of
collusion to Ambassador Dillon and spoke of 'French
intelligence that the Soviets plan military intervention
through a Syrian base.' Neither ploy worked. Admiral
Radford, Allen Dulles, and the State Department 'strongly
discounted the credibility' of Soviet intervention, and
Foster Dulles was angered by Pineau's revelations.79
A cruel twist of fate finally doomed British hopes of
American sympathy. Early on 3 November, Foster Dulles was
76 PRO, AIR8/1940, Keightley to COS, Cable KEYSEC 5, 2 
November 1956, and KEYCOS 17, 2 November 1956; PRO, 
W0288/98, HQ to 2(BR)Corps, Cable PERINTERP 1, 3 November 
1956. See also PRO, W0288/1, Butler to Darling, 16 October 
1956.
77 Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on MUSKETEER, 
p. 40.
78 DDE, Ann Whitman Papers, DDE Diaries, Box 20, Eisenhower 
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79 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 651.74/11-156, Paris to State 
Department, Cables 2120 and 2123, 1 November 1956.
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taken to hospital. Tests revealed that he was suffering from 
colon cancer. While Foster Dulles took the lead in 
condemning the British in the U.N., primarily to prevent the 
Soviets seizing the initiative, he refrained from private 
measures against London. In Foster Dulles' absence, pro- 
British officials like Wilson or Stassen were ineffective or 
had little influence, while Humphrey, who was unwilling to 
help Britain, was increasingly important because of his 
personal friendship with Eisenhower. More importantly,' the 
Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., had no love 
for the British after battles over Saudi Arabian oil 
concessions, Iran, and Buraimi, and his opinion was shared 
by officials such as Assistant Secretary William Rountree, 
responsible for Middle Eastern affairs.
On 3 November, Chester Cooper, the CIA liaison with the 
Joint Intelligence Board of the British military, received a 
call from Robert Amory, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, 
who said:
Tell your friends to comply with the God-damn 
ceasefire or go ahead with the God-damn invasion. 
Either way, we'll back them up if they do it fast.
What we can't stand is their God-damn hesitation, 
waltzing while Hungary is burning.
By 9 a.m., London time, Amory's words were superseded by
Foster Dulles' illness. Eden later received an account of
the American attitude from the State Department's Legal
Adviser, Herman Phleger:
They knew well enough that we intended in the last 
resort to take direct action. They were pained 
that we did not take them into their confidence 
about the meeting that took place in secret with 
the French and Israelis in Paris, but they assumed 
that once we had decided on action it would be 
swift and decisive. They foresaw that there would 
be a good deal of vociferous comment in the U.N. 
and elsewhere, but they calculated that this would
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not come to a head until our action had been 
effective.
In the event our military plan took far more 
time to carry through than they had allowed for 
and public opinion had got highly worked up not 
only in the U.N. but also elsewhere, including the 
U.S. with an Election in progress. Consequently it 
was no longer seemed practical for the U.S. to 
stand aside until we had finished the job and then 
use their influence in the tidying-up operation.80
The Egypt Committee tried to delay the Americans by
promising that Britain would cease military action when
Egypt and Israel accepted the UNEF if the U.N. promised to
maintain the force until the Suez Canal and Arab- Israeli
disputes were settled. Dixon warned, however, that Lodge was
'quite clear' that Eisenhower was 'very cool' about these
conditions.81
Moreover, Keightley now opposed even a limited 
paratroop drop. After the Egypt Committee dismissed a 
proposal to drop paratroops at Haifa, Israel, with an 
advance through Israeli-held Sinai upon the Canal, some 
Ministers argued that SIMPLEX should proceed, as there was 
little more than one Egyptian brigade at Port Said and no 
reason to think the Egyptians would fight any better than 
they had against the Israelis. Others emphasized the 
necessity of limiting civilian casualties. It was finally 
agreed that Minister of Defence Head and General Templer 
should consult Keightley in Cyprus while the drop on Gamil
. • Q Oairfield was postponed. *
In a rare Saturday sitting of the Commons, the
80 Chester Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1978), pp. 181ff.? AP, AP33/7, unsigned record, 
undated.
81 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)38th meeting, 3 November 1956; 
PRO, F0371/ 121747/VR1074/491, New York to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1035, 3 November 1956.
82 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)38th, 3 November 1956.
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Opposition, buoyed by the U.N. call for a cease-fire, 
shouted Lloyd down. Eden accepted the UNEF in principle but 
refused to halt the invasion, prompting Gaitskell to charge, 
'What [Britain] did was to go in and help the burglar and 
shoot the householder.' As the Prime Minister left the 
chamber, the entire Labour front bench rose and called for 
his resignation. Accusations of 'murderers' were launched,
QO
and MPs nearly came to blows. J
Undaunted, Eden broadcast to the nation that evening. 
He portrayed Anglo-French operations as a 'police action' in 
support of U.N. objectives and recalled his career as 'a man 
of peace, a League of Nations man, a United Nations man.' 
The following morning, he noted that the newspapers were not 
unfavourable and more than 100 telegrams supported his 
speech. Photo-reconnaissance revealed that Egyptian defences 
around Port Said were not as extensive as Keightley feared. 
Head and Keightley agreed on an assault by Anglo-French 
paratroopers upon Port Said and the near-by town of Port 
Fuad on the morning of 5 November. The Egypt Committee 
accepted the plan, codenamed TELESCOPE, at 12:30 p.m. on 4
ft ANovember.
The Government, however, was now pressed by its own 
constituents. Asked by a Gallup poll of 1-2 November, 'Do 
you think we were right or wrong to take military action 
against Egypt?', 37 percent replied yes, 44 percent replied 
no, and 19 percent had no opinion.85 More than 30,000 anti-
83 Hansard. 3 November 1956; Jay, p. 259.
84 Rhodes James, p. 569; Clark, p. 208; PRO, AIR8/1940, 
Keightley to COS, Cable KEYCOS 24, 3 November 1956; PRO, 
CAB134/1216, EC(56)39th meeting, 4 November 1956.
85 Rhodes James, p. 557. See also PRO, PREM11/1123, Poole to 
Eden, 2 November 1956.
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Government protesters gathered in Trafalgar Square on 4 
November, and Downing Street was 'closed to the public 
because of the riotous meeting.'86 Eden's wife, Clarissa, 
recalled the presence of counter-demonstrators for the 
Government, but Chester Cooper, monitoring events for the 
CIA, later wrote, 'Lady Eden was right about the presence of 
people carrying pro-Eden signs and hecklers, but the police 
removed them from the square when they appeared to be in 
danger of being drawn and quartered by the angry crowd./87
Ironically, the Cabinet convened in emergency session 
as the rally was in full cry. Adverse developments at the 
U.N. had jeopardised the Anglo-French airdrops, approved 
only six hours earlier. Early on the morning of 4 November, 
the Assembly adopted an Afro-Asian resolution asking the 
Secretary-General to arrange a cease-fire within 12 hours. 
The Egypt Committee, at 12:30 p.m., agreed 'to go as far as 
possible' towards accepting the purpose of a Canadian 
resolution which asked Hammarskjold to prepare the plans for 
UNEF within 48 hours.88
Distressing news then came from an unexpected source: 
Israel. Ben-Gurion always suspected the British might renege 
on the arrangements with Israel, and Eden's insistence on 
Britain acting as a 'peacekeeper' of the Suez Canal, rather 
than as a co-belligerent with Israel, added to Israeli 
fears. Eden's statement to the Commons on 1 November that 
Britain and France would ensure Israeli withdrawal from the 
Sinai after Egypt's fedayeen bases were destroyed incensed
86 AP, AP20/30/1, Downing Street diary, 4 November 1956.
87 Cooper, p. 187.
88 PRO, PREM11/1105, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1035, 
3 November 1956; PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)39th meeting, 4 
November 1956.
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Ben-Gurion, as did Lloyd's comments to Ambassador Elath that 
Britain could not be identified with collusion because of 
its relationships with Arab States.
Shortly after midnight in the Assembly debate of 3/4 
November, Israeli delegate Eban said that 'Israel agreed to 
a cease-fire, provided a similar announcement was 
forthcoming from Egypt.' The Israeli Army had occupied 
almost all of the Sinai peninsula and would take its last 
objective, Sharm el-Sheikh, within hours. The Egyptian 
threat from the Gaza strip had been cleared, the Egyptian 
Army overwhelmed and most of its Soviet equipment destroyed, 
and the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran opened to Israeli 
shipping. Optimally, the Israelis would have liked Britain 
and France to open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, but they 
were frustrated by repeated delays in the Anglo-French
, Q Q
landing. *
The Egypt Committee met again at 3:30 p.m. to consider 
the Israeli news and other developments. Ambassador Wright 
again cabled that Britain's position in Iraq was untenable 
unless Britain overtly condemned Israeli aggression. When 
Lloyd added that oil sanctions against Britain, France, and 
Israel were being discussed in New York, Macmillan allegedly 
exclaimed, 'Oil sanctions! That finishes it.' The meeting 
divided between Ministers who wished to delay TELESCOPE and 
the main landing for at least 24 hours and those who felt 
that a further delay 'would make it politically more 
difficult to resume military operations.' Finally, the 
Committee agreed to refer the matter to an emergency
89 PRO, F0371/121747/VR1074/477, New York to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1047, 4 November 1956.
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Cabinet.90
Eden gave the Cabinet three options: proceeding with
the occupation of Port Said, delaying the airdrops for 24 
hours, or deferring action indefinitely. Twelve Ministers
wanted to proceed. Four --  Butler, Kilmuir, Heathcoat-
Amory, and possibly Macmillan ---  voted for the delay, while
Salisbury, probably swayed by the U.N. attitude, Buchan- 
Hepburn, and Monckton favoured an indefinite deferral. The 
three Service Ministers, asked for their views, also 
divided: the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Hailsham,
wanted to continue operations but Secretary of State for Air 
Nigel Birch favoured a delay and Secretary of State for War 
John Hare preferred indefinite postponement.
All Ministers except Monckton agreed to support the 
majority decision, but Eden was disconcerted by the 
significant vote against immediate operations. Unwilling to 
proceed without a clearer mandate, Eden took Butler, 
Macmillan, and Salisbury aside and allegedly said that 'if 
they wouldn't go on, then he would have to resign.' Butler 
replied that 'no one else could form a Government,' a 
statement endorsed by Macmillan and Salisbury. Eden 
temporarily adjourned the Cabinet and despatched an 
emergency cable to Keightley, asking if a 24-hour delay in 
TELESCOPE could be arranged. Keightley replied that this was 
possible, but it would shatter troop morale, allow Egypt to 
build up its defences, and horrify the French.91
90 PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)40th meeting, 4 November 1956; 
Carlton, p. 451.
91 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.79(56), 4 November 1956? Rhodes 
James, pp. 566ff.; PRO, AIR8/1940, COS to Keightley, Cable 
COSKEY 32, 4 November 1956? AP, AP20/1, Eden diary, 1957, 
and AP33/7, Eden record, undated.
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Eden was waiting for the Israelis to retract their 
agreement to a cease-fire. Bombarded by British and French 
messages, the Israeli Foreign Ministry finally instructed 
Eban that Israel would cease fire if Egypt halted its
fedayeen attacks, ended its economic boycott against Israel 
and the ban on Israeli transit through the Suez Canal, and 
terminated the 'state of war' that existed since 1948, i.e., 
signed a peace settlement. The Israelis realised Egypt would 
not accept these conditions, since they implied that the 
Israeli invasion was justified and allowed Israel to
maintain its occupation of the Sinai. When Eden informed the 
Cabinet, 'Everyone laughed & banged the table with relief —  
- except Birch and Monckton, who looked glum.'92
Meanwhile, Gaitskell broadcast in response to Eden's 
speech of 3 November. Labelling British troops as
aggressors, Gaitskell called for the Prime Minister's 
resignation and offered to support any Conservative
successor who complied with the U.N. resolutions. The 
broadcast aroused controversy at home and in the 
Mediterranean, where servicemen listened on the BBC World 
Service, but it failed to mobilise a rebellion against Eden. 
Only eight Conservative MPs declined to support the
Government, and few Tory voters turned against the Prime 
Minister.93
Desperate for American support, Eden again wrote 
Eisenhower:
If we had allowed things to drift, everything
would have gone from bad to worse. Nasser would
92 PRO, F0371/121748/VR1074/545, New York to Foreign Office, 
Cable 1065, 5 November 1956; Rhodes James, p. 567; AP, 
AP23/13/24, Butler to Eden, 19 June 1969.
93 Rhodes James, pp. 569ff.
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have become a kind of Moslem Mussolini, and our 
friends in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even 
Iran would gradually have been brought down. His 
efforts would have spread westwards, and Libya and 
North Africa would have been brought under his 
control.
Eden concluded with the plea:
The future of all of us depends on the closest 
Anglo-American cooperation. It has of course been 
a grief to me to have had to make a temporary 
breach into it which I cannot disguise, but I know 
that you are a man of big enough heart and vision 
to take up things again on the basis of fact. 4
The appeal was futile. When the President asked on 3
November if he should contact Eden 'to keep the channel
open,' Hoover, Rountree, and Phleger, the State Department's
legal adviser, insisted that the President wait for UNEF's
establishment. Eisenhower drafted a reply which indicated
that he would accept Anglo-French entry into the Canal Zone,
but he never sent the message.95
Britain, France, and Israel were alone. Cabling after
the Cabinet meeting of 4 November, Kirkpatrick informed
Dixon that the landing would proceed. The cable was not
deciphered quickly enough to reach Dixon before the Assembly
debate, and the British delegate endured the discussion with
no idea of Britain's position. At 12:15 a.m., the General
Assembly voted 57-0, with Britain, France, Israel, and 16
other countries abstaining, to reaffirm its call for a
cease-fire and authorise the UNEF's creation.96
While the Assembly voted, 780 British paratroops landed
94 PRO, PREM11/1177, Foreign Office to Washington, Cable 
5180, 5 November 1956.
95 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
1956 Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 3 
November 1956; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, International, Box 
17, Eden, Eisenhower to Eden draft, 5 November 1956.
96 PRO, F0371/121747/VR1074/503, Foreign Office to New York, 
Cable 1563, 5 November 1956, and F0371/121748/VR1074/512, 
New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1064, 5 November 1956.
393
at Gamil airfield and 487 French paratroops occupied two 
bridges on the Canal at Raswa. Egyptian resistance was 
stiff, but Gamil was taken in two hours and the edge of Port 
Said was reached in early afternoon.97 After a second drop 
of 500 men, the French captured Port Fuad. Negotiations for 
Port Said's surrender began at 5 p.m., but the talks
collapsed when Nasser learned about the terms and refused 
them.98 Eden believed, because of a mis-translation in 
communications, that Port Said had surrendered. He announced 
this to the Commons, only to be embarrassed when Nasser
• . QQissued a denial. *
The airdrops were a clear military success, but they 
were ultimately judged on political grounds. Dixon cabled, 
'We are inevitably being placed in the same low category as 
the Russians in their bombing of Budapest.' Eisenhower noted 
impending oil shortages in Britain and France and told 
Hoover and Phleger, 'The purposes of peace and stability 
would be served by not being too quick in attempting to 
render extraordinary assistance.'100 Cabinet Secretary Brook 
allegedly told Press Secretary Clark 'that no intelligent 
man could support the [British] policy.' Clark stated his 
intention to resign when the crisis eased, while Edward 
Boyle, junior Minister at the Treasury, joined Nutting in 
leaving the Government. On 5 November, senior Foreign Office 
members gathered for an 'explanation' of events in which,
97 PRO, W0288/152, HQ 2 (BR)Corps War Diary, 5 November 1956. 
See also PRO, W0288/74, 16th Independent Paratroop Brigade 
report, 17 December 1956.
98 PRO, AIR8/1940, Keightley to COS, Cables KEYCOS 33, 37, 
and 38, 5 November 1956.
99 Hansard. 5 November 1956.
100 PRO, PREM11/1105, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 
1071, 5 November 1956.
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according to Assistant Undersecretary Paul Gore-Booth,
'Kirkpatrick did his best to answer questions to which there
was no answer.'101
Britain also contended with a new threat of Soviet
action. Preoccupied with events in Hungary, the Soviets had
limited involvement in Suez to support for Egypt in the U.N.
Syrian President Quwwatli, visiting Moscow when Israel
invaded Egypt, asked Soviet leader Khrushchev to send
aircraft and 'volunteer' aircrews to Egypt but was refused.
Soviet technicians were withdrawn from Egypt.102
On 5 November, the Soviets launched a three-pronged
'diplomatic' offensive. First, Soviet Premier Bulganin sent
notes to Britain, France, and Israel hinting at military
action. The message to Eden pondered:
In what position would Britain have found herself 
if she herself had been attacked by more powerful 
states possessing every kind of modern destructive 
weapon? And there are countries now which need not 
have sent a navy or air force to the coasts of 
Britain but could have used other means, such as 
rocket technique.
Second, Bulganin asked Eisenhower 'to join their forces in
the U.N. for the adoption of decisive measures to put an end
to the aggression.' Thirdly, Foreign Minister Dmitri
Shepilov submitted a draft resolution to the Security
Council demanding Britain, France, and Israel cease fire
within 12 hours and withdraw from Egypt within 3 days.103
No one, with the possible exception of Israeli leaders,
believed that the Soviets would defend Egypt with nuclear
101 Clark, p. 210? Paul Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and 
Respect (London: Constable, 1974), p. 230.
102 PRO, AIR8/2097, 3rd Summary of Operations, 2 November
1956.
103 Middle East Affairs. January 1957, p. 11? Love, p. 614.
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weapons,104 but it was feared that the Soviets would land 
equipment and 'volunteers' in Egypt via Syria. Bulganin's 
note arrived in London at 2 a.m. on 6 November, hindering 
Eden's sleep and causing 'a bad night' for the Prime 
Minister's Office.105 After receiving Bulganin's note, 
Eisenhower consulted Hoover, Phleger, and his Chief of 
Staff, Sherman Adams. The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Charles 
Bohlen, believed that the Soviets would not deliberately 
start World War II, but he thought some form of Soviet 
assistance to Egypt was likely and the Soviets might invade 
Iran. Hoover also expressed 'great concern' that the Soviets 
might send troops into Syria. The President requested a 
passage in Hoover's draft rejecting Bulganin's suggestion of 
Soviet-American military intervention: 'In other words, we
should give the Soviets a clear warning [to stay out of 
Egypt]./106
The Soviet threat even restored a modicum of Anglo- 
American cooperation between the intelligence services. 
Cooper, the CIA liaison with the Joint Intelligence Board, 
told the Agency that he would not discuss the Soviet threat 
with the Board on 6 November unless the American embargo on 
intelligence was lifted. Last-minute instructions from 
Washington satisfied Cooper's demand.107
The Anglo-French landing proceeded at dawn on 6 
November. The French, fearing an imminent cease-fire, also
104 See Liddell-Hart Papers, 'Notes for History,' 31 August
1957.
105 William Clark Papers, File 7, Clark diary, 12 November 
1956? Author's interview with Sir William Hayter.
106 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
1956 Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 5 
November 1956.
107 Cooper, p. 197.
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planned a parachute assault on Qantara, 30 miles down the 
Canal, but British commanders, fearing Egyptian resistance, 
withdrew their consent shortly before the landings. After 
another false report of Port Said's surrender, which almost 
resulted in the capture of REVISE'S commanders, the town 
capitulated in late afternoon. Anglo-French forces prepared 
to 'break out' of Port Said and Port Fuad, proceeding along 
the causeway to Suez at the southern end of the Canal. By 
the time Port Said fell, however, the British Cabinet- had 
agreed to a cease-fire, to take effect at 5 p.m., London 
time.108
When the Cabinet gathered at 9:45 a.m., Lloyd set out
three considerations for Ministers. First, 'it was now
urgently necessary that [Britain] should regain the
initiative in bringing hostilities to an end while there was
an opportunity to carry with us the more moderate sections
of opinion in the General Assembly.' Second, 'it was equally
important that we should shape our policy in such a way as
to enlist the maximum sympathy and support from the U.S.
Government.' Finally, Britain had to 'maintain [its]
position against the Soviet Union' and 'not appear to be
yielding in face of Soviet threats.' Ministers favouring a
cease-fire added:
[We] must reckon with the possibility of a Soviet 
invasion of Syria or some other area in the Middle 
East, and possibly a direct Soviet attack on the 
Anglo-French forces in the Canal area. It was also 
probable that the other Arab States in the Middle 
East would come actively to the aid of Egypt and 
that the United Nations would be alienated to the 
point of imposing collective measures, including 
oil sanctions, against the French and ourselves.
108 PRO, W0288/152, HQ 2 (BR)Corps War Diary, 6 November 
1956.
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Ministers against a cease-fire, notably Head, noted the 
'risk that an effective international force would never be 
established in the Canal area and...we should appear to have 
fallen short of that effective occupation of the Canal area 
which we had publicly declared to be one of our objectives.' 
It was finally agreed, however, that 'in order to regain the 
initiative and to reestablish relations with those members 
of the United Nations who were fundamentally in sympathy 
with our aims, [Britain] should agree, subject to the 
concurrence of the French Government, to stop further 
military operations.'109
The official reason for the cease-fire was that Britain 
and France brought peace through their operations, as 
Israel, after the capture of Sharm el-Sheikh on 5 November, 
informed the U.N. that it would stop fighting.110 In fact, 
the stated goal of restoring peace between Egypt and Israel 
was always a mask for the Anglo-French goals of seizing 
control of the Canal and removing Nasser from power. Britain 
spectacularly failed to do this, suffering a week of 
humiliation at the U.N. and division at home.
Three factors were significant in the decision to cease 
fire. The first was American pressure upon the weak pound. 
In the first week of November, $85 million of the foreign 
reserves, almost 5 percent of the total, was lost. The 
estimated annual bill for Western Hemisphere oil, replacing 
that lost from the Suez Canal's blockage and the demolition 
of the pipeline in Syria, was more than $800 million. At the
109 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.80(56), 6 November 1956. See also 
Horne, p. 441; Hugh Thomas, p. 146; Clark, p. 79.
110 Eden, p. 557; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 166;
Lloyd, p. 210.
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present rate of depletion, the reserves would be exhausted
in early 1957. Eden summarised in 1957:
The fall of sterling..., apart from Indian and 
Chinese operations intended to weaken the pound, 
came mainly from New York. Harold [Macmillan] told 
me he had no doubt that this was encouraged by 
W'ton. I would also think this so. We were 
therefore faced with the alternatives, a run on 
sterling and the loss of our gold and dollar 
reserves till they fell way below the safety 
margin... or make the best we 99Vlc* of U.N. 
'takeover' and salve what we could. 11
No available evidence confirms that the U.S. sponsored 
the run against the pound, although Foster Dulles and 
Eisenhower both considered economic measures to stop Anglo- 
French action. The Americans did not have to sabotage the 
pound to influence Britain, however? they merely had to 
refuse to support it. If Humphrey did not press American 
banks and investors to trade pounds for dollars, he 
certainly did not encourage them to hold sterling. The U.S. 
refused to implement the plan to divert oil supplies to 
Britain. When Macmillan belatedly tried to obtain finance 
from the International Monetary Fund, Humphrey refused to 
endorse the request.112
By 6 November, Macmillan was near panic. Humphrey told 
him 'that only a cease-fire by midnight would secure U.S. 
support' of British financial measures. The Chancellor told 
Lloyd before the Cabinet 'that, in view of the financial and 
economic pressures, we must stop' and then informed 
Ministers that, without a cease-fire:
[He] could not be responsible for Her Majesty's
111 PRO, T236/4188, Record of Treasury meeting, 7 November 
1956? AP, AP20/1, Eden diary, 1957.
112 PRO, F0371/120832/UES1171/123, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2218, 30 October 1956, and UES1171/130, 
Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2257, 6 November 
1956? Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 164.
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Exchequer....If sanctions were imposed on us, the
country was finished. 13
Eden, Macmillan, and Lloyd denied, with hindsight, that 
the Soviet threat influenced their decision, but Moscow's 
possible intervention in Syria was prominent in the 
Cabinet's discussion. The British Ambassador, William 
Hayter, reported that the Soviets might take 'some violent 
independent action' and that it was 'vitally necessary to 
get into step with the U.S. again immediately' to keep 
Moscow 'from committing dangerous acts of folly.' Eden 
allegedly read the telegram at 6:30 a.m. and said, 'Those 
[Soviet] threats, they're just twaddle,' but others were not 
so sure. The Iraqi Royal Family told Wright that three 
Soviet warships had entered the Mediterranean from Romania 
and 80 Soviet bombers had flown into Syria. Keightley was 
concerned about an air attack upon Cyprus, ordering 'all 
airfields...at the maximum state of preparedness' and 'the 
greatest possible dispersion of aircraft.' Allen Dulles 
reported to Eisenhower that the Soviets had told Egypt 'they 
[would] "do something",' and the President authorised 'high- 
reconnaissance in the area,' with U-2 'flights over Syria 
and Israel.'114
Ironically, the possibility of Soviet intervention was 
dismissed by Whitehall after the decision to cease fire.
113 Lloyd, p. 209; Hugh Thomas, pp. 146ff.
Macmillan's account in his memoirs appears to be a 
convenient revision of history. (Macmillan, Riding the 
Storm, p. 164)
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Cooper told the Joint Intelligence Board at 10 a.m., as the 
Cabinet debated, that American intelligence indicated the 
Soviets would not act.115 The Chiefs of Staff informed 
Keightley at 4:42 p.m., '[We] do not consider Russian
intervention likely.7 The Foreign Office concluded that the
Soviets would not unilaterally send forces to Syria,
• 1 1 6  although they might do so under U.N. cover. A
Finally, the Cabinet faced continuing U.N. pressure. 
Dixon protested throughout 5 November that 'bombing' in 
support of the landings was upsetting the Assembly.117 When 
Eden called New York at 8:30 the next morning, Dixon said 
that he 'thought that he could hold on at the U.N. until the 
end of the week.' However, Lloyd and other Ministers, in 
discussion, cited U.N. opposition as a reason for cease­
fire.118
Eden wrote in January 1957, 'We and the French have 
been compelled by a combination of the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, acting inside and outside the U.N., to withdraw from 
Port Said before we could ensure the clearance of the 
Canal.' In the end, however, the American position was the 
dominant influence, for U.S. support would have removed all 
obstacles to continued Anglo-French action. Britain's
115 Cooper, p. 200. See also USNA, RG 218, Records of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
National Policy. Volume VI, 1955-1956, Chapter X, 'The 
Suez Canal Crisis.'
116 PRO, AIR28/9890, COS to Keightley, Cable COSKEY 48, 6 
November 1956? PRO, 121696/VR1022/21G, Foreign Office to 
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117 PRO, F0371/121747/VR1074/516, New York to Foreign 
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economy would have been sustained by loans from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and Western
Hemisphere oil supplies. The Soviets would have been
deterred by an American warning against intervention, and
the U.S., with her U.N. allies, could have delayed, if not
prevented, the passage of Assembly resolutions. The day
after the cease-fire, Eden summarised:
It is clear we cannot now carry this through alone 
with France. We must now get U.S. support.... Our 
aim would be to get them to tackle an Anglo-U.S. ' 
policy for a long-term settlement in the Middle 
East.119
After the Cabinet, Eden called Mollet. The French 
begged for two more days to seize the rest of the Canal, but 
Eden said Britain could not withstand American pressure on 
the pound. Mollet obtained an extension of the cease-fire to 
midnight, London time, when he notified Eden of French 
agreement to stop fighting, but the British refused further 
extensions.120
The only option for REVISE'S commanders, who learned of 
the cease-fire from a BBC bulletin, was to occupy as much of 
the Canal Zone as possible before the deadline. A hasty 
march by the main force ended at El Cap, 25 miles south of 
Port Said. Advance patrols at Fayid, 25 miles short of Suez, 
were recalled. The campaign cost 23 British and 10 French 
lives, while Anglo-French forces killed 400 Egyptian
119 PRO, PREM11/1826, Eden minute, 5 January 1957? PRO, 
PREM11/1105, Eden minute, 7 November 1956. See also John 
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soldiers. British estimates of Egyptian civilian deaths,
initially set at 100 by General Stockwell, were revised,
after much controversy, to between 650 and 1000.121
The British military, constantly assured by Ministers
that operations would not be halted by political
considerations, were furious. Stockwell was reprimanded by
Minister of Defence Head for telling reporters that the
Anglo-French force could have taken Suez in 48 hours if the
cease-fire had not been issued. Templer wrote to Stockwell,
'Thank you [for the gift of] the Russian rifle. If I could
use it, I'd give my first attention to certain politicians
in New York and London, and I'd have run out of ammunition
before I could spare a round, even for Nasser.'122
Eisenhower called London to express his pleasure at the
cease-fire and to promise Eden, 'Now that we know
connections are so good, you can call me anytime you
please.' Eden cabled Mollet:
The President of the U.S. telephoned me on his own 
account. There is no doubt at all that the 
friendship between us all is restored and even 
strengthened....I feel that, as a result of all 
our efforts, we have laid bare the reality of 
Soviet plans in the Middle East and are physically 
holding a position which can be decisive for the 
future.123
Perhaps all was not lost. Occupation of the area from 
Port Said to El Cap could be used as a 'bargaining counter' 
in negotiations with Egypt. The cut in oil consumption could
121 PRO, W0288/152, HQ 2 (BR)Corps War Diary, 6 November 
1956? Stockwell Papers, 8/2/2, Stockwell report on 
MUSKETEER? Damage and Casualties in Port Said. Cmd. 47, 
HMSO, December 1956.
122 Stockwell Papers, 8/4/1, Templer to Stockwell, 14 
November 1956.
123 PRO, PREM11/1105, Foreign Office to Paris, Cable 2498, 6 
November 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Ann Whitman 
Diary, Box 8, November 1956 Diary (2), Eisenhower to 
Eden, 6 November 1956.
be limited to 10 percent over the next fortnight while 
supplies were arranged with the U.S. The Americans had 
restored the intelligence link with Britain and could offer 
the protection of the 'nuclear umbrella' against Moscow. 
Resolutions for the UNEF would have to be respected, but 
Anglo-French forces could be maintained in the Canal Zone 
until the UNEF arrived and then be integrated into the 
force. Meanwhile, Britain and France would maintain economic 
and financial pressure upon Nasser, and the OMEGA program 
with the U.S. might be renewed.
404
CHAPTER 16
7 NOVEMBER 1956-10 JANUARY 1957: AFTERMATH
On 7 November, the British Cabinet pondered how to turn 
a tenuous presence in the Canal Zone into victory over 
Nasser. Some Ministers preferred to form the UNEF without 
contingents from Security Council members, as this 'was 
probably an essential preliminary to reestablishing close 
relations with the U.S.' Other Ministers demanded a British 
presence in Egypt through representation in the UNEF, even 
if this brought further conflict with the Americans. After 
heated discussion, a compromise was reached. Britain would 
'devote [its efforts to inducing [the Americans] to 
acknowledge the existence in the Middle East of the 
dangerous situation which they had consistently refused to 
recognise since the end of [World War II].' Political and 
economic measures against Nasser could then be pursued as 
part of an Anglo-American policy. Meanwhile, Eden would 
'endeavour to convince [the U.S.] that a final decision by 
the U.N. on the composition and functions of the 
international force in the Suez Canal area should, if 
possible, be deferred until the Governments of the U.K. and 
the U.S. had reached a clearer understanding on their common 
objectives in the Middle East.'1
Eden called Eisenhower to suggest a meeting with the 
French on the Middle Eastern situation and the Soviet 
threat. Eisenhower was receptive, since, 'after all, [this] 
is like a family spat,' but his advisers were horrified, 
believing any concession to Britain would jeopardise
1 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.81(56), 7 November 1956.
405
American policy in the U.N. and the Arab world. After acting
Secretary of State Hoover asked the President to confirm
that Britain was committed to the UNEF, Eisenhower called
Eden to warn, 'If we are going to discuss this plan [for the
UNEF] and your people would find it necessary to disagree
with us, then the resulting divided communique would be
unfortunate.' When Eden assured that he and French Prime
Minister Mollet understood this, Eisenhower replied:
Then I think my fears are groundless.... If we are 
going to talk about the future [in the Middle
East] and about the Bear [the Soviet Union]--
okay.
The announcement of the summit would be made by Eden in the 
Commons and by a White House spokesman at 4 p.m., London 
time.2
Hoover was unsatisfied. Noting British claims to the
State Department that the Soviets had offered 250,000
'volunteers' to Egypt, he asserted that Eisenhower's welcome
of Eden and Mollet risked the 'danger of a complete
turnabout by the Arabs,' with Egypt accepting the Soviet
offer and the Arab world rejecting the UNEF. After a half-
hour of discussion, Eisenhower called Eden to postpone the
meeting. Firstly, the President noted:
You have given us something on the military side I 
didn't know [about the 250,000 Soviet 
volunteers]... .We have got to get a coordinated 
military intelligence view.
Secondly, Eisenhower would meet Congressional leaders on 9-
10 November to discuss the new Congress, in which the
opposition Democratic Party had a majority in both houses.
Finally, the U.N. was demanding that Egypt and Israel accept
2 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Ann Whitman Diary, Box 8, 
November 1956 Diary (2), Eden to Eisenhower and Eisenhower 
to Eden, 7 November 1956.
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the UNEF, and 'any meeting until that gets done would
exacerbate the situation.'
Eden pleaded for the President to reconsider, but
Eisenhower would not defy his officials:
I just don't see how we could do it now with so
much on our plate --  we just can't handle this at
the same time. I am really sorry because, as I 
told you this morning, I want to talk to you.
Desperate, the Prime Minister protested that nothing should
prevent friends discussing matters, but Eisenhower replied,
'I am not talking about not meeting and talking with our
friends, but I have had opposition about the timing.' He
then cut off further conversation, as he had to leave for a
Cabinet meeting.3
In fact, the President and Hoover visited Foster Dulles
in hospital. Fearing Soviet intervention, Foster Dulles
supported Hoover:
It was extremely important to get the British and 
French troops out of Egypt as soon as 
possible.... If this is not done - at least within 
a week's time - the fire will go on burning.
Foster Dulles favoured 'an embargo on all funds going to
Israel,' including remittances by American citizens, but he
and Eisenhower disagreed sharply over American treatment of
Britain and France. Eisenhower promoted Eden's case that
'the important thing to remember in this present situation
is that "the Bear is still the central enemy",' but Foster
Dulles insisted, 'The British and the French going into
Egypt was a "crazy act".' He 'did not exclude the usefulness
of a meeting between the President and Eden and Mollet,' but
3 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
1956 Diary, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 7 
November 1956; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Ann Whitman Diary, 
Box 8, November 1956 Diary (2), Eisenhower to Eden, 7 
November 1956? AP, AP20/1, Eden diary, 1957.
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'the meeting [would] be contingent on the British and French 
having previously gotten their troops out of Egypt.' Foster 
Dulles' only concession was to agree to Eisenhower's 
recommendation of a special assistant in the White House to 
oversee the Middle East.4
Two important trends were set. First, the U.S. 
Government imposed a virtual 'blackout' on communications 
with Eden. Apart from an exchange of short letters on 11 
November about a possible summit, the Americans did not 
contact Eden between 7 November and Eden's departure on the 
23rd for a three-week vacation in Jamaica.5 Second, the 
President, deprived of his working relationship with Foster 
Dulles, was an unhappy spectator of the policy set by the 
State Department, led by Hoover, and the Treasury.
Despite Suez, Eisenhower thought the British had a role 
to play in the Middle East as well as in NATO. When the new 
British Ambassador to the U.S., Harold Caccia, presented his 
credentials on 9 November, he found that the President 
'could not personally have been more friendly or indeed more 
forgiving.' Eisenhower said, 'Just because Britain and the 
U.S. had had a sharp difference over the attack on Egypt, 
there was no thought that we would not keep our friendship 
over the long term.' In contrast, Secretary of the Treasury 
Humphrey, told the British Embassy's Economic Minister, Lord 
Harcourt, 'For the U.S. to offer financial aid to the U.K. 
and France in the light of actions of the last 10 days would 
be totally unacceptable politically in the U.S. for some
4 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, 
Chronological, Box 4, Meetings with the President,
Macomber memorandum, 7 November 1956.
5 PRO, PREM11/1177, Eden to Eisenhower and Eisenhower to 
Eden, 7 November 1956.
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considerable time,' although he added, 'This opinion would 
not hold if the Russians were to make any major move in the 
Middle East.'6
The NSC defined American policy on 8 November. The 
Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) was ready to ship 
Western Hemisphere oil to Europe, but Humphrey's attitude 
that 'for the time being...he would oppose programming oil 
shipments to Europe' prevailed. Hoover informed the British 
Embassy, 'The question of supply could best be left to- the 
oil companies to thrash out between themselves.' When 
British Minister Coulson interjected, correctly, that the 
MEEC was set up for coordination between the U.S. Government 
and the oil companies, Hoover replied that this was not 'in 
any way necessary.'7
The British were isolated. The other Baghdad Pact 
members stopped short of expelling Britain or condemning 
Anglo-French aggression, but they called upon Britain and 
France 'to stop hostilities, withdraw their forces,...and 
fully observe and respect the sovereignty, integrity, and 
independence of Egypt.' The French, embittered by the cease­
fire, were uninterested in negotiations over the UNEF or 
concessions to the Americans. The Israelis, after Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion exultantly told the Israeli Parliament, 
the Knesset, on 7 November that Israel would keep her
6 PRO, PREM11/1106, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2277, 9 November 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE 
Diaries, Box 19, November 1956 Diary, Staff Memoranda, 
Goodpaster memorandum, 9 November 1956? PRO, 
F0371/120832/UES1171/132, Washington to Foreign Office, 
Cable 2272, 8 November 1956.
7 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 
8, 303rd NSC meeting, 8 November 1956? PRO, F0371/120832/ 
UES1171/137, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2278, 9 
November 1956.
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military gains, were checked by an urgent message from
Eisenhower:
It is obvious to us that the Soviets are taking 
advantage of this situation for disastrous 
purposes. If that should happen, Israel would be 
the first to be swallowed up.
Hoover threatened to suspend all American aid, public and
private, to Israel and to support U.N. sanctions and
Israel's expulsion from the organisation. The Americans also
'made it quite clear that they would not intervene on
Israel's behalf in the event of an attack by Soviet
"volunteers”.' Pineau told the Israelis:
France is ready to share with you whatever she has
  but... we have no means of defence against
missiles.
After extensive consultation with the Israeli Ambassador to 
the U.S., Eban, and a seven-hour Cabinet meeting, Ben-Gurion 
agreed to conditional withdrawal from the Sinai.8
On 7 November, the General Assembly considered two
resolutions. An Argentine resolution, drafted by Canada,
excluded Anglo-French troops from the UNEF but allowed them 
to remain at Port Said until the international force was in 
place. In contrast, an Afro-Asian resolution demanded the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt within 24 hours. The 
Assembly easily passed the Argentine resolution, and the 
Afro-Asian resolution was approved after it was amended to 
allow withdrawal 'in accordance with earlier resolutions.' 
Lloyd repeated to the Cabinet, 'It was important that we 
should reestablish close relations with the U.S. Government 
and secure their support for our policy in the Suez Canal
8 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86 Series, Tehran to State 
Department, Cable 727, 8 November 1956, and State 
Department to Tel Aviv, Cable 483, 7 November 1956? Bar- 
Zohar, Ben-Gurion. p. 250? Brecher, pp. 284ff.
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area and the Middle East.'9
General Keightley was increasingly agitated about 
possible Soviet intervention, despite the Chiefs of Staff's 
assessment that this was unlikely and photo-reconnaissance 
indicating no Soviet planes in Syria. On the afternoon of 6 
November, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander informed London 
that 'Turkey [was] being overflown by jet aircraft,' 
presumably Soviet, and the 'Turkish Air Force [was] being 
alerted.' The report, which proved to be exaggerated, may 
have been 'disinformation,' spread by the CIA to scare the 
British into a cease-fire or by the Turks to scare the U.S. 
into intervention against Egypt or Syria.10 Late that 
evening, however, Keightley informed London that a MiG-15 
fighter, possibly one of eleven flown into Egypt in recent 
days, had strafed the British position at Gamil airfield, 
and the Egyptians had repaired ten runways.11
Keightley also reported that two Canberra B-6s on 
photo-reconnaissance over Syria were fired upon by fighters. 
One Canberra escaped with superficial damage, but the 
wreckage of the other was later found in the Lebanon. 
Canberras normally flew at more than 48,000 feet, a height 
matched only by fighters like the MiG-15, and Keightley 
feared that a Soviet pilot was flying the 'enemy' plane. 
REVISE'S Headquarters later learned that the two Canberras 
had descended to 15,000 feet because of cloud cover, where 
they were intercepted by two Meteor fighters of the Syrian
9 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.82(56), 8 November 1956.
10 PRO, AIR20/10757, AFHQ to HMS Tyne, Cable CIC/155, 6 
November 1956? USNA, RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/11-656, ALUSNA 
(Ankara) to State Department, Cable 062240Z, 6 November 
1956.
11 PRO, AIR20/9890, Keightley to COS, Cable KEYCOS 52, 6 
November 1956.
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Air Force.12 Finally, a large unidentified jet flew over 
Cyprus at 54,000 feet at 3 a.m. on 7 November, the height 
indicating that the aircraft was superior to a MiG-15 or an 
11-28 bomber. The British may have detected an American U-2 
flight from Turkey, but Keightley, verging on panic, warned 
London that up to 50 MiGs could be flown into Egypt from 
Syria in one night. J
The U.S. was also concerned about the Soviet threat. 
Hoover told Eisenhower on 9 November that he would see 
Foster Dulles about 'the Syrian thing....If they [the Soviet 
Union] built it up past a certain point, then it will be 
hard to handle.' To persuade Moscow of American vigilance, 
the State Department publicly spread the disinformation that 
a large number of Soviet aircraft were present in Syria. 
Foster Dulles told Hoover that he would revive OMEGA, as 
Allen Dulles thought 'Operation STRAGGLE [to overthrow the 
Syrian Government] might be carried forward but when the 
British and French troops are out.'14
The State Department, however, rendered Eisenhower 
powerless to restore Anglo-American cooperation before full 
British withdrawal. Lloyd tried to intimidate Ambassador 
Aldrich, citing Egyptian plans, with Soviet backing, to 
attack Israel in April 1957 and the imminent danger of a 
Syrian assault upon Tel Aviv. Unruffled, Aldrich said the
12 PRO, AIR20/9890, Keightley to COS, Cable KEYCOS 52, 6 
November 1956; PRO, AIR24/2426, General Summary of Events, 
6 November 1956; PRO, AIR8/2111, AFHQ to Air Ministry, 6 
November 1956.
13 PRO, AIR20/9890, Keightley to COS, Cables KEYCOS 55, 7 
November 1956, and KEYCOS 57, 8 November 1956.
14 DDE, Ann Whitman, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 1956 
Phone Calls, Eisenhower to Hoover, 9 November 1956; PRO, 
AIR20/9890, Keightley to COS, KEYCOS, Cable KEYCOS 65, 10 
November 1956; DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone 
Calls, Box 5, Foster Dulles to Hoover, 9 November 1956.
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Americans had no evidence of Syrian plans to attack.15 Dixon 
cabled from the U.N. that 'the U.S. delegation continues to 
ignore us.'16
With Foster Dulles and Hoover in close contact with
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Adams, the State Department 
covered the President's every move. Foster Dulles thought 
the idea, passed to him by Adams, of inviting Saudi Arabia's 
King Saud 'as an offset' to any Eden-Mollet trip to 
Washington, 'had merit,' but when Eisenhower suggested 
visits by Ben-Gurion and Nuri, Foster Dulles argued that it 
was 'a dangerous game inviting all these people over.'17 On 
10 November, a press release announced the appointment of 
Walter Bedell Smith, former Director of the CIA and
Undersecretary of State, as 'special assistant to the
President on foreign policy matters.' In the afternoon, 
however, an official statement insisted no appointment had 
been made. White House officials blamed the cancellation 
upon State Department opposition, and Bedell Smith later 
told Lloyd:
The trouble about the President was that he 
delegated responsibility and things had come up to 
him through the person in charge, in other words, 
through Hoover, as acting Secretary of State. 
Hoover was no good and had no influence over 
Lodge. Lodge was irresponsible and the best we 
could hope for was a speedy recovery by Dulles, 
because he at least thought about things in terms 
of what was practical.18
15 PRO, PREM11/1106, Lloyd to Caccia, 9 November 1956? USNA, 
RG 59, CDF, 684A.86/11-1056, London to State Department, 
Cable 2639, 10 November 1956.
16 PRO, PREM11/1106, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1163, 
9 November 1956.
17 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject, Alphabetical,
Box 6, Personnel Matters 1955-1957 (5), Foster Dulles 
memorandum, 9 November 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE 
Diaries, Box 19, November 1956 Phone Calls, Foster Dulles 
to Eisenhower, 9 November 1956.
18 PRO, F0371/120320/AU1017/21, Washington to Foreign
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By 12 November, the Egypt Committee wavered in its 
determination to maintain an Anglo-French force on the 
Canal. A meeting between Treasury and Bank of England 
officials concluded that Britain could not continue to lose 
reserves without devaluation of the pound. Only with a 
'friendly and compliant attitude' from the U.S. could 
Britain take necessary economic steps, including a 
withdrawal of up to $1 billion from the IMF, a waiver of the 
annual repayment of the 1946 loan from the U.S., and an 
Export-Import Bank loan for oil purchases. The meeting 
suggested that Lloyd, travelling to the U.N., conduct face- 
to-face negotiations with Administration officials. In a 
tactical retreat, the Committee agreed in principle to a 
phased withdrawal of troops.19
The State Department remained intransigent. Aldrich 
reported that the British were disturbed 'more than anything 
else' by the impression that Eden's visit to Washington 
might be indefinitely delayed because of 'a protracted 
negotiation between Nasser and [the] U.N.' The State 
Department was unmoved. Eisenhower thought 'it would be 
wrong if [Lloyd] were coming for a long conference but just 
as an old friend, it would be all right for him to call and 
pay his respects,' but Hoover vetoed the idea. Eisenhower's 
secretary recorded that the President thought 'the State 
Department had a completely exaggerated view of the meaning 
that could be attached to seeing old friends.'20
Office, Cable 2285, and AU1017/22, Washington to Foreign 
Office, Cable 2286, 10 November 1956? PRO, PREM11/1176, 
Lloyd-Smith meeting, 18 November 1956.
19 PRO, T236/4189, Treasury-Bank of England meeting, 12 
November 1956? PRO, CAB134/1216, EC(56)43rd meeting, 12 
November 1956.
20 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 5, November
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Lloyd, settling for a talk with Lodge, tried to
frighten the Americans into a high-level meeting. He
indicated that Britain intended to topple the Syrian
government, possibly with Iraqi and Turkish cooperation,
while Jordan would be partitioned between Iraq and Israel.
Shaken, Lodge said that Hoover was coming to New York on 15
November and suggested that Lloyd also see Foster Dulles. He
reported to the State Department:
[Lloyd's] attitude struck me as reckless and full 
of contradictions....He is in a dangerous state of 
mind which could touch off a war./2r
Lloyd's desperate approach had a slight chance of 
success. British commanders adopted a plan, MUSKETEER 
RENEWED, to resume hostilities if their forces were attacked 
by the Egyptians or the Soviets. Keightley's reports of 
possible Soviet intervention were passed to the Americans, 
and Turkey again warned the U.S. and Britain of 'alleged 
overflying by Russian military aircraft, the Russian build­
up in Syria, and the exposed position of Iran.' Eisenhower 
eventually agreed to U-2 missions in the Middle East along
the border of 'friendly countries' and to missions over the
. . .  . . . ooSoviet Union if they avoided the most sensitive areas. A
1956 (2), London to State Department, Cable 2648, 12 
November 1956; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 
19, November 1956 Phone Calls, Hoover to Eisenhower, 13 
November 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Ann Whitman Diary, 
Box 8, November 1956 Diary (1), Ann Whitman diary entry,
15 November 1956.
21 PRO, PREM11/1137, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1216,
14 November 1956? DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries,
Box 19, November 1956 Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster
memorandum, 16 November 1956; USNA, RG 59, CDF,
684A.86/11-1456, New York to State Department, Cable DELGA
87, 14 November 1956.
22 PRO, AIR24/2426, 'Operation MUSKETEER RENEWED,' 11 
November 1956? DDE, White House Office, Office of the 
Staff Secretary, Subject, Alphabetical, Box 14, 
Intelligence Matters (2), Goodpaster memorandum, 15 
November 1956.
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The CIA and the U.S. military were more amenable than
the State Department to reconciliation with Britain and
France.23 At a White House meeting on 16 November, Admiral
Radford and Allen Dulles said they had been invited to meet
Lloyd when he came 'incognito' to Washington 'in the next
day or two.' Hoover, noting the Soviet threat and Lloyd's
comments to Lodge, accepted the private talks. Allen Dulles
later met Pineau for two hours at the French Embassy.24
The Soviet threat was diminishing each day, however.
British photo-reconnaissance over Syria on 14 November
finally confirmed that no build-up was occurring, and the
flights were suspended from the 17th because their discovery
might prompt Egypt to block the UNEF. U-2 flights of 15
November detected no Soviet presence in Syria,25 and Allen
Dulles refused Pineau's suggestion of action against the
Syrian Government. Pineau tried to win Allen Dulles'
confidence with a semi-accurate account of the collusion
against Egypt, but the CIA Director concluded:
We found ourselves in agreement only on the 
following points: the importance of Franco-
American understanding? that the Communist menace 
was our greatest danger? that Syria was a 
potential weak point from the viewpoint of 
Communist penetration, and that Egypt and the Arab 
world could well dispense with the services of 
Nasser. There was some degree of difference 
between us as to the degree of his rascality, and 
also as to the type of measures which were 
justifiable to effect a change.26
23 See PRO, F0115/4545, Denny to Caccia, 16 November 1956.
24 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
1956 Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 16 November 
1956.
25 PRO, AIR20/9630, JIC Intelligence Summary Number 16, 16 
November 1956? PRO, AIR20/9890, Keightley to COS, Cable 
KEYCOS 81, 16 November 1956.
26 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 611.51/11-1756, Tyler memorandum, 17 
November 1956? DDE, White House Office, Office of the 
Staff Secretary, Subject, Alphabetical, Box 7, CIA, Volume 
I (4), Allen Dulles to Goodpaster, 17 November 1956.
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On 14 November, Albert Gazier told Eden of Pineau's
'master plan' for Iraqi takeover of Syria and partition of
Jordan.27 The next day, Gazier told Kirkpatrick that France
wanted a new Egyptian Government 'based on progressive
elements.' Kirkpatrick argued:
We did not believe that there was anyone in the 
progressive camp who could weld the heterogeneous 
Opposition and lead a successful coup against 
Nasser. Only the Wafd [the dominant party in 
Egyptian politics before 1952] could do this. 8
Undeterred, the French foreign intelligence service,
the SDECE, plotted the assassination of Nasser, but the
British could not even incite a coup. Keightley's
headquarters had neither 'the resources and experience nor
the time to give' to a psychological warfare campaign. On 15
November, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the campaign
should be given to the Foreign Office to be 'pursued more
vigorously.' However, the Foreign Office was soon
preoccupied with counter-propaganda to refute Egyptian
claims of extensive civilian casualties and damage from the
Anglo-French invasion.29
Furthermore, the British had no more luck than Pineau
in winning American support. While Eden repeated his concern
about the lack of Anglo-American cooperation to the Egypt
Committee on 15 November, he refused to withdraw British
troops until a satisfactory agreement to clear the Suez
27 PRO, F0371/118872, Record of Eden-Gazier conversation, 14 
November 1956.
28 PRO, FO371/118833/JE1015/72, Kirkpatrick minute, 15 
November 1956.
29 PRO, AIR20/10369, AFHQ to Ministry of Defence, Cable 
KEYCOS 74, 13 November 1956, and COS to Keightley, Cable 
COSKEY 69, 15 November 1956; PRO, AIR20/10371/File. See 
also Walter Monckton Papers, Box 8, Monckton record, 22 
November 1956; PRO, ADM205/150, 'A Short Account of 
MUSKETEER,' undated.
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Canal had been implemented. The NSC reaffirmed the same day 
that no Western Hemisphere oil would be diverted to 
Britain.30
Lloyd cabled Eden that he was 'rather depressed' by his
discussions with Radford and Allen Dulles. He concluded:
The plain fact is that, as Bedell [Smith] said, 
the President is the only man who matters and 
there is no one around him to give him advice who 
is of the slightest use. That the future of the 
Middle East should be at the mercy of Hoover and 
Lodge is a tragedy.31
More significantly, Lloyd met Foster Dulles in Walter
Reed Hospital on 17 November. The talk is legendary for
Foster Dulles' alleged remark, accompanied by a wink, about
the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt: 'Selwyn, why did you
stop?' Five days earlier, Foster Dulles told Eisenhower:
The British, having gone in, should not have 
stopped until they had toppled Nasser. As it was, 
they now had the worst of both possible worlds.
They had received all the onus of making the move 
and, at the same time, had not accomplished their 
major purpose.32
Lloyd confirmed to the Foreign Office:
[Foster Dulles] had no complaint about our
objectives in our recent operations. In fact they 
were the same as those of the U.S., but he still 
did not think that our methods of achieving them 
were the right ones. Even so he deplored that we 
had not managed to bring down Nasser.33
British Ministers were incensed, but Foster Dulles'
words were consistent with his position throughout Suez.
30 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 611.84A/11-1656, London to State 
Department, Cable 2770, 16 November 1956; PRO,
CAB134/1216, EC(56)44th meeting, 15 November 1956; DDE, 
Ann Whitman Series, National Security Council, Box 8,
304th NSC meeting, 15 November 1956.
31 PRO, PREM11/1106, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1282, 
18 November 1956.
32 Cited in The Economist. 'Britain Should Not Have 
Stopped,' 16-22 June 1990, p. 155.
33 PRO, PREM11/1106, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2308, 17 November 1956.
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Like Eisenhower, he believed that Britain and France would
not attack Egypt unless they were sure of a quick occupation
of the Canal Zone and overthrow of Nasser. The occupation
did not occur, and if the U.S. resolution had not been
presented to the General Assembly on 1 November, the
Americans would have been forced to vote for an even
stronger Soviet resolution. Foster Dulles did not act
outside the U.N. to halt the Anglo-French operations, and
only after his departure for hospital on 3 November did
American policy force British consideration of a cease-fire.
Even so, the Secretary always had qualms about the outcome
of Suez. The head of Walter Reed Hospital recalled that,
just before Foster Dulles died in 1959, he said, 'Perhaps I
made a mistake at Suez,' and Dean Rusk, later Secretary of
State, claimed that Foster Dulles told him, 'I would not
have made some of the decisions which I made about Suez had
I not been sick at the time.'34
Lloyd concluded, after seeing Foster Dulles:
Foster Dulles was most friendly and intelligent 
but seemed to want to evade personal 
responsibility during the coming phase. Hoover was 
quite negative? I am afraid the same applies to 
Lodge....Allen Dulles could not have been more 
cordial, but said that he did not influence 
policy....It is clear that the most antagonist 
elements are the second rank in the State 
Department (e.g., people like Rountree).35
With formal contacts doomed to failure, Britain's hope lay
in informal exchanges. As early as 8 November, the Lord
Privy Seal, Butler, told Aldrich 'with great earnestness how
deeply he deplored the existence of what he termed mutual
34 AP, AP33/2, Heaton to Wheeler-Bennett, 4 September 1973, 
and Rusk to Wheeler-Bennett, 26 July 1974.
35 AP, AP20/25, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 2307, 17 
November 1956.
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misunderstandings of policy which had arisen.' He confided 
to the Ambassador, 'You are the only man who is in a 
position to explain to your government in detail the various 
attitudes of the members of our government.' Within three 
days, Macmillan and the Lord President, Salisbury, also 
approached Aldrich.36
The Cabinet member with the most interest in American 
cooperation was Macmillan. Not only was he responsible for 
the pound, but he had shifted from being the most vocal 
proponent of military action against Egypt to the strongest 
advocate for a cease-fire. At any point, he could be branded 
a foolish warmonger by the left wing of the Conservative 
Party or a faint-hearted warrior by the right. At a meeting 
of the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation on 15 
November, U.S. observers bluntly refused Macmillan's request 
for help with oil supplies. Lloyd asked from New York that 
Britain not set conditions upon withdrawal until Secretary- 
General Hammarskjold returned from a visit to Cairo. Eden, 
however, insisted that the Cabinet link withdrawal to the 
Canal's clearance.37
Fortunately for Macmillan, Eden provided an opening to 
present to the Americans. Since August, Eden's doctors had 
recommended a holiday to ease the Prime Minister's pain from 
his 1953 operation.38 On 16 November, Macmillan told Aldrich 
that he could visit Washington as 'Eden's deputy,' since 
'Eden was very tired and should have a rest' before 
attending a summit. Two days later, the Prime Minister's
36 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/11-1256, London to State 
Department, Cable 2648, 12 November 1956.
37 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 169? PRO, CAB128/30,
C.M.84(56), 16 November 1956.
38 AP, AP20/1, Eden diary, 21 August 1956.
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doctor, Horace Evans, told Macmillan that Eden must have a 
vacation, although he did not indicate that the Prime
Minister would resign. Macmillan, fearing the Americans 
would not negotiate if they thought Eden would return to
office, was ready to disclose and even distort Evans'
information.39
After meeting Evans, Macmillan visited Aldrich's 
residence. He told the Ambassador that Britain's foreign
reserves would be exhausted within weeks and the country 
would shut down from lack of oil. The Cabinet had two 
options: withdrawal from the Canal Zone or renewal of
hostilities to occupy the entire Canal. Macmillan realised 
that Eisenhower was reluctant to meet British Ministers, but 
the Cabinet was 'completely to be reshuffled and...Eden 
[was] going out because of sickness.' The following
afternoon, Macmillan reiterated that Eden had suffered 'a
physical breakdown and [would] have to go on vacation
immediately, first for one week and then for another, and 
this [would] lead to his retirement.' Butler, Macmillan, and 
Salisbury would lead the new Government. The first action 
after Eden's departure would be a step towards withdrawal 
from Egypt 'if [the U.S. could] give us a fig leaf to cover 
our nakedness.'40
The effect on the Americans was immediate. Aldrich
39 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/11-1956, London to State 
Department, Cable 2791, 19 November 1956; Macmillan,
Riding the Storm, p. 174. See also Winthrop Aldrich 
Papers, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., 
Aldrich appointments diary, 18 November 1956. I am 
grateful to Dr. David Carlton for this reference.
40 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/11-1956, London to State 
Department, Cables 2791 and 2814, 19 November 1956; DDE, 
Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 1956 
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called Eisenhower to tell him of Eden's departure and
Macmillan's wish to visit Washington. Hoover was hesitant,
saying, 'I think this is one time to sit tight, awaiting his
further information.' Humphrey, however, indicated he would
support a Conservative Government without Eden, if only to
keep the Labour Party from power:
I hate to have a man [Macmillan] stick in there 
and go to a vote of confidence and get licked. If 
they throw him out, then we have these Socialists 
to lick. 1
On 20 November, Eisenhower, Hoover, and Humphrey
considered the response to Macmillan. Aldrich had cabled
that Macmillan or Butler, considered by most Britons to be
Eden's 'heir-apparent,' would become Prime Minister.
Humphrey thought Butler the 'stronger of the two men being
mentioned,' but Eisenhower said he 'always thought most
highly of Macmillan, who is a straight, fine man, and, so
far as he is concerned, the outstanding one of the British
he served with during the war.'
The question of collaboration with Butler and Macmillan
remained. Apparently, Butler had not spoken to Aldrich, so
the relationship between Butler and Macmillan was unknown.
With Humphrey and Hoover present, Eisenhower called Aldrich:
EISENHOWER: You are dealing with at least one
person - maybe two or three - on a very personal 
basis. Is it possible for you, without 
embarrassment, to get together the two that you 
mentioned in one of your messages?
ALDRICH: Yes. One of them [probably Macmillan] I 
have just been playing bridge with. Perhaps I can 
stop him.
EISENHOWER: I'd rather you talk to both together.
You know who I mean? One has same name as my
41 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
1956 Phone Calls, Eisenhower to Hoover and Eisenhower to 
Humphrey, 19 November 1956.
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predecessor at Columbia University Presidency 
[Butler] ? the other was with me in the war 
[Macmillan].
ALDRICH: I know the one with you in the war. Oh 
yes, now I've got it.
EISENHOWER: Could you get them informally and say 
of course we are interested and sympathetic and, 
as soon as things happen that we anticipate, we 
can furnish 'a lot of fig leaves'?
ALDRICH: I can certainly say that....
EISENHOWER: Herb [Hoover] probably will send you a 
cable later tonight. You see, we don't want to be 
in a position of interference between those two, . 
but we want to have you personally tell them. They 
are both good friends....
ALDRICH: That is wonderful. I will do this --
tomorrow?
EISENHOWER: Yes, first thing in the morning.
ALDRICH: I shall certainly do it and will then
communicate. Can do it without the slightest 
embarrassment.
EISENHOWER: Communicate through regular channels - 
—  through Herb. 2
Macmillan quickly exploited Eden's absence from
Cabinet. After Ministers were told on 20 November that Eden
was cancelling his public engagements, Macmillan said
rationing would have to produce a 25 percent reduction in
oil consumption, even if Britain 'should receive from the
U.S., without any considerable delay, the greater part of
the supplies assigned to us under the emergency arrangements
which had been agreed with the U.S.' The Chancellor warned:
Cabinet might shortly face the grave choice of 
deciding whether to mobilise all our financial 
resources in order to maintain the sterling/dollar 
rate at its present level or to let the rate find 
its own level with the possible consequence that 
sterling might cease to be an international 
currency.
42 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
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Macmillan did not reveal his contact with Aldrich but hinted 
that the solution to Britain's problems was discreet
negotiation:
Although any formal approach to the U.S. would be 
premature at the present time, we should endeavour 
to establish informal contact with them through 
the Treasury Delegation in Washington, in order
gradually to enlist their support for the loans 
which we should have to raise....If we were 
assured of the goodwill of the U.S. in this
respect, it might be possible for us to declare,
simultaneously with the announcement of the loss
of gold and dollars during November, our . 
determination to maintain the existing
sterling/dollar rate and to restore the economy by 
means of appropriate internal and external
policies. 3
The next morning, Butler and Macmillan assured Aldrich that 
the Cabinet would approve British withdrawal.44
Eden was oblivious to Macmillan's intrigues. Commenting 
on a CIA report about Nasser's internal position, he
complained to Lloyd, 'It is only on that level [the 
intelligence services] that Americans cooperate nowadays.' 
He drafted a final plea to Eisenhower, asking for U.S. 
support of an 'effective' UNEF and British clearance of the 
Suez Canal, but decided not to send the message. He left for 
Jamaica on 23 November, still unaware of the discussions 
with the Americans.45
The restoration of Anglo-American relations still had 
to overcome two obstacles. First, Butler and Macmillan had 
to persuade the Cabinet to accept American conditions for 
aid. Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd, Commonwealth Secretary 
Home, and Minister of Defence Head opposed concessions, and
43 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.85(56), 20 November 1956.
44 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/11-2156, London to State 
Department, Cable 2841, 21 November 1956.
45 PRO, F0800/742, Foreign Office to New York, unnumbered, 
20 November 1956.
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a large number of Conservative backbenchers, supported them.
To defuse the opposition, Butler and Macmillan had to
extract compensation, political as well as economic, in
exchange for withdrawal.
On 21 November, Macmillan and Butler suggested to
Aldrich that, after British withdrawal, the U.S. should join
the Baghdad Pact. Eisenhower told Humphrey:
Apparently "fig leaves" did not mean merely 
financial help. It may have been something else 
that we have not even guessed.
Humphrey, despite his worries about the Labour Party,
refused any 'political' commitment to the British before
complete withdrawal. Eisenhower agreed, and Hoover
instructed Aldrich to stall Butler and Macmillan:
We do not believe meeting with Butler and 
Macmillan [in Washington] would be feasible until 
possible week of December 3....We remain firm in 
our conviction that withdrawal of troops is of 
prime urgency and must be moving toward 
accomplishment before other important questions 
can be considered.
Butler and Macmillan's only option was to persuade the
Cabinet to adopt gradual measures toward withdrawal while
negotiations continued with the U.S. They told the Cabinet
on 22 November:
If the U.S. Government were prepared to guide the 
forthcoming debate in the General Assembly [on an 
Afro-Asian resolution for immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops] on moderate lines and thereafter 
to state clearly that the problem of the Suez 
Canal would be firmly dealt with and that the 
Russians would not be allowed to exploit the 
situation in the Middle East to their advantage, 
we might hope to reestablish close political 
relations with the U.S. and to secure a 
satisfactory and lasting settlement in the Middle
46 USNA, RG 59, CDF, 974.7301/11-2156, London to State 
Department, Cable 2841, and State Department to London, 
Cable 3665, 21 November 1956; DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE 
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East as a whole.
A token withdrawal of British forces should be undertaken 
while full withdrawal was linked to the Canal's clearance 
and the resumption of negotiations over the Canal.47
The second obstacle to Anglo-American reconciliation 
was the division in the U.S. Administration. Eisenhower, 
needing an excuse to overcome the resistance of the State 
Department, found it when the U.S. rebuffed the British over 
the Afro-Asian resolution. The British delegation had sought 
amendments fulfilling the Cabinet's conditions of 22 
November. By the evening of the 23rd, Lloyd was optimistic: 
the Belgians had sponsored the desired amendments, and Lodge 
said he had no objections. When the vote was taken the next 
day, however, the U.S. abstained on the Belgian measures, 
ensuring their defeat when other delegations followed the 
American lead. The Afro-Asian resolution subsequently passed 
easily.48
The U.S. abstention occurred when the State Department 
decided that complete withdrawal superseded all other 
considerations. Deputy Undersecretary Murphy told Caccia and 
French Ambassador Herve Alphand 'that the U.S. was now the 
prisoner of its own policy.' Lloyd proposed discussions on 
the Middle East's future but failed to influence Hoover, who 
had cabled Aldrich that international control of the Suez
• • • 49Canal was no longer a practical objective. 9
47 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.87(56), 22 November 1956.
48 PRO, PREM11/1106, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 1401, 
24 November 1956.
49 PRO, PREM11/1106, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
2342, 24 November 1956, Cable 2330, 21 November 1956, and 
Cable 2334, 23 November 1956; DDE, White House Office, 
Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject, Alphabetical, Box 
82, Suez Canal Crisis (2), State Department to London, 
Cable 3666, 21 November 1956, and Cable 3702, 23 November
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At last Eisenhower circumvented the State Department.
He had been warned by Allen Dulles, 'Britain's long-standing
dominant position in Iraq has now become precarious as a
result of the military action against Egypt.'50 Winston
Churchill wrote the President on 23 November:
Whatever the arguments adduced here and in the 
United States for or against Anthony's action in 
Egypt, to let events in the Middle East come a 
gulf between us would be an act of folly, on which 
our whole civilisation may founder.
Eisenhower replied, 'Nothing would please this country more
nor, in fact, could help us more, than to see British
prestige and strength renewed and rejuvenated in the Middle
East./51
The President avoided the risk of publicity attached to 
a special adviser's appointment. Instead, the White House, 
'through discreet channels,' suggested to Caccia 'discussing 
our major outstanding problems other than through the State 
Department.' The 'suggestion would have to be handled with 
the greatest care' since the attempt to appoint Bedell Smith 
'had been torpedoed by the State Department.'52
Eisenhower confronted Hoover on 25 November. They 
agreed with Foster Dulles' suggestion that Britain 
definitively state its plans and immediate steps for 
withdrawal before the U.S. offered aid, but they differed 
over the content of the statement. Hoover believed, 'It 
might be necessary to tell Britain that it looks as though
1956.
50 DDE, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, 
Subject, Alphabetical, Box 7, CIA, Volume I (4), Allen 
Dulles to Hoover, 22 November 1956.
51 DDE, Ann Whitman, International, Box 18, Winston 
Churchill, Churchill to Eisenhower, 23 November 1956, and 
Eisenhower to Churchill, 27 November 1956.
52 PRO, PREM11/1137, Washington to Foreign Office, Cable 
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they are through in the area and ask if they want us to pick 
up their commitments.' Eisenhower objected that Anglo- 
American partnership was still necessary and concluded, 'We 
should give the British every chance to work their way back 
into a position of influence and respect in the Middle 
East./53
Once Eisenhower committed himself, Humphrey followed. 
He called Butler on 26 November to express Eisenhower's 
worry that the U.S. 'were today opposed to [the] U.K., whom 
they regarded as being disobedient to the U.N. commandments 
and in defiance of them.' Provided Britain withdrew from 
Egypt, the U.S., while supplying loans and oil, could press 
the Egyptians to make concessions over the powers of an 
international authority cooperating in the Canal's 
operation. Humphrey even held out the prospect of a visit to 
London, though this was 'difficult while the British 
attitude was uncertain.' He agreed with Butler that 
'questions which could not be mentioned [over the phone] on 
the succession' to Eden would be addressed in the near­
future.54
Gradually, Butler and Macmillan led the Government into 
accommodation with the U.S. They were assisted by Salisbury, 
who invited Aldrich to his home 'for tea and talks.' Lloyd, 
unaware of the covert discussions, endorsed Butler and 
Macmillan's calls for withdrawal because of his distress at 
British difficulties in the U.N. He reported from New York 
on 26 November that 4,000 UNEF troops would be in place by 5
53 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 19, November 
1956, Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 26 November 
1956.
54 PRO, PREM11/1106, Humphrey to Butler, 26 November 1956.
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December, negotiations on the Canal's status would start
when the date of withdrawal had been fixed, and clearance of
the Canal would begin when Anglo-French troops were
withdrawn. The Cabinet agreed to recall Lloyd immediately so
a decision could be reached, as Butler, 'considerably
encouraged by his talk' with Humphrey, favoured a definite
date for withdrawal.55
Lloyd returned to London on 28 November. After his
offer to resign over his role in Suez was declined, he
informed the Cabinet:
If we withdrew the Anglo-French troops as rapidly 
as was practicable, we should regain the sympathy 
of the U.S. Government; we should be better placed 
to ask for their support in any economic measure 
which we might need to take, and we should have 
removed, as far as lay in our power, all 
impediments to the further clearance of the 
Canal.56
Macmillan called for an immediate announcement of
withdrawal, but the battle was not yet won. Dissenting 
Ministers argued that withdrawal was unacceptable to many 
Conservative backbenchers and obtained agreement that 
withdrawal would only occur with assurances of 1) a
competent UNEF, 2) some action toward clearance of the Suez
Canal, 3) suspension of the expulsion of British nationals 
from Egypt, and 4) immediate and tangible support from the 
U.S. Noting reports of internal political and economic 
deterioration in Egypt and a swing of public opinion towards
55 Joseph Alsop Papers, Van Patten to Alsop, 24 November 
1956; PRO, FO115/4550, New York to Foreign Office, Cable 
524, 27 November 1956; PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.88(56), 26 
November 1956; DDE, White House Office, Office of the 
Staff Secretary, Subject, Alphabetical, Box 82, Suez Canal 
Crisis (2), London to State Department, Cable 2948, 27 
November 1956.
56 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.90(56), 28 November 1956; Thorpe, p. 
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the Government in Britain and the Commonwealth, some 
Ministers concluded that Britain should 'dig in.' Butler 
postponed a final decision on the pretext that Lloyd should 
consult the French.57
The next morning Macmillan told the Cabinet of a loss 
of a $450 million, more than 20 percent, of the reserves 
since September, including a $270 million fall in November. 
Fears of a backbench revolt continued, but Lloyd obtained 
Hammarskjold's promise that 'all available equipment' would 
be used to clear the Suez Canal and Egypt would be asked for 
a public statement guaranteeing free transit to British and 
French ships. Although some Ministers thought this 
inadequate, the Cabinet agreed on 30 November that Lloyd 
would inform the Commons about withdrawal on 3 December.58
Butler and Cabinet Secretary Brook prevented Eden's 
intervention in the discussions. Told by Butler, 'Do not 
attempt to break your isolation. There is no major issue, 
i.e., Anglo-American policy at the moment,' Eden only cabled 
London for information on 29 November. When he received a 
summary, Eden, questioning the arrangements for withdrawal, 
clearance of the Canal, and the UNEF, informed Ministers, 'I 
am better and shall be available for any consultation.' His 
generous offer was not accepted. Butler merely wrote, 'We 
shall continue our efforts in New York to obtain the best 
possible terms on clearance, future settlement, size of 
force, etc.'59
57 Ibid.
58 PRO, CAB128/30, C.M.91(56), 29 November 1956. See also 
PRO, T236/4190, Rowan to Makins and Makins to Macmillan,
30 November 1956.
59 Rhodes James, pp. 587ff.? AP, AP20/25, Brook to Eden, 30 
November 1956, and Butler to Eden, undated.
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Eden was unhappy, since he 'never thought the Six
Principles [for a Canal settlement] amounted to so much.' He
wrote his Private Secretary, Frederick Bishop:
I am sure that the only thing is to stand firm on 
the ground that we have chosen and I believe that 
[the U.N.] will come around. I quite understand 
that the financial position can meanwhile become 
quite difficult, but after all, we have resources, 
which I would rather not put in a telegram.
Butler, aware that Eden might block withdrawal if he knew
the details of its negotiation, replied on 2 December, after
consulting Salisbury, Macmillan, and Chief Whip Edward
Heath:
We believe that the policy on which we have 
decided is consistent with the course which you 
set for us. We hope you will feel that we have 
taken the right direction.
He added the next day:
We of course considered very anxiously whether it 
was our duty to suggest to you that you should 
return. We concluded that you ought not to 
interrupt your rest.
Salisbury and Dr. Evans agreed. The Prime Minister finally
relented, 'I fully agree and will now pipe down.'60
Butler and Macmillan also instructed Eden not to make
public statements from Jamaica and told an American
television network that he was unavailable for comment.
Bishop and Robert Allan, Eden's Parliamentary Private
Secretary, cabled Eden before his return to London:
You yourself are not giving interviews to the 
Press. You have been kept informed of the broad 
lines of policy, but might find difficulty over 
minor tricky questions. We all feel sure that a 
short statement on departure [from Heathrow for 10
60 AP, AP20/25, Jamaica to Colonial Office, Cables PERS 102 
and 103, 1 December 1956, Colonial Office to Jamaica, 
Cable PERS 70, 2 December 1956, Cable PERS 72, 3 December 
1956, and Cable PERS 75, 4 December 1956, and Jamaica to 
Colonial Office, Cable PERS 117, 4 December 1956.
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Downing Street]...is the best course.61
When Eden, in his proposed statement, referred to 'the
Moscow-Cairo Axis' and Nasser's dictatorial ambitions and
criticised the U.N., Butler, supported by Lloyd and
Salisbury, responded that Eden's denunciation of the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, China, and the U.N....
...would create a bad impression....In particular 
there is a growing wish to end the breach with the 
U.S. It is important that your first pronouncement 
should be in tune with the changed atmosphere.
Criticism of Nasser should be deleted since it 'supported
the contention that our real motive was to get rid of
Nasser.' After further exchanges, Eden accepted Whitehall's
draft.62
Once they knew of the intention to withdraw, the 
Americans eagerly fulfilled British requirements. An 
American statement pledged full support for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the Baghdad Pact's members. 'A 
very relaxed and cheerful' Butler told Aldrich on 1 December 
that, as the American 'activation of [the emergency] oil 
committee and warning message regarding aggression against 
Turkey and other members of the Baghdad Pact had made [a] 
most favourable impression' in Britain, he 'thought he had 
turned the corner with the Suez rebels [in Commons].'63
On 3 December, Lloyd told the Commons that British 
troops would withdraw by mid-December if an effective UNEF
61 Rhodes James, pp. 589ff.
62 AP, AP20/25, Jamaica to Colonial Office, Cables PERS 141 
and 145, 11 December 1956, Colonial Office to Jamaica, 
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was in place. The British would not insist on participation
in the Canal's clearance and would not set preconditions on
negotiations for a Canal settlement. Privately, the U.S.
assured Macmillan that a loan from the Export-Import Bank
was forthcoming, that Britain could borrow from the
International Monetary Fund, and that the annual repayment
of the interest due on the 1946 U.S. loan would be waived.
Within 72 hours of Lloyd's announcement, American oil
supplies were sent to Europe. By 22 December, Britain
received almost $2 billion in U.S.-backed loans and aid.64
The British had survived the immediate crisis, but a
new problem emerged: Eden, refreshed by his vacation, did
not intend to resign as Prime Minister. The Americans had
negotiated on the assumption that Eden would not return to
power, Humphrey telling Foster Dulles that 'nothing but a
change of Government' would save the pound, and Butler and
Macmillan were already vying for the succession.65
Even though Macmillan was as responsible as Butler, if
not more so, for the cease-fire and subsequent efforts for
withdrawal, he placed the onus of 'retreat' upon his rival.
As Acting Prime Minister, Butler took responsibility for
withdrawal, while Macmillan's role was never revealed.
Former Conservative Minister Brendan Bracken wrote to the
newspaper baron, Lord Beaverbrook:
Macmillan is telling journalists that he intends 
to retire from politics and go to the morgue [the 
House of Lords]. He declares that he will never 
serve under Butler. His real intentions are to 
push his boss out of Number 10 and he has a fair 
following in the Tory Party. The so-called Canal 
die-hards think better of him than they do of Eden
64 Hansard. 3 December 1956; PRO, F0115/4551, Washington to 
Foreign Office, Cable 2436, 7 December 1956.
65 Horne, p. 452.
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or Butler.66
At the meeting of the 1922 Committee of Conservative
backbench MPs on 22 November, Butler gave a straightforward
presentation of the situation and asked Macmillan for a few
words on oil supplies. The Chancellor turned the opportunity
into a rousing 35-minute speech. A Conservative Whip, Philip
Goodhart, recalled, 'Rab was not on his best form, whereas
Harold was at his most ebullient and managed to win the day,
not only on the merit of what he said...but also physically
in that his expansive gestures nearly caused poor Rab to
fall backwards from the adjacent seat.'67 Douglas Dodds-
Parker, the Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Foreign
Office, claimed:
A document had been drawn up saying that, as 
Butler had dragged his feet over Suez, the 
signatories would not support him for the 
leadership; that this had been signed by some half 
of the Tory Party [MPs] ? that he would therefore 
be unable to form an administration? and so there 
was no alternative to him but Macmillan. This 
document was sent on high through a Privy 
Councillor [Lord Scarborough].
Scarborough spent the evening of 3 January with Eden, but it
cannot be determined if the Prime Minister's potential
successors were discussed.68
At a NATO meeting in Paris on 12 December, Macmillan,
distorting his role in Suez, solicited the support of Foster
Dulles, who reported to Eisenhower:
[Macmillan] recognised that there had been a 
certain loss of confidence on the part of the
66 Charles Lysaght, Brendan Bracken (London: Allen Lane, 
1979), p. 302.
67 Horne, p. 455. See also Anthony Howard, Rab (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 241.
68 Douglas Dodds-Parker, Political Eunuch (Springwood, 
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President, myself, and others because of the Suez 
operation and the deception practiced upon us in 
that connection....He, personally, was very 
unhappy with the way in which the matter was 
handled and the timing but...Eden had taken this 
entirely to himself and he, Macmillan, had had no 
real choice except to back Eden. Macmillan did not 
disguise the fact that he had always favored 
strong action but the point was that he did not 
like the manner and timing, particularly vis-a-vis 
the U.S.
Macmillan also reassured Foster Dulles that, even if Eden
remained as Prime Minister, he would not be in charge of
British policy:
After Eden returned, there would be a question as 
to whether he would resign at once on account of 
ill health. If not, he would probably hold on for 
six months, but he would be a constitutional Prime 
Minister.69
Future U.S. policy in the Middle East also had to be 
decided. Eisenhower still foresaw renewed cooperation with 
Britain, but the State Department assumed 'that [Britain's] 
position in the area has been seriously prejudiced by its 
action against Egypt and that the U.S. must assume 
leadership in maintaining and restoring the Western position 
in the area.' In the short term, the U.S. would use King 
Saud to 'moderate both extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet 
views among the Arabs.' If Jordan refused British subsidies, 
'the U.S. should offer to assist Jordan financially and 
perhaps militarily in the context of closer federation with 
Iraq.' In the long run, the U.S. would fix Arab-Israeli 
boundaries through the U.N., provide a unilateral assurance 
of aid to the Baghdad Pact, 'utilise all appropriate 
opportunities to isolate Egypt and reduce Nasser's prestige 
and influence,' 'assist Iraq to expand its influence in
69 DDE, John Foster Dulles Papers, General Correspondence 
and Memoranda, Box 1, L-M (2), Macmillan-Foster Dulles 
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Syria and Jordan,' and 'further strengthen Saudi Arabia and 
reduce its ties with Egypt.'70
On 8 December, Foster Dulles outlined three 
alternatives to Eisenhower: accession to the Baghdad Pact, 
which was favoured by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, creation of 
a new regional organisation under the U.N. Charter, or 
bilateral arrangements with Middle Eastern countries. Foster 
Dulles favoured the bilateral approach, 'since you wouldn't 
get in trouble with the troublemakers [Britain and France].' 
Eisenhower thought that, since 'Saudi Arabia and even 
Lebanon...might want to adhere to the Pact,' the U.S. 'would 
want to go in with them,' but when Foster Dulles revived the 
objection that the U.S. could not join the Pact without a 
guarantee of Israeli borders because of the pro-Israeli
• • 7 1lobby m  Congress, the President gave way. ^
Two general tenets of American policy emerged. First, 
King Saud would replace Nasser as the leader of the Arab 
world.72 Second, the U.S. would unilaterally guarantee the 
security of Middle Eastern states from Communist aggression 
inside or outside their borders. At a meeting on 20 December 
with Eisenhower, Hoover, Wilson, and Radford, Foster Dulles 
said the Senate's approval of American accession to the 
Baghdad Pact 'would be extremely difficult to obtain.' 
Furthermore:
Nasser opposes [the Pact] and, more importantly,
King Saud does also....Saud is the only figure in 
the area...[who could] serve as a counterpoise to
70 U.S. DDRS, US81 555A.
71 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 20, December 
1956 Phone Calls, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 8 December 
1956.
72 See DDE, Ann Whitman Series, Dulles-Herter, Box 6, 
December 1956, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 12 December 
1956.
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Nasser.
Instead, a Congressional resolution should authorise 
Presidential action to counter Communism in the Middle East, 
just as the Truman Doctrine of 1947 'defended' Greece and 
Turkey against Communism and the 'Formosa Doctrine' of 1955 
protected Taiwan.73
On 5 January, Eisenhower addressed Congress to request 
a resolution to 'authorise the U.S. to cooperate with and 
assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of 
the Middle East in the development of economic strength 
dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.' 
Reasonable amounts of economic aid would be allocated, and 
the President could provide military assistance, including 
direct aid by American forces, 'against armed aggression 
from any nation controlled by international Communism.' The 
Resolution was approved by Congress and signed by Eisenhower 
in March.74
It remained for Britain to accept the Americans' 
unilateral commitment, even though this implied British 
subservience to the U.S. Conveniently, Eden's fall from 
power was imminent. When he Prime Minister returned from 
Jamaica, a group led by Salisbury and Butler informed him 
that, 'while the Cabinet were willing to carry on under his 
leadership until Easter, if it was then clear that his 
health was not fully restored, they felt that a new head of 
Government would be necessary.' On 18 December, Eden gave an 
unimpressive account of Suez to the 1922 Committee.
73 DDE, Ann Whitman Series, DDE Diaries, Box 20, December 
1956 Staff Memoranda, Goodpaster memorandum, 20 December 
1956.
74 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 180.
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Questioned about collusion, Eden replied that 'some [half-
truths] - and if they existed at all, they were not serious
or many in number - were necessary, and always are in this
sort of operation which demands extreme secrecy.'7^
Eden returned to the Commons two days later to silence.
Under close questioning from Gaitskell about collusion, Eden
resorted to deception:
I want to say this on the question of 
foreknowledge and to say it quite bluntly to the 
House, that there was not foreknowledge that -
Israel would attack Egypt --  there was not. But
there was something else. There was --  we knew it
perfectly well --  a risk of it, and, in the event
of the risk of it, certain discussions and 
conversations took place as, I think, was 
abs^Jutely right, and as, I think, anybody would
Eden might have remained as Prime Minister for a few 
months, but he had effectively lost power. Butler consulted 
Eden's Principal Private Secretary, Frederick Bishop, who 
warned that Eden's resignation 'might conceivably happen
• # 77 .quite quickly.''' At the end of December, Eden began asking 
Ministers and prominent Conservative peers if he should 
continue, telling them that he was having trouble sleeping
. . .  , 7 0
and regaining his former vigour. 0 From 1 January, Dr. Evans 
saw Eden daily, and on 7 January, Eden was examined by Evans 
and two other specialists. Told that his health would be 
endangered if he stayed in office, Eden discussed the 
details of his resignation with Brook and Salisbury.79 On 9 
January, Eden told the Cabinet:
75 Carlton, Anthony Eden, pp. 463ff.
76 Hansard. 20 December 1956.
77 Author's interview with Frederick Bishop.
78 See AP20/33/7, Buchan-Hepburn to Eden, 28 December 1956, 
and AP20/33/19, Coleraine to Eden, 5 January 1957.
79 AP, AP20/30/1, Prime Minister's appointments diary, 
January 1957, AP33/8, Brook to Eden, 8 January 1957, and 
AP33/10A, draft Eden to Churchill, 8 January 1957.
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Since Nasser seized the Canal in July, I have been 
obliged to increase the drugs considerably and 
also increase the stimulants necessary to 
counteract the drugs. This has finally had an 
adverse effect on my rather precarious inside. 0
Macmillan's succession was surprisingly easy, despite
doubts by Lord Salisbury. Four Cabinet supporters of the
Chancellor discussed their strategy as soon as they learned
that Eden intended to resign. Michael Adeane, the Queen's
Private Secretary, not only consulted Salisbury but also
Lord Waverly, Lord Chandos, and Winston Churchill, ali of
whom independently recommended Macmillan. When Salisbury,
with his lisp, polled Ministers, 'Which is it to be: Hawold
or Wab?', no more than three voted for Butler.81
80 Rhodes James, p. 597.
81 Colville, p. 722; Gilbert, p. 1227. See also Horne, p. 
458; Howard, p. 247.
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CONCLUSIONS: SUEZ AND BRITISH POLICY
The Suez War was not primarily the product of weakness 
in individuals but of weaknesses in the structure of British 
Government as it protected its 'traditional' Middle Eastern 
position. Anthony Eden, even before his gall bladder 
operation of 1953, was vain and short-tempered. Often in 
pain before and during the Suez Crisis, he would explode in 
rage against Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Yet 
British policy, not only long-term strategy but short-term 
operations, was not forged by Eden's 'irrationality.' In 
1954, he enjoyed a series of diplomatic triumphs, including 
the Geneva settlement of Indochina, the formation of Western 
European Union, and the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty. Despite the difficulties he faced as Prime Minister, 
his rejection of long-term measures against Nasser in March 
1956, in favour of plans to 'murder' the Egyptian leader, 
was soon retracted. His desire to strike immediately after 
Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company was 
overruled by the military's insistence upon weeks of 
preparations, and those military plans were postponed during 
the diplomatic manoeuvring of September and October.
Similarly, the' hypothesis that Harold Macmillan, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, pushed fellow Ministers into 
war against Egypt, either as a 'necessary' measure to save 
British influence throughout the world or as part of a wider 
intrigue against Eden, is unsupported by evidence. Even if 
Macmillan was willing to distort his conversations with 
American officials in late September and to understate the 
cost to the British economy of a war, he was unable to halt 
the Foreign Office's pursuit of genuine negotiations with
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Egypt.
Those who blame U.S. Secretary of State Foster Dulles 
for the Suez War claim that he misled the British into 
thinking that the Eisenhower Administration would not oppose 
the use of force. Foster Dulles did refer to 'making Nasser 
disgorge the Canal,' made to appease the British and to 
promote OMEGA as the long-term method to topple the Egyptian 
Government, but he, like Eisenhower and State Department 
officials, clearly warned Britain that the U.S. would only 
accept the use of force if there was no alternative to 
internationalisation of the Canal. In mid-October, the U.N. 
discussions provided such an alternative. Moreover, British 
Ministers, including Eden and Macmillan, recognised in late 
October that the U.S. would not support military action. Far 
from being misled by Foster Dulles, they gambled that he and 
Eisenhower would not intervene to halt Anglo-French 
operations.
i
The portrayal of Egyptian President Nasser as the cause 
of the war is also suspect. He and Eden, while differing 
over the Turkish-Iraqi Pact, were not unfavourably impressed 
with each other during the latter's visit to Cairo in 
February 1955. As late as March 1956, both the U.S. and 
Britain were willing to work with Nasser on projects such as 
the Aswan High Dam. OMEGA, the Anglo-American program to 
curb Nasser's influence, was not undertaken to overthrow an 
evil dictator but to defend the interests of the U.S. and 
Britain in the Middle East, notably the resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute and the maintenance of the British 
position in Jordan, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Only 
MI6 portrayed Nasser as a megalomaniac intent on the
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destruction of Israel and the formation of a pan-Arab, pan- 
Islamic bloc under Egyptian control, and their assessment 
was not shared by the Foreign Office or most of their 
American colleagues.
Even if Nasser was the villain depicted by MI6 and, 
later, by Eden, his actions after the nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal Company gave no pretext for military action 
against Egypt. Even the British Cabinet recognised that, on 
'narrow' legal grounds, the nationalisation did not vialate 
international law. Nasser did not threaten foreign nationals 
or the employees of the Suez Canal Company nor did he impede 
the flow of traffic through the Canal. Throughout the 
crisis, he offered negotiation of a new settlement based on 
international cooperation with the Egyptian Canal Authority, 
and the U.N. discussions in early October brought Anglo- 
Egyptian agreement on the principles of such a settlement.
The interplay of personalities, such as Eden's 
susceptibility to public and press criticism, the tension 
between Eden and Foster Dulles, or the 'anti-Munich' spirit 
among most British Ministers, may have influenced the course 
of the Suez Crisis, but it was secondary to two 
considerations: the development of British policy in the
Middle East and regional events beyond the control of London 
and Washington. Specifically, after the decision in 1953-54 
to shift the centre of Middle Eastern position from Cairo to 
Baghdad, British policy was predicated upon the formation 
and defence of the Iraqi-Jordanian axis, which eventually 
led to Anglo-Egyptian conflict.
Britain, presented with the fait accompli of the 
Turkish-Iraqi Pact in January 1955, had to maintain its
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Middle Eastern position by joining the agreement, despite 
Nasser's opposition. At the same time, Nasser, confronted 
with a more aggressive Israeli policy on his border, pursued 
Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian ties and a secure source of arms to 
avoid isolation in the Middle East. His acquisition of 
weapons from the Soviet bloc prompted the Foreign Office not 
only to endorse Iranian accession to the Baghdad Pact but to 
seek the inclusion of Jordan with the ill-fated Templer 
mission. By early 1956, almost all Middle Eastern events 
were seen through the prism of an Egyptian 'challenge' to 
the British strategy.
General Glubb's removal as head of Jordan's army by 
King Hussein, although it was not instigated by Nasser, was 
interpreted by Eden as Cairo's attempt to remove Britain 
from the Middle East. The Foreign Office, recognising that 
the Egyptian leader was not directly responsible for Glubb's 
dismissal, resisted immediate confrontation with Egypt, but 
it could only defend the Iraqi-Jordanian axis by removing 
the alternative of an Egyptian-led Middle Eastern system. 
Officials drafted the long-term covert program to curb 
Nasser's influence and obtained Cabinet approval.
The British reaction to Nasser's nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal Company merely subordinated covert planning to 
overt military preparations. It was irrelevant if the 
Egyptian action was legal or if trade through the Canal and 
Middle Eastern oil shipments was unimpeded. Acceptance of 
nationalisation indicated British submission to Egyptian 
initiatives, undermining the Iraqi-Jordanian axis and a 
British-led Middle Eastern system.
Yet British policy and the ensuing Anglo-Egyptian
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conflict was not sufficient cause for the Suez War. As of 14 
October, Eden had accepted Lloyd's opinion that further 
negotiations with the Egyptians on supervision of the Canal 
were desirable, and Anglo-French plans for invasion of Egypt 
were to be suspended, at least until spring 1957. In 
essence, the Foreign Office's opinion, shared by the U.S. 
Government, that a genuine settlement over the Canal should 
be pursued while the covert, non-military program of March 
1956 was implemented against Nasser prevailed.
British collusion with France and Israel against Egypt 
occurred when the policy of the Iraqi-Jordanian axis was 
linked to other events outside British control. Just as the 
Iraqis surprised the Foreign Office with their signature of 
the Turkish-Iraqi Pact in early 1955 and the Arab-Israeli 
dispute forced Nasser to turn to the Soviets, so the 
developing Franco-Israeli 'alliance' became intertwined with 
the Anglo-French planning against Egypt. It is possible, 
though impossible to determine, that French and Israeli 
military planners conspired to force Britain into tripartite 
collusion against Egypt through the attack on the Jordanian 
village of Qalqilya in early October 1956. Even if the 
assault upon Qalqilya was merely the product of Israeli- 
Jordanian tension, the French used it to frighten Eden into 
accepting collaboration with Tel Aviv. If Britain refused, 
Israeli-Jordanian war would destroy the Iraqi-Jordanian axis 
and British plans for the Middle East.
However, neither personalities nor policies, even when 
they are linked to regional developments, can solve certain 
questions about British policymaking during Suez. How could 
Eden, with the endorsement of a few senior Ministers,
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implement the plan with the French and the Israelis without 
informing most of the Foreign Office, the Treasury, and his 
own military commanders? How could he pursue military 
operations which, given the length of time between the 
Israeli attack upon Egypt and the landing of British and 
French troops, were politically indefensible?
The answers lie within the British system of 
policymaking. In effect, there were two British policies for 
the Middle East in 1956, one pursued by the Foreign Office 
and another by MI6, with no interdepartmental body to 
coordinate them. Even though the Foreign Office strategy was 
repeatedly endorsed by the Cabinet before July 1956, MI6 
pursued plans and carried out operations without Cabinet 
approval. It is probable, though not certain, that Eden, 
through the Permanent Undersecretary's Department of the 
Foreign Office, approved the MI6 policy, at least in 
principle. It cannot be determined if Foreign Secretary 
Lloyd was informed.
The outcome was a British foreign policy which was not 
only ambiguous but sometimes contradicted itself. Eden, 
weaned on 'intelligence' about Nasser from MI6 sources such 
as LUCKY BREAK, repeatedly intervened to alter Foreign 
Office plans. Eden's propensity for unilateral action could 
be checked by civil servants and Ministers, for example, the 
Cabinet decision of 21 March 1956 for a long-term program 
against Nasser, but even then the Prime Minister nearly 
sabotaged the plans. He leaked information to the American 
press about British determination to topple Nasser, insisted 
on a show of military strength in the Arabian Peninsula, and 
blocked Anglo-Saudi discussions on the Buraimi oasis.
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Meanwhile, MI6, either with Eden's approval or on its 
own volition, showed little regard for Foreign Office 
strategy in its proposals for the overthrow of King Saud of 
Saudi Arabia, an ally of the U.S., and co-operation with 
Israel to remove Nasser from power. Even when MI6 supported 
Foreign Office policy, the intelligence services failed to 
coordinate its operations with those of other departments. 
The Foreign Office was ignorant of the 'alternative' 
Egyptian Government cultivated by MI6 in 1956. When MI6 
cooperated with the Iraqis to overthrow the Syrian 
Government, it failed to inform the CIA of its operations, 
eventually dooming not only its own plans, but those of the 
Americans.
There is little direct evidence of MI6's involvement in 
British planning against Egypt during Suez, but it is likely 
that the ill-fated Phase II of MUSKETEER REVISE, aerial and 
psychological warfare against Egypt, was based upon MI6 
assurances that the plans would soon lead to Nasser's 
replacement by an 'alternative' Government. A more 
intriguing issue is the possible link between MI6's plans to 
conspire with Israel against Egypt and the eventual 
collusion of October 1956. It cannot be determined whether 
Harold Macmillan conferred with MI6 before tabling his 
proposals for collusion in August or whether MI6 was passing 
information to its French and Israeli counterparts about the 
state of opinion within the Eden Government.
The arrangements between 10 Downing Street and MI6 set 
a dangerous precedent for planning during the Suez Crisis. 
Eden circumvented the Foreign Office and the military to 
pursue collusion and then neglected to give them details of
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the arrangements with France and Israel. British diplomat 
and military commanders fought a war with no idea of the 
plans behind it.
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CONCLUSIONS: SUEZ AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
In contrast to those authors who have blamed the 
breakdown of the Anglo-American alliance on personalities, 
some political scientists have constructed an explanation 
based on systematic analysis.1 Although these accounts of 
Suez, written before the release of unpublished government 
documents, are 'historically' suspect, they offer a more 
complete description of the relationship between London
and Washington than that provided by other published 
works.
In general, however, systematic models of Anglo- 
American relations suffer from three fundamental 
shortcomings. First, they tend to be 'exclusive,' 
regarding the events of Suez solely as the product of
Anglo-American relations. It is misleading to assume that 
a policymaking system is insulated from the effects of 
other countries' actions. The Franco-Israeli 'alliance,' 
Israeli-Jordanian tension, and the Iraqi-Jordanian axis 
were the primary catalysts for British involvement in
collusion against Egypt. Saudi Arabian opposition to 
Anglo-French military action as well as the political 
situation in Syria was a significant influence upon
American policy during Suez.
Similarly, any change in variables outside the 
control of the policymakers limits the efficacy of 
cooperation between them. For example, the information 
which an official in Washington receives from sources 
outside the 'alliance' can only correspond with the
1 The most notable example is Richard Neustadt, Alliance 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
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information available to his counterpart in London if 
there is a complete and constant exchange of information. 
This condition can never be met. Even if an official was 
willing to transmit all information he received and even 
if his system was willing to allow full transmission, no 
technology can instantaneously communicate the material. 
Furthermore, an official's interpretation of the 
information, based on subjective factors which may not be 
acknowledged by the official himself or which may elude 
definition, cannot be expressed completely on paper.
Secondly, while the models may be dynamic, 
recognising the effect of changes in personnel, 
perspectives, and the channels of communications upon 
Anglo-American relations, the underlying definition of 
'alliance' is static. Merely asserting the basis of 
'alliance' as 'formal pledges, long-standing institutional 
arrangements, history, language, acquaintance, shared 
external interests, and felt need,' gives a superficial 
foundation to the Anglo-American 'alliance' divorced from 
political and strategic considerations.
Outside of a institution such as NATO, in which the 
'alliance' is formally and systematically defined, 
'alliance' is subjectively determined by the objectives of 
each system, the perceptions of the policymaker, and the 
channels between the two systems. Thus, a change in these 
conditions may not only affect the operation of the 
'alliance' but also its very existence.
Thirdly, the models may be flawed in assuming unitary 
systems producing and implementing policies. In practice, 
two or more inconsistent policies may be pursued and
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implemented if there is no effective procedure to unify 
the views and plans of different agencies and actors. Such 
was the case with British policymaking in 1956.
'Alliance' is conditioned upon the objectives of each 
system and the interests of officials within those 
systems. If these are fulfilled through 'allied' action or 
policy, all is well; if not, the 'alliance' exists only in 
name. Although Britain and the U.S. never disagreed about 
the general aim of defending the Western position in the 
Middle East, cooperation to fulfill that objective was not 
automatic. Firstly, one government might decide that its 
interests were not sustained by the methods of its 'ally.' 
Although the British recognised the Soviet 'threat' to the 
Middle East and were willing to use the rhetoric of the 
Cold War to obtain American support, their priority was 
the defence of long-standing interests in the region. 
Conversely, the United States, apart from its economic and 
military position in Saudi Arabia and its ties, through 
domestic politics, to Israel, had little intrinsic 
interest in the Middle East. Its overriding objective was 
the development of the region within a global system 
containing Soviet expansion. If Britain action threatened 
the success of its Cold War policy, the United States 
might refuse to support its 'ally.'
Divergence in the 'alliance' in the Middle East 
predated the Suez Crisis. In 1953, the Eisenhower 
Administration perceived that Britain's conduct of the 
negotiations for a new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was 
jeopardising the Western position in Cairo. Moreover, 
British inability to supply large amounts of military aid
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to countries such as Iraq and Pakistan was hindering the 
formation of a 'Northern Tier' defence against the Soviet 
Union. The Administration reacted by suspending the 
'alliance' and pursuing unilateral initiatives. Only in 
late 1954, after the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty, supply of American weapons to Iraq and Pakistan, 
and signature of the Turkish-Pakistani defence agreement 
did the U.S. restore political co-operation with Britain 
in the Middle East. Both countries perceived that the 
Arab-Israeli dispute was hindering the achievement of 
their goals in the region, so they agreed to co-ordinate 
the ALPHA program for an Arab-Israeli settlement.
At working level, individual officials, embassies, or 
agencies, such as MI6 and the CIA, did not always follow 
the guidelines set by their Governments. While the State 
Department worked with the British on initiatives such as 
the Tripartite Declaration and Middle Eastern Command 
between 1950 and 1953, the CIA implemented its strategy of 
cultivating nationalist leaders, even those who objected 
to British influence in their countries. In 1955-56, MI6's 
policy of toppling any Middle Eastern regime that did not 
defer to British wishes jeopardised the Anglo-American 
'alliance.'
Most significantly, the 'alliance,' without formal 
definition, could not be protected from the effects of 
other countries' actions. While the Turkish-Iraqi fait 
accompli of early 1955 forced the British to create the 
Baghdad Pact, the Americans, primarily for reasons of 
domestic politics, could not join the organisation. 
Similarly, when the possibility arose in mid-1955 that the
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Israelis would expose or pre-empt Anglo-American plans for 
an Arab-Israeli settlement, Foster Dulles was forced into 
a public speech on the Arab-Israeli issue, despite British 
misgivings.
To some extent, the relationships between British and 
American policymakers could mitigate these hindrances to 
the operation of the Anglo-American 'alliance.' Anglo- 
American military discussions on the Middle East continued 
during 1953-54 despite the Eisenhower Administration's 
pursuit of 'independence.' The damage wrought by MI6's 
ambitious plans upon Anglo-American discussions of OMEGA 
was minimised by British diplomatic and military 
representatives in Washington. The troublesome issue of 
the Buraimi dispute between Saudi Arabia and the British- 
supported Trucial Sheikhdoms was never resolved but Anglo- 
American consultations prevented it from sabotaging the 
'alliance.'
The differing interests of Britain and the U.S. in 
the Middle East produced divergent reactions to Nasser's 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, but these were 
reconciled through high-level discussions during August 
and September. While Foster Dulles' conference-making, 
with hindsight, could be perceived as a delaying tactic to 
forestall Anglo-French military action, the British agreed 
to the convening of the first London Conference and the 
formation of the Suez Canal Users Association. Foster 
Dulles was angered at Britain's peremptory approach to the 
U.N. in late September, but he was able to encourage 
Foreign Secretary Lloyd to pursue genuine negotiations 
with the Egyptians. Even if Britain was forced to accept
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American insistence upon diplomatic manoeuvres because of 
a lack of military resources for an immediate assault upon 
Egypt, the 'alliance' continued as a significant influence 
for a peaceful settlement until mid-October. Meanwhile, 
Britain and the U.S. pursued covert plans to remove Nasser 
from power.
The breakdown of the Anglo-American 'alliance' in 
October 1956 was not due to the mistaken perception of 
British policymakers like Eden and Macmillan that the U.S. 
would not oppose the use of force, resulting from 
Eisenhower's reluctance to express his objections. In 
fact, Eden and his supporters proceeded with collusion, 
not only because of their determination to topple Nasser 
and defend the Iraqi-Jordanian axis but because of two 
factors external to the model of 'alliance': the pursuit 
by certain British agencies, notably MI6, of an 
'independent' policy against Egypt and its effect upon 
Ministers, and the use, by France and Israel, of Israeli- 
Jordanian tension to draw Britain into tripartite action 
against Cairo.
Thus, the conditional 'alliance' between Britain and 
the U.S. in the Middle East, founded upon the common 
threat of Nasser rather than formal institutions and 
arrangements, disintegrated. Within months of the Suez 
debacle, however, the Macmillan Government restored co­
operation with the Eisenhower Administration. The U.S. 
finally joined the Baghdad Pact, renamed the Central 
Treaty Organisation, and new plans for a coup in Syria 
were prepared. Yet the 'alliance' still rested upon the 
convergence of the American interest in containing
Communism and the British interest in retaining some 
influence in the Middle East, if only to support its 
position in the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. 
Any reinforcement was provided, not by formal mechanisms, 
but by British subservience to American leadership, 
through the Eisenhower Doctrine, in the Levant.
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